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Steven Lockey 
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN 
THE TRUST REPAIR PROCESS 
 
Abstract 
Organizational trust and trust repair are topics that have primarily been 
considered from a cognitive perspective. Although a number of scholars have called 
for further investigation into the role of emotions and individual differences in these 
processes, little empirical research has been conducted. A reason for this may concern 
how trust is usually measured in the organizational literature, through measures 
relating to the trustworthiness characteristics of others. This thesis argues against such 
a “perceived trustworthiness paradigm” (Möllering, 2013a) and empirically tests the 
approach conceptualised by Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) which asserts that that trust 
is a process consisting of attitudinal and behavioural processes comprising of belief, 
decision, and action. It primarily investigates the influence of emotion and emotion-
related individual differences in repairing trust, and whether they are integral to the 
proposed process model. Three studies are conducted to investigate these questions. 
Studies 1 (N = 82) and 2 (N = 253) are experiments carried out to determine to what 
extent change in affect influenced participants’ change in perceptions of a coach 
company from post-violation (a coach crash) to post-trust repair effort (CEO’s 
response), and their willingness to trust in it. Study 3 (N = 135) is a cross-sectional 
survey of Volkswagen vehicle owners in the aftermath of the 2015 Emissions Scandal 
undertaken to measure the trust process in its entirety with people actively involved in 
a trust violation. Results indicate that negative emotions are influential predictors of 
trust repair effects and relate strongly to distrusting acts. Individual difference effects 
were generally not found, but the proposed process model of trust was supported, with 
willingness to trust mediating the relationship between perceptions of trustworthiness 
and distrusting acts. Emotions appeared to become more influential as the trust process 
developed, and findings imply that purely cognitive models are not sufficient to fully 
understand the nature of trust and its repair. 
Key words: Trust, Trust Repair, Process, Emotion, Fear, Anger, Contempt 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
A Brief History of Trust Research 
Trust and the question of what its antecedents are have been a subject of 
scholarly debate for centuries, with some of the most renowned philosophers in history 
documenting its importance. For example, as far back as the 4th century B.C., Aristotle 
argued in his classic work Rhetoric that one who displays good sense, good moral 
character and goodwill will inspire trust from his audience. The philosopher Confucius 
asserted that three things are needed for government: weapons, food, and trust. If a 
ruler cannot hold on to all three, he should give up weapons first and food next, for 
“without trust, we cannot stand” (O’Neill, 2002). Interestingly, Machiavelli disagreed, 
believing that a prince should aim to be both loved and feared, but if both are not 
possible, he should choose to be feared rather than loved (O’Neill, 2002).  
The history of the topic of trust in psychology and sociology has a somewhat 
shorter tradition, and in the organizational and management literature, it is shorter still. 
Early work in psychology established the proposal that that trust has a motivational 
element (Deutsch, 1958; 1960). Deutsch was an early proponent of the behavioural 
approach to trust, which focused on measuring trust as an outcome, primarily in 
experimental scenarios (Kramer, 1999; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Half a century prior 
to Deutsch’s work, the German sociologist Georg Simmel proposed that trust has a 
“further element” that transcends inductive reasoning (1990: 179 [1900] in Möllering, 
2001). Lewis and Weigert (1985) recognised Simmel’s contribution in their own work, 
recognising the “further element” to trust, and choosing to consider it as a sociological 
phenomenon rather than a psychological construct (Möllering, 2001). They considered 
trust to have both cognitive and emotional components, suggesting that although there 
must be a cognitive element of “good reasons” based on perceptions of others’ 
trustworthiness present to take the decision to trust, the decision cannot be made based 
on such good reasons alone (Lewis & Weigert, 1985: 970). Lewis and Weigert (1985: 
972) note that “trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational thinking”, and 
other work indicates that emotion may be the “further element” to trust (Möllering, 
2001).   
In the organizational and management literature, the area within which this 
thesis focuses, the 90’s were a particularly important decade.  Many of the seminal 
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works from the 1990’s laid the conceptual foundations of the topic and are still heavily 
cited today (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer, 
Schoorman & Davis, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Robinson, 1996; Rousseau, Sitkin Burt 
& Camerer. 1998). Of these works, Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) seminal “ABI” 
(ability, benevolence, integrity) model of trust has had the most enduring impact on 
the organizational trust literature, and on the manner in which trust is conceptualised 
and measured today.  
Although the ABI model represents an improvement because it takes a 
relational approach, rather than the behaviourist perspective of early work into trust 
(Kramer, 1999), there are still potential problems with it. Primarily, it has led to an 
overly rational perspective of trust, with the implication that people trust largely based 
on perceptions of the trustworthiness of another party. Möllering (2013a: 54) referred 
to this as the “perceived trustworthiness paradigm” and notes that the Mayer et al. 
(1995) model “is not limited to, but mostly referred to in terms of its three dimensions 
of perceived trustworthiness: ability, benevolence and integrity”. The empirical link 
between perceived trustworthiness and trust is robust and well-established (Colquitt, 
Scott & LePine, 2007), however to quote Möllering (2013a: 54), only considering what 
is known about others “reduces trust to its least interesting part – processing of 
available information – whereas the more striking issue is how people deal with 
incomplete or inconclusive information”. In other words, the “further element” to trust 
is missing if we only consider it in terms of prior knowledge about other people. Yet 
it is in this element that the desire for, interest in, and importance of trust lies. As this 
dissertation will show, the further element in question may be emotion. Further 
discussion of this argument and its implications on the conceptualisation and 
measurement of trust continues in Chapter 2.  
Trust Repair in the 21st Century 
The new millennium has seen research interest in trust grow further. The study 
of trust repair, which is central to this thesis, has seen exponential growth since 2000. 
Indeed, the review of the trust repair literature in Chapter 3 shows that the majority of 
work into the subject has taken place in the new millennium. Special issues of 
prominent journals have focused on trust repair (Academy of Management Review, 
2009, Vol. 34, Issue. 1; Organization Studies, 2015, Vol. 36, Issue 9) and individual 
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or organizational reintegration after ethical or legal transgressions (Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 2014, Vol. 24, Issue 3).  
The increased focus on trust repair over the last twenty years should not be 
surprising. In recent years, corporations and public bodies have been engulfed by a 
myriad of scandals, and organizational legitimacy and stakeholders’ trust are at a 
premium (Moran, 2013). When organizations engage in wrongdoing, stakeholders 
typically withdraw support and resources, damaging the ability of the organization to 
survive and thrive (Elsbach, 2003). For this reason, understanding how organizations 
can repair broken trust and relationships with stakeholders is an especially important 
and salient issue. If trust is violated, trust-informed behaviour is less likely to be 
demonstrated (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). The violated party is likely to re-evaluate their 
relationship with the violator (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), may retaliate (Bies & Tripp, 
1996), and may even withdraw from the relationship (Robinson, 1996). 
Surprisingly, and perhaps due to the dominance of the perceived 
trustworthiness paradigm, trust repair has largely been considered from a cognitive, 
rational perspective, mostly ignoring the intrinsically affective nature of trust violation 
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis 2007). While research on close, interpersonal 
relationships has focused on emotional responses to trust violations and their 
consequences (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Haden & Hojjat, 2006), such a focus in 
organizational research has been lacking. However, as this dissertation will 
demonstrate, reactions to organizational transgressions are not purely rational. Rather, 
they have a strong emotional component which is particularly important in trust repair 
and influences stakeholder attitudes and behaviours towards the offenders. 
Chapter Overview 
This introductory chapter outlined a brief history of trust research. It 
demonstrated that, largely due to the prominence of Mayer et al’s. (1995) seminal 
model, organizational trust scholars have converged on a “trustworthiness paradigm” 
(Möllering, 2013a) which implies that the decision to trust is taken based on sound 
evidence of the trustee. However, this paradigm reduces trust to its least interesting 
form and has generally led to a very rational understanding of the construct in the 
organizational literature. Moreover, it does not take into account the further element 
to trust proposed by sociologists such as Simmel, Lewis and Weigert, and Möllering. 
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As per Lewis and Weigert (1985), I propose that this “further element” may be 
emotion, and that trust is not entirely rational. 
Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 builds on this foundation by defining and reviewing the trust 
literature. It returns to the topic of conceptualisation and the pervading tendency of 
scholars to consider trust from the perspective of trustworthiness beliefs, outlining the 
problems that such a perspective entails with regards to how trust is measured. I offer 
an alternative perspective, that of trust as a process. Conceptualising trust as a process 
allows scholars to delineate perceptions of trustworthiness beliefs from actual trust and 
to depart from the perceived trustworthiness paradigm. In turn, this enables 
consideration of the further elements of trust that make it desirable and necessary, such 
as emotion. I then review the small body of work that has considered the role of 
emotion in trust development. Findings indicate that the perceived trustworthiness 
paradigm is still pervasive in these articles, which are conceptual. These issues imply 
that adequate empirical investigation of emotion in trust research is still lacking, 
something that this thesis seeks to address. Finally, other trust-related concepts that 
are key to this thesis are reviewed. Namely, distrust and research into the influence of 
various individual differences on trust.   
Trust repair, which is the focus of this dissertation, is addressed in Chapter 3. 
This chapter illustrates the variety of methods that have used to address this topic. A 
critical point illustrating the value of this dissertation, is that there are very few articles 
addressing the emotional aspects of trust repair, despite the fact that breach of trust is 
a betrayal that provokes strong emotional responses.  
As there has been such little research into emotion in both the trust and trust 
repair literatures, is there any reason to consider it? Chapter 4 considers this argument, 
turning to literature that explores the role of affect in information processing. 
Specifically, the theory of feelings-as-information is reviewed. This theory suggests 
that emotions may play an integral role in the processing of information, how it is 
perceived, and how people make decisions. It indicates that emotions are integral to 
complex social processes such as trust. 
Reviews of the relevant trust, trust repair and emotion literatures indicate that 
there are research gaps that are worthy of exploration. First, there is a general lack of 
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consideration of the role of mood and specific emotions in the trust repair literature. 
Second, other than trust propensity, individual differences have been largely neglected 
in the study of trust, and particularly in the trust repair literature. One previous study 
showed that regulatory focus was influential in predicting generalised trust. However, 
to date, there is no research relating to it in studies of trust repair. Furthermore, 
feelings-as-information theory dictates that emotion-related individual differences are 
likely to determine how and when emotions influence information and decision-
making processes. Hence, the research programme described in this dissertation 
includes regulatory focus and emotion-related individual differences to determine their 
relevance in the repair of trust. Finally, few studies of either trust or trust repair 
explicitly consider trust as a process, with some quantitative measures either solely 
considering perceptions of trustworthiness, or conflating trustworthiness and trust into 
a single measure. These issues raise questions about what is being measured. Taking 
a process perspective allows us to develop a more nuanced understanding of how 
emotions may interact with perceptions of trustworthiness, and attitudinal and 
behavioural manifestations of trust itself. Thus, Chapter 5 outlines these issues and 
presents a research programme of three studies that empirically investigate questions 
relating to these three research gaps. A methodological rationale for the approaches 
taken in the three studies concludes the chapter. 
The following section of the dissertation pertains to its primary research 
programme. Chapter 6 presents the results of Study 1, which focused on the role of 
mood states and emotion-related individual difference in an experiment that measures 
the belief and decision components of the trust process after an organizational-level 
ability failure and subsequent trust repair attempt. Foreshadowing results, there was 
enough supporting evidence linking trust and affect to encourage further investigation. 
Hence, Chapter 7, pertaining to Study 2, used the same experimental design in an 
attempt to replicate and extend findings. Additional variables related to specific 
emotions towards the target organization and further emotion-related individual 
differences were included, and a larger sample was solicited. Replicating results of 
Study 1, change in negative affect (Δ NA) was influential in predicting Δ trust, 
controlling for Δ perceptions of trustworthiness. Moreover, the specific emotions of Δ 
fear and Δ joy were predictive of Δ trust, controlling for both Δ trustworthiness and Δ 
negative affect. Finally, the primary focus of Study 3, detailed in Chapter 8, was to 
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replicate the results of Study 2 and measure the trust process in its entirety by utilising 
a cross-sectional design and a scenario of personal relevance to participants. Results 
suggest that mood and specific emotions are influential in not just the decision to trust, 
but in predicting distrusting behaviours as well.  
The final chapter returns to each of the research questions posed in Chapter 5 
and the extent to which they were answered within this research programme. A general 
discussion and implications for theory and practice, follows. In sum affect, particularly 
negative affect, related significantly to attitudinal measures of trust and behavioural 
measures of distrust, indicating that trust may not be so rational after all. Individual 
differences did not prove to be particularly influential in trust repair. Finally, the study 
of trust as a process and the separation of perceptions of trustworthiness beliefs and 
willingness to trust provided some interesting results. Namely, emotions appeared to 
influence perceptions of trustworthiness very differently to willingness to trust and 
distrusting behaviours. As the trust process developed, perceptions of trustworthiness 
became less relevant, and the role of certain affective responses became more 
influential. These results indicate that the “further element” to trust may indeed be 
rooted in emotion, and that we should break free from the perceived trustworthiness 
paradigm. The thesis concludes by acknowledging its limitations and providing some 
directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Trust 
This chapter provides a general review of the trust literature, presenting the two 
most common conceptualizations of trust and critiquing them from a methodological 
standpoint, before describing the “trust as process” conceptualization that I adopt in 
the current study. Following this, some key scholarly debates in the trust literature 
relevant to my study are described, such as whether trust and distrust are opposite poles 
of the same dimension or are separate constructs. Also, because I argue that trust 
inherently has a basis in emotion, I provide an overview of recent research in this area 
and explain how my perspective differs from the affective trust conceptualization 
popularized by McAllister (1995). The chapter concludes by exploring some of the 
dispositional antecedents of trust (i.e., biological, trait, and attitudinal factors) posited 
in previous literature. 
Definitions of Trust 
Scholars have proposed many different conceptualisations of trust in a wide 
range of disciplines (see Table 2.1 for a list of definitions). However, the 
organizational literature is increasingly converging on common definitions (McEvily 
& Tortoriello, 2011). Prior reviews of the trust literature indicate that two key 
dimensions are prevalent in the majority of definitions of the concept: positive 
expectations of the trustworthiness of another party and a willingness to be vulnerable 
(Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Kim et al., 2004; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). ‘Positive 
expectations of trustworthiness’ generally refers to “perceptions, beliefs or 
expectations about the trustee’s intention and being able to rely on the trustee” (Fulmer 
& Gelfand, 2012: 1171). ‘Willingness to be vulnerable’ refers to the inclination of the 
trustor to take a ‘leap of faith’ (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Möllering, 2006) or an 
intention or decision to take a risk and depend on the trustee (Li, 2012). These 
dimensions appear in the two definitions of trust that are most cited by organizational 
scholars. Much of the research, across levels and referents, utilises the definition 
proposed by Mayer et al. (1995). They define trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the positive expectations that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). Other research has drawn upon 
the work of Rousseau and colleagues (1998: 395), who define trust as “a psychological 
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state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations 
of the intentions or behaviour of another”.  
I accept the definition proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995) for my current 
study. Rousseau et al.’s. (1998) definition is also widely cited, yet I do not agree with 
its explicit assertion that trust is merely a psychological state. Indeed, the debate as to 
whether trust should be considered as a psychological state or behaviour is one that 
has long divided scholars. I now review the two conceptualisations, before presenting 
a third perspective that combines the salient elements of both. 
Trust-as-Behaviour 
Research based on early empirical work (i.e. Deutsch, 1958) tended to 
conceptualise trust as an overt behaviour. For example, Currall and Judge (1995: 153) 
defined trust as “manifestations of behavioural reliance on another person under the 
condition of risk”. Kramer’s (1999) review discussed trust as a rational choice 
behaviour and trust as a psychological state (attitude). From the rational choice 
perspective, people are expected to make the decision to trust based on rational, 
efficient judgements that take into account the likelihood of maximising gains or 
minimising losses (Kramer, 1999). Schelling (1960 in Kramer, 1999: 572) noted that 
choice is motivated by “conscious calculation of advantages that is in turn based on an 
explicit and internally consistent value system”. We would expect that if trust is indeed 
a choice, a rational perspective would be an adequate conceptualisation: one simply 
decides either to trust another party or not. However, March (1994: 7) noted that 
rational theories may not be empirically viable, and that “although decision-makers try 
to be rational, they are constrained by limited cognitive capacities and incomplete 
information, and thus their actions may be less than completely rational”. Moreover, 
trust-as-behaviour is very heavily cognitive and affords little to the role of emotions 
and other social intricacies. As Granovetter (1985: 470) notes, such a concept provides 
an under-socialised conceptualisation of trust, stating that “actors do not behave or 
decide as atoms outside a social context”.  
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Table 2.1 - Definitions of Trust 
 
 
 Psychology and Sociology 
Deutsch 
(1958) 
“An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if 
he expects its occurrence and his expectations lead to behaviour which he 
perceives to have greater motivational consequences if the expectation is 
not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed” 
(p.265). 
  
Deutsch 
(1973) 
“The confidence that one will find what is desired from another, rather 
than what is feared” (p.161). 
  
Cook & Wall 
(1980) 
“The extent to which one is willing to ascribe good intentions to and have 
confidence in the words and actions of other people” (p.39). 
  
 Management 
Zand (1972) 
“Actions that (a) increase one’s vulnerability, (b) to another whose 
behaviour is not under one’s control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty 
(disutility) one suffers is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if that 
person does not abuse that vulnerability” (p.230) 
  
Gambetta 
(1988) 
“The probability that a person with whom we are in contact will perform 
an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental is high enough for us 
to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him” (p.217).  
  
Mishra & 
Morrisey 
(1990) 
“One party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the 
belief that the latter party is (a) competent, (b) open, (c) concerned and (d) 
reliable” (p. 265). 
  
Mayer et al. 
(1995) 
“The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the positive expectations that the other party will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party” (p.712) 
  
McAllister 
(1995) 
“The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the 
basis of, the words, actions and decisions of another” (p.25). 
  
Fukuyama 
(1995) 
“The expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behaviour based on commonly shared norms on the part of 
other members of that community” (p.26). 
  
Currall & 
Judge (1995) 
“Behavioural reliance on another person under a condition of risk” 
(p.153). 
  
Rousseau et 
al. (1998) 
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behaviors of another” (p.395). 
  
Lewicki et 
al. (1998) 
“Confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct” (p.439). 
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Table 2.1 continued. 
 
From an empirical perspective, behavioural trust is often operationalized as 
cooperation; as the level of one’s cooperation changes, so, it is argued, does one’s level 
of trust (Axelrod, 1984; Deutsch, 1958; 1973). However, this has been criticized as 
making inferences about trust based on cooperative behaviour may not be accurate; 
increased or decreased cooperation may stem from other factors (Lewicki et al., 2006). 
For example, one may demonstrate trusting behaviours towards a co-worker, such as 
cooperation, risk-taking or divulging sensitive information without trust actually being 
present. Rather, such behaviours may be elicited due to other factors, such as coercion 
or workplace norms. Equally, one may trust another without having the opportunity to 
overtly demonstrate that trust (Romano, 2003). Finally, from a psychological 
perspective, the trust-as-behaviour approach has been deemed to be too cognitive. To 
this end, some scholars have developed what Kramer (1999) calls relational models of 
trust (see Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Tyler & Kramer, 1996). 
Trust-as-Psychological State 
The trust-as-psychological state position conceptualises trust as a complex 
construct with multiple intrapersonal considerations, such as expectations, affect, 
disposition and intentions (Lewicki et al., 2006). As Lewicki and colleagues (2006: 
996) state: “whereas those who espouse the behavioural approach “fast forward” to the 
action, the psychological approach “backs up” to consider the cause of that action”. In 
this respect, psychological approaches allow for the fact that trust may occur for 
reasons other than, or in conjunction with, rational choice. However, there have been 
objections to the trust as psychological state school of thought. Firstly, while trust-as-
choice focuses almost exclusively on behaviour, trust-as-psychological state may or 
may not include a behavioural element at all. Li (2007; 2012) argues that trust only 
Zaheer et al. 
(1999) 
“The expectation (1) can be relied on to fulfil obligations, (2) will behave in a 
predictable manner, and (3) will negotiate fairly when the possibility for 
opportunism is present” (p. 143). 
  
Castaldo et 
al. (2010) 
“(a) An expectation (or a belief, a reliance, a confidence, and synonyms/aliases) that 
a (b) subject distinguished by specific characteristics (honesty, benevolence, 
competencies, and other antecedents), (c) will perform future actions aimed at 
producing (d) positive results for the trustor (e) in situations of consistent perceived 
risk and vulnerability” (pp. 665-666). 
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matters if it involves trusting behaviours that make the trustor vulnerable to the trustee. 
In their paper on the dark side of trust, Skinner, Dietz, and Wiebel (2013) argue that 
“insincere trust”, that which is expressed but not supported by actions, can have 
negative implications for both the trustor and the trustee. The authors state that “trust 
cannot only be viewed as a psychological state […] the act is real trust, not the stated 
willingness to trust.” (p. 218, emphasis present in original text). Li (2012) discussed 
this issue in his editorial essay on when trust really matters. He suggested that trust as 
psychological state concerns expectations of trustworthiness. If this is the case, Li 
(2012; 2016) argues, then trust and trustworthiness become mirror images of each 
other. A related point was made by Möllering (2013a) while discussing the “perceived 
trustworthiness paradigm”. The perceived trustworthiness paradigm assumes a direct 
link between knowledge and trust, indicating that we should only trust when we have 
sufficient knowledge about another’s trustworthiness. However, is trust really 
necessary in situations when such knowledge is high? We may develop positive 
expectations based on such knowledge, but in doing so, we may reduce our willingness 
to be vulnerable. Indeed, only displaying trust when sufficient knowledge of a trustee 
is available suggests that one is not willing to be vulnerable. Hence, if trust is only 
possible when knowledge is high, then the very essence of what makes trust relevant 
and interesting is lost (Li, 2012; 2016; Möllering, 2013a). Li (2012; 2016) also claimed 
that trust-as-psychological state is a static concept, and is not sufficient to take into 
account the dynamic, multifaceted nature of trust and how relationships are formed, 
developed, and can be damaged and repaired.  
My short overview of the two prevalent conceptualisations in trust research 
shows that each has their problems. The behavioural approach is overly cognitive, 
focuses solely on the action, and is empirically troublesome. On the other hand, the 
psychological state approach may not encapsulate trusting behaviours, raises some 
conceptual issues regarding the role of trust and trustworthiness, and is a static concept. 
Below, I discuss another conceptualisation, one that encapsulates the positive aspects 
of both the trust as choice and trust as psychological state. 
Trust-as-Process 
In recent years, some scholars have conceptualised trust as a process comprised 
of belief, behaviour, and action (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; McEvily, Perrone & 
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Zaheer, 2003; Skinner et al., 2013). In presenting trust as a process, it is salient to 
discuss the three stages of said process, which I do in this section. 
Belief. The trust process begins with a set of beliefs about another’s 
trustworthiness. The characteristics that are typically assessed to determine one’s 
trustworthiness are ability, benevolence, and integrity (ABI; Mayer et al., 1995). 
Ability concerns a person’s skills, competence and characteristics that enables him or 
her to carry out their obligations in a specific domain (Mayer et al., 1995). 
Benevolence is the extent to which a person demonstrates care and concern to another; 
that is, the willingness to “do good” to someone when doing so has no egocentric 
economic benefit (Mayer et al., 1995: 1994). Integrity is the extent to which “the 
trustor adheres to a set of principles that the trustee finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 
1995: 719). Other characteristics that have been proposed to influence levels of trust 
include: competence, consistency, discreetness, promise fulfilment, loyalty, 
availability, openness, receptivity, overall trustworthiness (all present in Butler’s trust 
conditions, 1991), altruism (Frost, Stimpson, & Maughan, 1978), caring (Mishra, 
1996) and goodwill (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). However, the above characteristics 
can be subsumed into Mayer et al.’s (1995) three trustworthiness characteristics.  
Although ABI is the most widely cited of the trustworthiness characteristics 
models, some believe that something is missing from the model. In this respect, Dietz 
(2011: 220) describes what he calls the “ABI+” model. Predictability or reliability, 
which relate specifically to the consistency and regularity of one’s behaviour (Dietz & 
Den Hartog, 2006), is sometimes included alongside ability, benevolence and integrity 
as a characteristic of trustworthiness (Cunningham & MacGregor, 2000; Dietz, 2011; 
Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; McKnight & Chervany, 2001; Mishra & Mishra, 1994). I 
believe that the need for this addition of predictability/reliability to the model depends 
upon context. Using a trust repair example, one may not expect a catastrophic 
organization-level ability failure to happen regularly, whereas an integrity failure may 
involve repeated cases of malfeasance.  
This idea brings us to context and domain specificity. Mayer et al. (1995) state 
that trust is domain-specific. I am inclined to agree. Chen, Saparito, and Belkin (2011) 
claim that each trustworthiness characteristic domain spans different boundaries and 
settings. Ability is task-specific. For example, an academic supervisor may trust a 
Ph.D. student to work on a paper with him, but not trust that same student to deliver a 
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lecture to 200 students. Chen and colleagues believe that the domain specificity of 
integrity relates to life domains (private versus public life or business versus personal 
life). The authors give Bill Clinton as an example of someone who was considered to 
act with integrity in his position as president. Indeed, he is regarded as one of the most 
popular post-war US presidents (Langer, 2001). However, numerous accusations of 
affairs, including the infamous Monica Lewinski scandal, have brought into question 
his personal integrity. ABC News captured this duality perfectly at the end of Clinton’s 
tenure: “You can’t trust him, he’s got weak morals and ethics – and he’s done a heck 
of a good job” (Langer, 2001, para.1). I would argue that in this instance, the “trust” 
ABC described is not all-encompassing, but reflects views of Clinton in the personal 
domain. If he was not trusted in his public position, he would not be as popular or 
perceived to be a successful president. The domain of benevolence, according to Chen 
and colleagues (2011), is the stage, type, or nature of personal relationships. Thus, 
perceived benevolence may vary depending on whether the relationship is nascent or 
at a mature stage of development, on whether there is in-group or out-group status, and 
on whether there is shared or non-shared social similarity such as gender and race 
(Williams, 2001). In relation to this point about domain-specificity, Galinsky and 
Schweitzer (2015) posited that “core violations” are far more difficult to overcome 
than “non-core” violations. That is, people and organizations are likely to find it very 
difficult to restore broken trust after they have betrayed the central reason that others 
have for that trust in the first place. In this respect, Clinton’s extramarital 
transgressions may have been considered to be a non-core violation to the American 
people, compared to, for example, the Watergate Scandal that ended Richard Nixon’s 
tenure as president.  
Methodologically, the belief stage is the point of reference for many of the 
most commonly cited measures of trust (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; Dirks & Ferrin, 
2002; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). In their review of 14 different trust measures, 
Dietz and den Hartog (2006) showed that eight are based solely at the belief level (e.g. 
Brockner et al., 1997; Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Huff & Kelley, 2003; McAllister, 
1995; Robinson, 1996; Spreitzer & Mishra, 1999; Tyler, 2003; Tzafrir & Dolan, 2004). 
In other words, these measures relate to perceptions of trustworthiness. Furthermore, 
according to the review, two additional measures were based primarily at the belief 
level with some items implying actions (Mayer et al., 1995; Clark & Payne, 1997). 
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This poses a quandary; if an empirical work uses one of the aforementioned belief 
measures, do they actually measure trust? If, as Dietz and den Hartog (2006) stated, 
trust is not manifested until the second stage of the trust process, then I would suggest 
not. Although one’s belief in another’s trustworthiness is considered to be a strong 
predictor that he will decide to trust (Noteboom et al., 1997 in Dietz & den Hartog, 
2006: 559), it does not necessarily mean that he will demonstrate that trust. More 
complete measures that involve items relating to willingness to be vulnerable and, if 
possible, trust behaviours, should be included in measures of trust. If interest simply 
lies in the perceptions of trustworthiness without wanting to measure actual trust, then 
belief measures would be appropriate. 
Decision. The decision is the first part of the process in which trust is partially 
manifested (Dietz and den Hartog, 2006). At this stage, the trustor believes that the 
trustee is trustworthy enough to be willing to be vulnerable to him. Conversely, one 
may decide not to render oneself vulnerable if there are confident negative 
expectations about the other party (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). This decision 
not to trust may be based on distrust (Skinner et al., 2013), but this is not always the 
case. It may be that one does not actively distrust the other party, but does not trust 
them enough in a particular domain or context (as discussed above), does not need to 
take the risk, or may damage the relationship with another party by taking the decision 
to trust (Dietz, 2011). Thus, perceptions of trustworthiness are not likely to be the only 
determinants of trust (Möllering, 2013a). Equally, the decision not to trust may not be 
based purely on distrust. 
Few measures focus on the decision stage of the trust process. However, 
Gillespie’s (2003) Behavioral Trust Inventory (BTI) was designed specifically for this 
purpose. It consists of items worded as behavioural intentions (i.e., “how willing are 
you to…?”), split evenly between “reliance-based” and “disclosure-based” items. 
Reliance-based behaviours may involve reduced monitoring or control of a 
subordinate’s actions, or the delegation of work that is important to an actor to another 
party. Disclosure-based behaviours may include divulging sensitive or potentially 
damaging information to a colleague. Although worded as behavioural intentions, the 
Gillespie (2003) items denote a willingness to trust; they are not indicators that 
behaviours have taken or will definitely take place (Dietz & den Hartog 2006; McEvily 
& Tortoriello, 2011). In addition, note that Mayer and Davis’ (1999) Organisational 
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Trust Inventory (OTI), as well as containing items pertaining to trustworthiness, also 
included items that indicate a willingness to act, so their measure is another viable 
option for measuring the decision to trust (Dietz & den Hartog 2006; McEvily & 
Tortoriello, 2011). McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) also recommended the measure 
proposed by Currall and Judge (1995), as, like Gillespie’s (2003) measure, it taps into 
the willingness to engage in a trusting behaviour, which Currall and Judge (1995: 152) 
consider to be “the most proximal antecedent of trusting behaviour”. 
Recently, Heyns and Rothmann (2015) studied the relations between trust 
propensity, perceptions of trustworthiness, and the decision to trust. They used the trust 
propensity and trustworthiness items from Mayer and Davis’ (1999) OTI, and 
Gillespie’s (2003) BTI. These authors found that propensity, trustworthiness, and trust 
were distinct constructs in their sample of 539 single-source responses to a survey 
circulated among raw material and petrochemical companies in South Africa. 
Trustworthiness and trust were strongly related, with benevolence and integrity being 
the more influential facets of trustworthiness. Propensity to trust had a moderate 
relationship with trust, but only indirectly through trustworthiness. This study appears 
to be the first to use both the OTI and BTI to measure trust as a multidimensional 
construct, providing evidence of support for such multidimensionality. However, it did 
not explicitly measure behaviour. 
Action. The final stage of the trust process is the action. The decision to trust 
only suggests an intention to trust, it does not necessarily mean that trust will be 
realised by way of a trusting action (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006). According to Skinner 
et al. (2013: 218), the act is “real trust” (emphasis present in original text). The action 
is akin to the behaviour in the behavioural conceptualisation of trust, but the difference 
is that, as part of the three-stage process, the trust action is not only concerned “with 
the action” (Lewicki et al., 2006; 996), but by considering the process as a whole we 
may be able to understand more about how that action occurred.  
Vulnerability is central to the act of trusting. Positive expectations tend to be 
based on the belief that another is trustworthy; in taking the decision to trust, one 
renders oneself willing to be vulnerable. However, it is in the action that the 
aforementioned willingness to be vulnerable translates to actual vulnerability. It is in 
this vulnerability that trust is manifested (Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Nienaber, Hofeditz 
& Romeike, 2015). Trusting actions include deliberately reduced monitoring, sharing 
Chapter 2: Trust 
16 
 
valuable resources, increased collaboration and reliance (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; 
Gillespie, 2003), and the adoption of a product or service (Kim, Prabhakar, & Park, 
2009; McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar, 2002). Nienaber et al. (2015) contend that 
trusting behaviours demonstrate either active vulnerability or passive vulnerability. 
They deem active vulnerability to include behaviours such as disclosure of sensitive 
information to another party. Conversely, passive vulnerability includes behaviours 
such as reliance.  
Regarding paper-and-pencil measures, there appear to be no explicit measures 
of trust actions or behaviours. McEvily and Tortoriello (2011: 39) suggested that the 
behavioural intention measures proposed by Currall and Judge (1995) and Gillespie 
(2003) could be manipulated to form actual trust behaviour measures by changing the 
item prompts from “would” to “have”, it is possible to shift the focus from “intentional 
and hypothetical to actual and past, behaviours”. Another way to measure behaviour 
is through experimental manipulation. Indeed, behavioural measures are inherently 
part of the trust games and prisoner’s dilemma scenarios often used by proponents of 
the behavioural tradition of trust research (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The 
behavioural manifestations tested by these kinds of scenarios tend to involve either 
cooperation (the trustor either agrees to continue cooperating with the trustee or does 
not and ends the game) or monetary stakes (whereby the “trust” the trustor has in the 
trustee is manifested by the amount of money he or she is willing to share). To date, 
few studies validate the entire trust process chain by empirically measuring 
trustworthiness characteristics, trust decision and trusting actions (McEvily & 
Tortoriello, 2011). One exception is an empirical study of bank customers conducted 
by Kim, Prabhakar and Park (2009), their behavioural measure was whether or not 
customers adopted internet banking.  
Although Colquitt et al. (2007) conducted a meta-analysis that studied the 
relationship between propensity to trust, trustworthiness, trust, and a number of 
behavioural outcomes (specifically: risk-taking, task performance, citizenship 
behaviour and counterproductive work behaviour), willingness to trust was considered 
as a proximal indicator to these outcomes; they were not considered as part of the trust 
process. Conceptually. this differentiation is important. Some of these behaviours do 
not necessarily relate to “trusting” per se. For example, task performance and 
citizenship behaviour do not necessarily contain the elements of willingness to be 
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vulnerable or positive expectations that are central to trust. In addition, given the nature 
of a meta-analysis, it was not possible to disentangle which behavioural outcomes were 
measured in which context and with which trust conceptualisation. McKnight et al. 
(2002) developed a trust measure for use in e-commerce that included each step of the 
process, including trusting beliefs, trusting intentions, and behavioural measures 
related to providing a vendor with personal information, engaging in a purchase, or 
acting on a vendor’s advice. However, although it was included as part of their model, 
the trusting behaviours were not measured in the McKnight et al. (2002) study due to 
the difficulty of obtaining such information. The authors acknowledged this as a 
limitation of their study and suggested that measurement of trusting behaviours would 
be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Summary. In this section I argued for the conceptualisation of trust as a 
process, after reviewing the two most prominent traditions in the literature which treat 
trust as a behaviour or choice, and trust as a psychological state or attitude. 
Importantly, the conceptualization of trust as a process allows us to integrate 
traditional perspectives to consider both the psychological and behavioural aspects of 
trust, paving a way for us to study both the “action” and the causes of that action 
(Lewicki et al., 2006). Furthermore, as part of my review of trust as a process, I 
addressed the methodological issue of which stage(s) of the process some of the most 
commonly utilised trust measures relate to. The majority of measures take place at the 
belief stage, whilst a few are based at the decision or intention-to-trust level. This may 
be why the perceived trustworthiness paradigm (Möllering, 2013a) is so pervasive in 
the literature. No measures explicitly consider the behavioural level, although it may 
be possible to manipulate some to place them in the realm of concrete behaviours. 
Furthermore, some studies use experimental methods that have behavioural measures 
embedded within them. However, a potential issue with such studies is that while some 
explicitly measure beliefs, the decision to trust is not explicitly measured, rather it 
implicitly implied through the behavioural manifestation of a cooperative or economic 
action. In this respect, it is not possible to measure belief, decision, and action as an 
integrated, multidimensional framework, or to understand how the different stages of 
the process relate to each other.  
Researchers have been advised to take care in choosing which trust measures 
to use depending on what exactly they want to measure (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; 
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Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). For instance, if one wants to 
measure how much trust an employee has in their manager, then using measures that 
only take into account the belief stage of the process by focusing solely on perceptions 
of the manager’s trustworthiness will not be sufficient. I argue that, if possible, 
measures that tap into all three stages of the process should be used in order to measure 
trust fully. In the three studies conducted in this dissertation, I measure perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness (belief) and willingness to trust (decision) in Studies 1 
and 2. As these studies were experimental and not personally relevant to participants, 
the action stage of the process was not measured. However, in Study 3 I measured the 
whole process by undertaking a research design that was personally relevant to 
participants and including a suite of items relating to distrusting behaviours, thus 
measuring the action component of the process. Later in this chapter, I contend that 
trust and distrust are related but separate constructs. In this respect, questions may be 
raised regarding the use of a measure of distrust in a process of trust. However, in the 
context of trust repair, distrust is likely to be particularly salient (Bijilsma-Frankema, 
Sitkin, & Wiebel, 2015) and may tell us more about whether a situation has actually 
changed. Furthermore, judgements of trust and distrust are not likely to occur 
simultaneously; people tend to actively trust, actively distrust, or do neither (Saunders, 
Dietz & Thornhill, 2013). Thus, I believed that measuring instances of distrusting 
rather than trusting behaviours was would be more pertinent in Study 3 and discuss 
the issue and my reasoning further in Chapter 8.  
Figure 1 displays my proposed process model, based on previous research 
(Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015; Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; Nienaber et al., 2015; 
Skinner et al., 2013). This model is primarily based on that of Dietz and den Hartog 
(2006), who adapted elements of Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model. I note that 
Dietz and den Hartog (2006) include inputs, the process, outputs, and a feedback loop 
from outputs back to inputs. Inputs are what I, and Dietz and den Hartog (2006: 564), 
consider antecedents to trust, such as pre-disposition to trust, quality of relationship 
and organisational, structural, or situational constraints. Although I do consider 
antecedents to trust later in this chapter, and include some measures of them in my 
studies, I do not formally include them in the model depicted in Figure 1, as they are 
not part of the process itself. Relatedly, it is confusing that Dietz and den Hartog (2006) 
include the action component as an output in their model, yet they state the following:  
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In much the most commonly cited conceptualisation, Mayer et al. (1995) 
separate trust from its associated behaviours. However, our conceptualisation 
reflects the distinction drawn by McEvily et al. (2003, p. 93) between trust’s 
three necessary constituent parts: as “an expectation, a willingness to be 
vulnerable and a risk-taking act”. (p. 560). 
The previous quote suggests that the authors do include the action as part of the 
process, as opposed to simply being an output. Based on this, and the assertion of 
Skinner and colleagues (2013: 218) that “the act is real trust”, I include the action as 
part of the process. Finally, the Dietz and den Hartog (2006) model includes a feedback 
loop, suggesting that the information will be fed back to inform beliefs based on 
experience. While I expect this to be the case, I do not include a feedback loop in my 
model. My research design does not enable me to empirically test such a loop given 
time constraints and concerns over the viability of collecting repeat survey data on two 
separate events. As such, the model depicted in Figure 1 consists of the three stages 
of the trust process: belief, decision, and action. It does not formally include the inputs, 
nor does it contain a feedback loop, however I acknowledge that the processes I study 
in this thesis form part of a larger model, as per Dietz and den Hartog (2006). 
In the following section, I discuss some of the contentious issues in trust 
research, starting with the distinction between cognitive and affective trust. I then 
review the literature on trust and distrust, before exploring some of the trait-based 
antecedents to trust. The chapter concludes with a return to the issue of measuring trust 
and a summary of the chapter as a whole. 
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Figure 1. A process model of trust 
Cognitive and Affective Trust 
Here, I review cognitive and affective trust. I begin by defining the concepts, 
then review a number of studies, some of which suggest that affective and cognitive 
trust should be delineated, and some that suggest they should not. Table 2.2 
summarizes the papers reviewed in this section, and whether or not they make the case 
for delineating cognitive and affective trust. This may take the form of explicitly 
stating that the two are distinct constructs, or it may simply be inferred through the 
measures used. Indeed, all empirical papers in this review that delineate cognitive and 
affective trust use the McAllister (1995) measure, or an adaptation of it. Equally, the 
papers that do not delineate the two use items adapted from Mayer et al. (1995). This 
poses some methodological questions, which I discuss later in the chapter.  
Defining Cognitive and Affective Trust 
Cognitive and affective trust are two forms of trust associated with competing 
theoretical explanations of how trust is developed. In their meta-analysis of research 
into trust in leadership, Dirks and Ferrin (2002) frame the two as character- and 
relationship-based perspectives. Cognitive trust is associated with the character-based 
perspective; it captures perspectives about the trustee’s character that are likely to 
influence the trustor’s vulnerability to him or her. Relationship-based trust, 
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unsurprisingly, consists of the relational aspects between leader and follower; derived 
from social exchange theory, it focuses on the exchange of socio-emotional benefits 
between parties (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998; McAllister, 1995). 
Cognitive trust refers to trust that is based on an evaluation by the trustor of the 
personal characteristics of the trustee, such as their ability, reliability, and integrity 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). It hinges on a personal appraisal; whether or not the trustor 
believes the trustee has shown ability, reliability and integrity in the past. McAllister 
(1995) hypothesised that reliable role performance; a trustee’s “track record” in his or 
her role, cultural-ethnic similarity; how similar people are in terms of race, age, gender 
and other cultural characteristics. Professional credentials such as education, 
professional accreditation, and membership of professional associations, should prove 
to be antecedents of cognitive trust. However, these hypotheses were not supported. 
Failure of the trustee to meet expectations regarding the aforementioned characteristics 
may provide a basis for the trustor to withhold trust (McAllister, 1995). Conversely, 
the most prominent conceptualisation of affective trust in the organizational literature 
refers to trust based on emotional attachment, usually between two parties, that results 
from the mutual exhibition of care and concern (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; McAllister, 
1995). McAllister’s (1995) beliefs that citizenship behaviour -- i.e., choosing to 
demonstrate care and concern for another party that is not linked to one’s role or own 
self-interest -- and frequency of interaction between trustor and trustee are antecedents 
to affective trust were supported.  
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Table 2.2 - To Delineate Cognitive and Affective Trust or Not? 
  
Delineate Cognitive and Affective 
Trust? 
 
Author(s) 
Research 
Field 
Yes (Correlation of 
affective and 
cognitive trust) 
No Measure 
McAllister 
(1995) 
Trust X (.63)  McAllister  
     
Mayer et al. 
(1995) 
Trust  X Mayer et al. 
     
Johnson & 
Grayson 
(2005) 
Trust X (.80)  McAllister 
     
Ng and 
Chua (2006) 
Trust X (.36)  McAllister 
     
Colquitt et 
al. (2007) 
Trust  X Meta-analysis 
     
Schoorman 
et al. (2007) 
Trust  X N/A 
     
Tomlinson 
and Mayer 
(2009) 
Trust  X N/A 
     
Colquitt et 
al. (2011) 
Trust  X Mayer et al. 
     
Schaubroeck 
et al (2011) 
Trust and 
Leadership 
X (.58)  McAllister 
     
Zhu et al. 
(2013) 
Trust and 
Leadership 
X (.57)  McAllister 
     
Schaubroeck 
et al. (2013) 
Trust and 
Leadership 
X (Leader T1 
correlations = .44, T2 
= .26, T3 = .26,  
Peers T1 =.48, T2 = 
.64, T3 = .57 
 McAllister 
     
Newman et 
al. (2014) 
Trust and 
Leadership 
X (.61)  McAllister 
     
Miao et al. 
(2014) 
Trust and 
Leadership 
X (.64)  McAllister 
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What is the Relationship between Cognitive and Affective Trust? 
Some prior research indicates that cognitive trust provides a base for affective 
trust, and that the former is a positive predictor for the latter (McAllister, 1995). 
Further, some level of cognitive trust is required for affective trust to develop (Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Newman, Kiazad, Miao, 
& Cooper, 2013; Schaubroeck, Lam, & Peng, 2011; Schaubroeck, Peng, & Hannah, 
2013). Lewis and Weigert state:  
First, trust is based on a cognitive process which discriminates among persons 
and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted and unknown. In this sense, we 
cognitively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under which 
circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be “good reasons”, 
constituting evidence of trustworthiness. (Lewis & Weigert, 1985: 970). 
However, Ng and Chua (2006) found that there was a spill-over effect from affect-
based trust to cognition-based trust that did not translate the other way; when 
participants were primed with relational-orientated information to induce affect-based 
trust, they were also more likely to perceive higher levels of cognitive trust in their 
team members. These results run counter to the pervading theory that a base of 
cognitive trust must exist before affective trust can form. However, the authors 
recruited participants from the Chinese context, whereas the proponents of affect- 
building on cognition-based trust conducted their research in Western contexts. The 
results of Ng and Chua’s (2006) study may support Chen, Chen, and Meindl’s (1998) 
assertion that cognition-based trust has greater significance in eliciting cooperation in 
individualistic cultures, whilst affect-based trust is more important in collectivist 
cultures. However, it is important to test this assertion by specifically investigating 
affect-based trust in individualistic cultures. 
Are Cognitive and Affective Trust Distinct Constructs? 
Evidence for cognitive and affective trust as distinct constructs. In their 
empirical study of cognitive and affective trust in service relationships, Johnson and 
Grayson (2005: 500) demonstrated that “cognitive and affective dimensions of trust 
can be empirically distinguished and have both common and unique antecedents”. This 
finding is consistent with the assertion of McAllister (1995: 51) that “although 
cognition- and affect-based trust may be causally connected, each form of trust 
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functions in a unique manner and has a distinct pattern of association to antecedent 
and consequent variables”. 
Zhu, Newman, Miao, and Hooke (2013) observed the mediating role of 
affective and cognitive trust on the relationship of followers’ perceptions of 
transformational leadership behaviours with job performance, organizational 
citizenship behaviours (OCBs) and affective organizational commitment. They found 
that transformational leadership led to higher levels of both cognitive and affective 
trust, but only affective trust (positively) mediated the effect of transformational 
leadership on follower job performance, affective organizational commitment and 
OCBs. Cognitive trust negatively mediated the relationship between transformational 
leadership and job performance, and had no mediating effect on either affective 
organizational commitment or OCBs. The authors posit that the negative relationship 
between transformational leadership, cognitive trust, and job performance outcomes 
may be due to a “free-riding” tendency engendered by followers’ overconfidence in or 
over-reliance on the competence of their leader. Their findings suggest that whilst 
affective trust translated transformational leadership behaviours into positive work 
performance outcomes, cognitive trust did not. Miao, Newman, and Huang (2014) also 
found that affective trust related to favourable behaviours and performance, yet 
cognitive trust did not. These finding indicate that cognitive and affective trust should 
be considered as different dimensions, rather than two points on one continuum. 
Indeed, in their social dilemma experiment, Ng and Chua (2006) also found support 
for the proposition that cognitive and affective trust are separate dimensions and that 
higher levels of cognitive trust amongst team members may lead to free-riding 
behaviour.  
For studies that delineate cognitive and affective trust, Table 2.2 displays the 
correlation(s) of the variables. In all but one study, effect sizes are large (>.50). In the 
Ng and Chua (2006) study, the relationship was .36, indicating a moderate relationship. 
In a time-lagged study that measured both trust in leader and trust in peers from 
cognitive and affective bases, leader variable correlations (cognitive Time 1 and 
affective Time 1, cognitive Time 2 and affective Time 2 etc.) were moderate, ranging 
from .44 at Time 1 to .26 and Times 2 and 3. For trust in peers, relations were stronger: 
T1 = .48, T2 =.64, T3 = .57. Such strong correlations indicate that McAllister’s (1996) 
cognitive and affective trust constructs are related but distinct. However, I content that 
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there are problems with this measure, which I critique in further detail later in the 
chapter. 
Evidence for cognitive and affective trust as opposite poles of a continuum. 
On the other hand, Colquitt and colleagues’ (2007) meta-analysis of prior literature 
showed that Mayer et al.’s (1995) dimensions of trustworthiness: ability, benevolence 
and integrity, have positive, unique relationships with trust and are interrelated. The 
authors suggested this may be because the ABI model taps into both affective and 
cognitive trust. The cognitive calculations of a person’s skills and capabilities are 
encapsulated in the ability dimension, whereas mutual concern and social exchange 
form the benevolence facet of the model. This validation of the ABI model components 
may suggest that there is no need to explicitly delineate affective trust from cognitive 
trust, and that the two forms of trust co-exist within the overarching construct of trust 
as proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995). In revisiting the ABI model 11 years 
after its conception, Schoorman et al. (2007) briefly discussed the role of affect and 
emotion on the model. The authors posited that while emotions may cause a temporal 
“irrationality” perceptions of another’s ability, benevolence and integrity, perceptions 
are likely to return to a rational state in time. After a violation of trust, they believe 
that emotions are likely to dissipate over time but question the effect that it will have 
on the trustor’s evaluation of the trustee and whether or not the emotion will ever truly 
return to a non-emotional evaluation. Alternatively, it may be that the trustor re-
evaluates his or her perception of the trustee’s ability, benevolence and integrity when 
intense emotions are experienced, and that even when a neutral or “rational” emotional 
state has been restored, the effect on the decision to trust remains. Schoorman et al. 
(2007) do state that effect of emotion on trust is an interesting topic and may yet add 
a new dimension to it.  
In their conceptual paper, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) discussed the role of 
emotion in situations where trust declines and needs to be repaired. They proposed that 
trust and trustworthiness are more likely to be repaired if emotions such as anger and 
fear are reduced prior to or concurrently with the trust repair interventions. However, 
they did not make a case for affective or cognitive trust to be delineated. This paper is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
Colquitt, LePine, Zapata, and Wild (2011) studied trust amongst firefighters in 
typical and high-reliability contexts. “Typical” contexts were everyday situations that 
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included tasks such as answering the telephone and completing administrative duties, 
and “high-reliability” contexts were dangerous, less common situations such as 
callouts to fires or road accidents. They found that trust in the context of typical tasks 
was related to both cognitive and affective sources, but cognitive sources were far 
more predictive of trust in high-reliability tasks. The authors used the ABI model, with 
the added dimension of identification. Ability and integrity were considered to be 
cognitive bases of trust, whilst benevolence and identification were affective bases. 
Colquitt et al., (2011) observed that identification-based trust has a strong relational 
quality, which suggests an affective base. Identification is described as: “that part of 
an individual’s self-concept that derives from his/ her membership in a social group, 
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” 
(Tajfel, 1978 in Colquitt et al., 2011: 1001). 
Interestingly, the Colquitt et al. (2011) study found that ability did not uniquely 
predict trust formation in either high-reliability or typical contexts. The authors opine 
that this might be because assessments of ability have less relevance in jobs with the 
kind of duality that firefighting has. They also acknowledge the task-specific nature of 
ability, as hypothesized by Mayer et al. (1995), and suggest results may have been 
different if they had made a distinction between high-reliability and typical tasks when 
referencing ability. Integrity had a particularly powerful effect in high-reliability task 
contexts, whereas benevolence and identification were more prevalent in trust 
formation in typical tasks. Integrity was still found to be significant, but to a lesser 
degree. 
In sum, it appears that researchers increasingly acknowledge that trust can be 
considered both as cognitive and affective. However, whether there should be an 
explicit division of the two, as per McAllister’s measure (1995), or whether they 
should be considered as part of overarching construct, as per Mayer et al. (1995) is not 
clear. From a literature review of cognitive and affective trust, it does appear that in 
papers that do delineate the two dimensions of trust tend to use McAllister’s (1995) 
measure. A discussion of some of the methodological implications of this, and other 
matters, is forthcoming. However, firstly, I turn to another perspective of trust that 
considers trust as a central element but is quite different from the affective trust 
definition provided earlier. 
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An Emotional View of Trust 
Recently some scholars have attested that emotions should be considered as a 
central facet of the trust process. In their discussion of public trust in the sciences, 
Engdahl and Lidskog (2014) make a case for moving towards an emotional 
understanding of trust that appears to be quite different from the conceptualisation of 
affective trust offered above. They reject the notion of trust being mutual, suggesting 
instead that “mutual” trust is actually two separate instances of trust, both of which 
consist of separate, asymmetrical relationships. Furthermore, they posit that trust “is 
not the opposite of reflexivity or rationality, but rather an emotionally based strategy 
that bridges the gap between the present and the future by anticipating the result that 
trust, if successful, creates” (Engdahl & Lidskog, 2014: 711). In relation to this point, 
Barbalet (2011: 41) points out that “trust, as a modality of action requiring a 
commitment to act in the absence of evidence concerning its outcomes, involves both 
emotional apprehension and emotional engagement”. He then suggests that this aspect 
of trust can be characterised in James’ (1896/1956) account of “the alpine climber” in 
which a climber stuck on an icy precipice is faced with a “forced option” of either 
jumping or not jumping across a chasm. Feelings of confidence and hope, James states, 
are likely to result in the climber executing the jump, whereas fear and despondency 
are likely to result in a missed jump and almost certain death. Although James’ original 
passage related to faith and God, and the scenario is perhaps simplistic, the climber’s 
emotional commitment to a particular course of action leading to a singular outcome 
is applicable to trust in that it bridges the gap between the present and the future. It is, 
quite literally, a “leap of faith”, something that some trust scholars believe is a 
fundamental aspect of the trust process (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Möllering, 2001; 
2006). 
Regarding trustworthiness, proponents of an emotional understanding of trust 
suggest that perceptions of a trustee’s trustworthiness can never be solely accountable 
for the process of trust-giving. The granting of trust relies not only on perceptions of 
others, but perhaps more importantly the trustor’s confidence in his own capacities to 
form judgements of others (Barbalet, 2011; Engdahl & Lidskog, 2014). These 
judgements are based on positive confident expectations that are likely to be 
background to the object of the trustworthiness they assess, in that they may not be 
particularly strong (or even explicitly recognisable) in the way that emotions are 
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characterised. Relatedly, perceptions of trustworthiness are often thought to be based 
on cognitive, rational decisions, however rationality itself may be considered akin to 
an emotional feeling. William James (1879: 317) discusses this idea in “The Sentiment 
of Rationality”, suggesting that we feel (emphasis added) rationality in a similar way 
to any other emotional state. He describes the recognition of rationality through the 
feeling of subjective “marks”, often characterised by a transition from a state of 
puzzlement to one of ease, peace and even “lively relief and pleasure”. 
The papers cited in the previous paragraph come from the field of sociology. 
The proposition that emotion plays a central role in the trust process is one that has 
received scant attention in the organizational literature, but offers an interesting 
counterbalance to the cognitive underpinnings of the discipline. One author who does 
include emotion as a central facet to her work on organizational trust building is 
Michelle Williams (2001; 2007), whose work is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Works considering affect in trust development. In her article on group 
membership and its affectivity as a context for trust development, Williams (2001) 
suggests that affect is an important factor in both similar and dissimilar group 
membership. She contends that the link between group membership, its affective 
context, and interpersonal trust lies in category-driven processing. Category-driven 
processing involves reliance on previously held beliefs about a particular group, rather 
than incoming information about specific members of the group (Hilton & von Hippel, 
1996 in Williams, 2001: 385). Hence, Williams (2001) posits that perceptions of 
trustworthiness will increase when there is an increase in positive category-based 
affect related to an outgroup category. Conversely, perceptions of trustworthiness will 
decrease when there is an increase in negative category-based affect related to an 
outgroup category. With regards to actual trust, Williams (2001: 387) asserts that this 
is first driven by motivation to trust, or “the desire to view another person as 
trustworthy enough to be relied on”, which can be influenced by emotions due to their 
association with the motivation to approach or avoid others. People desire affective 
attachments in order to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and Williams (2001) 
posits that such attachment is less likely to develop with outgroup members than in-
group members, resulting in a lack of motivation to trust them. Finally, cooperative 
behaviour is likely to be influenced by positive affect.  
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Williams (2001: 387) asserts that motivation to trust is based on the 
consideration that another party is “trustworthy enough” to be relied upon. Here, we 
see evidence of the “trustworthiness paradigm” (Möllering, 2013a). As stated 
previously, I contend that the motivation to trust does not solely arise from perceptions 
of trustworthiness (Dietz, 2011; Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; Möllering, 2013a). 
In the second of her Academy of Management Review publications, Williams 
(2007) develops a threat regulation model of trust and collaboration across boundaries. 
Analysis concerns the actions boundary spanners may take to reduce potential threats 
to their counterparts in order to increase positive emotional responses and demonstrate 
trustworthiness. Lazarus and Folkman (1984, in Williams, 2007: 597) define threats 
as “harms and losses that have not yet taken place but are anticipated”. They are 
associated with negative emotional responses (Lazarus, 1991), and may inhibit trust 
development due to their potential interruption of goal attainment (Williams, 2007). 
Thus, particularly in organizational contexts in which boundary-spanning cooperation 
is required, threat regulation processes may be necessary. Williams (2007: 601) asserts 
that the threat regulation process consists of three stages: perspective taking, threat-
reducing behaviour, and reflection. 
Perspective taking involves imagining another’s thoughts, motives, and 
feelings from that person’s point of view (Davis, 1996 in Williams, 2007: 601), and 
can be undertaken to anticipate how events might impact upon the other’s well-being 
and goals. It is an essential part of the threat regulation process because it equips the 
boundary spanner with the necessary understanding to partake in responsive action. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates trustworthiness to the other party and may provoke more 
cooperative action tendencies in response. 
The next step of the process, threat-reducing behaviours, involves engaging in 
responsive actions, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The primary strategies of 
threat-reducing behaviour take the form of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation 
refers to “the process by which we influence emotions we have, when we have them, 
and how we experience and express them” (Gross, 2002: 282). Williams (2007) 
considers interpersonal emotion management strategies (as opposed to the 
intrapersonal strategies generally considered in previous research, e.g. Gross, 1998).  
Williams (2007) asserts that successful threat regulation will increase affective 
attachment to, perceived trustworthiness of, trust in, and cooperation with the 
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boundary spanner. In particular, engaging in threat regulation successfully through 
threat-reducing behaviour will increase positive emotion, potentially increasing the 
feeling that the other is trustworthy, and in turn increasing trust. 
As with that in her 2001 paper, Williams’ (2007) model relates to trust 
development in a very particular context, specifically, the role of organizational 
boundary spanners. If, and how, this model would work in other contexts, both 
organizationally and in terms of a context that would require trust repair, is not known. 
Indeed, if we consider a scenario that requires trust repair, it is likely that threats are 
either (a) likely to occur as a result of a trust violation and require regulation, or (b) 
have already become actual harms and losses, by which time threat regulation is too 
late. In situation (a), the model may still be applicable, but may take on a different 
function, moving from developing trust to rebuilding it. In situation (b), the model 
would not appear to be applicable. Moreover, both models devised by Williams (2001; 
2007) have, to my knowledge, not been empirically tested. Williams’ (2001; 2007) 
assertions do, however, suggest that emotions may play an important role in trust 
processes.  
In sum, this section has discussed work that considers emotion as central to 
trust development processes. From a sociological perspective, the research of Barbalet 
(2011) and Engdahl and Lidskog (2014) presents a conceptualisation that suggests that 
trust can never solely emanate from perceptions of trustworthiness. From an 
organizational outlook, Williams (2001; 2007) also promotes the idea that emotions 
are important in trust development, however a number of her assertions are based on 
increasing trustworthiness in order to develop trust. While I do not discount the 
importance of trustworthiness in the trust process, I suggest that there are other 
important elements to also consider, and that emotion will influence perceptions of 
trustworthiness and trust in different ways.    
The emotional view of trust brings into question the conceptualisation of 
affective trust presented earlier, which proposes that repeated, mutual displays of care 
and concern over time lead to a type of trust that is affective in nature. This suggests 
that numerous demonstrations of the benevolence facet of trustworthiness are required, 
and there must always be a cognitive foundation on which affective trust can be 
fostered. Proponents of an emotional basis of trust would reject this view as it does not 
consider the emotion a trustor feels when making the decision to trust (even if it seems 
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like a rational decision). Whether this decision is made for the first time or as part of 
an ongoing trust process, there is always going to be some affective component to 
trusting, whereas the conceptualisation of affective trust discussed earlier appears to 
relate heavily to identifying with another or liking. Affective trust, as conceptualised 
in the organizational literature, is almost exclusively other-focused and does not place 
much emphasis on the self and the sense of feeling inherent in the act of trusting. 
Neither does it take into account any embodied aspects of trust (Williams & Bargh, 
2009). This, then, also gives rise to methodological quandaries, of which a discussion 
follows. 
Methodological Issues 
Methodological issues, mainly relating to the measurement of trust, are still 
pervasive in the literature. McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) reviewed 171 empirical 
papers measuring trust in organizational contexts between 1962 and 2010. Several of 
these studies included more than one measure of trust, and the total number of 
measures included in the review was 207. This figure demonstrates the fragmented 
nature of the literature. A total of 129 unique measures were found, and of those, 77 
were newly developed rather than replications of previous measures. Of the 52 
measures that had been replicated, 30 had been replicated just once before (that is, they 
appeared in only one other study). Therefore, 22 measures in the review had been 
replicated more than once, and taken together those 22 measures appeared in 89 of the 
171 papers that were reviewed by McEvily and Tortoriello (2011). The authors 
identified 130 instances where 1 of the 52 existing replicated measures had been used, 
but only 18 cases where measures had been replicated in a verbatim or essentially 
verbatim manner. 
The two most replicated measures in McEvily and Tortoriello’s (2011) review 
were those developed by McAllister (1995) and by Mayer and Davis (1999). 
McAllister’s measure was replicated 12 times, and Mayer and Davis’ measure was 
replicated 11 times. As mentioned previously, McAllister’s measure only relates to 
trustworthiness beliefs, not intention to act nor trusting behaviour. Furthermore, Dietz 
and den Hartog (2006) state that two of the McAllister’s (1995) items do not 
specifically relate to trust, but instead to loss/regret (i.e., “We would both feel a sense 
of loss if one of us was transferred and could no longer work together”) and to 
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emotional sentiment (i.e., “I have to say that we have both made considerable 
emotional investment in our working relationship”).  Finally, the affective items in 
McAllister’s measure tend to relate entirely to benevolence. The fact that “integrity” 
items are included in the cognitive section of the measure has been raised as a point of 
contention, suggesting that one does not assess integrity on any kind of emotional level 
(Dietz & den Hartog, 2006). Becker (1998: 159), taking an objectivist perspective, 
claims: “integrity requires that reason – not emotion – be a person’s primary guide”. 
On the other hand, one Webster’s dictionary definition of integrity is: “firm adherence 
to a code of especially moral or artistic values” (emphasis added). Given the link 
between morality and emotion (Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt, 1999), I contend 
that, from the prospective of a trustor evaluating a trustee, there would be an affective 
element to the judgement of integrity. 
McAllister’s (1995) measure also explicitly contains the words “trust” and 
“trustworthiness”. Direct reference to trust in measurement instruments is not 
recommended because it may distort participants’ responses (Cummings & Bromiley, 
1996; Dietz & den Hartog, 2006) and poses an “emotive challenge” (Blois, 1999: 201). 
The measure has been shown to have acceptable psychometric properties and has also 
had information provided regarding the item generation process and construct validity. 
Few other measures in McEvily and Tortoriello’s (2011) review have such information 
provided by their original authors. However, the affect-based items in McAllister’s 
measure could be argued to be indicative of liking or identification rather than trust, 
an assertion that can also be levelled at the conceptualisation of affective trust itself. 
They are based entirely on positive expectations, forgoing willingness to be vulnerable 
(Dietz & den Hartog, 2006).  
The Mayer and Davis (1999) OBI measure covers the ABI facets of 
trustworthiness, with six items related to benevolence, five to competence, and five to 
integrity. One item relates to predictability, and four signal an intention to act (trust). 
There are also eight items concerning propensity to trust. In this respect, the measure 
covers both the belief and decision stage of the trust process. In Mayer and Davis’s 
(1999) original suite of studies, conducted over two waves, the trustworthiness items 
had good reliabilities, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .82-.89. However, the 
propensity and trust items did not prove to be so reliable. For propensity to trust, the 
wave 1 alpha was .55, and that of wave 2 was .66. Alphas for the trust scale were .59 
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and .60, respectively. Mayer and Gavin (2005) replicated the trustworthiness and trust 
items of the OBI ad verbatim, and report reliabilities of .85 to .92 for trustworthiness 
and .72 to .81 for trust, providing some evidence of acceptable reliability for the trust 
measure. McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) state that, in contrast to the McAllister 
(1995) measure, the trust content of the OBI relates to willingness to be vulnerable 
without considering positive expectations. Positive expectations are covered in the 
trustworthiness items, however. When considering the process view of trust proposed 
by Dietz and den Hartog (2006), this may not be a problem. They state that the belief 
stage of the process concerns positive expectations, and the decision stage involves 
willingness to be vulnerable. Trusting actions or behaviours demonstrate actual 
vulnerability. In this respect, if at least the first two stages of the trust process are 
measured, then both the positive expectation and willingness to be vulnerable 
components of trust are met. 
In sum, it seems that there are some issues relating to the two most commonly 
cited measures in the organizational trust literature. McAllister’s (1995) measure only 
relates to beliefs, it explicitly included the words “trust” and “trustworthiness”, the 
decision of the author to include integrity-related items as part of the cognitive basis 
for trust is somewhat perplexing, and it only measures positive expectations. With 
regards to Mayer and Davis’ (1999) OBI measure, there are questions over the 
reliability of the trust propensity and trust items. Furthermore, as stated previously, 
neither measure the action stage of the trust process. 
Next, a discussion of trust and distrust is presented. Distrust could be a 
particularly important concept given than this thesis is primarily concerned with trust 
violation and repair. 
Trust and Distrust 
In recent years, scholars have started to consider the construct of distrust. Prior 
research into the negative effects of distrust in organizational and interpersonal settings 
is plentiful. Indeed, distrust has been related to a lack of cooperation, lack of 
willingness to disclose information or commit to a relationship (Cho, 2006), avoidance 
of interaction (Bies & Tripp, 1996), stigmatization (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), reduction in 
intention to buy products (Ou & Sia, 2010), and intergroup conflict (Tomlinson & 
Lewicki, 2006).  
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Although the consequences of distrust are well documented, a consensus as to 
what its primary characteristics are and whether it should be considered as a distinct 
construct to trust or at the opposite pole to it on a continuum is lacking. However, 
regarding the first point, two distinct elements of the characterization of distrust have 
generally been accepted in the literature (Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015). First, 
distrust involves pervasive negative perceptions and expectations of the other(s) 
(Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015; Cho, 2006; Dimoka, 2010; Lewicki, McAllister & 
Bies, 1998). Secondly, distrust develops in a self-amplifying cycle, a process in which 
pervasiveness and intensification of negative perceptions and behaviours are central 
elements (Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015). Regarding pervasiveness, distrust appears 
not to be domain specific, unlike trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Rather distrust in one 
domain of a relationship spreads to other domains. Further, the characterization of 
distrust as a self-amplifying cycle indicates that a process-view of distrust must be 
considered. In relation to the centrality of behaviour in the process of distrust, 
Bijilsma-Frankema and colleagues (2015: 2) state that “the role of behavior is 
paramount because distrust is conveyed through behaviors (as distinct from 
perceptions)”. 
There have been two primary schools of thought relating to distrust. The first 
is that distrust lies on the low end of a continuum of trust, and that the concepts should 
not be delineated (Luhmann, 1979; Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al, 2007). 
Conversely, other scholars argue that trust and distrust are separate but linked 
dimensions (Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015; Cho, 2006; Dimoka, 2010; Lewicki et al., 
1998; Ou & Sia, 2010; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). A mounting body of empirical evidence 
supports the idea that distrust and trust should be delineated in the form of early 
measurement work (Clark & Payne, 1997) and more recent concept discrimination 
testing (Cho, 2006; Ou & Sia, 2010). In a neuroimaging study, Dimoka (2010) showed 
that trust and distrust activated different areas of the brain; trust stimulated areas that 
provoked intentional engagement in a relationship, whereas distrust stimulated areas 
that engaged automatic responses that would seek to prevent the occurrence of a 
harmful event. These findings are consistent with prior literature, which states that 
trust develops slowly over time through the cumulative gathering of evidence based 
on careful deliberation, whilst distrust is quick and episodic, based on emotional cues. 
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I believe that trust and distrust are separate constructs, rather than existing on 
opposite ends of the same continuum. Recent empirical investigations support this 
perspective, and Dimoka’s (2010) research provides compelling evidence of the 
automaticity of distrust, indicating the importance of emotions in the construct. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, I consider distrusting behaviours in Study 3 of my 
research programme rather than trusting behaviours. I take this decision for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, distrust is likely to be particularly relevant in instances of trust 
violation. In situations that warrant it, people tend to actively trust or actively distrust, 
rather than do both simultaneously (Saunders et al., 2013), so in the context of 
violation, distrust is likely to be dominant. Moreover, behaviours related to distrust are 
likely to indicate that something about the relationship between a customer and an 
organization has changed for the worse. In the aftermath of a trust violation, if such 
negative behaviours from the violated party are not manifested, I argue that the status 
of the relationship has not changed substantively enough for the transgressor to need 
to repair it. Hence, understanding whether such distrusting behaviours have occurred 
may be more interesting and salient in understanding the nature and status of a 
relationship after a violation than the consideration of trusting behaviours. 
The following section considers the antecedents of trust, focusing particularly 
on individual differences.  
Antecedents of Trust: Individual Differences 
Research into the antecedents of trust has tended to focus on situational, 
institutional or organizational constraints (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006), a number of 
factors relating primarily to the trustee, such as their motives, traits, and previous 
behaviours, and characteristics of the relationship that the trustor has with the trustee. 
Of the influence of the trustor’s personal characteristics, little research has been 
conducted. Indeed, Searle (2013: 15) stated that “individual difference is an under-
researched factor underlying trust perceptions”, and called for further study of 
individual differences and their relationships with trust. Of the individual differences 
that have been studied in this area, propensity to trust appears most frequently in the 
literature. I now present an overview of what propensity to trust entails and its 
relationship with trust, before considering some of the other individual differences that 
have been studied in the trust literature. It is important to the current study to consider 
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these individual differences for three reasons. First, some, such as propensity to trust, 
should be included as control variables to eliminate alternative explanations. Second, 
some emotion-related individual difference variables may influence if and how 
emotion influences social judgements (Schwarz, 2012), so they should be included in 
studies that explore the effects of emotion on phenomena such as trust. Finally, the 
influence of individual differences as antecedents of trust provide further evidence of 
the importance of moving beyond the perceived trustworthiness paradigm (Möllering, 
2013a). 
Propensity to Trust 
There are times when the decision to trust must be made before a sufficient 
amount of information regarding an actor’s trustworthiness is available. Kee and Knox 
(1970) argued that trust is not just based on prior experience, but also on dispositional 
factors. Rotter (1967) was one of the first scholars to view trust as a form of 
personality, defining interpersonal trust as a generalised expectancy regarding the 
conduct of others. Other scholars have referred to this personality-based trust as 
dispositional trust (Kramer, 1999) and trust propensity (Mayer et al., 1995).  
McKnight et al. (1998) argued that propensity to trust has become more 
important as new working relationships are formed more and more frequently through 
globalisation, organizational restructuring and the emergence of cross-functional 
workgroups. Trust requires a leap beyond the expectations that existing objective 
information on characteristics of trustworthiness can provide (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 
Möllering, 2006; 2013a). Colquitt et al. (2007) showed in their meta-analysis of the 
antecedents and consequences of trust that trust propensity may drive that leap. They 
demonstrated that trust propensity was positively related to trust, both using zero-order 
correlations (corrected meta-analytic correlation, rc = .27, r = .20), and when 
trustworthiness facets (ability rc = .15, benevolence rc = .20 and integrity rc = .29) 
were included via meta-analytic structural equation modelling (SEM). In an earlier 
meta-analysis, Dirks and Ferrin (2002) also found that trust propensity had a positive 
relationship with trust (r = .17). Although the effects of trust propensity were relatively 
small in these meta-analyses, length of relationship was not measured in concurrence 
with trust propensity. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) did measure length of relationship as a 
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direct antecedent of trust, and found a nonsignificant relationship, but did not include 
it as part of a path with trust propensity.  
Considering length of relationship, Johnson-George and Swap (1982) found 
that pre-disposition to trust is particularly influential in the early stages of a 
relationship and diminishes in importance as the relationship develops and more direct 
evidence of the other party is gathered. Furthermore, several scholars posited that the 
strength of the situation may be an important boundary condition of the relationship 
between trust propensity and trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002, Mayer et al., 1995, Rotter, 
1971). Mischel (1971) asserted that situations could be characterised as either strong 
or weak. Strong situations have cues that generally lead people to behave in a uniform 
manner. For example, one would expect people to behave in a sombre manner at a 
funeral, or attend a job interview in appropriate attire. Conversely, weak situations lack 
salient cues regarding behavioural expectations. Rotter (1971) argued that disposition 
to trust would predict trust only when the information available was ambiguous, and 
Mayer et al. (1995) suggested that trust propensity would only be significant when 
cues regarding another’s trustworthiness were unavailable. These situations could be 
categorised as weak. Gill, Boies, Finegan and McNally (2005) tested this assertion 
empirically, and reported that the relationship between trust propensity and intention 
to trust was only significant in a weak situation, that is when participants in their study 
were given ambiguous information regarding the trustworthiness of a hypothetical 
colleague in an experimental setting as opposed to high or low trustworthiness 
information. It is evident, then, that trust propensity has a complex relationship with 
trustworthiness and intention to trust, and may be more important in some situations 
than others. Particularly at the start of a relationship, and when situational cues are 
ambiguous. 
It is evident that much research has been conducted into trust propensity. It 
should be included in studies of trust and trust repair even if its influence may wane in 
strong situations, or as the trust process develops. The following sections contain 
overviews of studies that explore other individual characteristics and their influence 
on trust, beginning with regulatory focus.  
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Trust and Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory focus theory posits that people either focus more attention on the 
promotion of positive outcomes, or on the prevention of negative outcomes, in pursuit 
of goal attainment (Higgins, 1997). Crowe and Higgins (1997: 117) stated: “a 
promotion focus is concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment, 
whereas a prevention focus is concerned with security, safety and responsibility”. 
Recently, research has been conducted into the relationships between regulatory focus 
and trust. Wirtz and Lwin (2009) studied the role of regulatory focus theory effects on 
trust and privacy concerns, and Keller, Mayo, Greifeneder and Pffatheicher (2015) 
explored the relations between regulatory focus and generalised trust. Both studies 
found support for their primary hypotheses, with Wirtz and Lwin (2009) showing that 
trust mediated the relationship between fairness perceptions and promotion-oriented 
behaviours, and Keller et al. (2015: 3) finding that prevention-orientation related to 
generalised trust, the trusting of unknown others and people in general. Generalised 
trust was conceptualised as a global belief that people in general are likely to be 
reliable, sincere, truthful and benevolent. In this respect, it is similar to Rotter’s (1967; 
1971) conceptualisation of trust as a generalised expectancy regarding the conduct of 
others and other personality-based conceptualisations that followed (e.g. dispositional 
trust and trust propensity). Keller and colleagues (2015) showed that prevention-
orientation, but not promotion-orientation influenced generalised trust and the 
likelihood to express trust. Their results suggested that people high in prevention-focus 
were less likely to score highly on a generalised trust self-report measure, and were 
less likely to express trust in a trust game. In this respect, regulatory focus appeared to 
be influential in predicting both propensity to trust and trust itself. 
Biological Factors, Personality, and Attitudes 
As stated earlier in this section, individual characteristics of the trustor 
involved in the trust process, have not received a great deal of attention. However, 
there are a few exceptions.  
Personality and attitudes. In the field of economics, Ben-Ner and 
Halldorsson (2010) included a number of individual difference variables in their paper 
on the antecedents and measurement of trustworthiness and trust. These were 
categorised into two factors. The first was those determined at birth and through early 
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childhood experiences, such as gender, age, ethnicity, birth order, personality and 
general mental ability. The second was comprised of views, attitudes, social 
preferences, values and beliefs. These included belief in God, optimism, pessimism, 
and altruism. Trust was measured behaviourally via amount sent to another in a trust 
game, and through self-report survey measures of generalised trust, trusting 
interactions (whether someone tends to be cautious or trusting in their interactions with 
other people) and trusting evidence (how much the trustor needs to know about the 
trustee before being willing to trust them). Trustworthiness was measured 
behaviourally via proportion of money sent back in a trust game and through self-
report survey measures of Machiavellianism. In this study, Machiavellianism was 
viewed as a potential measure of trustworthiness rather than a personality measure.  
Results suggested that the behavioural measure of trust, amount sent in a trust 
game, was strongly related to unconditional kindness, and women tended to send less 
than men. Of the personality measures, extraversion had a significant positive 
relationship with amount sent, and conscientiousness had a significant negative 
relationship with it. The other personality measures did not have any significant 
relations with the behavioural trust measure. Taken as a whole, these relationships may 
suggest that part of the motivation to send money related to investment or gambling 
reasons. 
 Regarding the trust surveys, optimism was the main determinate across the 
different measures, with the view that others are not cheating also proving to be 
important in relation to generalised trust. Personality measures also appeared to have 
more of a bearing on the survey measures of trust than the behavioural measure, with 
agreeableness and extraversion having positive relationships and narcissism and 
conscientiousness having negative relationships with all survey measures. 
 In terms of what the outcome variables measure, Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 
(2010: 77) suggested that the behavioural component, amount of money sent, 
represents “both less and more than trusting” in that it probably relates both to altruism 
and kindness to others, and to trusting in the economic sense of willingness to risk 
investment with the expectation of a return. The survey measures appear to reflect trust 
in more general situations, and the authors note that the measures relate to each other 
and mildly overlap, but that they measure different things. Results relating to 
trustworthiness suggest that the behavioural measure, proportion of money sent back, 
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relates to obligation to reward the trustor. This interpretation was supported by the 
positive relationship between agreeableness and proportion sent back. There was no 
relationship between universal kindness, reciprocation or amount sent in the first place 
to the amount sent back, so altruism or kindness can be eliminated as possible 
explanatory variables in this context. In this respect, it appears that the behavioural 
measure is at least a reasonable indicator of trustworthiness, at least in respect to the 
facet of trustworthiness that reflects one’s willingness not to take advantage of the 
vulnerability of another in the context of financial risk. Of the survey measures, 
although Machiavellianism appeared to relate to some facets of trustworthiness (or 
lack of trustworthiness), when birth and childhood factors were controlled, the 
relationship disappeared. This infers that Machiavellianism does not make for a 
suitable survey measure of trustworthiness.  
One issue with the Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) study, and many others 
that take a purely behavioural approach, is that “trust” is measured financially, based 
on how much money the trustor is willing to send to the trustee in an artificial game. 
The authors did also use survey measures, but these measures concentrated on 
generalised trust, relating more to trust propensity. Moreover, all three of the survey 
measures directly use the word “trust”. As discussed earlier in this chapter in the 
section relating to methodological issues, this is not good practice. In addition, these 
measures seem disparate, as the behavioural measure considers dyadic trust, yet the 
survey measures are concerned with generalised trust in unknown others. Finally, trust 
is multifaceted, and measuring it in purely financial terms is not sufficient to develop 
a well-rounded understanding of the concept. In this respect, the study provides some 
insight into some of the personal characteristics that relate to behavioural and survey 
measures of trust, such as extraversion being positive related to both, and 
conscientiousness having negative relations with both. However, given that the 
measures relate to financial outcomes and generalised trust, we do not know how these 
traits may interact with other facets of trusting behaviour, such as willingness to 
disclose sensitive information, willingness to rely or depend on another, or willingness 
to adopt to a service or product.  
Biological factors. Somewhat more research has been conducted into the 
relationship between biological processes and trust than work relating to personality 
and trust. For instance, several studies have demonstrated that oxytocin (Baumgartner, 
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Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher and Ehers, 2008; Keri & Kiss, 2011; Kosfeld, 
Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher & Fehr, 2005), physical warmth (Williams & Bargh, 
2008) and hereditability (Oskarsson, Dawes, Johannesson & Magnusson, 2012) all 
shape trust in human interactions. These studies indicate that various factors other than 
those traditionally considered by organizational scholars influence the trust process. 
In sum, this section illustrates that a number of personal characteristics may 
influence the trust process, yet they have largely been ignored in the organizational 
trust literature. However, my review indicates that such characteristics may be 
influential in the study of trust. Hence, relevant individual differences measures should 
be considered to constrain the possibility of effects being caused by exogenous 
influences. 
Chapter Summary 
This aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the trust literature, 
particularly from an organizational perspective. Definitions and concepts were 
explored, as well as antecedents to trust. My stance on some of the key issues relating 
to trust are as follows. First, I define trust as a process. The trust-as-process perspective 
allows us to consider both psychological and behavioural conceptualisations of trust 
and explore it as a multidimensional construct. However, the way in which trust tends 
to be measured has meant that the study of such a process perspective is difficult. Most 
measures of trust only consider the belief component of the trust process, relating to 
perceptions of trustworthiness. This is problematic, as trustworthiness does not equate 
to trust, and just because A perceives B to be trustworthy, it does not mean that A will 
actually trust B. In this respect, both the decision, one’s willingness to be vulnerable, 
and the manifestation of trust through action, should be measured. 
Second, the literature appears to be converging on the view that there are both 
cognitive and affective components to trust. However, whether these elements should 
be explicitly separated or considered as part of one overarching construct is still a 
matter of debate. I have concerns around delineation, primarily relating to 
measurement. All of the studies in my review that do delineate affective and cognitive 
trust use McAllister’s (1995) measure. I believe this to be problematic for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, this measure only considers beliefs, or perceptions of trustworthiness. 
As discussed previously, this is not sufficient for a process perspective of trust. 
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Secondly, and because the McAllister (1995) measure only relates to considerations 
of trustworthiness, it is particularly other-focused. The measure does not consider the 
emotionality of the trustor involved in the act of trusting, something that is central to 
the proponents of an emotional view of trust, and one that I support. In this respect, 
although trust involves an emotional hue, I do not think it should be separated into 
cognitive and affective bases. Rather, trust should be considered as a singular construct 
with both cognitive and affective elements, as per Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) ABI 
model. 
Third, trust and distrust are distinct but related constructs. The measurement of 
distrust may be particularly relevant in scenarios where trust has been violated, and 
neurological research indicates that distrust is based on emotional cues (Dimoka, 
2010). 
Finally, research into the role of individual difference characteristics in the trust 
process is sparse, particularly in the organizational context. Research does suggest that 
personality factors may influence how people trust, as may a number of physiological 
processes, yet these avenues remain underexplored. 
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Chapter 3: Trust Repair 
This chapter reviews the extant trust repair literature. It begins by defining and 
discussing the importance of trust repair, then focuses primarily on the extent to which 
affect has been explored as an important explanatory variable in trust repair studies, 
and on which elements of the trust process have been measured. Research gaps appear 
in these areas, and I provide details regarding how my current study contributes to the 
trust repair literature by examining them.  
What is Trust Repair and Why is it Important? 
At the start of a relationship, trust levels are usually high (Robinson, 1996); people 
tend to view others as trustworthy if they do not have evidence to suggest otherwise 
(McKnight et al., 1998). However, when an organization acts in a manner that 
undermines the trust of its employees, customers, or other stakeholders, trust may 
become damaged, and thus may need to be repaired.  
There are various formal definitions of trust repair. Kim et al. (2004: 105) 
define trust repair efforts as “activities directed at making a trustor’s trusting beliefs 
[i.e., beliefs about another’s integrity or competence] and trusting intentions more 
positive after a transgression is perceived to have occurred”. Tomlinson and Mayer 
(2009: 87) define trust repair as “a partial or complete restoration of the willingness to 
be vulnerable to the other party following a decline in that willingness”. Trust repair 
may be considered a specific form of relationship repair. In their review of relationship 
repair both within and between organizations, Dirks et al. (2009: 69) propose that 
relationship repair happens: “when a transgression causes the positive state(s) that 
constitute(s) the relationship to disappear and/or negative states to arise, as perceived 
by one or both parties, and activities by one or both parties substantively return the 
relationship to a positive state”. I contend that “relationship” can be replaced with 
“trust” in this instance, as did Kramer and Lewicki (2010) in their review of 
organizational trust and its repair. Specific trust repair tactics may be either non-
substantive (i.e., apologies, denials, explanations and promises) or substantive (i.e., 
offering penance and self-regulation), as will be expanded on later in this chapter. 
 Trust repair is important because a loss of trust can lead to unfavourable 
outcomes for organizations. Employees may be less inclined to demonstrate trusting 
behaviour or to perform the trust-informed actions that are required for efficient 
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organizational operation (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Indeed, they may engage in 
obstructive or rebellious behaviour (Bies & Tripp, 1996) or may withdraw from the 
organization entirely (Robinson, 1996). Wider stakeholder groups also can react 
negatively when they perceive organizations to have failed. Transaction problems and 
negative publicity caused by product malfunctions can cause consumers to lose trust 
in organizations and withdraw support in terms of intention to purchase in the future 
(Lin, Chen, Chiu & Lee, 2011; Xie & Peng, 2009). Regulators take punitive action 
against malfeasant companies (Gillespie, Dietz & Lockey, 2014), and the societal 
impact of systemic organizational failure can be grave. Such was the case with the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. In their compelling analysis of the GFC, 
Gillespie and Hurley (2013) demonstrate systemic failure at multiple levels, from 
financial institutions to governmental and regulatory bodies, all of which played a role 
in a crisis that affected millions of people worldwide. 
In sum, organizational trust violations and failures can have profound negative 
outcomes at both micro and macro levels. However, evidence suggests that broken 
trust sometimes can be repaired, and a review of the trust repair literature follows. 
Review of Trust Repair Literature 
My review of the trust repair literature begins with an overview of the 
important theoretical bases underlying theories of trust repair, then follows with a 
conceptual analysis of the body of literature on trust repair. In particular, several 
themes that also imply research opportunities emerge, including an overwhelming 
tendency of scholars to concentrate solely on the cognitive bases of the trust repair 
process, a prevalence of experiments over fieldwork, and a lack of empirical research 
at either the group or organization levels.  
Another theme in this literature is the need for increased empirical 
investigation into the role of affect in the trust repair process (Chen, et al., 2011; 
Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Gillespie et al., 2014; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Tomlinson 
& Mayer, 2009). A review of articles that do consider affect to be central to trust repair 
follows, but my review begins with a discussion of the three main theoretical bases for 
understanding trust repair, and a general overview of the literature. 
Theoretical bases. Three theoretical bases frequently underpin trust repair 
theory: the attributional process, the social equilibrium process, and the structural 
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process (c.f. Dirks et al., 2009). These three bases form an integral part of my review 
of the literature and are areas in which potential gaps in extant literature exist, thus are 
described in more detail in the following sections.  
Attribution Theory. Derived from Heider’s (1958) work, attribution theory 
focuses on how people make sense of the world around them via a cognitive process, 
and then use the resulting information to arrive at causal explanations of events. Trust 
repair researchers (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; 2006; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009) typically 
build on Weiner’s (1985) theory of attribution. Weiner (1985) suggests that an 
individual will experience a general emotion of pleasure or displeasure following the 
completion of a task, depending upon whether it was successful or a failure. If the 
outcome is unexpected, he or she would seek out the cause of it. The perceived cause 
is known as a causal ascription. Once a causal ascription has been identified, the 
individual evaluates the cause along three primary, continuous attribution dimensions 
consisting of: (a) locus of causality, whether a cause was generated internally or 
externally, and hence where blame for the outcome lies; (b) controllability, the degree 
of volitional control an individual has over an outcome; and (c) stability, the extent to 
which the cause of an outcome is deemed to fluctuate or remain the same, indicating 
what one can expect in the future under similar circumstances. 
Although attribution theory may be useful for understanding the cognitive 
intra-person components of trust repair, it is not well-suited to explain the interpersonal 
aspects of a relationship that is damaged following a transgression (Dirks et al., 2009). 
Equally, at the organization-level, the attributions as to who or what is responsible for 
trust violations may vary, be contested, and be shaped by external influences. Thus, 
not all stakeholders are likely to make sense of a trust violation in the same way 
(Bachmann, Gillespie & Priem, 2015). 
Social Equilibrium. Based on the work of Goffman (1967), Ren and Gray 
(2009) suggest that trust transgressions call into question the relative standings of the 
parties involved and cause disequilibrium in the relationship and social context, with 
the assumption that parties desire to have equilibrium in norms and social 
relationships. Re-establishing equilibrium can be achieved by restoring the relative 
standings of the parties and reaffirming the norms that govern them through various 
social rituals. Examples include apologies, penance and punishment. Ren and Gray 
(2009) indicate that the social equilibrium approach is particularly useful for 
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decreasing negative affect and restoring positive exchange. However, an issue with 
this approach is that it is bound by context and thus it may be difficult for 
heterogeneous multinational organizations to repair trust through this mechanism 
(Bachmann et al., 2015). A related point is that this underpinning cannot, by its 
relational, contextually bound nature, consider the environmental mechanisms, 
structures and controls in which relationships occur (Dirks et al., 2009). This brings us 
to the structural approach to trust repair.  
Structural. Whereas the attributional process perspective focuses on trust 
repair via the cognitions of the violated party and the social equilibrium process 
focuses on the social, interpersonal facets of a relationship, the structural process 
dictates that the contextual factors involved in a transgression must be changed to 
discourage future transgressions and encourage positive exchange. Several of the 
concepts of this approach, from a trust repair standpoint, were developed by Sitkin and 
Roth (1993). These authors termed such structural approaches as “legalistic remedies”, 
which include monitoring, regulation and imposing controls and sanctions to increase 
the reliability of future behaviour. Gillespie and Dietz (2009) refer to such practices as 
distrust regulation mechanisms. The structural approach constrains the possibility of a 
party to commit a trust violation, hence, the focus lies more in restoring a positive 
exchange rather than repairing trust or reducing negative affect. And, as with the 
attribution and social equilibrium approaches, solely considering structural 
mechanisms as a means to repair trust has its limitations. Firstly, this approach creates 
a paradox. Although for some employees, structural controls may promote trust 
(Weibel, den Hartog, Gillespie, Searle & Skinner, 2016), overly rigid structural 
mechanisms might also constrain desirable organizational practices such as innovation 
and creativity. Moreover, while a restructuring of organizational processes may 
increase external stakeholder trust, it may negatively affect internal stakeholders by 
making it more difficult for them to do their jobs efficiently (Eberl, Geiger & Aßländer, 
2015). 
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General Overview and Discussion of the Trust Repair Literature 
To conduct this review, I gathered articles through a Web of Science search 
containing the term “trust repair”, then discarded articles that were obviously unrelated 
(such as those related to trust(s) in the legal sense). Summary tables of the trust repair 
conceptual, experimental, and field studies are displayed in Appendices A, B, and C, 
respectively. The salient aspects of these tables are summarised in the following 
paragraphs, proceeding with a brief discussion of some of the pertinent issues relating 
to extant conceptual and empirical articles. 
Conceptual papers. It is evident that conceptual trust repair papers at the 
organizational level, and with organizational referents, are heavily cognitive. For 
example, Gillespie and Dietz (2009) and Pfarrer et al. (2008) both propose four-stage 
systemic models that, although conceptually sound, are very rational and do not appear 
to take exogenous factors such as emotional reactions into account. The idea that the 
aftermath of tempestuous organizational crises can be remedied by neatly and 
rationally passing through four stages seems overly simplistic. In a case study analysis 
which uses the Gillespie and Dietz (2009) and Pfarrer et al. (2008) models as 
frameworks, Gillespie et al. (2014) suggest that more research should be conducted in 
how emotion management may influence the trust repair process. 
Empirical papers. Of the empirical papers reviewed, 18 (58%) were 
experiments and 13 (42%) were field studies. Experimental studies have the benefit of 
allowing researchers to control extraneous conditions or variables, examine one or 
more independent variables in a controlled fashion, and thus explore causal relations 
between predictors and outcomes (Griffin & Kacmar, 1991). However, experiments 
typically lack the realism and depth of fieldwork, qualities which also may be 
important to developing a more complete picture of the trust repair process. But a 
major challenge of fieldwork in comparison to experiments is the difficulty of gaining 
access to organizations that are either in the midst of a crisis or have recently 
experienced one (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Most organizations are poor at responding 
to trust failures (Schwartz & Gibb, 1999), so it is unlikely that top management would 
allow outsiders to investigate what had gone wrong internally and how to fix it. For 
this reason, many field studies use a retrospective case study methodology (Gillespie 
& Dietz, 2009). Unfortunately, both questionnaire-based self-report measures and 
qualitative interviews are retrospective cognitive appraisals and may be subject to self-
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report bias (see Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). The following paragraphs discuss 
some of the potential problems with the extant empirical trust repair research in further 
detail 
Table 3.1 contains a summary of the level of analysis and trust referent of each 
empirical paper reviewed in this chapter. The level of analysis refers to the level at 
which the study takes place. It refers to the party whose trust has been violated. The 
referent refers to the party being trusted, typically the transgressor. 
 
Table 3.1 - Level of Analysis and Referent in Empirical Trust Repair 
Studies 
Note. 31 empirical papers were reviewed in this chapter. The total implied in this table 
does not match that number because some papers contained multiple studies at 
different levels and with different referents.  
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the majority of empirical studies on trust repair have 
been conducted at the individual level, and there has been very little empirical work 
done at the group level. Indeed, only a single experimental study by Kim et al. (2013) 
has investigated a group-level response to an individual’s transgression. More research 
has been conducted at the organizational level, and/or with the organization as a 
referent. Of the organization-level studies, most have individuals as a referent (that is, 
individual trust in an organization).  
However, the existing empirical work at the organizational level still may have 
some gaps. Of the extant experimental studies at this level, few use stimuli from real 
organizational trust failures, and none consider affect. Thus, as will be seen when they 
are described in more detail later in this document, the studies that I have conducted 
for my dissertation contribute by exploring the role of affect in real-life organizational 
 REFERENT (i.e., the transgressing party) 
LEVEL 
(i.e., the level(s) of 
analysis of a study – 
usually the violated 
party) 
Individual Group Organization Industry Multiple 
Individual 17 1 -- -- -- 
Group 1 -- -- -- -- 
Organization 10 -- 3 -- 3 
Industry -- -- -- -- 1 
Institution 1 -- -- -- 1 
Total 29 1 3 -- 5 
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failures and repair efforts, using real-life stimulus materials or situations. Further to 
this point, only two of the empirical trust repair papers that I reviewed in this section 
used more than one type of research design (for instance, an experiment and a field 
study). Although many papers conducted multiple studies within an article, they 
tended to be the same, either all experimental, or all interview-based. Replication of 
results over multiple studies, particularly using different methodologies, bolsters 
confidence in findings and provides some evidence of generalization (Rietzchel, Wisse 
& Rupp, 2017). This is another strength of my own research programme: Studies 1 
and 2 are experiments and Study 3 is a cross-sectional survey. This enabled me to first 
ascertain whether there is a causal link between affect and trust, and then to address 
whether such findings replicate and generalise across contexts.  
Process measurement. In Chapter 2, I argued that trust should be measured as 
a process, while noting that the three stages of my proposed model form part of a larger 
process that includes a feedback loop (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006; Mayer et al., 1995). 
Given this perspective, I reviewed the components of the process (belief, decision, and 
action) measured in each of the trust repair studies included in my summary of the 
literature (note that the field studies using case study methodologies were coded as 
being not applicable to this summary of process measurement).  
On the surface, it appears that the majority of the studies in this review measure 
the trust process in its entirety (N = 9). However, there are some methodological issues 
which indicate that this may not necessarily be the case. Firstly, in all instances in 
which action is measured in an experiment, it is done so based on an economic game 
such as the prisoner’s dilemma. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is problematic because 
while “money sent” could be considered as a trusting action, it does not reflect other 
aspects on which trust may be based. It is just one form of trusting behaviour. 
Furthermore, such actions occur in contexts where relationships begin and end over 
the course of an experiment. Behaviour in experiments does not have future 
consequences for participants. Obviously, in organizational contexts this is not the 
case; actions have consequences and relationships last for prolonged periods of time. 
Another issue is that while some researchers measure all components of the trust 
process in a single study, often the process components are measured separately across 
the different studies included in a single article. For instance, Haesevoets et al. (2015) 
conducted two studies to test whether money would prove to be an effective means to 
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repair trust after an integrity violation versus an ability violation, and if 
overcompensation would help in this regard. In Study 1, the authors measured belief 
(i.e., “I think person A means well for others”) and decision (i.e., “I trust person A”). 
In Study 2, they measured action by asking participants whether they would rather 
complete a task with Player A or Player B after witnessing A appearing to commit 
either an ability- or integrity-related transgression towards B in an unrelated 
experimental task. The manipulation consisted of Player A offering Player B no 
compensation, equal compensation, or overcompensation. Hence, the trust process was 
never measured in its entirety in this article. 
 In a repeated trust game, Schweitzer et al. (2006) measured trust as a decision 
(i.e., “How much do you trust your partner?”) and as an action. The action involved 
the player either taking an offer and ending the round or passing it and tripling the 
amount available, but giving the other player (in this case, a computer simulation) the 
decision as to how much money to return. Beliefs relating to the participant’s partners’ 
ability, benevolence and integrity were also measured, yet were done so at the end of 
the experiment. Ex-post beliefs were measured using one item each pertaining to 
benevolence, integrity, and reliability. One item relating to decision (“how much do 
you trust your partner?”) was also included, and the items were summed. The average 
of the sum total represented post-experiment trust. Relating back to my discussion of 
the measurement of trust in Chapter 2, there are some problems here. Firstly, beliefs 
and decision are amalgamated into a single measure of trust, yet three of the items 
(those relating to beliefs) are perceptions of trustworthiness. In this respect, it appears 
that Schweitzer and colleagues (2006) fall foul of the perceived trustworthiness 
paradigm. Secondly, decisions, both ex-post and during the experiment, consist of 
single-item measures that explicitly use the word “trust”. Explicit use of the word 
“trust”, as explained in Chapter 2, is not good practice (Blois, 1999; Cummings & 
Bromiley, 1996; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). Further, if one is to consider trust as a 
multifaceted construct, as I do, single-item measures are not sufficient as they imply 
trust is unidimensional (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). 
One article that does measure the complete trust process in a single study is 
that of Spicer and Okhmatovskiy (2015). Here, the authors measure trust in 
government, top politicians, state ownership, and state regulation as determinants of 
where participants keep their savings in the wake of the financial crisis (in a state-
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owned bank, in a private bank, or in cash). However, affect is not measured in this 
paper.  
Another example is an experimental study by Dirks et al. (2011) in which 
trustworthiness beliefs are measured alongside actual behaviour using a trust game. 
Here is another potential issue relating to the trust process. The majority of studies in 
this review that measure the entire trust process do not explicitly measure the decision 
to trust. Beliefs and actions are measured in the Dirks et al. (2011) study. The decision 
is not explicitly measured, yet implicitly implied through the undertaking of the action. 
Conversely, studies that measure belief and decision, but not action, do so explicitly. 
This review indicates that just one empirical work explicitly measures the entire trust 
process in a single study. In this respect, my study makes a contribution by measuring 
the trust process in its entirety. Moreover, it considers the role of affect in the process. 
Affect in trust repair. Of the 42 papers reviewed, only five considered 
emotion as central to the process of trust repair. Other articles may discuss emotion, 
but do so in passing, considering it something worthy of future research, or without 
explicitly measuring it (e.g., Gillespie et al., 2014; Schweitzer et al., 2006). Of the 
conceptual papers reviewed, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) considered the role of 
specific emotional reactions of the trustor in the trust repair process. Chen et al. (2011) 
used the ABI model developed by Mayer and colleagues (1995) as a framework to 
explore which emotions are likely to relate to breaches the different facets of 
trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity). One experimental paper 
explicitly measured positive and negative affect during a trust game (Bottom et al., 
2002). Two field studies also considered affect in trust repair. Chen et al. (2013) 
investigated the role of positive mood in mediating trust repair in e-commerce. In a 
qualitative study of BP executives’ responses to the organization during and after the 
2010 Gulf of Mexico oilrig explosion and spill, Petriglieri (2015) focused on whether 
relationship repair between the organization and its employees is possible. She 
considered the emotionality of ambivalence, the co-existence of both positive and 
negative feelings towards another, and its resolution as a pathway to relationship 
repair. I analyse these articles in further detail later in this chapter.  
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Experimental Levels of Analysis and Transgression Types 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the nature of experimental research, no studies 
appear to have been conducted at the organization-level. However, organizations have 
been used as referents in two experimental study papers. Both used vignette studies in 
which individuals rated the trustworthiness of organizations depending on their trust 
repair responses (Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005; Van Laer & de Ruyter, 2010). 
Nakayachi and Watabe (2005) used materials that related to existing organizations. It 
is unlikely that the organizations presented in the vignettes had any personal relevance 
to the participants, although this was not explicitly stated. Indeed, the organization in 
the Van Laer and De Ruyter (2010) paper was fictional, potentially decreasing the 
level of psychological realism of their experiments.  
Another interesting point is that many experiments have explicitly examined 
integrity and ability failures (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2004; 2006) Van Laer and 
de Ruyter (2010) or specifically focused on an integrity-based failure. Although 
Nakayachi and Watabe (2006) used trustworthiness measures relating to the ability, 
benevolence and integrity of the organizations in their vignettes, they did not explicitly 
mention the type of transgression that occurred in each study. Their first study, which 
concerned a product recall, was likely an example of an ability failure. The second, 
involving a company using chicken in their products from a country of origin that was 
banned by the government, was probably an integrity failure. The third study was a 
trust game. Trust games are most closely related to integrity transgressions, as when 
transgressions do occur within such games, they tend to involve deception in an 
attempt to achieve the best economic outcome possible. There may be a lack of 
benevolence in such actions, but in all the cases above, participants played with 
strangers behind a computer screen; no prior relationship existed, so it is unlikely that 
players would consider benevolence-related actions related to unseen, unknown 
others. From the review of the experimental studies, there are no explicit examples of 
benevolence-based transgressions.  My research programme considers failures related 
to ability (Studies 1 and 2), and integrity (Study 3). It is important to differentiate 
between failure types, as different emotions are likely to be relevant after an ability 
failure than would be after an integrity failure (Chen et al., 2011; Tomlinson et al., 
2009).  
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Experimental Trust Repair Strategies Tested 
Table 3.2 displays a summary of the types of repair strategies tested in the 
experimental papers, divided into non-substantive and substantive responses.  
Non-substantive responses. Many extant experimental trust repair research 
has focused on non-substantive responses to trust violation. These tend to be verbal in 
nature, although reticence and inaction also have been explored. Findings related to 
such strategies are discussed below. 
Apologies. Of the trust repair strategies tested in the experimental papers, 
apologies were examined more than any other strategy. Eleven of the papers examined 
this variable, usually in combination with other strategies. Bottom et al. (2002) found 
that apologies were effecting in restoring cooperation, indicating that apologies may 
be more than mere “cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002: 500). Similarly, other researchers 
have shown that offering an apology after deceiving another in a trust game could lead 
to the trustee agreeing to trust the deceiver again (De Cremer, 2010; De Cremer & 
Schouten, 2008; Schniter et al., 2013. Research has demonstrated the additive effect 
of explanation and penance coupled with apology as being more effective than apology 
alone (Bottom et al, 2002; Elangovan et al., 2015).  
Denials. Kim et al. (2004; 2013) and Ferrin et al. (2007) found that denials 
were more likely to improve perceptions of trustworthiness after an integrity-based 
violation than an apology. Van Laer and de Ruyter (2010) also found this to be the 
case when denial content was coupled with an analytic format vs. an apology in an 
analytic format after an integrity-based transgression. That is, denials that consisted of 
factual, analytic content were more successful in repairing perceptions of 
trustworthiness than apologies based on factual, analytic content. However, Van Laer 
and de Ruyter (2010) found that an apology with a narrative format was effective in 
repairing perceptions of trustworthiness in the same scenario. Put differently, when an 
apology was given as part of a “story” of what happened, it was more successful in 
repairing perceptions of trustworthiness than an apology that only relayed facts and 
figures. This may be due to apologies being associated with guilt, and guilt being 
regarded as a negative sign after an integrity transgression (Snyder & Stukas, 1999). 
Human failings may be deemed more acceptable after factual denials because facts 
correspond to a lack of guilt in a way that apology does not. Equally, a narrative 
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apology may make a transgressor appear more “human”, thus facilitating the 
restoration of positive beliefs and intentions. 
Explanations. Shapiro (1991) posited that offering explanations alone would 
not be sufficient to negate negative reactions to bad news. However, from an 
organizational perspective, studies by Van Laer and de Ruyter (2010) indicate that 
storytelling to give context and an apology coupled with involving the participant in 
an engrossing narrative explanation was effective in repairing trust after an integrity-
based transgression. Having the wrongdoing party explain him or herself was deemed 
to be more effective at repairing trust than having a PR mouthpiece comment. Bottom 
et al. (2002) showed that explanations coupled with apologies could repair trust, and 
Elangovan et al. (2015) found that apologies and explanations were more effective in 
minimising the erosion of trust than apologies alone. 
Reticence, Inaction and Promises. These variables did not fit into any of the 
other categories. Reticence and inaction are similar, but not the same. Reticence 
involves a party neither confirming nor denying the veracity of an allegation (Ferrin et 
al., 2007), and inaction, in the context of Elangovan and colleagues’ paper (2015), 
consists of not engaging in any trust repair activity. Ferrin and colleague (2007) 
showed that reticence is a suboptimal response after both competency- and integrity-
based violations compared to denials and apologies, respectively. Results obtained by 
Elangovan et al. (2015) indicated that engaging in some form of trust repair behaviour 
(whether it be apology, explanation, or penance) was more effective in minimising the 
erosion of trust than doing nothing at all. 
Schniter et al. (2013) posited that transgressors should apologise, make a 
promise regarding cooperative behaviour in the future, and be willing to make a 
financial sacrifice to the wronged party (i.e. penance). Schweitzer et al. (2006) also 
found that promises can aid trust repair; they can significantly speed up the process. 
However, prior deception negated the effectiveness of a promise. 
Substantive responses. Recently, studies focusing on the results of taking 
action aimed at constraining the possibility of future violations have been undertaken. 
Many demonstrate that offering penance may elicit future cooperation after a trust 
breach more than verbal actions. The two substantive strategies tested in the 
experimental studies are the offering of penance, and the willingness to self-regulate. 
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Table 3.2 - Summary of Trust Repair Strategies Tested in Experimental 
Research 
Note. Pr. = Promise, Re. = Reticence, In. = Inaction, Violation type refers to whether the trust 
violation stimuli in the paper is ability-, benevolence-, or integrity-based. Personally relevant 
= if the scenario faced by participants affected them personally. All cases in which the answer 
was “yes” involved economic participation in a trust game. 
 
Penance. The offer of financial compensation after a trust transgression has 
been shown to be incentive enough for wronged parties to trust deceitful partners in 
further rounds of trust games (Bottom et al., 2002; De Cramer, 2010; Desmet et al., 
 Verbal Substantive Violation / 
Personally 
relevant? 
 Apology Denial Explanation Other Penance Regulation  
Shapiro (1991)   X    Integrity – No 
Botom et al 
(2002) 
X X X  X  Integrity – Yes 
Kim et al. (2004) X X     Ability / 
Integrity - No 
Nakayatchi and 
Watabe (2005) 
     X Ability / 
Integrity - No 
Kim et al. (2006) X      Ability / 
Integrity - No 
Schweitzer et al. 
(2006) 
X   X – Pr.   Integrity - Yes 
Ferrin et al. 
(2007) 
X X  X – Re.   Ability / 
Integrity - No 
De Cremer and 
Schouten (2008) 
X      Integrity - Yes 
Van Laer and de 
Ruyter (2010) 
X X X    Ability / 
Integrity - No 
De Cremer 
(2010) 
X    X  Integrity - Yes 
Desmet et al. 
(2010) 
    X  Integrity - Yes 
Desmet et al. 
(2011) 
    X  Integrity - Yes 
Dirks et al. 
(2011) 
    X X Ability / 
Integrity - No 
Schniter et al. 
(2013 
X   X – Pr. X  Integrity - Yes 
Kim et al. (2013) X X     Ability / 
Integrity - Yes 
Haesevoets et al. 
(2013) 
X    X  Integrity - Yes 
Elangovan et al. 
(2015) 
X  X X – In. X  Not Stated - No 
Haesvoets et al. 
(2015) 
    X  Ability / 
Integrity - Yes 
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2010; 2011).The combination of apology and financial compensation also proved to 
elicit further trusting behaviours when the compensation was below the commensurate 
amount (e.g. undercompensation), whereas undercompensation alone did not 
(Haesevoets et al., 2013). Moreover, Haesevoets and colleagues (2015) found that 
overcompensation was not more effective than compensation that equated to the 
amount lost in repairing trust. Elangovan and colleagues (2015) showed that penance 
in the form of offering a remedy to a problem, coupled with an apology and an 
explanation, was a more effective strategy in minimising the erosion of trust after a 
transgression than offering an apology alone, or an apology with an explanation. 
Regulation. In their study of “hostage posting”, Nakayatchi and Watabe (2006) 
found that by voluntarily introducing monitoring systems and agreeing to punish 
themselves should they make a similar transgression in the future, organizations that 
made trust transgressions could improve their trustworthiness in the eyes of 
consumers. In their experiments into the effects of penance and regulation on trust 
repair, Dirks et al. (2011) found that both substantive efforts were effective in repairing 
trust, but only to the extent that participants perceived the transgressor to have repented 
for their actions. 
In sum, it appears that the more varied efforts that transgressors make to repair 
trust, the more successful such efforts are likely to be. Research suggests that 
substantive strategies are more effective in repairing trust than non-substantive 
strategies alone. Finally, engaging in some form of trust repair activity seems to be 
better than engaging in reticence or doing nothing at all. In my studies, the trust repair 
manipulations involve both verbal non-substantive responses, and substantive 
responses to failures by the organizations’ Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). 
Specifically, the response to an ability failure in Studies 1 and 2 involves an 
explanation and self-regulation. In Study 3, after an integrity-failure, the trust repair 
manipulation involves a response with apology, explanation, and penance content. 
Level of Analysis and Transgression Types in Field Work Studies 
It is evident that there are more studies at the organization-level in field work 
study settings than in experimental settings, and studies at the level of the institution 
have recently been advanced.  
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Levels of analysis. Seven of the eight organization-level studies were 
conducted using a case study methodology. Six and Skinner (2010) also used a case 
study method for their study of trouble between dyadic pairs of employees, as did 
Grover, Hasel, Manville and Serrano-Archimi (2014). Of the two institution-level field 
studies, one used a case study approach (Mueller, Carter & Whittle, 2015). Case study 
methods are particularly useful in tracking complex social phenomena over time, in a 
particular context, to offer holistic analysis of a given situation (Sigglekow, 2007). 
With this is mind, it is clear why this methodology has proven popular in organization-
level trust repair research, given its complex longitudinal nature.  
The remaining organization-level study in this review, that of Webber, Bishop 
and O’Neill. (2012), utilised both quantitative and qualitative approaches. One-time 
in-depth interviews and questionnaires were undertaken. Webber and colleagues’ 
study (2012) involved individual managers measuring the trustworthiness of their 
organization’s top management team (TMT). It has been argued that top management 
symbolizes the organization, and through TMT actions, employees’ impressions of it 
are formed (c.f. Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). In this respect, I believe that TMT can 
represent the organization-level when it comes to level of analysis. Chen, Wu and 
Chang (2013) used questionnaires to measure individuals’ responses to trust repair 
efforts by organizations, and at the institutional level, Spicer and Okhmatovskiy (2015) 
also use a survey to measure trust government and banking. 
Violation types. As with the experimental studies, there are no explicit studies 
of benevolence-based transgressions. Kim et al. (2009: 417) posit that a reason for this 
may be that people neither “weigh negative information about benevolence as heavily 
as negative information about integrity, nor weigh positive information about 
benevolence as heavily as positive information about competence”. Another reason 
offered by Kim and colleagues (2009) is that the majority of trust repair research has 
been conducted in contexts where relationships are either completely new or nascent, 
thus benevolence-based attributions may not be particularly applicable.  
Gillespie et al. (2014) explicitly examine an integrity-based transgression, and 
Webber et al. (2012) explicitly measure both competence-based and integrity-based 
transgressions. Other authors don’t state which type(s) of transgression they are 
studying, but Lamin and Zaheer (2012) focused on firms that were caught using 
sweatshop labour (integrity), whilst Elsbach (1994) evaluated a wide range of 
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transgressions relating to public concerns over the use of hormones in cattle rearing, 
water contamination by manure, treatment of cattle, and grazing on public lands which 
left the California cattle industry facing a great deal of negative press (integrity and 
benevolence). 
Trust repair strategies tested in fieldwork settings. A review of the field 
work in organizational trust repair reveals some interesting differences between some 
of the strategies tested and proposed in comparison to those offered in experimental 
studies. For instance, whilst some experimental research suggests that transgressors 
should offer a denial rather than apology (Kim et al., 2004) or an apology with an 
external attribution (Kim et al., 2006) after an integrity-based transgression at the 
interpersonal level, field work at the organization-level suggests that defensive 
approaches which involve denial and obfuscation may harm trust repair efforts 
between an organization and its stakeholders (Gillespie et al., 2014). Similarly, Chen 
et al. (2013: 367) claimed that e-vendors should “instantly respond to negative events 
by providing apology, adequate information and financial compensation” in order to 
turn affected consumers’ negative feelings into positive moods and rebuild positive 
public perceptions regarding their (the vendor’s) intentions. This may be due to the 
increased complexity of trust at the organization level (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). 
Another possible explanation of these differences concerns the continuity of the 
relationships in each example. In the experimental studies, the relationships exist only 
within the confines of the experiment itself; once the experiment ends, so does the 
relationship. On the other hand, in the field examples relationships continue. In this 
respect, participants in experiments do not have to consider the wider implications of 
a particular trust repair response outside of the experiment. 
Elsbach’s (1994) findings suggested that adequate accounts of organizational 
transgressions can protect legitimacy, yet Lamin and Zaheer (2012) indicated that it 
may not be possible to improve negative perceptions held by the public after a firm’s 
legitimacy is challenged. They believed that investors and the wider public inhabit two 
different “thought worlds”, and that the two stakeholder groups cannot be reconciled 
simultaneously; investors value profit above all else, whilst the general public value 
fairness.  
Some of the field studies either directly or indirectly test or base their theory 
on two of the theoretical bases of trust repair: structural or attributional (c.f. Dirks, 
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Lewicki and Zaheer, 2009). I was unable to find an explicit field study test of social 
equilibrium, or a paper in which it was the primary theoretical underpinning. 
Structural. Both Sitkin and Roth (1993) and Gillespie et al. (2014) found 
evidence to suggest that a structural approach comprised of legalistic remedies was not 
efficient in promoting trust repair. Indeed, although the latter team agreed that 
structural reforms comprised of imposing controls, regulation and sanctions can be 
used to regulate distrust, they are not sufficient as a sole strategy to repair trust as they 
do not restore positive expectations of trustworthiness. 
 In a recent special issue related to trust in crisis in Organization Studies (2015, 
Vol: 36, Issue: 9), a number of articles explored the impact of structural reforms on 
trust repair. Eberl et al. (2015: 1220) indicated that while structural reforms may have 
been necessary to signal to external stakeholders that Siemens were attempting to 
change their ways after committing an integrity violation, they could be a “double-
edged sword” as they may prove to be problematic for the employees directly affected 
by them.  
Mueller et al. (2015) indicated that structural reform of the UK Big Four audit 
companies could only be legitimised and accepted when a sense-making process of 
what went wrong, and who or what was responsible for the companies’ (and the 
sector’s) role in the global financial crisis occurred. Moreover, Mueller and colleagues 
(2015) expressed that this could only take place through the transfer of trust from 
independent enquiry leaders to the damaged audit industry. This suggests that, as noted 
in previous research, structural reforms alone are not sufficient to repair trust (Gillespie 
& Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al., 2014; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
Attributional. Chen et al. (2013) built on conceptual work by Tomlinson and 
Mayer (2009) by empirically investigating the causal impact on positive moods of 
consumers. Their findings indicated that the perceived controllability of an event 
played no role in switching negative feelings to positive moods. This work added to 
extant evidence that Chinese consumers are less likely than Western consumers to 
believe that a negative event is controllable (Poon, Hui & Au, 2004). Six and Skinner 
(2010) took a cognitive, attributional approach to their work on trust.  
In the following section, I analyse the articles in this review that consider the 
role of affect, including Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) paper that uses an attributional 
approach explore the role of affect in trust violation in repair. 
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Emotion and Trust Repair 
There have been several calls for the further investigation of the role of affect 
in the trust repair process (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; 
Gillespie et al., 2014; Kim, et al., 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Schweitzer et al., 
2006; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), yet I was only able to find five papers that 
meaningfully consider it. This section analyses the reviewed articles that either 
conceptually argue for or empirically test the role of affect in trust repair. 
Concerning conceptual contributions, two papers in my review consider the 
centrality of emotion to trust breach and repair (Chen et al., 2011; Tomlinson & Mayer, 
2009).  
A conceptual model of attribution, emotion, and trust repair. Using 
Weiner’s (1985) causal attribution theory, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) developed a 
model of trust repair. Per their model, a general negative emotional response is felt 
after a negative outcome, which then leads to cognitive sensemaking in the form of 
causal ascription and causal attribution. Specific emotional reactions are likely to arise, 
depending on the causal attribution made. The causal attribution and the specific 
emotional reactions affect subsequent trustworthiness and trust perceptions. Specific 
attributions may be modified or invalidated if more information is received. This 
depends on the response of the violator, and the authors describe four social accounts 
that violators may use in different scenarios: (a) apologies, which are attempts to assert 
that the cause of the negative outcome is unstable and is not likely to happen again; 
(b) justifications, which are attempts to reduce the perceived negativity of the outcome; 
(c) denials, consisting of attempts to shift attribution from internal to external (in 
relation to the trustee); and (d) excuses, which attempt to establish external, 
uncontrollable and / or unsustainable attributions as cause(s) of the negative outcome. 
A voluntary action is more likely to signal true remorse, repentance and desire 
to reform than a “forced” action (e.g. in response to media pressure). However, should 
the transgression be attributed to something external, outside of the trustee’s control, 
or something unstable and not likely to happen again, trustworthiness is not likely to 
be damaged as heavily as it otherwise might be if the attributions are internal, 
controllable and/or stable. 
Attribution theory is a prevalent theoretical underpinning in trust repair 
research. Yet, Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) article is the only one to date to devote 
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an entire paper to the relationship between the two phenomena, and to derive a model 
of trust repair from it. Their approach has undoubtedly helped advance theory 
development; it has taken the most prominent theoretical base used in the literature 
and devised a model that has formed the basis of recent research (Chen et al., 2013). 
However, Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) focused on the principles that characterize the 
attribution process (such as locus of causality, controllability and stability), rather than 
on the mental operations by which processes are made before, during and after a person 
makes an attribution.  
In relation to this point, Smith and Miller (1983) demonstrated that personality 
attributions occurred more rapidly than attributional judgments. A mounting body of 
evidence suggests that we make judgements about others’ trustworthiness through 
facial cues in milliseconds (Bar, Neta & Linz, 2006; Willis & Todorov, 2006), even 
outside of conscious awareness (Freeman, Stolier, Ingbretsen & Hehman, 2014). If 
trustworthiness (and trust?) judgements are made more rapidly than attribution 
judgements, then it may not be possible for attributions to be mediators. To this end, 
Gilbert, Pelham & Krull (1988) integrated the process of dispositional attribution into 
a three-stage model which consists of: a categorization stage, in which the individual 
asks “what happened?”; a characterization stage, in which dispositional attributions 
are inferred; and a correction phase, in which situational information and other sources 
may be used to either discount or back up the dispositional attribution. The first two 
stages are automatic, but the correction stage is a controlled process that requires some 
attention in order to be undertaken. 
 Gilbert and colleagues assumed that such attentional capacities are limited, 
and that cognitive load or “busyness” will impair one’s ability to correct their 
automatic dispositional attributions using situational information. This hypothesis has 
been supported empirically (Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988). In a replication of that 
study, Gilbert, Krull and Pelham (1988) showed that when people self-regulate they 
act as cognitively busy people do and thus are less able to make use of situational 
information than those that do not self-regulate. This suggests that cognitive busyness 
and self-regulation will cause attributions to be inaccurate. Relating this to Tomlinson 
and Mayer (2009), excessive cognitive loading and/or self-regulation may lead to the 
inability of violated parties to actually complete the “cognitive sensemaking” stages 
of their model, or give credence to the trust repair efforts of the violator. The authors 
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do mention Gilbert’s process model, and suggest that “the latter [correction process] 
involves more mental effort and is engaged in when the observer has the motivation 
and cognitive resources to do so” (p. 92). Whilst motivation to disambiguate the 
meaning of trust-breaching action or behaviour may be present, in the context of an 
organizational trust violation, the cognitive resources to do so may not be available. 
The affective properties of trustworthiness components and the salience of 
different emotions after their violation. Using Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) ABI 
model, Chen et al. (2011) focused on the affective elements of the ABI components 
and the emotions that trustors are likely to feel depending on which element is most 
prominent in breaches of trust. They assumed that ability is the least affective, as 
discerning someone’s competence and skill can be achieved by assessing their track 
record in a particular domain; a cognitive undertaking. However, a successful 
collaboration completed competently may foster positive affective feelings (Williams, 
2001). Integrity is less tangible than ability or benevolence, so it most likely exists as 
reputation within a community. In discerning it, the trustor is likely to have to recall 
his or her own personal experience, as well as seek others’ testimony on the trustee’s 
adherence to shared principles. The trustor’s assessment of value congruence and 
perception of shared social identity is also likely to be considered when evaluating 
another’s integrity. Although there has been debate about whether integrity should be 
considered as affective or cognitive (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; McAllister, 1995), as 
per Chen et al. (2011), I argue that it has an affective base, being more affective than 
ability but less so than benevolence. With regards to benevolence, recollection of 
encounters that bring about pleasant or unpleasant encounters, compromise, conflicts 
of interest and sacrifice is primarily affective. Such instances are examples of direct 
cues that signal the direct intentions of the trustee towards the trustor in a way that 
ability and integrity do not. The authors also hypothesised which emotions were likely 
to be felt in trust breaches, depending on which component is breached. These are as 
follows: (a) Ability: disappointment, frustration and annoyance; (b) Integrity: 
aversion, contempt and loathing; and (c) Benevolence: distress, despair, and fury. It is 
likely that the average negative affective emotions will be higher in breaches of 
benevolence, followed by integrity, followed by ability. The first emotion in each list 
should be lowest among the three in terms of intensity, followed by the second, with 
the third being the most intense.  
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The assertions posited by Chen et al. (2011) in relation to the role of relevance 
of particular specific emotions in the midst different breach domains (i.e. ability vs. 
benevolence vs. integrity) have not been empirically tested. With regards to the 
proposed specific emotions relating to ability failures, disappointment, frustration, and 
annoyance, this may depend on the context of the failure. For instance, in an 
organizational setting where person A makes a mistake than affects person B’s ability 
to do their job, person B may feel one or more of the emotions posited by Chen and 
colleagues. However, if an ability failure involves something that could harm people, 
such as those made in product recall cases, feelings of fear and anger may be more 
prevalent. An example of this would be the various technical errors in Toyota vehicles 
that led to recalls between 2009 and 2011 due to defective accelerator pedals. 
Notwithstanding, empirical research that tests the propositions put forward by Chen 
and colleagues (2011) relating to the salience of different emotions after different types 
of trust breaches may be fruitful, and this is something that my studies provide. 
An experiment considering positive and negative affect in cooperation. 
Only one experimental paper in my review considered emotion, that of Bottom and 
colleagues (2002). Using a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, results suggested that 
violations after longer interactions resulted in more emotional reactions than violations 
after shorter interactions. Moreover, the authors found that offers of penance after a 
violation had significant positive direct effects on positive emotions, and on 
cooperative behaviour. Negative affect did not appear to have any effect on behaviour. 
One potential issue with the study concerns the measurement of emotion, 
particularly negative emotion. The items that comprised the positive emotion factor 
were “good”, “pleased”, and “satisfied”. For negative emotions, the items were 
“distressed”, “angry”, “hostile”, “astonished”, and “surprised”. “Astonished” and 
“surprised” are ambiguous; they could have either a positive or negative valence. In 
Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect, “astonished” is positioned at about 70˚, 
indicating it involves a high degree of arousal and a fairly neutral level of pleasure. 
Notwithstanding, it fell on the “positive” side of the circumplex, so for it to be 
considered as a negative emotion seems strange. Equally, research into surprise has 
yielded inconclusive results regarding its valence. Reisenzein and Meyer (2009: 387) 
contended that “in contrast to paradigmatic emotions such as joy and fear, surprise 
does not presuppose the appraisal of the eliciting event as positive (motive-congruent) 
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or negative (motive-incongruent), and the feeling of surprise is per se hedonically 
neutral rather than pleasant or unpleasant”. In contrast, recent findings by Noordewier 
and Breugelmans (2013) suggested that surprise may be both personally experienced 
and perceived by others as negative, given that it interrupts ongoing thoughts and 
activities, which is unpleasant and disrupts the desire for predictability and structure. 
This is not to say that surprise can never be positive, rather it takes a short time for the 
stimulus that elicits the surprise to be understood, after which point it may be perceived 
as good. In light of this, the inclusion of “surprise” in Bottom and colleagues’ (2002) 
negative emotions category may be understandable. It is unlikely that participants who 
did feel surprised would then feel positive afterwards, especially if they felt it as a 
reaction to violation. The same may be said of the rating of “astonished”. Even so, the 
inclusion of two such ambiguous items alongside three items that clearly have negative 
valence may call into question the utility of the authors’ negative emotions category 
to clearly measure negative emotions. This may be why the factor did not prove to be 
influential in predicting cooperative behaviour (or lack of). 
Attribution and positive affect in repairing consumer trust after a negative 
shopping experience. Chen and colleagues (2013) considered the roles of trust 
violation attributions and positive affect as a mediating process in the repair of trust 
following a negative online shopping experience. They used a cross-sectional survey 
design and recruited a sample of 513 Taiwanese participants who had faced a negative 
online shopping experience in either the clothing (N = 332) or consumer electronics 
(N = 181) industries. SEM analysis indicated that there was no relationship between 
attributions of negative events (that is, locus of causality, stability, or controllability) 
and post-encounter trust, suggesting that understanding whom and what to blame for 
a negative occurrence does not influence the repair of consumer trust. However, 
stability and locus of causality did have significant, negative effects on respondents’ 
positive mood, though controllability did not. Positive mood had a positive, direct 
effect on post-encounter trust, accounting for almost 57% of the variance in it, 
indicating the importance of changing negative reactions to positive moods if e-
vendors are to repair the trust of their consumers. However, the authors did not include 
any measures of negative affect. This decision is confusing, especially as the scenario 
involves trust violation and repair, and that reducing negative mood has been posited 
as being integral to successful trust repair efforts (Dirks et al., 2009). 
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In addition, the measurement of trust in this study contains similar issues as 
some of the papers discussed in Chapter 2. It is an amalgamation of the belief and 
decision stages of the trust process, considering perceptions of trustworthiness and 
willingness to be vulnerable. However, with regards to perceptions of trustworthiness, 
items relate to dependability and reliability (i.e., “generally speaking, this company is 
dependable/reliable”). While these items may relate to a component of an extended 
ABI+ model (Dietz, 2011), they do not appear to tap into the core facets of ability, 
benevolence, or integrity. Items covering the decision stage relate to willingness to 
buy products from the company, willingness to recommend to a friend or family 
member, and willingness to try new products introduced by the company. Finally, one 
item explicitly contains the word “trust” (“generally speaking, I trust this company”.). 
Actual behaviour was not measured. From a process perspective, I contend that the 
post-encounter trust construct should in fact consist of two factors, one relating to 
perceptions of trustworthiness and the other to willingness to trust. More generally, 
the “trustworthiness” items only consider one facet of trustworthiness, and not one 
pertaining to any of the ones that exist in Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) seminal model.  
Scholars suggest that after a trust violation, different strategies are required 
depending on what trustworthiness dimension has been breached (Harris, Keevil & 
Wicks, 2013; Kim et al., 2004, 2006, 2013). Chen et al. (2013: 361) do not explain 
which kinds of violation their participants experienced, merely that they all had 
“unhappy shopping experiences”. In this respect, it is not possible to ascertain whether 
the trustworthiness facets that the authors capture in their trust measure are particularly 
relevant to the type of violation(s) that occurred. In sum, the measurement of post-
encounter trust in this paper seems flawed. 
A qualitative study of employee trust repair and organizational 
(re)integration: the role of ambivalence. In the final paper examined in this review 
of affect in trust repair, Petriglieri (2015) adopted a qualitative approach to review the 
case of the BP oil spill and its effect on BP employees. Specifically, she explored 
whether organizational members’ relationship with the company could be repaired 
once damaged, focusing on themes of personal and organizational identification. 
Concerning emotion, Petriglieri (2015) considered the concept of ambivalence and its 
resolution. Ambivalence “involves the co-existence of positive and negative feelings 
and/or thoughts towards the other”, and per this conceptualisation, relationships will 
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continue if both parties believe that the negative elements are acceptable due to the 
greater worth of the positive ones (Petriglieri, 2015: 522-523). The author argues that 
ambivalence is always present in a relationship, if not always salient, but it is resolved 
through active choice. She found that there were two key factors in helping employees 
resolve the ambivalence they felt towards BP. These were identity enactment and 
credible social information. Identity enactment involves one understanding who one 
is through observing their own personal actions (Petriglieri, 2015). Those who could 
engage in identity enactment through co-creating relationship repair by actively 
working on BP’s response to the oil spill were able to amplify the positive side of their 
ambivalence and strongly (re)identified with BP. For those organizational members 
unable to engage in identity enactment, whether they re- or de-identified with BP 
depended on the source of social information they received regarding the incident. 
Those who only received positive social information resolved their ambivalence 
through conscious domination; their positive feelings towards the company overrode, 
but did not eliminate, the negative ones, leading to weak (re)identification with BP. 
Conversely, people who received credible negative information about the incident 
from external sources would amplify the negative side of their ambivalence, de-
identify with BP, and seek to exit the organization. 
This section reviewed the conceptual, experimental, and fieldwork studies that 
consider emotion in the trust repair process. Table 3.3 provides a summary of this 
review. Considering the articles as a body of work raises an interesting point about the 
influence of positive and negative emotions. Although the conceptual papers both 
focused on negative emotions, empirical results indicated that positive emotions may 
be particularly relevant in repairing trust. However, Chen et al. (2013) did not measure 
negative affect at all, and some of the items included in Bottom and colleagues’ (2002) 
negative emotions factor may not actually have a negative valence. Petriglieri’s (2015) 
qualitative study into the need to resolve feelings of ambivalence following an 
organizational transgression provides an interesting platform for further analysis of the 
consideration of how both positive and negative feelings towards a target ebb and flow, 
and what this means with regards to repairing trust. My study builds on these works 
by exploring the role of both positive and negative affect in trust repair. Furthermore, 
general mood states and specific, targeted emotions are included. No previous study 
has explored the influence of both mood and specific emotions on trust repair. 
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Table 3.3 - Summary Table of Papers Concerning Trust Repair and 
Emotion 
 
Author 
(Year) 
Article 
Type 
Emotion(s) 
Discussed/ 
Measured 
Limitations 
Petriglieri 
(2015) 
Field Ambivalence 
Difficulty in measuring ambivalence through 
survey measures. 
Possible selection bias.  
Qualitative design does not allow for testing of 
causality. 
    
Chen et al. 
(2013) 
Field 
Positive emotions 
(happy, glad, 
pleased joyful). 
No consideration of negative emotions. 
Questions regarding measurement of trust. 
No measurement of behaviour. 
Violation type(s) (ability, benevolence, or 
integrity) not acknowledged. 
Cross-sectional design does not allow for 
testing of causality. 
    
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
Conceptual 
Negative emotions 
(Disappointment, 
frustration, 
annoyance, 
aversion, 
contempt, loathing, 
distress, despair, 
fury). 
Not empirically tested. 
Questions regarding the negative emotions 
proposed after an ability failure. 
    
Tomlinson 
& Mayer 
(2009) 
Conceptual 
Negative emotions 
(“general 
emotional 
displeasure”, 
anger, fear).  
 
The scant empirical research into the role of 
attribution dimensions in the trust repair 
process does not support their utility (see Chen 
et al., 2013). 
Research indicating that personality 
judgements are made more quickly than 
situational attributions may suggest that 
attribution processes cannot be mediators 
(Smith & Miller, 1983). Depending on the 
cognitive resources available, people may not 
actually make it to the “sense-making” stage of 
the authors’ model. They may rely on quick, 
affective responses. 
    
Bottom et 
al. (2002) 
Experiment 
Positive emotions 
(good, pleased, 
satisfied). 
Negative emotions 
(distressed, angry, 
hostile, astonished, 
surprised) 
Questions over some of the negative emotion 
items and whether they actually represent 
negative emotion (specifically, surprised and 
astonished). 
Experimental design raised questions over 
external validity.  
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter consisted of a review of the trust repair literature. Two of the 
particularly pertinent findings of this review relate to how trust has been measured in 
empirical studies of trust repair, and the lack of investigation into the role of emotion 
in the trust repair process. With regards to measurement, many articles do consider the 
belief, decision, and action stages of the trust process, however only one does so over 
the course of a single study. Furthermore, most studies that do consider the action stage 
of the process do so solely via economic games such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the 
trust game. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are other forms of trusting actions or 
behaviours, such as information sharing, adoption of a product or service, increased 
collaboration, and reduced monitoring that are not demonstrated in such games.  
In relation to the role of emotion in trust repair, only five studies in my review 
appeared to consider this aspect, even though there have been a number of calls 
spanning many years for further exploration of the role emotion plays in process of 
trust and its repair (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Gillespie et 
al., 2014; Kim, et al., 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Schweitzer et al., 2006; 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Moreover, the studies that have considered emotion in 
trust repair all have limitations. I believe the empirical quantitative studies have issues 
relating to measurement, regarding both trust (Chen et al., 2013) and emotion (Bottom 
et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2013).    
Given the research cited in this chapter, there is a strong rationale to further 
consider the impact of affect on trust violations and subsequent trust repair efforts. The 
following chapter concerns emotion and mood, and how they are defined and 
conceptualised. Moreover, I discuss how affect influences information processing to 
provide further evidence that emotion plays an important role in how we make social 
judgements such as trust. 
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Chapter 4: Affect and its Role in Information Processing 
This chapter focuses on the role of affect in decision-making and information 
processing. Given the sparse empirical examination of the subject in the trust and trust 
repair literatures, it is pertinent to explore how affect may influence such social 
processes to determine if further study is relevant. I begin with a brief overview of 
affect in social psychology, highlighting some of the reasons for the increased focus 
on the phenomenon over the past 30 years. I then explore different definitions and 
differentiate the two facets of affect: moods and emotions, before highlighting how 
affect influences information processing. 
The Rise of Affect in Social Psychology 
Social psychology, especially in its early years, has been dominated by 
behaviourist and cognitive orientations (Forgas & George, 2001). However, over the 
past few decades, there has been an increase in focus on the role of affect in both social 
psychology and organizational settings. Forgas and George (2001) state that this 
change in focus was primarily driven by scholars who integrated affect into their 
cognitive models of human behaviour (e.g. Bower, 1981; Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 
1984). Also, some researchers began to recognise that “cognition is not as logical as it 
was once thought, and emotions are not always so illogical” (LeDoux, 1996, in Forgas 
& George, 2001: 6). Indeed, some psychologists have argued that affect, rather than 
cognition, should be considered the primary driver of interpersonal behaviour, and that 
affect is crucial to making sound decisions and judgements. (Forgas & George, 2001; 
Izard, 1977; 2009; Zajonc, 1980; 1984; 2001). Thus, evidence indicates that 
discounting the consideration of emotion in favour of entirely cognitive models of 
decision-making and socially bound constructs, such as trust, is at best incomplete and 
at worst insufficient. 
In psychology and the organizational literature, the term “affect” has often been 
used to describe mood, emotion, or interchangeably to describe both (Williams, 2001). 
In this thesis, I consider emotions and mood to be two different forms of affective 
states. However, to avoid confusion, from a measurement perspective I consider 
“positive affect” and “negative affect” as mood states (which can be either trait or state 
in nature), as per Watson, Tellegen, and Clark’s (1988) Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS). Definitions of emotions and mood follow. 
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Defining Emotions and Mood 
Emotions. Although the topic has been studied for over a century, there 
remains no universally accepted definition of emotion (Izard, 2010; Mulligan & 
Scherer, 2012). Indeed, in a recent book focusing on the relationship between emotion 
and rationality, Winter (2014: 18) neglected to define emotion, stating: “I have yet to 
find a satisfactory definition from among several dozen that I have seen in all the time 
that I have been studying this subject”. However, there has been considerable 
convergence on the components and characteristics of emotion (Izard, 2007; 2009; 
2010). 
First, there is the experiential component, which Frijda (1993: 383) argues is 
“the irreducible aspect that gives feelings their emotional, noncognitive character”. 
Regardless of the various elements of an emotional reaction “it is the experience that 
remains fundamental” (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996: 18, emphasis in original). Next, 
one is aware of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the emotion-eliciting event. In 
this respect, the experience of the event is intrinsically linked to the appraisal of that 
event. Thus emotion is always caused by something, e.g., “One is happy about 
something, angry at someone, afraid of something” (Fridja, 1993: 381). Third, 
emotions involve a broad range of physiological bodily changes (Fridja 1993; Izard; 
1977). Finally, the experience of an emotion leads to a readiness to act through 
increased arousal or vigilance. As such emotions have a motivational function (Fridja, 
1993; Izard, 1977; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño & Edmondson, 2009). 
Mood. In contrast to the more specific and reactive nature of emotions, moods 
are defined as “generalized feeling states that are not typically identified with a 
particular stimulus and not sufficiently intense to interrupt ongoing thought processes” 
(Brief & Weiss, 2002: 282). Fridja (1993) indicated that the primary distinction 
between moods and emotions concerns diffuseness regarding both object and 
response. Unlike emotions, moods lack an object to which affect is attached. Further, 
moods can change into weak emotions, and vice versa. An emotion changes into a 
mood when one loses focus on the eliciting object or event. Similarly, a mood can 
transform into a weak emotion if the cause of the mood is made salient. Forgas and 
George (2001: 28) believed that moods are more important than emotions in an 
organizational context as they unconsciously influence people’s thoughts and 
judgement. Emotions, on the other hand, “typically carry a great deal of cognitive 
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baggage, and there is usually considerable focal awareness concerning their origins, 
causes, features, and planned responses”. The distinction between the two affective 
states has implications relating to how emotion and mood may differentially influence 
information processing, a topic I return to later in this chapter. 
The following section discusses the two pervading theories of emotional 
experience and categorisation, as they have implications for how affect is measured in 
the current research programme. 
The Categorisation of Emotions 
Regarding the classification of different types of emotions, there are two 
pervading theories: (1) Emotions are discrete and different constructs, or (2) Emotions 
are dimensional and can be classified into groupings. 
Discrete emotions. Discrete emotion theory posits that there is a short list of 
emotions that are biologically determined, and that can be recognised and experienced 
by all people, regardless of cultural or ethnic differences (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; 
Ekman, 1993. Over the years, scholars have proposed different lists of discrete 
emotions (Ekman, 1971; 1993; Izard, 1977). In his early development of Differential 
Emotions Theory (DET), Izard (1977) suggested that ten fundamental emotions 
existed: interest, joy, surprise, anger, shame/shyness, sadness, fear, contempt, disgust, 
and guilt. DET postulates that each discrete emotion: (a) has unique motivational and 
phenomenological properties; (b) serves adaptive functions and motivates different 
sets of behaviour; (c) may activate or attenuate other emotions; and (d) has unique 
neural activity (Izard, 1977). In reflecting on and updating his thesis on emotions and 
DET, Izard (2009: 3) proposed some further principals relating to DET and the 
functioning of emotions in general. The overarching principle suggested that emotion 
and cognition are “mingled” in the brain, that is, they are interactive and integrated. 
Further, Izard (1977; 2009) suggested that emotions provide information relating to 
motivation and action, a position shared by ‘feelings-as-information’ proponents 
(Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), a theory I review in further detail later in 
this chapter. 
With regards to the measurement of discrete emotions, the Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES) was developed by Izard (1977) and is one of the most widely 
cited and studied measures of discrete emotion (Akande, 2002; Boyle, 1984; 1986; 
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Boyle & Katz, 1991). The original measure contained 30 adjectives to describe the ten 
fundamental emotions. A meta-analysis of the reliability of the DES measure 
conducted by Youngstrom and Green (2003) found that the average Cronbach’s alphas 
of the sub-scales in prior studies were acceptable, ranging from .61 for the contempt 
sub-scale to .77 for the fear subscale. 
However, the belief that different emotions have distinct neurological 
pathways and processes has recently been challenged by some scholars (Feldman 
Barrett, 2006a; Feldman Barrett, Lindquist, Bliss-Moreau, Duncan, Gendron, Mize & 
Brennan, 2007; Feldman Barrett & Wager, 2006; Wilson-Mendenhall, Feldman 
Barrett, Simmons & Barsalou, 2011). Instead, Feldman Barrett (2006b) suggested that 
emotions are learned, rather than being hard-wired, and the way they are experienced 
is determined by the interpretation of the situation in which one finds oneself. For 
example, if an individual feeling negative affect sees a lion, he would categorise and 
experience the emotion as “fear”, thus generating an instance of fear derived from his 
perception of the event. In contrast, discrete emotion scholars would suggest that 
simply seeing the lion would activate a particular “fear circuit” in the brain. Proponents 
of the dimensional perspective believe that, rather than being discrete, emotions can 
be grouped into different dimensions. A discussion of this categorisation approach 
follows. 
Emotions as dimensional clusters. Dimensional conceptualisations of affect 
contend that emotions can be grouped by where they lie on different dimensions, as 
opposed to being separate and arising from different neural processes. Researchers in 
this area have typically converged on a two-factor structure based on orthogonal 
dimensions of valence and arousal (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya & Tellegen, 1999). 
Valence represents the directionality of the emotion, that is, whether it is perceived as 
positive or negative (Watson & Tellegen, 1985) and arousal concerns how exciting or 
calming an emotion is (Russell, 1980). For current purposes, I consider valence and 
arousal but note that there are other, similar conceptualisations used by different 
writers. Akin to valence are hedonic tone, pleasure-displeasure, utility, good-bad (see 
Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). Scholars have developed a number of dimensional 
models of emotion, but two are particularly dominant (Rubin & Talarico, 2009). These 
are the Circumplex model (Russell, 1980) and the Positive Activation – Negative 
Activation (PANA) model (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  
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The Circumplex Model. Russell’s (1980) circumplex model asserts that 
emotions fall within a circular space between bipolar dimensions spaced 45° apart: 
Pleasantness (pleasure – misery), Excitement (excitement – depression), Activation 
(arousal – sleepiness), and Distress (distress – contentment). However, Russell 
believes that activation and pleasantness are the basic dimensions of affect, and the 
central point of his circumplex model denotes medium arousal (or activation) and 
neutral valence (or pleasantness). Russell (1980) argued that the circumplex model 
encapsulates the cognitive process that leads to affective experience. He suggested that 
affective experience is shaped by the meaning attributed to it, and thus cognition must 
precede affect.  
In revisiting the model almost 20 years after Russell’s original article, Russell 
and Feldman Barrett (1999) argued that emotion cannot be considered through the lens 
of one single structure. They provide an illustrative example of the difference between 
prototypical emotional episodes and core affect. Prototypical emotional episodes refer 
to what Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999: 806) call “the clearest cases of emotion”. 
Such an episode is a complex, correlated series of sub-events concerned with a 
particular object. Here we find a similarity with one of the characteristics of emotion 
described earlier in this chapter. Namely, that emotion is related to something. The 
object, in this case, is what the prototypical emotional episode is about. Prototypical 
emotional episodes tend to be considered in terms of discrete emotion categories such 
as fear, hate, and love. Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) reviewed the different 
schools of thought relating to such categories. Namely, basic categories, dimensional 
structures, and hierarchies. Each has problems. Research into basic categories, 
discussed earlier, does not appear to converge on an accepted number of categories. 
Dimensional structures, according to Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999), represent 
core affect (discussed in the following paragraph) but not prototypical emotional 
episodes. For instance, anger, fear and disgust responses could all share the same core 
affect and thus fall in the same space in a circumplex structure despite being part of 
qualitatively different prototypical emotional episodes. Finally, the authors review the 
hierarchical approach to capturing emotion, whereby some emotions are considered as 
subordinate to others. Indeed, the hierarchical structure of emotion may be a bridge 
between the seemingly opposing research streams of dimensional vs. discrete 
emotions, as positive and negative affect (or poles of unpleasant-pleasant and 
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deactivation-activation, as per Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999) are considered 
superordinate, followed by basic emotions. The lowest subordinate level includes 
emotions named after the most typical emotion of that category. Perhaps the greatest 
problem with the hierarchical approach is the fuzziness of the hierarchy of emotions. 
The categories of emotions are fuzzy, as are the different levels. 
Core affect, on the other hand, need not be directed at anything and ebbs and 
flows over time. Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999) claimed that core affect is always 
present, whether as part of, or, most commonly, separate to a prototypical emotional 
episode. They suggested that the subjective structure of core affect (that is, how one 
reports core affect) is comprised of two independent dimensions: degree of 
pleasantness and degree of activation. An example of core affect could be waking up 
and feeling cheerful for no explicable reason. There is no object to which the happy 
feeling is attributed to. These characteristics of core affect appear to share similarities 
with the features of mood, described earlier in the chapter. Specifically, neither 
concept need be related to an object, and both are ever-present.  
The PANA Model. Watson and Tellegen (1985) developed the PANA model 
based on Russell’s (1980) circumplex model (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, et 
al., 1999). They reanalyzed seven self-report mood studies conducted previously and 
found that positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) consistently proved to be the 
most prominent two dimensions in orthogonal factor analyses. Furthermore, oblique 
factor analysis was conducted to analyse data relating to the ten discrete emotions 
postulated in Izard’s (1977) DET, and found that PA and NA were the first two second-
order factors derived from the analysis. Relating back to the consideration of the 
hierarchical structure of affect, this suggests that the two constructs of PA and NA may 
be general dimensions that are superordinate to the discrete emotions (anger, joy, fear, 
etc.). 
When measured as traits, PA and NA have been shown to be independent 
dimensions rather than to be polar opposites (the latter view would imply they are 
strongly negatively correlated; Watson et al., 1988). PA relates to the extent to which 
a person feels alert, enthusiastic and active. High PA is a state in which people 
experience high energy, elevated levels of concentration and pleasurable engagement. 
On the other hand, low PA can be characterised as a state associated with low energy 
and sadness (Watson et al., 1988). Conversely, NA relates to the extent to which one 
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generally feels distress and unpleasurable engagement. High NA individuals are likely 
to feel such aversive moods, whereas those low in NA are characterised by calmness 
and serenity (Watson et al. 1988). Furthermore, with regards to the distribution of NA 
scores representing daily fluctuation of mood, studies have shown that NA responses 
are often positively skewed and leptokurtic, or more “peaked” than a normal 
distribution. Most scores clustered in a narrow range slightly below the mean (Watson 
et al., 1999; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). However, Zevon and Tellegen (1982) also 
found that extremely elevated scores occurred regularly. This indicates that, although 
NA scores generally remain low in the absence of threat or danger, spikes in NA 
responses constitute emergency reactions to ongoing crises (Watson et al., 1999). 
Watson and colleagues (1999) posited that this relates to the evolutionary significance 
of NA and PA, in that they each reflect an evolutionary-based motivation system. 
Specifically, NA relates to withdrawal-tendency and PA to a goal-directed approach 
system. These are the components of state affect; what people feel in the present 
moment. The PANA model can also be used to assess trait affect, the stable, 
underlying tendency an individual has to experience either positive or negative 
emotional states (Watson & Clark, 1984). Trait positive affect (TPA) and trait negative 
affect (TNA) correlate with their state counterparts (Watson & Clark, 1984). 
Therefore, people who are high in TNA are more likely to experience negative 
affective states (Watson & Clark, 1984). Trait affect not only relates to the likelihood 
of feeling negative emotional states, it also influences how individuals perceive 
themselves and the world around them (Watson & Clark, 1984). 
With regards to how emotions are experienced, a point related to the previous 
paragraph, I take an interpretive approach as per Ashforth and Humphrey (1995) in 
their exploration of the role of affect in organizational settings. Ashforth and 
Humphrey’s (1995: 100) interpretivist perspective suggests that neither the 
dimensional nor discrete approaches to emotion categorisation have greater intrinsic 
merit than the other, rather, “the equivocality is resolved after-the-fact by a more or 
less arbitrary label”. Stimuli may cause physiological arousal at times, but the precise 
cause and meaning of an emotion may be ambiguous. If and when this is the case, 
meaning may be socially constructed. For instance, this may occur in cases of complex 
organizational crisis or change. As an example, in Gillespie and colleagues’ (2014) 
case study of organizational reintegration and trust repair after an integrity violation, 
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some employees felt shame for what their company had done. Yet, others were angry 
at the whistle-blower who brought the organization’s failing to light, or at the 
department that was “guilty”. 
With this in mind, I consider both conceptual approaches to emotion in my 
primary research, measuring the dimensional approach to categorisation through 
Watson and colleagues’ (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and 
discrete emotions via Izard’s (1977) DES. This enabled me to determine whether 
previous results related to the superordinate effects of NA and PA over specific 
emotions would hold true in my studies and explore if and how they influence trust 
and its repair differently. 
Affect and Information Processing 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the field of psychology has long been 
concerned with the study of cognition. Dubbed the “cognitive revolution”, this 
perspective grew as a response to the behaviourist tradition of the mid-1900s (Miller, 
2003). Here, we see parallels to the trust literature, in which psychological and 
behavioural perspectives exist without much overlap. The cognitive branch of 
psychology has focused on understanding how people process information, exploring 
“the way man collects, stores, modifies, and interprets environmental information or 
information already stored internally” (Lachman, Lachman & Butterfield, 1979 in 
Phelps, 2006: 28). Although there had been a long-standing argument about the role 
of affect in the study of cognitions (Lazarus, 1982; Zajonc, 1984), the two tended to 
remain separate (Phelps, 2006). However, recent evidence from neuroscience 
acknowledged that affect and cognition should not be separated. Rather, they are 
intertwined (Izard, 2009; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006), and the classical division 
between the study of the two may be unrealistic. Indeed, in finding that several the 
textbook phenomena found in cognitive psychology either did not occur or occurred 
weakly when participants were feeling sad, Clore and Huntsinger (2007: 398) noted 
that “the cognitive revolution had an emotional trigger”. With this being the case, I 
now present an overview of a theory pertaining to the role of emotion in information 
processing.  
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Feelings-as-Information 
Feelings-as-information theory posits that mood, emotions, and bodily 
reactions can inform judgement (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Early work 
into this area considered mood states (mood-as-information; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), 
but as the literature has developed, so too has the hypothesis that the theoretical 
principles that underpin it could be applicable to other types of feelings, such as 
emotional and physiological responses (Schwarz, 2012). Feeling-as-information 
theory is comprised of five underpinning principles. 
The Experience Principle. According to the experience principle, the 
cognitive consequences of affect are mediated by its subjective experience. Support 
for this principle comes from research into individual differences in the experience of 
emotion (Gohm & Clore, 2000). For example, in a study by Gaspar and Clore (1998), 
participants were split into two groups by the extent to which they usually attended to 
their feelings (high vs. low). Mood influenced risk judgements in the “high” condition, 
but not in the “low” condition. These results suggest that considering emotion-related 
individual differences may be important in determining how emotions are experienced, 
and in turn how they influence attitude formation and behaviour. 
The Information Principle. This principle holds that emotional feelings 
inform affective feedback, which in turn provides guidance in judgement, information-
processing, and decision-making. One of the major arguments in support of this 
principle comes from research by Damasio (1994) on brain-damaged patients. He 
found that physical damage to one’s brain resulted in a reduced capacity to experience 
emotions and impairment of the capacity to make decisions and pursue goal-related 
activities successfully. In a series of experiments, van den Bos (2003) found that when 
relevant information for making social justice judgements was missing, judgements 
tended to be formed based on the affective states that participants were in prior to 
making the judgements. This finding brings us to the next principle of feelings-as-
information, relating to attribution. 
The Attribution Principle. Previous research has shown that people do not 
tend to rely on their feelings alone when they attribute them (correctly or incorrectly) 
to a source other than the target of judgement (Schwartz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983). Indeed, in experiments that included misattribution manipulations, Schwarz 
and Clore (1983) demonstrated that when something other than the object of 
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judgement was made salient (the weather, or the nature of a room), the influence of 
mood on the object of judgement disappeared. Such mood-attribution findings have 
been replicated a number of times (e.g. Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Keltner, Locke & 
Audrain, 1993; Schwarz, Servay & Kumpf. 1985). On the other hand, Clore and 
Huntsinger (2007:394) note that “without a salient cause, affect tends to be 
promiscuous, attaching itself to whatever is available, which is why moods can 
influence even irrelevant judgements”. That is not to say that mood states only 
influence inconsequential judgements. For instance, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
observed that the weather had an influence on stock market returns. Specifically, the 
market went up when the sun was shining in the city that hosts the country’s stock 
exchange. This implies that the positive mood associated with good weather may make 
investors feel more optimistic about the future of the economy. Hirshleifer and 
Shumway’s (2003) analyses took place during the period spanning from 1982 to 1997. 
In the United States, recession bit in 1982, but by 1983 the economy had stabilised and 
a period of prosperity ensued, particularly with regards to the financial markets. This 
culminated in the economic boom of the 1990s. In this respect, the period of analysis 
covered generally prosperous times for investors. In other words, the investment 
environment was generally benign. The influence of positive and negative affect in 
cognitive processing is discussed further in relation to the Immediacy Principle, below.  
 Here, we see both sides of the issue. When feelings are attributed to something 
other than the target of judgements, their influence on the judgement is minimal. 
However, if feelings cannot be attributable to a salient cause, they may influence 
judgement. In both cases, the actual informational value of the feelings may not be 
particularly high. Although these results indicate that affect does not always influence 
judgement, they also suggest that there are times that it does. 
The Immediacy Principle. This principle states that feelings are usually 
caused by current mental content (Clore, Gasper & Garvin, 2001). In this principle, we 
find the link between affect and motivation, which is unsurprising given that emotions 
form an evolutionary alarm system that facilitates coping with threats and 
opportunities in the environment (Clore et al., 2001; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). 
Positive affect indicates that all is well and that the environment is benign. Conversely, 
negative affect signals that something is wrong and needs to be rectified (Bagozzi, 
Gopinath & Nyer, 1999; Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Fu, Uy & Baron, 2009). Put 
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differently, positive affect provides a “go” sign, and negative affect provides a “stop” 
sign (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009). Fu et al. (2009) provided empirical support for this 
principle. The authors conducted research on how feelings influences effort in 
entrepreneurs. Their results indicated that negative affect increased effort on venture 
tasks that required immediate effort, and positive affect increased effort on tasks 
beyond what is immediately required. Fu and colleagues (2009) found that negative 
affect also influenced effort on tasks beyond what is immediately required, suggesting 
that entrepreneurs may take precautionary measures to prevent future damage to their 
ventures. 
The Episodic Constraint Principle. The final of the five underpinning 
principles of feelings-as-information contends that affective feelings should have 
similar effects as primed concepts. That is, when the sources of affective feelings are 
obscure, as is the case in the experimental priming of concepts, their potential meaning 
should be similarly constrained. Thus, the resulting affective feelings should be 
experienced as reactions to whatever is in focus at the time. 
The role of specific emotions in information processing. Many of the 
principles that apply to mood also apply to specific emotions in information processing 
(Clore et al., 2001; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 2009). However, whereas mood states 
are prone to be misattributed because they are not generally attached to an object, 
misattribution is less likely to occur to emotions because they are already situated 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Schwarz, 2010). There are fewer inferences to make 
regarding emotional responses because they indicate that an appraisal has taken place. 
For instance, one is angry at someone, sad about something, yet in a bad mood.   
To summarise, feelings-as-information is a framework that could be used to 
understand how affect influences the way in which we process information. This could 
relate to trust in a number of ways. Firstly, the link between motivation and affect, a 
component of the Immediacy Principle, should prove to be relevant to the process 
perspective of trust. Specifically, in demonstrating a willingness to be vulnerable (the 
trusting decision) and actual vulnerability (the trusting action), one implicitly and then 
explicitly demonstrates motivation. Conversely, the belief stage of the trust process, 
relating to perceptions of trustworthiness, does not necessarily have a motivational 
quality, as it does not require the trustor to do anything with that information. In this 
respect, I would presume that mood and emotion would play a greater role in the 
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decision and action stages of the trust process than the belief stage, which would have 
implications as to how trust is measured. Secondly, feelings-as-information theory 
implies that when people have sufficient information available about the target object 
of interest, they will be less likely to rely on their feelings than in situations when 
information is missing (see van den Bos, 2003). Therefore, the more salient an object, 
and the greater information available about it, the less likely that one would use their 
mood state as a source of information. However, if the target object is salient and is 
deemed to be the cause of a specific emotion (i.e. is deemed to be attributable), then 
specific emotions may be influential in processing information about the object. 
Relating this to trust repair, mood states may prove to be influential in trust repair in 
experimental scenarios where the object of judgement (or trust, in this case) is not 
salient and participants have little available prior knowledge or information about it, 
prompting them to ask: “how do I feel about this?” as a means to make a judgement. 
On the other hand, specific emotions may be more influential in personally relevant 
situations in which individuals have some prior knowledge from external sources. 
Finally, the Experience Principle indicates that emotion-related individual differences 
are influential in affect’s role in information processing. As such, trait measures 
relating to affective experience and intensity should be included in any empirical use 
of the framework in trust repair studies. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter proceeded with definitions of emotions and mood, before 
discussing the two prevailing perspectives of how emotions are categorised. Rather 
than choosing one perspective over another, I elected to take a middle ground and 
consider both the dimensional and discrete perspectives of emotion in this research 
programme. Furthermore, I follow the interpretive approach as per Ashforth and 
Humphrey (1995) relating to how emotions are experienced, taking the perspective 
that it is the interpretation of an emotion-eliciting event and subsequent emotional 
response that is important, rather than the semantics of whether the response is 
biologically hard-wired or socially constructed. 
A discussion on how affect can influence information processing followed. The 
feeling-as-information framework has received compelling empirical support for the 
assertions that mood states and specific emotions can indeed influence judgement. 
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Moreover, both affect and trust contain strong motivational elements, indicating a link 
between the constructs that should be investigated further.  
Chapter 5 assimilates the research gaps found in the literature review chapters 
into research questions and provides a methodological rationale and outline for my 
series of studies.  
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Chapter 5: Research Questions and Methodological Rationale 
Research Questions 
A review of the extant trust and trust repair literatures identified some research 
gaps which this thesis aimed to address. Primarily these gaps relate to three distinct 
areas. Firstly, my review of the trust repair literature in Chapter 3 showed that while 
there were a small number of articles that did consider affect as central in the process 
of trust repair (five of 42 to be precise, only three of which were empirical), each had 
problems. For the empirical papers, these problems tended to concern the measurement 
of affect, trust, or both. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, work into feelings-as-
information suggests that mood and emotion can influence how we make social 
judgements, indicating that they may be salient in the study of trust and trust repair 
Secondly, returning to Chapter 2, there is scant research into the effects of 
individual differences on trust, other than the consideration of propensity to trust. Two 
studies have considered regulatory focus theory and its relationship with generalised 
trust, but nothing has been considered in relation to trust repair. Regarding trust repair, 
I was unable to find a single empirical paper that included any individual difference 
measures. In addition, the experience principle of feelings-as-information theory posits 
that emotion-related individual differences will influence whether and how affect 
influences judgement. 
Finally, my chosen conceptualisation of trust is that it is a process consisting 
of belief, decision, and action. The process perspective of trust has received scant 
empirical attention. Although my review of the trust repair literature suggested that 
several papers did implicitly measure all three stages of the trust repair process, this 
was not explicitly acknowledged. Certainly, no article attempted to determine whether 
the three stages of the process form an integrated, empirically supported model. Based 
on these gaps, I developed a suite of studies that aimed to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
Research question 1: Do emotions and mood predict change in trust after a trust 
failure, controlling for evaluations of trustworthiness?  
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Research question 2: Does regulatory focus affect trust or interact with 
emotions?  
 
Research question 3: Do emotion-related individual differences affect trust or 
interact with emotions?  
 
Research question 4: Do belief, decision, and action processes of trust form a 
coherent model?  
 
Research question 5: Are emotions central to an integrated model that predicts 
distrusting acts?  
 
Three empirical studies were conducted to explore the research questions 
posed above. All used stimuli from real-world incidents of organization-level trust 
failures. Table 5.1 compares the three studies, showing the characteristics of each and 
which key elements were explored, and demonstrating the progression of knowledge 
generation. Foreshadowing results, Study 1 was an experiment, had a small sample 
size, and only considered mood and a small number of individual difference measures 
to first ascertain whether such processes had any influence at all on perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust in an organization given a 
scenario that would not have been personally salient to participants. Results indicated 
that these processes may indeed be pertinent in Study 1’s trust repair context. Thus 
Study 2, also an experiment, was conducted using the same stimuli, a larger sample, 
and the inclusion of specific emotions and additional individual difference variables 
(emotional reactivity and private body consciousness (PBC); a proxy for embodied 
cognition). The rationale for using the same stimuli as in Study 1 was to ascertain 
whether results would replicate in a different, larger sample. Some did, some did not, 
but the added element of specific emotions did appear to be influential in the decision 
to trust. Study 3 used different stimuli, and while one aim was to replicate the results 
of the previous two studies in relation to emotion and individual differences, the 
extension involved the measurement of the behavioural element of distrust in a 
personally relevant situation (car ownership). Study 3 had an experimental 
manipulation and a survey component. 
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Table 5.1 - The Key Process Elements and Characteristics of Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 
Note. B = Belief stage of trust process, D = Decision stage of trust process, A = Action stage 
of trust process. Personal relevance = Whether the scenario was personally relevant to the 
study’s participants. Mood = Measurement of positive affect and negative affect. Specific 
Emotions = Measurement of anger, fear, sadness, contempt, joy, and calmness. 
 
In the following section, I provide a rationale as to why I chose to use an 
experimental design for Studies 1 and 2, and follow them with a cross-sectional survey 
for Study 3.  
Methodological Rationale 
Here, I present an overview of the experimental method and discuss its merits 
and disadvantages, before exploring its suitability for the current research programme. 
I follow this with an explanation of the nature of internet-based, crowdsourcing 
marketplaces that allow researchers to recruit participants to take part in experimental 
research. I utilise such a marketplace in each of my studies, so I present some of the 
arguments for and against their use in psychological and sociological research 
compared to more traditional data collection methods before reviewing their use in 
previous studies. 
The Experimental Method 
Kerlinger (1986, in Griffin & Kacmar, 1991: 302) defined a laboratory 
experiment as “a research study in which the variance of all or nearly all of the 
 Key Elements Measured  Study Characteristics 
Study Mood 
Specific 
Emotions 
Individual 
Differences 
Process 
Elements 
 
Violation  
Type 
Personal 
Relevance? 
Design 
One X  X B, D  Ability No 
Experiment 
(N = 82) 
         
Two X X  X B, D  Ability No 
Experiment 
(N = 253) 
         
Three X X  X B, D, A  Integrity Yes 
Cross-
sectional 
design with 
experimental 
element. (N 
= 135) 
Chapter 5: Research Questions and Methodological Rationale 
85 
 
influential independent variables not pertinent to the immediate problem of the 
investigation is kept to a minimum.”  
Although the experimental method has been a staple of psychology since the 
birth of the discipline, there have always been arguments regarding its merit. Critics 
cite the lack of generalisability to other situations and difficulty in replicating results, 
as well as the artificial nature of the setting and the knowledge that participants are 
almost always aware that they are being observed. Perhaps the most often quoted 
argument against the experiment relates to doubts over external validity (Epstein, 
1979; 1980; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). According to Campbell and Stanley (1963: 5), 
“external validity asks the question of generalizability: to what populations, settings, 
treatment settings and measurement settings can this effect be generalized?”   
In other words, some scholars have reservations regarding the generalisability 
of experimental results to “real world” settings, and thus the ability to replicate results 
outside of the laboratory setting. Epstein (1980: 796) asserts that “there is no more 
fundamental requirement in science than that the replicability of findings be 
established”, yet claims “the very nature of the paradigm of the single-session 
experiment is such that very few findings, no matter what their level of statistical 
significance, are apt to be replicable” (p. 790). A contentious issue in the social 
sciences that is related to both replicability and generalisability is the preponderance 
of the use of undergraduate student participants in experimental research. Critics 
suggest that research conducted with student samples is not representative of the 
general population, and is therefore not generalizable to other situations (Bello, Leung, 
Radenbaugh, Tung & van Witteloostuijn, 2009; Lucas, 2003; Sears, 1986). Sears 
(1986) argued that the predominance of student sample-based research in the social 
sciences has led to a bias in “what is known” about human behaviour, as students tend 
to have higher levels of cognitive ability, more compliant behaviour and less 
crystallised attitudes than older adults. 
On the other hand, there are arguments that this lack of generalisability is not 
always a concern. An example of this is when the research focus is on basic 
psychological processes or theory building linked to human behaviour, independent of 
sample characteristics (Bello et al., 2009; Lucas, 2003; Mook, 1983). Berkowitz and 
Donnertstein (1982) claimed that the meaning assigned to the situation that 
participants are in and their behavioural responses to it are of greater import to the 
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generalisability of an experiment’s outcome than the sample’s representativeness. In 
addition, there are some cases in which the use of a student sample may be 
representative in that they represent a population of interest. For instance, business 
students, in theory, should go on to be leaders or followers of the future in 
organizational environments. Therefore, they may be appropriate subjects for studies 
relating to management and leadership (Ahmed, Chung & Eichenseher, 2003; 
Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Ng & Burke, 2010).  
Regarding generalisation, Levitt and List (2007) developed a theoretical model 
that illustrates three things that cause pro-social behaviour to differ significantly 
between experimental and field settings, these are stakes, social norms and scrutiny. 
Stakes relate to the monetary (or other credit-based) rewards participants receive for 
completing a task. In the laboratory, participants “play” with the money they receive, 
whereas in the field the money is earned in some way or another (Benz & Meier, 2008). 
In this respect, entitlement may play some role, as demonstrated in a study by Cherry, 
Frykblom and Shogren (2002) that showed that it mattered whether money in a dictator 
game was earned by completing a task or whether it was distributed randomly to 
participants. Social norms may be triggered differently in an experimental setting than 
in the field because the laboratory lacks the real-life context that may be required for 
certain behaviours to occur (Bardsley, 2005). Finally, participants in experiments may 
alter their behaviours because they think that they are expected to behave a certain way 
or want to please the experimenter. This is the scrutiny component of the Levitt and 
List (2007) model. Equally, social desirability bias may be an issue, particularly in 
experiments that are not anonymous. For example, someone who is not particularly 
generous in a field setting may exhibit greater displays of generosity in an experiment 
because he may think that he will be perceived in a more positive light by the 
experimenter or others involved in the process by doing so.  
Although there may be drawbacks to the experimental method, it does have its 
advantages. A major strength of the experiment is the control it allows the researcher; 
extraneous conditions and variables can be controlled and independent variables can 
be manipulated in a way that is not possible in field research. Furthermore, by 
randomly assigning which units receive which treatment, and to what extent, the 
investigator can bypass the “unmeasured variables problem”. According to James 
(1980 in Colquitt, 2008: 616) this problem concerns unmeasured variables that are 
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either “correlated with a presumed cause or predictive of the presumed effect”. 
Random assignment by the roll of a die, use of a random number generator, or any 
other such method of randomisation, eliminates the possibility of an unmeasured 
variable being meaningfully correlated to an independent variable. By its very nature, 
randomisation ensures that no pattern can emerge, thus minimising the possibility of 
correlation between an independent variable and an unmeasured variable (Colquitt, 
2008). With regards to the second point, by controlling the levels of the independent 
variable the researcher is able to rule out the possibility that the outcome actually 
causes the predictor in a given study.  
Furthermore, whilst the sheer volume of fieldwork in areas such as leadership, 
performance appraisal and goal-setting suggests that it is relatively straight-forward to 
conduct field research in those realms, there are some concepts that, usually due to 
matters of sensitivity, are very difficult to study in the field. Indeed, organizational 
trust repair is one such concept, as noted by Gillespie and Dietz (2009). 
The previous section of this chapter outlined some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the experimental method. Whilst there are some justifiable concerns 
over the use of this method, it is a good fit for the type of research conducted in this 
thesis. Hence, the experiment was chosen as a relevant method for Studies 1 and 2 for 
three primary reasons. Firstly, the first research question that this thesis explores, 
relating to the role of affect in trust repair, is deliberately broad, and the results of 
Study 1 inform Study 2. For this, the experiment is preferable to a field study because 
the independent variables of interest can be controlled and isolated.  
Secondly, the very nature of trust repair research makes it difficult to study in 
the field, hence the preponderance of experimental and case-based studies in the 
literature, as evidenced by my review in Chapter 3. It is unlikely that organizations 
would be willing to allow scholars to conduct field research with them in the 
immediate aftermath of a scandal or transgression due to the possibility of negative 
feedback from stakeholders and potential reputational damage. Therefore, studying the 
effects of emotion during a “live” trust repair process will be very difficult in a field 
setting. To illustrate this issue, although recently Gillespie and colleagues (2014) 
conducted a case study that focused on trust repair and organisational reintegration, 
there were several unique aspects to getting access to the field setting. The study 
involved interviews with employees of a British utilities firm involved in a dispute 
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with the industry regulator which led to the company being fined over £37 million. 
However, the interviews were granted by a board of directors that was not in place 
during the period in which the transgressions took place; they were “once removed” 
from the wrongdoing. Furthermore, over three years had passed between the 
occurrence of the transgressions and the interviews taking place, during which time 
the company had already managed to rebuild its reputation and improve performance.  
When considering affect, such a case-based method would not be appropriate 
because individuals would have to attempt to recall what their emotions and moods 
were like after the event. Johnson, Tolentino, Rodopman and Cho (2010) suggest that 
attempting to accurately assess one’s state mood, that is, their mood at that moment in 
time, may be difficult due to the conscious self-awareness and inductive reasoning 
required. Past emotionally charged events that are salient to those who experienced 
them are sometimes (Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977), but not always 
(McClosky, Wible & Cohen, 1988) recalled more accurately than less significant 
events. However, some studies have suggested that people tend not to recall previous 
emotional events accurately (Brewer, 1988; Thomas & Diener, 1990). Current 
attitudes and appraisals may also play major role in how memories of emotional 
responses are recalled (Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Levine, 1997; Pattershall, 
Eidelman & Beike, 2012). Taking this into account, the ability to measure mood and 
emotion at the time a particular event occurs would be preferable in terms of 
ascertaining accurate indications of what a person is feeling at the time, which in turn 
will present us with a greater idea of how affect relates to other variables such as trust 
and trustworthiness. It is possible to do this with an experiment.  
Finally, and related to the previous point, causality can be assessed with an 
experimental design. In contrast, causal direction is generally difficult to establish and 
ambiguous in other types of designs such as cross-sectional surveys. However, that is 
not to say that cross-sectional research lacks merit. 
Cross-Sectional Research: Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 were comprised of entirely experimental designs, measured 
over three time-points. Study 3 used a cross-sectional design in order to explore the 
correlations between attitudes, affect, and behaviour in a sample personally affected 
by a particular organizational failure. Cross-sectional research designs have been 
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criticised because they do not allow us to draw confident causal conclusions and 
common method bias may inflate the observed correlations between variables (Lindell 
& Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003; Spector, 1994). 
However, the cross-sectional approach is still one of the most commonly used designs 
in organizational behaviour research, and can be useful in helping us understand the 
intercorrelations between various feelings and perceptions (Spector, 1994). Indeed, 
cross-sectional research can be very useful as part as a suite of studies, as is the case 
in this thesis. Undertaking experiments to provide first tests of hypotheses and 
following them up with the more uncontrolled conditions of the field can help 
demonstrate the robustness of findings (Rietzchel et al., 2017). As stated in Chapter 3, 
very few of the trust repair articles reviewed contain both experimental and field data. 
That my studies do is a strength of their design. Regarding the potential issue of 
common method variance in Study 3, although this is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 8, statistical tests suggest that it was not of great concern. 
Crowdsourcing to Collect Data 
All data for Studies 1 and 2, and the bulk of the data for Study 3, were collected 
using a UK-based crowdsourcing marketplace called Prolific Academic. This source 
is described on the Prolific Academic website (www.prolific.ac) as “the world's largest 
crowdsourcing community of people who love science. Researchers post studies and 
recruit the right participants fast. Participants earn rewards while helping to advance 
human knowledge.”  
As stated previously in this chapter, student samples are often used in 
experimental research. They are often called “convenience samples”, but recruiting 
them in a UK research institution is not particularly convenient. In other countries, 
such as the United States, it is possible for academics to offer course credit to students 
in return for their participation in a research programme. This practice is not possible 
in the United Kingdom; hence it can be difficult to recruit students to take part in 
experiments. A possible solution to the issue of recruiting participants presents itself 
in the form of utilising online crowdsourcing marketplaces. Such marketplaces consist 
of a pool of participants willing to take part in tasks for money. A particularly 
prominent platform is Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), but it is currently not 
available for use by those outside of the United States. Prolific Academic is a UK-
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based alternative, which, as of May 2016, had over 33,000 members in its participant 
pool. At this point, just two papers had been published using samples from the platform 
(Woods, Michel & Spence, 2016; Woods, Velasco, Levitan, Wan & Spence, 2015), 
though this may not be surprising given Prolific Academic only commenced 
operations in 2014.  
More generally, crowdsourcing as a means to recruit participants is relatively 
new, though it is becoming more commonplace. To illustrate this point, entering a 
search term of “Mechanical Turk” in the Psychology sub-field of Web of Science 
produces 437 papers. The earliest was published in 2010, a year in which two articles 
using MTurk data appear. Seven papers were published in 2011, 28 in 2012, 57 in 
2013, 108 in 2014, 167 in 2015, and 62 in 2016, as of May. MTurk data have been 
used in papers that have appeared in top ranking management journals such as 
Academy of Management Journal, Leadership Quarterly, Personnel Psychology, 
Management Science, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 
Thus, it is evident that the use of crowdsourcing platforms to facilitate academic 
research is growing and has been accepted as a valid by some of the most prestigious 
journals in the field of management. 
Is Crowdsourcing Reliable? 
The advent and subsequent growth of the internet has afforded academics new 
and varied means to collect data. In the past, researchers were relatively restricted by 
the logistics of either getting participants to a laboratory or the expense of sending 
paper surveys overseas. Now, due to the proliferation of web-enabled portable devices, 
it is possible to reach people from all walks of life via a variety of platforms with a 
few clicks of a mouse. Online surveys can be sent to the other side of the world for the 
same price (the subscription to piece of survey-building software) as to someone a mile 
away. However, concerns have been raised in the academic community regarding the 
use of the internet to collect data. Most of these doubts relate to uncertainty as to 
whether these data collection methods yield reliable results compared to traditional 
measures (Casler, Bickel & Hackett, 2013). One early concern was that the make-up 
of internet users was not representative of the general population in that internet 
participants were more mal-adjusted than traditional participants (Kraut, Patterson, 
Lundmark, Kiesler, Mukophadhyay & Scherlis, 1998). However, this claim has been 
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refuted (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & John, 2004). Others questioned whether 
participants sourced online would be less motivated than those sourced by traditional 
means (Gosling et al., 2004), and if the anonymity of the internet would negatively 
affect responses (Gosling et al., 2004). There seems to be little evidence to support 
these concerns, with research suggesting than internet-based participants are no less 
motivated than their traditionally-sourced counterparts, and if anything, the anonymity 
provided by the internet appears to be a benefit rather than a hindrance (Gosling et al., 
2004). Returning to a point made earlier about the problems of social desirability bias 
and the possibility that participants may adapt their behaviour to please the researcher 
in an experiment, anonymity may be beneficial in reducing such issues (Gosling et al., 
2004; Gosling & Mason, 2015). Finally, Germine, Nakayama, Duchaine, Chabris, 
Chatterjee, and Wilmer (2012) were able to successfully replicate five traditionally 
laboratory-based experiments using online samples. The experiments were selected as 
it was thought that they would be susceptible to issues such as lapses in attention by 
participants and “satisficing” (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009), but this 
was not the case. Germine et al. (2012: 84) concluded that “web samples need not 
involve a trade-off between participant numbers and data quality”. 
The advantages of platforms like MTurk and Prolific Academic over 
traditional data gathering methods primarily relate to the low cost of recruiting 
participants and the speed at which data can be gathered (Behrend, Sharek, Meade & 
Wiebe, 2011; Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011), 
as well as the possible solution to the issue of a limited participant pool (Gosling, 
Sandy, John & Potter, 2010). A number of studies have been conducted to test the 
validity of MTurk as a means of gathering quality data compared to student or other 
online samples. The demographic characteristics of MTurk respondents have been 
found to be more ethnically and socio-economically diverse than those of 
undergraduate university students, as well as being older and more experienced 
(Behrend et al., 2011; Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al., 
2013). The extent to which the platform is more diverse than other internet samples is 
not so clear. Berinsky et al. (2012) found that their MTurk sample was less 
representative of the general population than Internet-based panel samples or national 
probability samples, but Buhrmester and colleagues (2011) reported that their MTurk 
sample was slightly more diverse than the standard internet sample. With regards to 
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reliability, crowdsourcing samples have been shown to behave similarly to student 
participant pool samples (Behrend et al., 2012; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; 
Sprouse, 2011). Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that data obtained via 
MTurk were at least as reliable as those gathered in a large-scale Internet-based sample 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011) or a student sample (Paolacci et al., 2010). 
The major concerns about collecting data via crowdsourcing relate to the 
inability of the researcher or an assistant to oversee the experiment and the possibility 
of participants taking part in a study more than once or taking part in many similar 
studies and becoming overly familiar to popular experimental methods or 
questionnaires used by researchers. The lack of an experimenter’s presence may be 
problematic in that there is no way to answer any queries that participants may have 
during the experiment. Equally, it is not possible to ensure that participants are 
following instructions correctly. Rather disconcertingly, when they asked MTurk 
workers what they were doing when completing a study, Chandler and colleagues 
(2014) found that 18% of respondents were watching television, 14% were listening 
to music and 6% were communicating with others online. Catch trials are a possible 
solution to the issue of lack of attention or motivation. Oppenheimer et al. (2009) 
explicitly asked participants to click a small circle at the bottom of the screen upon the 
completion of two classic studies, rather than any of the nine response buttons that 
made up a scale running through the centre of the screen. In the Oppenheimer et al 
(2009) study, which was conducted in lab, a disquieting 46% of participants failed the 
catch trial. Only when these participants were excluded from the analysis were the two 
classic studies replicated. Another, less deceptive, approach is offered by Crump, 
McDonnell and Gureckis (2013). The authors suggest that inserting a set of questions 
directly after the instructional brief designed to quiz participants on the nature of the 
study is an effective way of ensuring they pay attention. If any questions are answered 
incorrectly, participants are asked to re-read the brief. This continues in a loop as long 
as any of the questions are answered incorrectly. Crump et al. (2013) found that this 
approach led to closer replication of a classic study compared to an earlier study in 
which there was no such intervention.  
Regarding the issue of repeat participation, Prolific Academic guards against 
this with a number of measures. Firstly, it requires participants to sign in with a 
Facebook account and verify their email address to deal with authentication and to stop 
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participants taking studies multiple times. Moreover, each participant receives a 
unique identifier code, has their IP address tracked, and must register a valid PayPal 
account. Therefore, while it may be possible for participants to set up second accounts, 
it is not easy to do. It is also possible to only invite participants who have taken part in 
a previous study to take part in a follow-up, making longitudinal studies possible. 
Conversely, the reverse is true; participants who took part in previous studies can be 
excluded from participating in future studies, ensuring unique participants can be 
recruited throughout a research programme. In addition, participants can be pre-
screened via several demographic characteristics such as age, sex, nationality, first 
language, country of residence, employment status and student status, enabling a great 
deal of flexibility regarding tapping into different sub-samples. Such flexible pre-
screening is not possible with MTurk samples, which can lead to issues with data 
reliability (Smith, Roster, Golden & Albaum, 2016). 
In summary, previous research suggests that crowdsourcing can be a viable, 
valid data collection tool that enables researchers to collect data quickly and 
inexpensively. Data quality has been shown to be acceptable when compared to more 
“traditional” collection methods, with many prior lab-based experiments being 
successfully replicated using this method and crowdsourced data appearing in some of 
the top management journals. As with any experimental study, a solid research design 
is imperative, and there are a number of ways to pre-screen participants that can help 
improve data quality. Finally, the ability to recruit a more diverse range of participants 
is a clear advantage over the average laboratory study conducted with undergraduate 
students.  
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented my research questions based on the gaps in the 
literature outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 and briefly outline a suite of three studies that 
aimed to explore these questions. It then provided a rationale for my chosen research 
designs and data collection methods. The following chapters (Chapter 6, Chapter 7, 
and Chapter 8) contain the thesis’ primary research. 
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Chapter 6: Study 1 – Mood and Individual Differences in Trust Repair 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether trust repair had a 
significant effect (compared to a non-trust-repair condition) in a particular 
experimental scenario, and if so, whether participants’ affective state had any influence 
on perceptions of trustworthiness in an organization and the level of trust placed in it.  
Repairing Trust and Trustworthiness  
As explained in Chapter 3, there is a body of research that shows that 
organizational efforts to repair trust after it has been breached can work (Bottom et al., 
2002; Desmet et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2004; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 Mishra, 1996). 
Several experimental studies (Dirks et al., 2011; Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2013; 
Schniter et al., 2013) and field studies (Andiappan & Treviño, 2010; Chen et al., 2013; 
Gillespie et al., 2014; Webber & Bishop, 2012) have suggested this to be the case. 
Previous experimental research suggests that participants who observe an effective 
trust repair condition perceive greater trustworthiness (Ferrin et al., 2007; Nakayachi 
& Watabe, 2005) and elicit more trust in the wrongdoer (Schweitzer et al., 2006) than 
those who either observe no repair condition at all or an inferior response.  
Thus, one goal of the current study was to design a new experiment that 
presented participants with a realistic scenario in which their trust is violated. 
Following an earlier data collection of relevant individual difference measures, an 
experimental manipulation was made in which half of the participants received a trust 
repair response and the other half did not. More specifically, all participants viewed a 
TV news report of a National Express coach crash in which two people died and many 
more were seriously injured. This is the trust failure stimulus. The trust repair 
manipulation consisted of presenting to half of the study participants (i.e., treatment 
group) the response that the organization’s CEO actually made in a televised interview. 
This is classified as a trust repair response. The control group saw a filler video. For 
all study participants, willingness to trust and perceptions of trustworthiness were 
measured at three time points: pre-trust-failure (Time 1), immediately post-trust-
failure (Time 2) and post-repair-response manipulation (Time 3). Time 1 
measurements provided a baseline of initial willingness to trust and trustworthiness 
against which changes at Times 2 and 3 could be assessed. Based on the previous 
literature, the following two hypotheses were advanced. 
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Hypothesis 1: There will be a decrease in (a) willingness to trust in the 
organization and (b) perceived organizational trustworthiness, immediately following 
the trust violation, as indicated by the change in responses from Time 1 to Time 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to participants who do not receive a trust repair 
response, those who receive the trust repair response will show a greater recovery in 
levels of (a) willingness to trust in the organization and (b) perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, as indicated by the change in responses from Time 2 to Time 3. 
Trust Repair and Affect 
As stated in Chapter 3, although there have been calls for further investigation 
of the role of affect in the trust repair process (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Fulmer & 
Gelfand; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, 2006; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), there 
has been little progress to this end within the research community. Some experiments 
have used trust games in which participants are presented with different computer-
generated facial stimuli (e.g., an angry face, a smiling face, etc.) and asked how much 
they would be willing to give their “partner” (Campellone & King, 2013; Kausel & 
Connolly, 2014). However, these experiments do not focus on the emotional state of 
the participant, rather they demonstrate how emotions displayed by another influences 
the participants’ behaviour. Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) demonstrated a robust 
relationship between normatively irrelevant, incidental emotions and trust across five 
studies and suggested that their research be expanded to other areas of trust research, 
including trust repair. They suggest that a trust violation may cause the trustor to feel 
negative emotions such as anger, and mitigating such emotions may help the trustee 
regain trust. 
In the current study, I included measures of both trait and state positive and 
negative affect (TPA, TNA, PA, and NA, respectively), to determine their 
relationships with trust and perceived organizational trustworthiness. Based on the 
overview of trait and state affect provided in Chapter 4, in the present study those with 
high TNA may be more likely to blame National Express for the accident and 
subsequently may be less likely to perceive them as trustworthy. Conversely, high-
TPA individuals may be less likely to blame the organization.  
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In relation to state affect, Bagozzi et al. (1999) suggest that the current 
dominant emotional state one is experiencing influences the way in which information 
is processed.  Specifically, if one is experiencing a positive emotional state, he is likely 
to use a top-down information processing system and pay little attention to details as 
positive affect signals a benign environment. Conversely, if one is in a negative 
emotional state, he is likely to use a bottom-up processing approach and be more 
reflective and deliberate of the situation. The type of information processing system 
used is likely to influence how trustworthy National Express is perceived to be, and 
potentially how willing individuals are to trust company. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Positive trait affect will relate positively to (a) willingness to 
trust and (b) perceived organizational trustworthiness, and negative trait affect will 
relate negatively to (a) willingness to trust and (b) perceived organizational 
trustworthiness. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Positive state affect will positively relate to (a) willingness to 
trust and (b) perceived organizational trustworthiness, and negative state affect will 
relate negatively to (a) willingness to trust and (b) perceived organizational 
trustworthiness. 
Explicit and Implicit Affect 
Organizational researchers have traditionally assumed that attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviours are processes that are conscious enough to be measured accurately, 
using explicit measures such as self-report surveys (Uhlmann, Leavitt, Menges, 
Koopman, Howe & Johnson, 2012). However, social and cognitive psychologists have 
demonstrated that many behaviours result from processes that occur with limited 
cognitive control and sometimes outside the realm of conscious thought (for a review, 
see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Such implicit processes are spontaneous and 
unintentional, and are therefore difficult for participants to accurately self-report. 
However, implicit processes are also useful to researchers when they can be used to 
construct measurement procedures that bypass some of the cognitive biases associated 
with explicit self-report measures, such as the influence of social desirability and 
evaluation apprehension (Uhlmann et al., 2012). Furthermore, explicit processing 
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requires significant attention and motivation to function effectively (Moors & De 
Houwe, 2006, Johnson et al., 2010). A great deal of introspection and deductive 
reasoning are required when measuring affect explicitly, for example, by asking 
someone to give a mood rating regarding the extent to which they agree with 
statements such as “I am happy” or “I am proud” using a scale format (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). These efforts may interfere with participants’ ability to give an 
accurate appraisal of their current state (Johnson et al., 2010).  
The distinction and advantages of implicit versus explicit measures is relevant 
to the current study because it requires the measurement of participants’ state and trait 
affect. Discrete emotions may be easier to measure explicitly due to their salient and 
acute nature (Weiss, 2002). However, by utilising a word-stem completion measure to 
assess implicit trait affect, and the PANAS measure (Waston et al., 1988) to assess 
explicit trait affect, Johnson et al. (2010) demonstrated that the implicit measure 
complemented the explicit one. In their study, both the implicit and explicit measures 
were reliable in finding that positive affect was positively related to task performance 
and citizenship behaviour, and negative affect was negatively related to task 
performance and positively related to counterproductive behaviour.  
I expect that the utilisation of an implicit measure of affect will help guard 
against social desirability responding that may be caused by the use of an explicit 
measure alone. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Positive implicit affect will relate positively to (a) willingness to 
trust and (b) perceived organizational trustworthiness, and negative implicit affect will 
relate negatively to (a) willingness to trust and (b) perceived organizational 
trustworthiness even when effects of explicit affect measures are controlled.  
Emotional Sensitivity 
Emotional sensitivity refers to “skill in receiving and interpreting the 
nonverbal or emotional expressions of others” (Riggio & Reichard, 2008: 171). It is 
an emotion-related individual difference. According to feelings-as-information theory, 
emotion-related individual differences are likely to influence how and to what extent 
affect influences judgement. 
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In a leadership context, emotional sensitivity was first classified as leader 
empathy (Bass, 1960). Emotional sensitivity allows one to gauge the emotional tone 
of a situation, and may be heightened during times of crisis (Riggio & Reichard, 2008). 
Recently, organizational scholars have demonstrated an increased interest in emotional 
sensitivity. Rubin, Munz and Bommer (2005) termed it emotional recognition, and 
found that emotional recognition ability, along with personality characteristics, 
predicted transformational leadership behaviours. Bommer, Pesta and Storrud-Barnes 
(2011) explored the relationship between emotional recognition and assessment centre 
performance, controlling for general mental ability and conscientiousness. They found 
that emotional recognition predicted assessment centre performance uniquely over 
general mental ability and conscientiousness. However, results varied by race, and 
although females generally had greater emotional recognition ability than males, sex 
was not related to assessment centre performance and it did not moderate the 
relationship between emotional recognition and assessment centre performance. 
 I believe that people who have high levels of emotional sensitivity are more 
likely to pick up on and be more affected by the emotional states of other people. 
Regarding trust repair, I expect that this will relate to how individuals perceive trust 
repair efforts. That is, people high in emotional sensitivity will be more able to 
determine the sincerity of such an effort, should it be given in person rather than in the 
form of a written statement. Some trust scholars suggest that sincerity is important 
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). This may be the case, but I believe that emotional sensitivity 
will moderate the ability of people to be able to interpret such a concept. Sincerity may 
be perceived differently depending on how emotionally sensitive a person is. Also, it 
is possible that being party to a trust repair effort may elicit an activation or trigger 
effect in those that are highly emotionally sensitive in that it may trigger potentially 
affect-laden memories of the original transgression that could influence attitudes and 
future behaviours. In the context of this study, I posit that emotional sensitivity will 
moderate the relationship between the dependent variables and affect. However, it is 
difficult to predict a directional relationship without knowing how participants 
interpret the trust repair response. Thus: 
Hypothesis 6: Emotional sensitivity (measured at Time 1) will moderate the 
relationship between affect, willingness to trust and perceived organizational 
trustworthiness at Times 2 and 3. 
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Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory focus theory posits that people either focus more attention on the 
promotion of positive outcomes, or on the prevention of negative outcomes, in pursuit 
of goal attainment (Higgins, 1997). Crowe and Higgins (1997: 117) stated that “a 
promotion focus is concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment, 
whereas a prevention focus is concerned with security, safety and responsibility”. 
Regulatory focus theory has received increasing attention in organizational 
psychology (Lanaj, Chan & Johnson, 2012), and has been found to influence attitudes 
and behaviours in the realms of ethics (Gino & Margolis, 2011), decision-making 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997), negotiations (Appelt & Higgins, 2010), product purchasing 
(Pham & Chang, 2010), and, as discussed in Chapter 2, trust (Keller et al., 2014; Wirtz 
& Lwin, 2009). In a meta-analysis, Lanaj et al. (2012) found that regulatory focus 
theory variables have relevant relationships with work outcomes and are not made 
redundant by other individual difference variables. 
In the context of this study, I am particularly interested in how one’s regulatory 
focus, i.e., whether one primarily holds a promotion or prevention focus, influences 
perceived organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust, and how regulatory 
focus interacts with affect. Gino & Margolis (2011) showed that an individual’s 
regulatory focus influenced the likelihood of him or her acting unethically. These 
authors found that people with a promotion focus were more likely to act unethically 
than those with a prevention focus, and suggested that such an inclination to act 
dishonestly could be explained by one’s attitude towards risk. Individuals with a 
promotion focus are more likely to engage risk-seeking behaviours than are those with 
a prevention focus, which predicts an inclination to avoid risk. As trust involves risk 
(Mayer et al., 1995), it may be that people with a prevention focus will be less likely 
to trust after a transgression than will those with a promotion focus. Equally, those 
with a promotion focus may be more willing to trust after a transgression if they believe 
doing so will help lead to goal attainment.  
Regulatory focus also sensitizes people to experiencing emotions (Lanaj et al., 
2012). Lanaj and colleagues reported that employees with a promotion focus tended 
to report more positive emotions, as well as higher self-esteem and self-efficacy. 
Conversely, prevention-focused employees report more negative emotions and a lower 
feeling of self-worth. This may impact on how people deal with unforeseen 
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difficulties; promotion-focused individuals may be more resilient in the face of such 
problems than their prevention-focused counterparts.  
Taking the above into consideration, I posit that those with high levels of 
prevention focus would be less likely to perceive National Express as being 
trustworthy, and would hold lower levels of trust in the organization than participants 
who are promotion-focused. Promotion-focused individuals were expected to have 
higher perceptions of trustworthiness and overall trust levels, particularly after trust 
repair. Therefore, the following two hypotheses based on regulatory focus theory were 
proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Promotion-focus (measured at Time 1) will moderate the 
relationships of affect with (a) willingness to trust and (b) perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, measured at Times 2 and 3. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Prevention-focus (measured at Time 1) will moderate the 
relationships of affect with (a) trust and (b) perceived organizational trustworthiness, 
measured at Times 2 and 3. 
Study 1 Methods 
Participants 
100 participants were recruited via Prolific Academic to take part in the Time 
1 baseline data collection, with the knowledge that they would be invited to take part 
in the experiment itself a week later. The baseline survey was posted to the website, 
and participants were solicited until the quota of 100 responses was filled. The 
participants were then randomly assigned to either a treatment or control group using 
a random number generator, and they were invited to take part in the experiment a 
week later. In total, 82 individuals responded and took part in the experiment, 40 were 
assigned to the treatment condition and 42 to the control condition. Of this sample of 
82, 78 respondents reported their gender; 40 were female and 38 were male. 45% of 
the sample was aged between 20-29 years. The next most common age ranges were 
30-39 years (18%) and under 20 years (17%). In terms of highest level of education 
attained, 35% had completed a Bachelor’s degree, 31% had finished their A-Level 
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qualifications and 18% had obtained a postgraduate degree. Independent-samples t-
tests showed that there were no statistically significant differences between the 
demographics of the treatment and control groups. Table 6.1 shows complete 
demographic information for both the treatment and control groups. 
 
Table 6.1 - Study 1 Demographic Information 
 
Research Design and Procedures 
A pre-screening process took place to ensure that only people based in the 
United Kingdom with English as their first language could take part in the study. This 
decision was taken to minimise possible issues with language comprehension, and 
because the experimental stimuli occurred in the United Kingdom and affected a 
 Treatment Group  Control Group 
 Number % Number % 
Gender 38 100% 40 100% 
   Male (1) 19 50% 19 47.50% 
   Female (2) 19 50% 21 52.50% 
Age Category 40 100% 42 100% 
   Under 20 10 25% 4 9.50% 
   20-29 17 42.50% 20 47.60% 
   30-39 6 15% 9 21.40% 
   40-49 6 15% 7 16.70% 
   50-59 1 2.5% 1 2.40% 
   60-65 0 0% 0 0.00% 
   Over 65 0 0% 1 2.40% 
Education Level 40 100% 42 100% 
   GCSEs 3 7.50% 1 2.40% 
   A Levels 15 37.50% 10 23.80% 
   Professional Qualification 4 10% 5 11.90% 
   Bachelor's Degree 13 32.50% 16 38.10% 
   Postgraduate 5 12.50% 10 23.80% 
   No Formal Qualifications 0 0% 0 0% 
Heard of National Express? 37 100% 38 100% 
   Yes (1) 36 97.30% 37 97.40% 
   No (2) 1 2.70% 1 2.60% 
Travelled with National Express 40 100% 40 100% 
   Yes - Since 2008 (1) 13 32.50% 11 28.20% 
   Yes - Prior to 2008 (2) 8 20% 12 30.80% 
   No (3) 19 47.50% 16 42% 
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British company. A week before the experimental component of the study began, 
participants completed a baseline survey collecting individual difference and 
demographic information, as well measures of baseline willingness to trust, 
perceptions of trustworthiness, and affect. The individual difference measures 
collected in this survey were trust propensity, state affect, emotional sensitivity, and 
regulatory focus orientation. After completing the individual difference measures, 
participants were then asked if they had heard of National Express, and if they had 
travelled with the company within the last four years (at the time of data collection, 
the accident had occurred four years previously), over four years ago, or not at all. 
They were then shown one of the company’s promotional videos before being asked 
about how trustworthy they deemed National Express to be, and the level of trust they 
had in the organization. This was used as a baseline for perceptions of trustworthiness 
and willingness to trust.  
I took the survey to estimate how long it would take to complete, and sent it to 
a colleague who did the same. These times were averaged, any survey that took less 
than eight minutes, one standard deviation below this average time, to complete was 
discarded. Each submission was also examined for evidence of straight-lined or 
incongruous responses. A similar procedure was undertaken in the second part of the 
study. Participants were paid twice; once upon completion of the first survey, and once 
upon completion of the second. 
In the experiment, conducted approximately a week after completing the 
baseline survey, participants watched a video of a Channel 4 News segment. The video 
was embedded in a Qualtrics survey and the segment contained a news report of a 
National Express coach crash, followed by a live interview with the CEO of National 
Express in which he discusses the incident and the company’s immediate response to 
it. In the context of this thesis and the trust repair literature, the coach crash event 
constitutes an organizational failure, and the CEO’s interview is an immediate trust 
repair response to the failure (c.f. Gillespie & Dietz, 2009), as shown in Table 6.2, 
which also contains sample quotes from interview. Next to each quote is an example 
of the kind of trust repair response it is (i.e. apology, explanation, penance etc.). 
After seeing the crash segment, both the treatment and control groups were 
asked to indicate their affective state before reporting their perceptions of National 
Expresses trustworthiness and indicating their level of trust in the company.  
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Following this, the manipulation took place. The treatment group watched the 
CEO’s interview (i.e., the trust repair effort), while the control group watched an 
unrelated video about news regulation and thus did not witness any trust repair activity. 
See Appendix G for a transcript of the trust repair manipulation interview. 
 
Table 6.2 - Evidence of Study 1 Treatment Group Manipulation Quotes, 
Response Types and Trust Repair Stage 
 
The filler clip was chosen because it was similar in length to the manipulation, 
shared the same news interview format, and the interviewee shared similar 
characteristics with the National Express CEO (i.e., was a white, middle-aged male). 
Both groups then had their affective states measured and were given a word-stem 
completion task to assess implicit affect before giving their perceptions of National 
Express and indicating their levels of trust for a third time. 
Measures 
This section presents the measures used in Study 1 (Appendix D) contains the 
full set of items for each measure described in this section). Rationales for the use of 
each measure, as well as reliability statistics from previous samples are provided.  
 
Quote 
 
Response Type 
Trust Repair Stage 
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009) 
“Well the first thing I think we 
must say is that our condolences 
do go to the families that have lost 
loved ones today, and to those who 
are still very poorly in hospital”. 
Expression of regret Immediate response 
   
“As to what happened, we are 
cooperating with the police, we’re 
working with everybody to find 
out what did happen”. 
Explanation 
 
Immediate response 
 
   
“We have taken all of the vehicles 
today, the twelve double-deckers 
that we have, out of service. With 
the manufacturer’s team of 
engineers, we are checking them, 
that is because safety is top 
priority for us and we’re just going 
to make absolutely sure”. 
Self-regulation Immediate response 
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Dependent Variable Measures 
Organizational Trustworthiness. Eight items were adapted from McKnight, 
Choudhury and Kacmar’s (2002) 11-item subscale of trusting beliefs. This subscale 
was chosen above others because it relates to perceptions of an organization external 
to the perceiver. A number of the most cited measures of trust and trustworthiness 
relate to interpersonal trust with managers/supervisors (i.e., Mayer & Davis, 1999; 
McAllister, 1995) inter-organizational trust between boundary-role persons (i.e., 
Currall & Judge, 1995) trust between collective entities involving negotiation and 
exchange (i.e., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996), and thus were not as relevant to the 
current study.  
The original McKnight et al. subscale focused on e-commerce, and related to 
trust in company that provides legal advice. Because of their content specific to this 
context, three of the McKnight et al. items were not deemed to be adaptable to the 
context of a coach provider, and were thus not included in the measure for this study. 
More specifically, those discarded items are: 
 
1. In general, LegalAdvice.com is very knowledgeable about the law. 
2. If I required help, LegalAdvice.com would do its best to help me. 
3. Overall, LegalAdvice.com is a capable and proficient Internet legal advice 
provider. 
 
In addition, the wording of one other item from the original McKnight et al. 
scale was changed from “truthful in its dealings with me” to “truthful in its dealings 
with stakeholders” to obtain a more general overview of participants’ perceptions of a 
company with which they may not have interacted with personally. Where applicable, 
“LegalAdvice.com” was changed to “National Express”, and “internet legal advice 
provider” was changed to “coach provider”. Regarding the trustworthiness 
dimensions, three of the items used in the current study relate to benevolence, three to 
integrity and two to ability. The original 11-item subscale had strong reliability with 
an alpha of .96.  
Willingness to Trust. Four items were developed to measure trust for the 
purpose of this study. They focus on the decision stage of the trust process, and are 
worded as behavioural intentions (“how willing are you to…?”). The items relate to 
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willingness to be vulnerable (i.e., “How willing are you to rely on National Express to 
get you to your destination safely?”), and general willingness to use the company 
(“How willing are you to use National Express to take a long-distance journey?”). 
Although worded as behavioural intentions, the items denote willingness; they are not 
indicators that behaviours actually have occurred, or will definitely take place (Dietz 
& den Hartog, 2006; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). However, willingness to engage 
in a trusting behaviour is considered to be the most proximal antecedent of actual 
trusting behaviour (Currall & Judge, 1995). 
Affect Measures 
Implicit Affect. A 20-item word-stem completion task developed by Johnson 
(2006), and tested by Johnson et al. (2010) was selected to measure implicit affect. 
Participants were asked to complete each word-stem as quickly as possible, and to skip 
any items that they were unable to complete. An example item is “_ O Y “, with “JOY” 
being the target positive affect word, and “BOY” being a neutral word. The authors 
calculated the total number of words completed by participants and then divided the 
number of implicit positive affect (IPA) words and the number of implicit negative 
affect (INA) words by the total number of words completed to calculate a score for 
each dimension. I used the same procedure in this study. In the Johnson et al. (2010) 
paper, the measure’s Cohen’s κ was .91, indicating good reliability.  
Explicit Affect. The 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson et al., 1998) was used to measure both trait and state explicit affect. Watson et 
al. (1998) reported the Cronbach alpha coefficient was .86 to .90 (depending on time 
instructions; e.g. at this moment, today, this year etc.) for the Positive Affect Scale and 
.84 to .87 for the Negative Affect scale, suggesting good internal consistency. To 
measure trait affect, in the instructions preceding the items, participants were asked to 
report on the extent that they feel certain emotions ‘in general’. To measure state affect, 
the instructions were changed to ask participants to report on the extent that they feel 
certain emotions ‘right now, that is, at the present moment’.  
Individual Difference Measures 
Emotional Sensitivity. To measure emotional sensitivity, 12 items were 
adopted from Bloise and Johnson’s (2007) Emotional and Interpersonal Sensitivity 
Measure (EISM). Bloise and Johnson used 8 items from the Emotional Sensitivity 
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subscale and Social Sensitivity subscale of Riggio’s (1986) Social Skills Index (SSI) 
to construct their instrument. They also added 4 items of their own to comprise the 
EISM. The overall SSI and the items from the Emotional Sensitivity and Social 
Sensitivity subscales have been well-established in other studies (e.g. Riggio, 1986; 
Riggio, Watring & Throckmorton, 1993), and the EISM had acceptable reliability with 
a coefficient alpha of .72.  
Regulatory Focus. The 18-item General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM) 
developed by Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda (2002) was used to measure regulatory 
focus. Both the promotion (Cronbach’s alpha: .81) and prevention (Cronbach’s alpha: 
.75) subscales were reliable in Lockwood et al.’s (2002) study 
Propensity to Trust. This variable was measured with 12 items adapted from 
Chun & Campbell’s (1974) short form of Rotter’s (1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale. 
The coefficient alphas for the short form version were shown to be .80 and .74 over 
two samples (Chun & Campbell, 1974).  
Results 
Correlations, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and regression analyses were 
used to test the hypotheses. See Table 6.3 for an overview of the means, standard 
deviations and reliabilities of the entire sample and Table 6.4 for zero-order 
correlations between the dependent, affect and individual difference variables. Table 
6.5 shows the means and standard deviations for the same variables in the trust-repair 
and no-trust-repair groups as well as independent samples t-tests to determine if there 
are any significant mean differences between the two groups. In order to present a clear 
narrative, the results of the hypothesis testing are presented under four headings:  
 
1. Was willingness to trust (trust) and perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness (trustworthiness) breached and was there a recovery? 
2. The role of trait, state and implicit affect on trust and trustworthiness. 
3. Individual differences and their influence on the relationships between affect, 
trust and trustworthiness. 
4. Further exploratory analyses. 
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Table 6.3 - Study 1 Variable Means, Standard Deviations and Reliabilities 
for Full Sample 
Note. N = 82. M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. T = Time. 
 
Table 6.4 reports results of independent samples t-tests of variables conducted 
to determine whether there were significant differences between the treatment (i.e., 
those receiving the trust repair) and control groups. Prior to these analyses, Levene’s 
test for equality of variance was consulted for each of the variables, showing that 
variability in NA at Times 1 and 3, and in TPA were significantly different between 
groups, thus degrees of freedom for the t-tests of these variables were adjusted 
accordingly. The tests for mean differences showed a significant difference between 
the two groups in emotional sensitivity, measured at Time 1. Thus, this is a pre-existing 
difference that had nothing to do with the experimental procedure. The treatment group 
had a significantly lower emotional sensitivity mean than the control group, mean 
difference score = -.35. 95% CI [-.605 to -.085], t(78) = -2.64, p = .01. 
There were also significant differences in NA at Time 3 and INA at Time 3. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the trust repair condition group had a significantly higher 
mean level of negative affect at Time 3 than did the no-trust-repair group: mean 
difference score = .43, 95% CI [.19 to .67], t(53.34) = 3.57, p <.001. With this being 
Variable M SD Alpha 
 1. Trust, T1 3.97 .64 .72 
 2. Trust, T2 3.11 1.02 .90 
 3. Trust, T3 3.27 .95 .91 
 4. Trustworthiness, T1 3.38 .43 .80 
 5. Trustworthiness, T2 3.13 .67 .90 
 6. Trustworthiness, T3 3.29 .65 .91 
 7. Positive Affect, T1 2.40 .81 .91 
 8. Positive Affect, T2 1.78 .69 .89 
 9. Positive Affect, T3 1.89 .77 .92 
10. Negative Affect, T1 1.31 .55 .91 
11. Negative Affect, T2 2.20 .97 .90 
12. Negative Affect, T3 1.41 .57 .86 
13. Trait Positive Affect 3.10 72 .89 
14. Trait Negative Affect 1.95 .85 .86 
15. Implicit Positive Affect 0.39 .19 -- 
16. Implicit Negative Affect 0.49 .18 -- 
17. Trust Propensity 3.31 .39 .74 
18. Emotional Sensitivity 3.22 .61 .80 
19 Promotion 6.29 1.56 .92 
20 Prevention 5.40 1.56 .85 
Chapter 6: Study 1 – Mood and Individual Differences in Trust Repair 
108 
 
the case, it may not be surprising that the treatment group also had a statistically 
significant mean level of INA than their control group counterparts; mean difference 
score = .09, 95% CI [.013 to .170], t(80) = 2.32, p = .023. These counter-intuitive 
results highlight the importance of looking at change in affect in the hypothesis tests 
that will be made a bit later in this chapter. The critical question is not whether the 
treatment and control groups differ in Time 3 levels of mean affect, but whether their 
changes in levels of affect from Time 2 to Time 3 differ. 
Reviewing Table 6.5, there are a few correlations of particular interest. 
Foreshadowing the hypothesis testing, it is evident that there are significant negative 
correlations between NA at Time 2 and both dependent variables at Time 2. For trust, 
the relationship was as follows: r = -.25, p = .025. For trustworthiness, r = -.29, p = 
.008. It is important to note that these measures were taken after the participants 
watched the news report (the trust transgression), but before the differential trust repair 
manipulation. With this in mind, the relationship between NA at Time 2 and emotional 
sensitivity is also interesting; r = .32, p = .004. This may indicate that the level of 
negative affect participants feel after seeing the transgression stimulus relates to how 
emotionally sensitive they are. Moreover, emotional sensitivity was also positively 
correlated with TNA, r = .31, p = .006. These relationships hint at a possible 
relationship between the dependent variables, negative affect and emotional 
sensitivity, which is examined in the hypothesis testing.  
At Time 1 and Time 2, all participants were subject to the same materials, but 
at Time 3 the treatment group saw a trust repair effort and the control group did not. 
Hence, Time 3 relationships were analysed using partial correlations, to control for the 
trust repair manipulation effects. There were no statistically significant zero-order 
correlations of either of the dependent variables at Time 3 with any of the affect or 
individual difference variables. However, there was one significant correlation 
between an affect variable and an individual difference variable when the condition 
(treatment vs. control) was controlled. Namely, emotional sensitivity was negatively 
correlated with PA at Time 3, r = -.24, p = .04. 
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Table 6.4 - Experimental and Control Group Means, Standard Deviations 
and Independent Samples t-tests. 
 Treatment Group  Control Group  
Variable M SD  M SD t 
1. Trust, T1 3.83 .59  4.10 .67 -1.88 
 2. Trust, T2 3.00 1.05  3.21 .99 -.93 
 3. Trust, T3 3.26 .92  3.29 .99 -.14 
 4. Trustworthiness, T1 3.33 .47  3.42 .39 -.93 
 5. Trustworthiness, T2 3.09 .68  3.16 .65 -.48 
 6. Trustworthiness, T3 3.35 .61  3.22 .69 .93 
 7. Positive Affect, T1 2.37 .83  2.43 .80 -.35 
 8. Positive Affect, T2 1.70 .62  1.85 .75 -.99 
 9. Positive Affect, T3 1.78 .68  1.98 .84 -1.19 
10. Negative Affect, T1 1.20 .40  1.42 .65 -1.88 
11. Negative Affect, T2 2.31 1.06  2.10 .89 .95 
12. Negative Affect, T3 1.63 .70  1.20 .31 3.58** 
13. Trait Positive Affect 2.94 .80  3.24 .60 -1.88 
14. Trait Negative Affect 1.88 .87  2.02 .82 -.76 
15. Implicit Positive Affect 0.42 .17  0.37 .20 1.21 
16. Implicit Negative Affect 0.53 .18  0.44 .18 2.32* 
17. Trust Propensity 3.23 .43  3.39 .34 -1.89 
18. Emotional Sensitivity. 3.05 .55  3.39 .62 -2.65** 
19. Promotion  6.00 1.47  6.60 1.70 -1.85 
20. Prevention  5.16 1.50  5.64 1.57 -1.43 
Note. N = 82, df ranged from 53 to 80. Emot’l Sens = Emotional Sensitivity, PA = 
Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect, Trustworth. = Trustworthiness. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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Table 6.5 - Study 1 Bivariate Correlations 
Note. N = 82. Implicit NA = Implicit Negative Affect 
 r>|22| has p <.05; r>|28| has p <.01; r>|35| has p <.001 (two-tailed). 
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 1. Trust, T1 47 49 34 29 34 02 13 03 01 02 -06 08 14 04 -14 07 19 -10 -09 
 2. Trust, T2 -- 89 11 64 62 -19 00 -09 -08 -25 -20 -15 10 04 -05 17 -08 -17 16 
 3. Trust, T3  -- 15 60 70 -15 02 -04 -05 -17 -13 -10 12 09 .03 17 -04 -18 16 
 4. Trustworthiness, T1   -- 39 40 .21 12 18 04 16 06 30 33 -16 -07 08 32 14 19 
 5. Trustworthiness, T2    -- 80 -11 00 -02 -14 -29 -18 -03 -04 -01 -16 07 -13 -04 -05 
 6. Trustworthiness, T3     -- -02 02 01 -19 -17 -09 04 03 05 -05 05 -08 -04 07 
 7. Positive Affect, T1      -- 57 50 12 19 19 61 -01 -06 07 06 02 22 -03 
 8. Positive Affect, T2       -- 83 10 -08 -08 38 -12 07 08 05 10 09 10 
 9. Positive Affect, T3        -- 18 00 -05 .39 -05 09 08 09 -17 09 -02 
10. Negative Affect, T1         -- 21 18 01 34 -06 02 38 06 -21 24 
11. Negative Affect, T2          -- 69 15 47 08 17 -02 32 -03 19 
12. Negative Affect, T3           -- -02 33 09 25 -05 17 -06 13 
13. Trait Positive Affect             -- -10 03 17 03 17 43 -11 
14. Trait Negative Affect              -- -04 -09 15 31 -07 56 
15. Implicit Positive Affect              -- 42 -07 08 01 10 
16. Implicit NA               -- -05 10 -10 15 
17. Trust Propensity                -- 15 15 24 
18. Emotional Sensitivity                 -- 19 32 
19 Promotion                  -- 20 
20 Prevention                   -- 
Chapter 6: Study 1 – Mood and Individual Differences in Trust Repair 
111 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test a series of models to determine 
the effects of affect, emotional sensitivity and regulatory focus on perceptions of 
trustworthiness and willingness to trust. Moreover, hierarchical linear regression was 
chosen as a method of analysis as it enabled me to test for moderation effects. New 
forms of the two dependent variables were created for these analyses. Specifically, the 
difference between Time 3 and Time 2 values was calculated to create difference 
scores for trust and trustworthiness. A similar procedure was used to create difference 
scores for two of the predictor variables: PA and NA. In preparation for the moderator 
analyses, the values of emotional sensitivity, Time 3 – Time 2 PA and NA difference 
scores, IPA and INA scores, and promotion and prevention were mean-centred, and 
multiplicative interaction terms were created from the centred variables. Each 
regression was performed on the sample split into treatment and control groups. The 
results of the analyses are presented in Tables 6.7 – 6.13. For an overview of the 
hypotheses and whether they were supported, see Table 6.6. Table 6.14 relates to 
exploratory, post-hoc analysis of the regression of the trust difference score on the NA 
difference score and the trustworthiness difference score to determine whether NA was 
a significant predictor of willingness to trust when controlling for cognitive 
evaluations of perceptions of trustworthiness. Results in Tables 6.5 – 6.14 are shown 
for both the treatment and control groups. Interestingly, there were no statistically 
significant results in the control group, suggesting that any significant results in the 
treatment group were not simply caused by time.  
As a precursor to the results, analyses were undertaken three times. Once with 
all affective measures included in regressions of the dependent variables with 
individual differences, that is, trait, explicit and implicit measures, once with explicit 
and implicit measures, and once with explicit measures only. The results tables related 
to relationships between the dependent variables, affect variables, and individual 
difference variables included in the text are those that include explicit measures of 
affect only. Moreover, the individual difference variable of trust propensity did not 
have any hypotheses regarding its effects. Rather, it was expected that it would relate 
to trust and trustworthiness and would be an important control variable in the 
regression models. However, it did not significantly correlate with either of the 
dependent variables at any time point. Furthermore, trust propensity was included as a 
control variable in all analyses that included the trust and perceived organizational 
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trustworthiness variables, but it was not found to alter results to a significant degree. 
Hence, I took the decision to re-run analyses without it for the sake of parsimony and 
these are the results contained within the text and corresponding tables.  
Tests of Trust Breach and Repair Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that immediately following the trust violation, there 
would be an overall decrease in the levels of the two dependent variables from Time 
1 to Time 2, namely, (a) willingness to trust in the organization and (b) perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness. To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to compare the 
change in willingness to trust and perceptions of trustworthiness responses from Time 
1 to Time 2, for both the treatment and the control group going across the full sample.  
Hypothesis 2 proposed that, compared to participants in the control condition 
who did not receive a trust repair response, those in the treatment condition who 
received the trust repair response would show a greater recovery in levels of the two 
dependent variables: (a) willingness to trust in the organization and (b) perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness, indicating that participants perceived a trust breach. 
Thus, this hypothesis involves a proposed interaction effect, namely, that the 
experimental group will show a larger change in trust and trustworthiness means from 
Time 2 to Time 3 than will the control group combined. 
To test these hypotheses, ANOVA analyses were undertaken. For Hypothesis 
1, a 2 (treatment vs. control groups) x 2 (Time 1 vs. Time 2) repeated measures 
ANOVA model was used in separate tests for each of the two dependent variables. 
Note that at both times, the two conditions had received the same materials in the 
study, so they would be expected to show the same pattern of drops in trust and 
trustworthiness. In other words, Hypothesis 1 suggests that there should be a main 
effect for time (i.e., a decrease in means from T1 to T2), but no time-by-condition 
interaction effect would be expected in the ANOVA. 
For Hypothesis 2, the 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA analysis was also used, 
although the time factor now involved the comparison of Time 2 vs. Time 3 values of 
the dependent variables. Support for Hypothesis 2 would consist of a statistically 
significant time-by-condition interaction effect, in contrast to Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 6.6 - Overview of Study 1 Hypotheses, Analyses Methods and 
Evidence of Support Continued 
 
 
Hypothesis Method of Analysis Hypothesis Supported? 
There will be a decrease 
in (a) trust in the 
organisation and (b) 
perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, 
immediately following 
the trust violation, as 
indicated by the change 
in responses from Time 1 
to Time 
2 (condition: treatment 
vs. control group) x 2 
(time: Time 1 vs. Time 
2 DV measures) 
ANOVA. Main effect 
for time expected, but 
no time-by-condition 
interaction effect. 
Full Support 
   
Compared to participants 
who do not receive a trust 
repair response, those 
who receive the trust 
repair response will show 
a greater recovery in 
levels of (a) trust in the 
organisation and (b) 
perceived 
trustworthiness, as 
indicated by the change 
in responses from Time 2 
to Time 3. 
2 (condition: treatment 
vs. control group) x 2 
(time: Time 2 vs. Time 
3 DV measures) 
ANOVA. Significant 
time-by-condition 
interaction effect 
expected. 
Partial Support – Significant 
time-by condition effects 
found for perceptions of 
trustworthiness. Effects 
significant at the .10-, but 
not .05-level for trust.  
   
Positive trait affect will 
relate positively to (a) 
trust and (b) perceived 
organisational 
trustworthiness, and 
negative trait affect will 
relate negatively to (a) 
trust and (b) perceived 
organisational 
trustworthiness. 
Correlations between 
the dependent variables 
at T1, T2 and T3 and the 
trait affectivity 
measures at T1, 
followed by hierarchical 
regressions of trust and 
trustworthiness change 
on trait, state and 
implicit affect measures 
No Support 
   
Explicit positive state 
affect will positively 
relate to (a) trust and (b) 
perceived organisational 
trustworthiness, and 
negative state affect will 
relate negatively to (a) 
trust and (b) perceived 
organisational 
trustworthiness. 
Correlations between 
the dependent variables 
at T1, T2 and T3 and the 
explicit measures of 
affect at T1, T2 and T3, 
followed by hierarchical 
regressions of trust and 
trustworthiness change 
on trait, state and 
implicit affect measures. 
Full Support 
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Table 6.6 continued 
Note. DV = Dependent variable, T = Time (e.g. ‘T1’ = Time 1). 
 
Hypothesis 1a, which pertained to trust failure, was supported; there appears 
to have been a trust breach at Time 2, as expected. The effect of time was statistically 
significant, F(1, 80) = 72.00, p < .001. Yet, as predicted, at this point there was no 
statistically significant difference between the treatment and control conditions, as 
indicated by the lack of a significant time-by-condition effect, (1, 80) = .08, p = .78. 
   
Emotional sensitivity 
(measured at Time 1) will 
moderate the relationship 
between affect, trust and 
perceived organisational 
trustworthiness at Times 2 
and 3. 
Multiple linear regressions 
of the dependent 
variables’ difference 
scores on emotional 
sensitivity and other 
independent variables 
related to affect. 
Partial Support – Moderation 
effect apparent in the 
relationship between 
emotional sensitivity, explicit 
positive affect and trust 
difference score. 
   
Promotion-focus (measured 
at Time 1) will moderate 
the relationships of affect 
with (a) trust and (b) 
perceived organisational 
trustworthiness, measured 
at Times 2 and 3. 
Multiple linear regressions 
of the dependent 
variables’ difference 
scores on promotion focus 
and other independent 
variables related to affect. 
No Support 
   
Prevention-focus 
(measured at Time 1) will 
moderate the relationships 
of affect with (a) trust and 
(b) perceived organisational 
trustworthiness, measured 
at Times 2 and 3. 
Multiple linear regressions 
of the dependent 
variables’ difference 
scores on prevention focus 
and other independent 
variables related to affect. 
Partial Support – Moderation 
effect apparent in the 
relationships between 
prevention-focus, explicit 
negative affect and the 
trustworthiness difference 
score, but not the trust 
difference score. 
   
Exploratory, Post Hoc 
Analysis – Is negative 
affect change from Time 2 
to Time 3 still a significant 
indicator of trust change 
from Time 2 to Time 3 
when Trustworthiness 
change from Time 2 to 
Time 3 is included in 
analysis? 
Hierarchical linear 
regression of (1) trust 
change on negative affect 
change and (2) trust 
change on negative affect 
change and 
trustworthiness change. 
Support would entail 
negative affect change 
remaining a significant 
indicator when 
trustworthiness change is 
included in the regression. 
Full Support 
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The treatment group’s mean level of trust fell by .83, from 3.83 at Time 1 to 3.00 at 
Time 2. In the control group, it decreased by .91, from 4.10 to 3.21.  
Hypothesis 1b was also supported, perceived organisational trustworthiness 
significantly declined in both groups from Time 1 to Time 2, F(1, 80) = 12.62, p = 
.001. The difference between the treatment and control groups was not significant, as 
expected, F(1, 80), = .02, p = .90. In the treatment group, mean trustworthiness dropped 
by .24, from 3.33 to 3.09, and in the control group it fell by .25, from 3.42 to 3.17.  
Hypothesis 2a, which focused on trust repair, received weak support for the 
trust variable; the time-by-condition interaction effect was not statistically significant 
at the .05 level, F(1, 80) = 3.16, p = .08. However, the pattern of the interaction effect 
was as expected. Specifically, trust recovered to a greater extent in the treatment group 
than in the control group, with the mean level of trust increasing by .26, from 3.00 at 
Time 2 to 3.26 at Time 3. There was also an increase in trust in the control group, but 
it was smaller; .08, from 3.21 at Time 2 to 3.29 at Time 3. Hypothesis 2b was fully 
supported, as the time-by-condition interaction effect was statistically significant for 
the trustworthiness variable, F(1, 80) = 5.24, p = .025. Again, the pattern for the 
significant interaction effect was as expected. Namely, there was a greater recovery in 
mean trustworthiness from Time 2 to Time 3 in the treatment group, with means of 
3.09 and 3.35, respectively. Perceptions of organizational trustworthiness also 
increased in the control group, but to a lesser extent, with a Time 2 mean of 3.17 and 
a Time 3 mean of 3.22. These values are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 depicts 
change in willingness to trust from baseline (Time 1) to post-violation (Time 2) to 
post-repair (Time 3) in the treatment and control groups. Figure 3 shows the same 
process for change in perceptions of trustworthiness. 
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Figure 2. Study 1 Trust Violation and Repair: Estimated Marginal Means 
of Trust from Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 1 Trustworthiness Violation and Repair: Estimated 
Marginal Means of Trustworthiness from Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 
3). 
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The results described in this section offer support for Hypotheses 1 (breach) 
and 2 (recovery). There was a breach in the dependent variables of willingness to trust 
and perceptions of organizational trustworthiness after the trust violation, as 
demonstrated by the significant drop in mean levels of trust in the whole sample from 
Time 1 to Time 2. Furthermore, both levels of trust and of perceived organizational 
trustworthiness increased in the trust repair condition group to a greater extent than 
they did in the control group from Time 2 to Time 3, indicating trust repair effects. 
Tests of Mood Effects on Trust Outcomes 
Earlier in the results section, I briefly described the zero-order correlations 
between variables used in this study. TPA and TNA both positively correlated to 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness at Time 1, and NA at Time 2 negatively 
correlated to both willingness to trust and trustworthiness at Time 2. Implicit affect 
measures did not correlate with either dependent variable at any time point.  
Although correlation matrices tell us about relationships between two variables 
in isolation, in order to understand the relationships that trait, state and implicit affect 
have on the dependent variables and individual difference variables, they must be 
considered not in isolation, but together. To do this, multiple linear regression analyses 
were undertaken to determine how the three sets of variables related to the difference 
scores (Time 2 to Time 3) of willingness to trust and perceived organizational 
trustworthiness. As trait affect is an individual difference, the trait affect variable of 
interest (either TNA or TPA, respectively) was included first, followed by explicit 
affect (either NA or PA), then implicit affect (either INA or IPA). This allowed me to 
determine whether trait affect alone could predict either of the dependent variables, 
whether state affect added anything above and beyond the trait measures, and finally 
whether the addition of implicit affect would substantively increase the predictive 
variance in the dependent variables, thus testing Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
Note that all regression coefficients reported are unstandardized. 
Trait affect results. As demonstrated in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, respectively, 
neither TNA nor TPA were statistically significant in predicting a change in 
perceptions of trustworthiness (Δ trustworthiness) from Time 2 to Time 3, and when 
state affect measures were included in analyses, the unstandardized regression 
coefficients of TNA (Table 6.6, Model 1, b = .09, t = .95) and TPA (Table 6.7, Model 
Chapter 6: Study 1 – Mood and Individual Differences in Trust Repair 
118 
 
1, b = <.01, t = .02) indicate that trait affect does not add anything to the relationship 
that cannot be explained by state measures. Although for change in willingness to trust 
(Δ trust), TPA was significant at the .10 level (p = .086), and formed a positive 
relationship, as expected (Table 6.7, Model 1, b = .19, t = 1.76), when PA was added 
to the regression, it accounted for greater variance and subsumed the effect of the trait 
measure. The TPA b was just .03, t = .26, implying that the state measure of affect was 
more significant predictor of Δ trust than the trait measure. TNA was not statistically 
significant in predicting Δ trust, and the addition of state negative affect variables 
diminished its significance further. Hence, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Given this 
finding, further regressions including state and implicit measures of affect were 
recalculated without trait variables.  
State affect results. Results pertaining to state affect and implicit affect, which 
is discussed in the following paragraph, are displayed in Table 6.9. Δ NA had a 
significant relationship with Δ trustworthiness, F(2, 37) = 4.45, p = .02, R² = .19. 
Moreover, the regression coefficients of the Time 2 and Time 3 measures indicate a 
difference effect (T2 b = .39, t = 2.96, T3 b = -.46, t = -2.29). Δ PA did not have a 
significant relationship with Δ trustworthiness at the .05 level, F(2, 37) = 2.77, p =.076, 
R² = .13. The Time 3 measure explained more variance than Time 2 but it was not 
statistically significant, T3 b = .28, t = 1.57, T2 b = -.01, t = -.07.  
Both PA and NA appeared to have significant relationships with Δ trust. As 
with trustworthiness, there seemed to be an important difference between Time 2 and 
Time 3 NA (T2 b = .42, t = 3.23, T3 b= -.43, t = -2.05) that meant a significant 
relationship occurred between Δ NA and Δ trust, F(2, 37) = 7.47, p = .002, R² = .29. Δ 
PA also had a significant relationship with Δ trust, F(2, 37) = 6.01, p = .002, R² = .25, 
and Time 3 seemed to be a more significant predictor than Time 2 (T2 b = -.15, t = -
.83, T3 b = .51, t = 3.78). In sum, Hypothesis 4 was supported; NA related significantly 
to both dependent variables at the .05 level, and PA was significantly related to trust 
at the .05 level and trustworthiness at the .10 level. Hence, NA seemed to be 
predominant, and the difference between it at Times 2 and 3 were of particular 
importance in the trust repair context of this study.  
Implicit affect results. INA, appeared to be a significant predictor of both Δ 
trustworthiness and Δ trust above and beyond explicit state negative affect measures. 
The relationship with Δ trustworthiness was as follows: ΔF(2, 37) = 5.58, p = .004, 
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ΔR² = .11. The implicit regression coefficient was significant (b = .94, t = 2.36). For Δ 
trust, this was the relationship: ΔF(2, 37) = 5.61, p = .001, ΔR² = .10, b = .94, t = 2.37. 
IPA was a significant predictor of Δ trustworthiness even when controlling PA 
(p = .076 for Model 2 without IPA, p = .030 for Model 3 with IPA), but not for Δ trust 
(p = .002 for Model 2 without IPA, p = .003 for Model 3 with IPA). 
However, it is difficult to explain the positive direction of the INA regression 
coefficients in relationships with both Δ trustworthiness and Δ trust. Consulting the 
corresponding bivariate correlations also indicates an unexpected relationship. 
Specifically, the relationships between INA and trust at Times 1 and 2 were negative 
as expected, yet at Time 3 it was positive, if nonsignificant (r = .03, p = .789). For 
trustworthiness, the relationships were negative, at all time points, as expected. 
However, they were nonsignificant. It is likely that the unexpected positive regression 
coefficient relationships between INA and both Δ trustworthiness and Δ trust was 
caused by multicollinearity, given that the relationship between the predictor variables 
of INA and NA Time 3 was significant (r = .25, p = .023), yet relations between INA 
and each of the dependent variables were all almost non-existent. With this possibility 
in mind, it was decided that implicit measures would not be included in further 
analyses for the purposes of this study. Therefore, Hypothesis 5, relating to the 
influence of implicit affect on the dependent variables of Δ trustworthiness and Δ trust, 
was inconclusive. That is not to say they should not be considered in future research.  
In conclusion, it appears that state affect, particularly NA, played an important 
role in the restoration of both trust and perceptions of trustworthiness following the 
post repair manipulation in the treatment group. Moreover, it is the difference effect 
between the Time 2 and Time 3 measures that is important. PA also appeared to predict 
Δ trust, and to a lesser extent, trustworthiness, but only at Time 3. Trait affect was 
found to add nothing above and beyond what state affect predicts, and further 
investigation into the role of implicit affect is required.   
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Table 6.7 - Regression of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on Trait and State Negative Affect Variables 
Note. Treatment n= 40, Control n = 41. Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 Trustworthiness, thus positive 
values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness from T2 to T3. Δ Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust from T3 Trust, 
thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. TNA = Trait Negative Affect, NA = Negative Affect, INA = Implicit 
Negative Affect PA = Positive Affect. Regression weights are unstandardized. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
  
   Treatment   Control  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
Independent Variable  Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Tworth               
TNA  .12 1.29 .09 .95 .08 .89 -.01 -.10 -.01 -.17 -.02 -.27 
NA 2  -- -- .37 2.79* .40 3.14* .-- -- -.01 -.11 .00 -.06 
NA 3  -- -- -.48 -2.38* -.55 -2.85* -- -- .05 .39 .09 .54 
INA 3  -- -- -- -- .93 2.13* -- -- --  -.27 1.11 
              
R²   .04  .21*  .32**  .00  .00  .04 
ΔR²   --  .17*  .10*  --  .00  .04 
              
DV: Δ Trust               
TNA  .09 .89 .00 .10 -.00 -.00 -.03 -.40 .03 .29 .02 .25 
NA 2  -- -- .42 3.14* .45 3.52* -- -- -.10 -1.15 -.10 -1.09 
NA 3  -- -- -.41 -2.02* -.48 -2.48* -- -- .05 .23 .06 .27 
INA 3  -- -- -- -- .94 2.33* -- -- -- -- -.11 -.31 
              
R²   .02  .25*  .35**       
ΔR²   --  .23**  .10*  .00  .04  .00 
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Table 6.8 - Regression of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on Trait and State Positive Affect Variables 
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variable Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Tworth.              
TPA .11 1.13 .00 .02 -.00 -.04 .06 .84 .10 1.50 .08 1.18 
PA 2 -- -- -.01 -.07 .-.03 -.17 -- -- -.01 -.12 -.02 -.23 
PA 3 -- -- .28 1.5 .26 1.46 -- -- -.10 -1.11 -.08 -.93 
IPA 3 -- -- -- -- .91 1.98 -- -- -- -- -.40 -2.13* 
             
R²  .03  .13  .22  .02  .14  .23* 
ΔR²  --  .10  .09  --  .12  .09* 
             
DV: Δ Trust              
TPA .18 1.76 .03 .26 .02 .22 -.02 -.16 .03 .32 .03 .23 
PA 2 -- -- -.16 -.85 .-.17 -.92 -- -- .06 .36 .05 .33 
PA 3 -- -- .49 2.88** .48 2.84** -- -- -.17 -1.20 -.16 -1.14 
IPA 3 -- -- -- -- .55 1.25 -- -- -- -- -.13 -.44 
             
R²  .09  .29**  .32**  .00  .07  .08 
ΔR²  --  .21**  .03  --  .07  .01 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 Trustworthiness, thus 
positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness from T2 to T3. Δ Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust 
from T3 Trust, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. TPA = Trait Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect, 
INA = Implicit Negative Affect. Regression weights are unstandardized.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6.9 - Regression of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on Explicit and Implicit Affect Variables 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 Trustworthiness, thus positive 
values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness from T2 to T3. Δ Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust from T3 
Trust, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. NA = Negative Affect, INA = Implicit Negative Affect. PA = 
Positive Affect, IPA = Implicit Positive Affect. Regression weights are unstandardized.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 Treatment Control 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variable Β t R² ΔR² Β t R² ΔR² Β t R² ΔR² Β t R² ΔR² 
DV: Δ Tworth    .19* --   .30** .11*   .00 --   .03 .03 
NA 2 .39 2.96**   .42 3.31**   -.01 -.22   -.00 -.08   
NA 3 -.46 -2.29*   -.53 -2.80**   .06 .37   .08 .49   
INA 3 -- --   .95 2.36*   -- --   -.27 2.34*   
                 
DV: Δ Trust    .25** --   .35** .10*   .04 --   .04 .00 
NA 2 .42 3.23**   .45 3.61**   -.09 -1.18   -.088 -1.12   
NA 3 -.41 -2.05*   -.48 -2.53*   .07 .32   .078 .349   
INA 3 -- --   .94 2.37*   -- --   -.119 -.337   
                 
DV: Δ Tworth    .13 --   .21* .08   .09 --   .21* .12* 
PA 2 -.01 -.07   -.03 .18   -.00 -.03   -.02 -.17   
PA 3 .28 1.57   .26 1.51   -.95 1.59   -.07 -.80   
IPA 3     .91 2.00*   -- --   -.44 -2.36*   
                 
DV: Δ Trust    .29** --   .32** .03   .07 --   .07 .00 
PA 2 -.15 -.83   -.16 -.91   .06 .38   .06 .35   
PA 3 .51 3.08**   .49 3.02**   -.17 -1.19   -.16 -1.13   
IPA 3 -- --   .55 2.00   .06 .38   -.15 -.49   
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Tests of Individual Difference Effects on Trust Outcomes 
Note that analyses related to hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 were undertaken without 
either trait or implicit measures. I took this decision due to the lack of influence the 
trait measures had in previous analyses, and the difficulty in interpreting results 
relating to the implicit measures. 
Emotional sensitivity. The hypothesised moderation effect of emotional 
sensitivity on the relationship between the dependent variables and state affect 
measures was not found for Δ trustworthiness (see Table 6.10), but was apparent in 
the relationship between Δ trust and PA, as demonstrated in Table 6.11. The regression 
of Δ trust on emotional sensitivity, PA T2 and T3, and the product terms of emotional 
sensitivity with the two affect measures proved to be significant. Indeed, Model 3, 
which included the product terms, accounted for 21% more variance than Model 2, 
which did not include the product terms. However, Model 3 showed that emotional 
sensitivity was significant (b = .32, t = 2.59), but the product terms ESxEPA2 (b = .58, 
t = 1.73) and ESxEPA3 (b = .50, t = 1.58) were not. In Model 2, emotional sensitivity 
was not significant (b = .15, t = 1.07). Emotional sensitivity did not have a significant 
influence on either Δ trustworthiness or Δ trust in relation to NA, neither as a lone 
predictor nor a moderator. 
In sum, Hypothesis 6 received weak support; there was a significant 
moderation effect when trust was regressed on emotional sensitivity and PA variables, 
but no other similar effects for trust and NA, or for trustworthiness and either PA or 
NA. 
Regulatory focus. Promotion orientation had no significant relationship with 
neither Δ trustworthiness nor Δ trust, nor did it significantly relate to any of the affect 
measures. Table 6.12 shows that the proposed moderator model (Model 3) accounted 
for 37% of the total variance, just a 7% increase from Model 2. This change was not 
significant, and in both models the regression coefficients suggest that the role played 
by promotion orientation was miniscule (Model 2: b = -.04, t = -.80; Model 3: b = -
.07, -1.26). Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
Prevention orientation proved to be a significant moderator of relations 
between the state negative affect variables and Δ trustworthiness, but not Δ trust, as 
shown in Table 6.13. 
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Moreover, prevention orientation had a statistically significant positive 
relationship with Δ trustworthiness as a lone predictor (b = .16, p = .006, R² = .18). 
Prevention orientation became more significant when regressed on NA at Time 2 and 
Time 3, ΔF (3, 36) = 5.85, p = .002, ΔR² = .14. When the product terms prevention x 
NA2 and prevention x NA3 were included in the regression, the relationship became 
stronger still, ΔF (3, 36) = 5.50, p = <.001, ΔR² = .16, accounting for almost 50% of 
the variance in predicting Δ trustworthiness. In addition, there appeared to be a 
difference effect, as the product term prevention x NA2 had a positive relationship 
with Δ trustworthiness (b = .23, t = 3.10), and prevention x NA3 had a negative 
relationship with it (b = -.35, t = -3.20). 
Prevention-orientation was not significant in predicting Δ trust in isolation (p 
= .67), and although Model 2, which included it in a regression with NA T2 and T3 
accounted for 24% of the variance in Δ trust, the regression coefficient of prevention-
orientation shows that its role in this significant relationship was negligible (b = <-.01, 
t = -.09). The addition of the product terms prevention x NA2 and prevention x NA3 
resulted in an 8% increase in explained variance, but this was a nonsignificant change. 
Thus, there was not a statistically significant moderation effect. Given a moderation 
effect was present for Δ trustworthiness but not for Δ trust, Hypothesis 8 was only 
partially supported. 
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Table 6.10 - Regression of Trustworthiness Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on 
Emotional Sensitivity and State Affect 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable. 
Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 
Trustworthiness, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness 
from T2 to T3. ES = Emotional Sensitivity, NA = Negative Affect. ESxNA = the interaction 
term of Emotional Sensitivity and Negative Affect. PA = Positive Affect, ESxPA = The 
interaction term of Emotional Sensitivity and Positive Affect. Regression weights are 
unstandardized. 
*p <.05, ** p <.01. 
  
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
IV Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Tworth              
ES .29 1.99 .31 1.89 .45 2.32* .01 -.13 -.07 -.08 -.07 -.64 
NA 2 -- -- .36 2.70* .45 3.25** -- -- -.01 -.19 -.02 -.39 
NA 3 -- -- -.55 -2.70* -.65 -3.17** -- -- .05 .33 -.11 .64 
ESxNA2 -- -- -- -- .62 2.01 -- -- -- -- .06 .60 
ESxNA3 -- -- -- -- -.72 1.85 -- -- -- -- -.28 -.89 
             
R²  .10  .27*  .35*  .00  .00  .03 
ΔR²  --  .17  .08  --  .00  .03 
             
DV: Δ Tworth              
ES .29 1.99 .30 2.12* .39 2.66* .01 -.13   -.06 -.75 
PA 2 -- -- -.02 -.10 -.07 .38 -- -- -.06 -.87 -.02 .16 
PA 3 -- -- .29 1.64 .29 1.63 -- -- .01 .08 -.11 -.95 
ESxPA2 -- -- -- -- .30 .74 -- -- -- -- .00 .00 
ESxPA3 -- -- -- -- .30 .79 -- -- -- -- .04 .31 
             
R²  .10  .23*  .29*       
ΔR²  --  .13  .07  .00  .11  .01 
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Table 6.11 - Regression of Trust Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on Emotional 
Sensitivity and State Affect 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable. 
Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 
Trustworthiness, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness 
from T2 to T3, ES = Emotional Sensitivity, NA = Negative Affect. ESxNA = the interaction 
term of Emotional Sensitivity and Negative Affect. PA = Positive Affect, ESxPA = The 
interaction term of Emotional Sensitivity and Positive Affect. Regression weights are 
unstandardized.  
*p <.05, ** p <.01. 
  
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
IV Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Trust              
ES .14 .88 -.01 -.06 .17 .82 .12 1.12 .18 1.54 .21 1.40 
NA 2 -- -- .43 3.10** .44 2.96** -- -- -.12 -1.55 -.11 -1.23 
NA 3 -- -- -.41 -1.94 -.42 1.90 -- -- .11 .48 .05 .27 
ESxNA2 -- -- -- -- .29 .88 -- -- -- -- -.07 -.49 
ESxNA3 -- -- -- -- -.53 1.29 -- -- -- -- .24 .54 
             
R²  .02  .20*  .25*  .03     
ΔR²  --  .22*  .05  --  .06  .01 
             
DV: Δ Trust              
ES -- -- .15 1.07 .32 2.59* -- -- .06 .57 .04 .40 
PA 2 -- -- -.15 -.83 .01 .08 -- -- .05 .28 .20 1.06 
PA 3 -- -- .51 3.02** .52 3.46** -- -- -.14 -.95 -.26 -1.48 
ESxPA2 -- -- -- -- .58 1.73 -- -- -- -- -.34 -1.32 
ESxPA3 -- -- -- -- .50 1.58 -- -- -- -- .33 1.65 
             
R²  .02  .31**  .51**  .03     
ΔR²  --  .29**  .21**  --  .05  .07 
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Table 6.12 - Regression of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 - Time 
2) on Promotion Orientation and Positive Affect 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable. 
Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 
Trustworthiness, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness 
from T2 to T3, Δ Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust from T3 Trust, thus 
positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. PA = Positive Affect. 
PromxPA = the interaction term of Promotion Orientation and Positive Affect. PA = Positive 
Affect. Regression weights are unstandardized.  
*p <.05, ** p <.01. 
  
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
IV Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Tworth              
Promotion .03 .45 .01 .12 -.02 -.29 .00 .08 .00 .06 -.00 -.15 
PA 2 -- -- -.04 -.21 -.10 -.47 -- -- -.00 -.02 -.04 -.41 
PA 3 -- -- .27 1.53 .36 1.81 -- -- .09 -.94 -.07 -.74 
PromxPA2 -- -- -- -- -.21 -1.11 -- -- -- -- .06 .81 
PromxPA3 -- -- -- -- .20 1.03 -- -- -- -- .02 .20 
             
R²  .01  .12  .15  .00  .09  .17 
ΔR²  --  .11  .03  --  .09  .08 
             
DV: Δ Trust              
Promotion  -.01 -.23 -.04 -.80 -.07 -1.26 .04 .97 .04 1.02 .06 1.48 
PA 2 -- -- -.12 -.63 -.06 -.30 -- -- .08 .51 .05 .30 
PA 3 -- -- .50 2.99** .50 2.77** -- -- -.18 -1.30 -.17 -1.24 
PromxPA2 -- -- -- -- -.09 -.55 -- -- -- -- .19 1.74 
PromxPA3 -- -- -- -- -.05 -.26 -- -- -- -- -.15 -1.40 
             
R²  .00  .30  .36  .02  .09   
ΔR²  --  .30**  .07**  --  .07  .07 
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Table 6.13 - Regression of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 - Time 
2) on Prevention Orientation and Negative Affect 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable. 
Δ Tworth = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 
Trustworthiness, thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness 
from T2 to T3, Δ Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust from T3 Trust, thus 
positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. NA = Negative 
Affect. PrevxNA = the interaction term of Prevention Orientation and Negative Affect. 
Regression weights are unstandardized.  
*p <.05, ** p <.01. 
 
Regarding the importance of individual difference variables and their 
relationships with the dependent variables and affect measures, it is difficult to come 
to a strong conclusion. It is evident that promotion orientation did not have a moderator 
effect on either trust or trustworthiness, so Hypothesis 7 was not supported. However, 
Hypotheses 6 and 8, relating to emotional sensitivity and prevention orientation 
respectively, were not so clear-cut. There was a significant moderation effect at play 
when Δ trust was regressed on emotional sensitivity and PA Time 2 and Time 3, 
however the proposed moderation was not present when trust was regressed on 
emotional sensitivity and the NA variables, or at all for trustworthiness. That said, 
emotional sensitivity was significant in predicting Δ trustworthiness when included in 
a regression with PA variables, just not as a moderator.  
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ Tworth              
Prevention .16 2.92** .14 2.68* .16 3.23** .00 -.02 -.02 -.16 .03 .74 
NA 2 -- -- .34 2.78** .35 3.15** -- -- -.01 -.24 -.01 -.13 
NA 3 -- -- -.42 -2.27* -.45 -2.66* -- -- .07 .39 -.12 -.52 
PrevxNA2 -- -- -- -- .27 3.08** -- -- -- -- -.01 -.15 
PrevxNA3 -- -- -- -- -.35 -3.18** -- -- -- -- .13 1.11 
             
R²  .18**  .32**  .48**  .00  .00  .04 
ΔR²  --  .14*  .16**  --  .00  .04 
             
DV: Δ Trust              
Prevention -.01 .06 <.01 -.09 .02 .37 -.01 -.30 -.01 -.24 .01 .14 
NA 2 -- -- .43 3.17** .43 3.29** -- -- -.07 -.89 -.07 -.88 
NA 3 -- -- -.41 -2.03* -.46 -2.28* -- -- .01 .41 .01 .02 
PrevxNA2 -- -- -- -- .13 1.53 -- -- -- -- .01 .31 
PrevxNA3 -- -- -- -- -.27 -2.07* -- -- -- -- .04 .21 
             
R²  .00  .24*  .32*  .00  .02  .03 
ΔR²  --  .24**  .08  --  .02  .01 
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Regarding prevention orientation, it is clear that the trustworthiness difference 
score was significantly influenced by it. There was a direct effect present, both in 
isolation and when prevention orientation was regressed with negative affect variables, 
and also a strong moderation effect. However, there was not a significant interaction 
effect between prevention orientation, NA variables and trust.  
Of the three individual difference variables analysed in this section, prevention 
orientation appears to be the most noteworthy, as it clearly interacts with the negative 
affect variables to influence trustworthiness. Emotional sensitivity related to positive 
affect variables and trust. However, when viewed holistically, NA was more influential 
in trust repair, at least in the context of this study, so effects relating to PA variables 
may not be particularly important. 
Further Exploratory Analyses 
Tests of the effects of Δ mood on Δ trust controlling for Δ trustworthiness. 
After testing the hypotheses and finding that affect, particularly NA, does indeed seem 
to play a role in the restoration of trust and perceptions of trustworthiness in this 
context, some exploratory analyses were conducted to determine whether NA still 
played a significant role in predicting Δ trust when Δ trustworthiness was controlled. 
As previously stated, trustworthiness is a characteristic that the trustee has (Dietz & 
Den Hartog, 2006). Cues of ability, benevolence and integrity signal to the trustor 
whether or not the trustee is trustworthy. If the trustor holds the belief that the trustee 
is indeed trustworthy, it is likely (but not guaranteed) that he will trust in that agent 
(Dietz, 2011). In the case of National Express, if Δ NA is still significant in predicting 
Δ trust, even when trustworthiness perceptions attributed to it are controlled, there is 
evidence to suggest that trust in the organisation is influenced by more than just 
cognitive evaluation. This would offer an alternative narrative to the extant body of 
trust research which is primarily cognitive in nature. 
Multiple linear regressions were conducted to test this question. Δ Trust was 
regressed on Δ NA, and then on both Δ NA and Δ trustworthiness. Support would entail 
Δ NA remaining significant when Δ trustworthiness was included in the regression.  
Δ NA was significant in predicting Δ trust, as shown in Table 6.14. The 
direction of the relationship was negative, b = -.43, t = -3.51, and Δ NA accounted for 
around 25% of the variance in Δ trust, F(1, 39) = 12.33, p < .001, R² =.25. The addition 
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of Δ trustworthiness resulted in a model that accounted for over 40% of the variance 
in Δ trust, ΔF(2, 38) = 10.684, p <.001, ΔR² = .17. Crucially however, NA remained 
significant, with a b of -.26, t = -2.19.  
Δ NA may partially mediate the relationship between Δ trustworthiness and Δ 
trust, and to test this possibility a bootstrapped (5000 iterations) mediation analysis 
using Hayes’ (2012) Process macro for SPSS was conducted. Confidence intervals 
(95%) of the indirect effect of the relationship between Δ trustworthiness and Δ trust 
via Δ NA suggested that a mediation effect was evident, 95% CI [.006, .418], with an 
effect of .13. 
 
Table 6.14 - Regressions of Trust Change (Time 3 – Time 2) on Negative 
Affect Change (Time 3 – Time 2) and Trustworthiness Change (Time 3 – Time 2) 
Note. Treatment n = 40, Control n = 41. IV = Independent Variable, Δ = a difference score 
created by subtracting T2 variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables 
indicate an increase from T2 to T3. NA = Negative Affect, TW = Trustworthiness. 
*p <.05, ** p <.01, p*** <.001 
 
With regards to PA, the assertion that Δ PA would still predict Δ trust, whilst 
controlling for Δ trustworthiness was not supported. Δ PA was significant in predicting 
Δ trust, and the direction of the relationship was positive, b = .39, t = 2.21. However, 
when Δ trustworthiness was included in the regression, it rendered the effect of Δ PA 
nonsignificant, b = .25, t = 1.90. These results are displayed in Table 6.15. 
  
 Treatment  Control 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t  Β t  Β t  Β t 
Δ NA -.43 -3.51***  -.26 -2.14*  .09 1.22  .09 1.82 
Δ TW -- --  .47 3.27**  -- --  -.11 1.22 
            
R² .25***   .42***   .04   .05  
ΔR² --   .17***   --   <.01  
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Table 6.15 - Regressions of Trust Change (Time 3 – Time 2) on Positive 
Affect Change (Time 3 – Time 2) and Trustworthiness Change (Time 3 – Time 2) 
Note. Treatment N = 39, Control N = 41. IV = Independent Variable, Δ = a difference score 
created by subtracting T2 variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables 
indicate an increase from T2 to T3. PA = Positive Affect, TW = Trustworthiness. 
*p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
Discussion 
Firstly, it is important to note that there did indeed appear to be (a) a trust 
breach, indicated by a significant decrease in trust and perceptions of trustworthiness 
from Time 1 to Time 2 in both groups, and (b) a trust repair effect, indicated by the 
differential recovery in levels of trust and perceptions of trustworthiness from Time 2 
to Time 3.  
Regarding the influence of affect on trust and trustworthiness, state affect, 
particularly negative, appears to predict trust and perceived organisational 
trustworthiness to a greater extent than trait affect. NA was significantly negatively 
related to both trust and perceived trustworthiness, and the difference between NA at 
Time 2 and Time 3 appears to be particularly significant in predicting Δ trust and Δ 
trustworthiness. In regressions of the dependent variable difference scores (Time 3 – 
Time 2) on explicit state NA at Times 2 and 3, the Time 2 affect b was invariably 
positive, and the Time 3 b would be negative. This suggests a genuine difference score 
effect (Edwards, 1994). Put differently, participants in this study were more likely to 
show greater trust and perceived trustworthiness after the trust repair response 
compared to after the trust failure when their levels of NA had decreased from Time 2 
to Time 3. Furthermore, NA remained a significant predictor of Δ trust even when 
cognitive evaluations of trustworthiness were included in analyses. This is particularly 
significant in terms of the question of the importance of affect in the trust repair 
 Treatment  Control 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t  Β t  Β t  Β t 
Δ PA .39 2.21*  .25 1.90  -.17 -1.11  -.19 -1.17 
Δ TW -- --  .54 4.20***  -- --  -.10 -.58 
            
R² .11   .40***   .03   .04  
ΔR² --   .29***   --   <.01  
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process. Moreover, there appears to be a mediation effect present, as NA related 
directly to both perceptions of trustworthiness and willingness to trust, and indirectly 
to willingness to trust through perceptions of trustworthiness.  
Interestingly, NA remained at a higher level at Time 3 in the treatment group 
than in the control group, and the difference between the treatment group mean and 
the control group mean was statistically significant, F(1, 53.35) = 29.77, t = 3.58, p 
<.001. Hence, even though the NA difference score seemed particularly important in 
predicting increased trust and perceived organisational trustworthiness at Time 3, NA 
remained comparatively higher in the treatment group than the control group. In sum, 
although participants in the treatment group had greater recoveries in trust and 
trustworthiness on average than their control group counterparts, they also had a higher 
and statistically greater level of NA after the trust repair manipulation than control 
group participants who saw a filler video clip. The CEO’s interview may have had a 
trigger effect on participants, reminding them of the crash, making it more salient and 
raising levels of NA. If this is the case, it could be that the trust repair attempt actually 
had a negative influence on some participants. In the literature, trust repair is generally 
perceived as a positive action, although some responses may be sub-optimal, and there 
is still debate over when certain responses may be preferable to others. For example, 
some scholars posit that after an integrity failure an organization should be willing to 
offer a sincere apology and pay penance (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Gillespie et al., 
2014). Others suggest that denial is a preferable response (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). 
Still, I generally agree that doing something is better than doing nothing at all 
(Elangovan et al., 2015; Ferrin et al., 2007). However, admitting wrongdoing or 
committing to substantive organizational changes in response to a transgression may 
have profound emotional consequences for stakeholders. Gillespie et al. (2014) 
suggest that it is important for organisations to allow and help their employees work 
through negative emotions and identity issues in the aftermath of trust repair attempts. 
However, they also note that this idea has received scant attention in the literature to 
date. Although this study did not involve employees, it did suggest that trust repair 
efforts may actually increase NA in potential stakeholders (in this case, potential 
customers) even if they appear to “work”. It could be argued that if such effects occur 
in scenarios that include passive observers who are not necessarily personally affected 
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or influenced by the situation, they may be stronger for those actively involved in such 
a process. This is certainly an avenue that warrants further investigation. 
Trait affect was found to have no significant relationship with the dependent 
variables at the .05 level either as a lone predictor or when included in analyses with 
state measures. Forgas (1998) posited that dispositional influence may override state 
mood, and therefore mood may not affect individual cognition and behaviour because 
a person’s traits are more ingrained, and therefore stronger, than the more transitory 
influence of passing moods. However, people tend to weigh negative information and 
moods more heavily than positive ones (Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; Kim et 
al., 2009). In this case, the crash may have caused an increase in negative mood and 
made state affect more salient, and thus more influential, than trait affectivity. In 
relation to feelings-as-information theory, participants may have processed situational 
information by asking themselves: “how do I feel about it?” at each time point. If they 
felt better, or less bad, about it at Time 3 than Time 2, then this information would 
likely be more salient to them than a baseline trait or state mood at Time 1. 
Although trait affect did not seem to be a significant predictor of either trust or 
trustworthiness, and I have not been able to disentangle the influence of implicit affect, 
the findings of this study add to the literature on trait x state interactions and their 
influence on cognitive outcomes, as called for in the organisational literature (Salovey 
& Mayer, 1990; Van Knippenberg, Kooj-de Bode & van Ginkel, 2010). 
While NA related strongly to both dependent variables, PA was a significant 
predictor of trust yet not of trustworthiness, at least in its explicit form. This implies 
that whilst positive affect may not be particularly influential in explicitly affecting 
one’s perceptions of an organisation, it may play a role in influencing an individual’s 
behavioural intentions towards it. This could be explained by the assertion that people 
with high PA are more likely to have a positive concept of themselves and the world 
around them (Watson, 2002), so they may be more willing to trust and less likely to 
think that bad things may happen to them. This could be particularly salient in the 
National Express scenario, in which trust is operationalized as willingness to use or 
rely on the company to get participants to a destination on time or safely, and the 
likelihood of using it at all. Those with high PA may be less likely to be affected by 
the crash and less likely to assign blame to the company for it, and may therefore be 
more likely to be willing to trust National Express with the expectation that nothing 
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bad will happen to them in doing so. However, when Δ PA was included in a regression 
with the Δ trustworthiness to determine if it would still be predictive of Δ trust, results 
indicated that the effect of the PA variable was subsumed by that of the trustworthiness 
variable. In short, Δ PA was no longer a significant predictor of Δ trust. This finding 
does not support prior empirical evidence that positive affect is particularly important 
in trust repair (Bottom et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2013). 
Two non-trust related individual difference measures were included in the 
current study, emotional sensitivity and regulatory focus. Regulatory focus appeared 
to be the more relevant of these. Emotional sensitivity played a role in influencing Δ 
trust in a regression model with PA Time 2 and Time 3 variables. Specifically, 
emotional sensitivity and PA Time 3 were significant predictors of Δ trust. However, 
as stated in the previous paragraph, as PA was not particularly influential in predicting 
either trust or trustworthiness this finding may not be particularly relevant. 
In terms of regulatory focus, there was a moderation effect of prevention focus 
with NA, on trustworthiness, but not on trust. Interestingly, there appears to be a 
difference effect, as both analyses show that prevention x NA T2 have positive b-
values in relation to predictions of willingness to trust and perceived organizational 
trustworthiness change, yet prevention x NA T3 b-values are negative. However, the 
regression of Δ trustworthiness on prevention orientation showed a significant, 
positive relationship between the two variables. This effect was not present for the 
regression of Δ trust on prevention orientation. The positive relationship between 
prevention orientation and Δ trustworthiness is perplexing. It may be that participants 
with higher levels of prevention orientation are reassured by the CEO’s performance 
and needed reassurance after the transgression that the company were taking steps to 
make amends and try to ensure that such an accident would not occur again. Indeed, 
the content of the CEO’s response may have been particularly appealing to those with 
high levels of prevention orientation. Regulatory focus theory suggests that prevention 
orientation is related to sensitivity regarding negative outcomes and vigilance relating 
to environmental cues towards potential losses (Higgins, 1998). Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that prevention-focused individuals, through having an “ought to” 
mentality, tend to respect normative standards (Higgins, 1998). It is possible that the 
CEO, in explaining National Expresses’ position in regard to taking all of their coaches 
off the road to check them with a team of engineers and working with authorities to 
Chapter 6: Study 1 – Mood and Individual Differences in Trust Repair 
135 
 
determine what went wrong, was able to signal that the organization is adhering to 
normative standards by ensuring that their coaches are safe and taking cautious, 
precautionary measures that would likely appeal to prevention-orientated people. 
Thus, they have a higher opinion of the organisation in regards to their cues of 
trustworthiness. This theory will be tested in the next study by including measures of 
the CEO’s performance and determining whether it mediates the relationship between 
prevention focus and trustworthiness. Another explanation could be that prevention-
focused individuals simply paid more attention to what the CEO was saying, whereas 
highly promotion-focused people may have followed internal cues (i.e. a gut feeling 
heuristic).  
Limitations 
This study was not without its limitations. Firstly, the sample size was rather 
small (N = 82), especially for analyses conducted separately on the two groups. To 
have adequate statistical power, a greater number of subjects is required. Secondly, 
although affect was measured, it was done so with a cognitive instrument (i.e., the 
PANAS). A measure of implicit affect was also included, but unfortunately I have thus 
far been unable to disentangle its significance. Specifically, I am unsure as to whether 
the results obtained from it are genuine but somewhat anomalous, or whether they are 
the result of statistical artefact caused by correlated errors. Fourthly, the difference 
score approach I have used for a number of analyses has been criticised for having 
several methodological flaws, with polynomial regression being suggested as an 
alternative method (Edwards & Parry, 1993; Edwards, 1994; 2001). However, as 
polynomial regressions can often contain a lot of terms, large samples are needed to 
test for statistical power (Edwards, 1993; 2001). Plainly the N of the current sample is 
too small to consider this analytic approach. Finally, the stimulus presented in this 
study was somewhat dry, and it would not necessarily have particular salience to the 
participants involved; they were not active in the process. However, one could argue 
that if significant effects are present in a scenario in which participants are simply 
passive observers, they are likely to be greater in situations that are more salient to 
those involved. A larger sample and additional measures are required to (a) determine 
whether the current results are replicable and (b) further understand the relationship 
between affect, trustworthiness and trust 
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Chapter Summary and Implications for Study 2 
The current chapter detailed the first empirical study of my thesis. Study 1 was 
undertaken to get a sense of what role affect plays in the trust repair process, if any. 
Results suggest that affect, particularly NA, is indeed important in such a process, even 
when cognitive evaluations of trustworthiness are taken into account. With this being 
the case, Study 2 was undertaken to further understand the relationship between affect, 
individual difference measures, trustworthiness and trust. For Study 2, the same 
experimental procedure and stimulus were used in an attempt to replicate results. 
Although, as suggested in the limitations, using the same experimental procedure does 
not present participants with a salient scenario, doing so enabled me to see if results 
replicate with a larger sample and additional measures. Depending on the results of 
Study 2, Study 3 could attempt to present participants with a more salient situation. 
In terms of new measures added for Study 2, one of these was a measure of 
CEO performance, which could be used to better understand the relationship between 
affect, prevention orientation, trust and trustworthiness. Items related to what extent 
emotional reactions were elicited by the CEO’s response (e.g. how reassured 
participants were by it, whether it actually increased negative affect etc.), how 
competent his performance was (e.g. was the response appropriate? Did he represent 
the organisation well?), and to what extent the subjects liked him, were added. 
Furthermore, although Study 1 included a measure of emotional sensitivity, that is, to 
what extent participants were sensitive to nonverbal cues, it did not measure to what 
extent they were aware of their own emotions. Thus, measures such as the emotionality 
subscale of the Emotionality, Activity, Sociability Impulsivity (EASI) scale (Buss & 
Plomin, 1984) and the Private Body Consciousness subscale of Miller, Murphy and 
Buss’ (1981) Body Consciousness Questionnaire were used to assess participants’ 
inner emotionality. 
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Chapter 7: Study 2 – A Replication and Extension of Study 1 
Study 1 was undertaken to get a sense of what role affect plays in the trust 
repair process, if any. Results suggested that affect, particularly NA, is indeed 
important in such a process, even when cognitive evaluations of trustworthiness are 
taken into account. Study 2 attempted to further understand the relationship between 
affect, individual difference measures, trustworthiness and trust. The experimental 
procedure and stimuli from Study 1 were used again in an attempt to replicate results. 
A larger sample was solicited in order to increase statistical power, and new measures 
were included to gauge the effects of differential emotions, as well as individual 
differences in emotional reactivity. 
In the following sections, I first cover hypotheses replicating the relationships 
in Study 1 among mood, trust and trustworthiness, and the moderation effects of 
prevention orientation on trust and trustworthiness. Then I extend these ideas to 
consider differential emotions and individual differences in emotional reactivity.  
Hypotheses 
Mood, Trust, and Trustworthiness 
The relationship between Δ NA and Δ trust was previously tested in Study 1 as 
part of exploratory analyses. Results showed that Δ NA was significant in predicting 
Δ trust even when Δ perceptions of trustworthiness was controlled. Based on these 
results, it was decided that this relationship should be tested again to see if they could 
be replicated, leading to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Δ NA will be a significant indicator of Δ trust even when Δ 
perceptions of trustworthiness are controlled. 
Regulatory Focus, Trust and Trustworthiness 
In Study 1, prevention-focus was found to moderate the relationship between 
NA variables and Δ trustworthiness, yet not NA variables and Δ trust. The same 
relationship was expected to occur again with regards to Δ trustworthiness. 
Furthermore, given the larger sample and the motivational orientation of willingness 
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to trust, I expected prevention orientation to also moderate the relationship between 
NA variables and Δ trust: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Prevention-focus will moderate the relationship between NA 
variables (Time 1 and Time 2) and a) Δ trustworthiness and b) Δ trust. 
Differential Emotions, Trust, and Trustworthiness 
The key distinctions between emotion and state affect (or mood) are that 
emotions are targeted and tend to be short-lived and intense in nature, while mood is 
not caused by or focused on an object, and tends to be weaker in strength than emotion. 
In this respect, if mood, and particularly change in mood is predictive of Δ trust, one 
would expect change in differential emotions to also be predictive of Δ trust. 
Furthermore, given that participants’ emotional response to the bus crash and 
subsequent perceptions are likely to be triggered by their feelings towards the event 
and the company rather than simply a general mood state, it was predicted that change 
in differential emotions would be more predictive of Δ trust than change in mood state. 
This reasoning led to the following predictions: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Change in the differential emotions of anger, sadness, joy, 
calmness, fear and contempt will predict Δ trust, even when Δ perceptions of 
trustworthiness are controlled. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Change in the differential emotions of anger, sadness, joy, 
calmness, fear and contempt will have an incremental effect over and above those of 
Δ NA in predicting Δ trust, even when Δ perceptions of trustworthiness are controlled. 
Emotional Reactivity, Trust and Trustworthiness 
Affect intensity. In Study 1, emotional sensitivity moderated the relationship 
between PA and Δ trust, but this was the only statistically significant relation found 
for this variable. Emotional sensitivity is the extent to which people are able to pick up 
on non-verbal cues in environment. On the other hand, affect intensity, in this context, 
is the umbrella term that reflects the degree and intensity to which people respond to 
events in an emotional manner. In this respect, whilst emotional sensitivity is outward-
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facing in that it reflects the extent to which people are able to pick up emotional cues 
in their environment, affect intensity is inward-facing, relating to how intensely and 
frequently they feel emotions. 
Affect intensity is an individual difference that has been reported to have a 
direct relationship with emotional responses (Larsen & Diener, 1987), and attitude 
formation is often influenced by the emotions that one experiences (Moore, Harris & 
Chen, 1995). In addition, people who are high in affect intensity have been found to 
demonstrate greater levels of cognitive and affective responses to both emotional and 
non-emotional advertising stimuli than their low affect intensity counterparts (Geuens 
& De Pelsmacker, 1999). Prior research into affect intensity indicates that it is a 
multidimensional construct (Rubin, Hoyle & Leary, 2012; Weinfurt, Bryant & 
Yarnold, 1994). I return to this point in the Measures section, but for the purposes of 
hypothesis development, note that the dimensions of affect intensity I analyse in Study 
2 are negative reactivity and emotional intensity. Negative reactivity relates to the 
extent to which people generally feel strong negative emotions, making it a fairly direct 
operationalization of Larsen and Diener’s (1987) conceptualisation of affect intensity 
(Rubin et al., 2012). Emotional intensity relates to whether people generally respond 
to situations calmly as opposed to emotionally (Rubin et al., 2012). Generalizing to 
the context of this study, I expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Negative reactivity will moderate the relationship between Δ 
NA and Δ trust. People high in negative reactivity will be more likely to report high 
levels of NA, and will be less likely to trust than those low in negative reactivity. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Emotional intensity will moderate the relationship between Δ 
NA and Δ trust. People high in emotional intensity will be more likely to report high 
levels of NA, and will be less likely to trust than those low in emotional intensity. 
 
Private body consciousness. This construct has been shown to be an important 
determinant of behaviour (Miller et al., 1981), and Miller et al. (1981) suggest that it 
may influence excitation transfer. Excitation transfer involves levels of arousal from 
one source transferring to and influencing subsequent emotional states (Miller et al., 
1981). These authors posit that people high in PBC should be more susceptible to 
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excitation transfer than those who are low, due to their heightened awareness of 
interoceptive feedback (intereoception being “the sense of the internal physiological 
condition of the body”; Seth, 2013: 565). This relates to the somatic-marker 
hypothesis, which suggests that bodily states and feelings bias thoughts and decisions 
(Damasio, 1994; 1996). In this respect, I proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 5: PBC will moderate the relationship between the negative 
emotion variable difference scores from Time 2 to Time 3, and the trust difference 
scores from Time 2 to Time 3.  
 
Perceptions of trust repair effort. Although both trust and trustworthiness 
increased from Time 2 to Time 3 in Study 1, it was not possible to ascertain exactly 
why this happened. In Study 2, the inclusion of items related to perceptions of the trust 
repair effort may offer insight into why certain processes occur. For example, if Study 
1 results replicate in Study 2, and prevention-focus is found to relate positively to the 
dependent variables, then perceptions of the trust repair response may offer an 
explanation as to why this somewhat unusual relationship occurred.  
As detailed in the literature review, there are a number of responses that 
organizations and their leaders can offer in order to attempt to rebuild trust after it has 
been broken. Previous research has shown that such efforts can be successful in 
rebuilding trust. In the aftermath of the National Express coach crash that formed the 
trust failure stimulus of this study, the company’s CEO expressed remorse for the 
accident, implied that National Express was adhering to normative standards by 
working with engineers and the relevant authorities to determine what caused the crash 
and to try to make sure it does not happen again, and repeatedly stressed that safety is 
National Expresses’ number one concern. It was necessary to determine how the 
participants perceived the CEO’s interview, and therefore items related to perceptions 
of his performance were included in the study. It was expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Perceptions of the CEO’s trust repair effort will a) directly 
influence Δ trust, b) will influence Δ trust via Δ NA, and c) will influence Δ trust via Δ 
perceived organizational trustworthiness. 
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Methodology 
Participants. As in Study 1, participants were recruited via Prolific Academic. 
A pre-experiment survey was sent to participants at Time 1, and the experiment was 
conducted a week later. In an attempt to assure data quality, attention filter questions 
were included in each part of the study, as proposed as good practice by Oppenheimer 
et al. (2009) when conducting experimental studies. 263 participants completed both 
parts of the experiment. After conducting outlier and normality tests, ten participants 
were excluded from analysis, leaving a dataset of 253 responses. As in Study 1, 
subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment or control group by using a random 
number generator. 
Table 7.1 displays the sample’s demographic information. The majority of 
participants were female (56%), and the most frequent age category was the 20-29 
range (40%), followed by the 30-39 age range (26%). 35% of the sample had attained 
a bachelor’s degree level of qualification, 30% had obtained A-level qualifications and 
17% had attained a Postgraduate qualification, suggesting that the participant pool 
was, on average, more educated than the general UK population (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2015). Independent samples t-tests were conducted 
and results indicated that there were no statistically significant between-condition 
differences on demographics. Degrees of freedom for the t-tests ranged from 235 to 
251.  
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Table 7.1 – Demographic Statistics 
Note. N = 253. Independent group t-tests (degrees of freedom ranging from 235 to 251) 
showed that none of these differences were significant  
Measures 
 In Study 1, the dependent variables considered were willingness to trust and 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness. In Study 2, these were measured the 
same way. The Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 
1988) was used to measure participant mood. Furthermore, implicit affect was also 
 Treatment Control 
 M SD N % M SD N % 
Gender 1.15 .51 122 100 1.53 .51 131 100 
   Male (1)   52 42.6   58 44.3 
   Female (2)   70 57.4   73 55.7 
Age Category 2.61 1.15 122 100 2.64 1.11 131 100 
   Under 20 (1)   18 14.8   14 10.7 
   20-29 (2)   46 37.7   57 43.5 
   30-39 (3)   33 27.1   33 25.2 
   40-49 (4)   19 15.6   18 13.7 
   50-59 (5)   4 3.3   7 5.3 
   60-65 (6)   1 0.8   2 1.5 
   Over 65 (7)   1 0.8   0 0 
Education Level 3.49 1.18 122 100 3.47 1.17 131 100 
   GCSEs (1)   13 10.7   12 9.2 
   Vocational Qualification (2)    6 4.9   9 6.9 
   A Level Qualification (3)    33 27.1   43 32.8 
   Degree or Graduate Qual. (4)    51 41.8   39 29.8 
   Postgraduate Education (5)   17 13.9   28 21.4 
   No Formal Qualifications (6)   2 1.6   0 0 
Employment Status 3.67 2.12 122 100 3.79 2.10 131 100 
Student: Full-time (1)   37 30.3   36 27.5 
Student: Part-time (2)   5 4.1   6 4.6 
Employed: Full-time (3)   44 36.1   46 35.1 
Employed: Part-time (4)   7 5.7   12 9.2 
Self-employed (5)   13 10.7   12 9.2 
Not in employment or education (6)   16 13.1   19 14.5 
Heard of National Express? 1.07 .25 116 95.1 1.04 .20 121 92.4 
   Yes (1)   108 88.5   116 88.5 
   No (2)   8 8.6   5 3.8 
Travelled with National Express 1.52 .50 117 95.9 1.43 .50 123 93.9 
   Yes (1)   56 45.9   70 53.5 
   No (2)   61 50.0   53 40.5 
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measured using a word-stem completion task. A number of individual difference 
measures were also considered based on Study 1 findings, namely regulatory focus, 
propensity to trust, emotional sensitivity, and trait affect. Trait affect and trust 
propensity measures were included in Study 2 even though they did not have any 
substantive influence in any of the hypotheses tests conducted in Study 1. Analyses 
were conducted with these measures prior to hypothesis testing that found that, as in 
Study 1, they did not relate significantly to the dependent variables of trust or 
trustworthiness, thus they were not considered for further analysis. 
Four new measures were introduced in this study pertaining to emotionality, 
namely the Private Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981) and the 
negative reactivity and emotional intensity subscales of the Affect Intensity Measure 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987) were included. In addition, Izard’s (1977) Differential 
Emotions Scale (DES) was adapted for use in this study. Furthermore, items related to 
perceptions of the trust repair effort were also used. Three of these were adapted from 
Coombs and Holladay’s Organizational Reputation Scale (2002), with the target 
changed from an organization to an individual (in this case, the CEO of National 
Express). All of the new Study 2 measures and their sub-items are included in 
Appendix E. 
Affect intensity. Study 2 used a multidimensional version of the Affect Intensity 
Measure (AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1987). Rubin et al. (2012) presented a review of 
multidimensional versions of the measure and conducted a study that also supported 
the superiority of a four-factor structure over a higher-order latent variable. The four 
factors suggested in the study conducted by Rubin and colleagues (2012) were: 
negative reactivity, negative intensity, positive affectivity (or serenity) and positive 
intensity. The two positive factors were not considered in the current study because I 
wanted to focus on negative reactivity and negative intensity. This decision was also 
taken with a view to attempt to reduce the risk of respondent fatigue by keeping the 
survey at a reasonable length. The Cronbach’s alpha results of the negative reactivity 
and negative intensity ranged from .76 to .86 in previous studies. 
The “negative intensity” factor of the AIM appears to measure the extent to 
which people are prone to react in an emotionally as opposed to calmly in general 
situations. Items include: “my emotions tend to be more intense than those of most 
people”, “my friends might say I’m emotional”, “my friends might say I’m an intense 
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or “high-strung” person” and “calm and cool could easily describe me (reverse 
scored)”. It actually appears that the items relate to the extent to which an individual 
feels emotional in general rather than how they feel negative emotions, specifically. 
This point was also made by Rubin and colleagues (2012), so for the purpose of this 
study, the sub-scale was named “emotional intensity” rather than “negative intensity.” 
Differential emotions. For the current study, Izard’s (1977) DES measure was 
adapted to measure how people felt when they thought about National Express. The 
subscales of sadness, fear, anger, contempt, joy and calmness were included. The 
negative emotional subscales were chosen for their perceived relevance to the context 
of a coach company involved in a crash. Joy was included to give some balance as a 
positive emotion. Although not included in Izard’s (1977) original measure, calmness 
was included in Study 2 as a means to provide an emotion that would fit between the 
negative specific emotional variables and joy, both in terms of valence and arousal, 
and to ascertain whether the trust repair response had a calming effect on participants 
and whether or not that would predict trust.  
Private body consciousness (PBC). This sub-scale (Miller, Murphy & Buss, 
1981) was one of the earliest of the body awareness scales to be developed, and one of 
only two to have been used more than a few times (Mehling, Gopisetty, Daubenmier, 
Price, Hecht & Stewart, 2009). It is a 5-item sub-scale for a “disposition to focus on 
internal bodily sensations”, “being aware of intereoceptive feedback” and being 
“sensitive to changes in bodily states”. Moreover, PBC was not found to correlate with 
emotionality (Mehling et al., 2009), minimising the risk of a statistical artefact 
occurring due to endogeneity. Internal reliability of the instrument has been shown to 
be satisfactory in a number of studies. In the original paper by Miller and colleagues 
(1981), the PBC had a test-retest reliability of .69. In subsequent studies, internal 
reliability has ranged from .69 to .75. 
Perceptions of CEO’s trust repair response. As perceptions of leaders’ 
responses to crises are situational and often domain-specific (a leader might be 
considered “competent” in dealing with a crisis, but not in other aspects of day-to-day 
leadership of an organization), it has been difficult to find an established scale to 
measure perceptions trust repair that would be appropriate for use in the current study. 
As such, I have developed a scale for this study. Three items were adapted from 
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Coombs and Holladay’s Organizational Reputation Scale (2002), with the rating target 
changed from an organization to an individual (the CEO): 
 
• Do you believe that the CEO is basically dishonest? (r) 
• Do you believe that the CEO’s response was appropriate?  
• Do you believe that the CEO cares about his public? 
 
Other measured items related to liking, sincerity, general competence and 
communication skills, how the response made participants feel regarding the crash, 
and whether or not the CEO wanted to make sure that a similar event does not happen 
in the future. These items were chosen because they included questions related to the 
CEO’s ability, benevolence and integrity, as well as participants’ feelings related to 
his response so as to include an emotional component. 
Results 
As a first step in the data analysis, descriptive statistics and correlations were 
computed. Next, to determine if there was a significant trust breach and subsequent 
trust repair effect, ANOVA analyses were conducted. Hypotheses were tested using 
hierarchical linear regressions. It should be noted that the regressions presented in the 
hypothesis testing section of the results were conducted separately for the treatment 
and control groups, and that all regression coefficients displayed are unstandardized. 
Full sample analyses were also conducted; however the results appear to simply be an 
average of the treatment and control group effects and thus do not add anything of 
substantive value to the discussion.  
Descriptive statistics. Full sample Cronbach’s alphas, means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 7.2. Cronbach’s alphas all fall within an acceptable 
range, with the lowest value for contempt at Time 1, with an alpha score of .60. 
Split-sample treatment and control descriptive information is shown in Table 
7.3, along with independent sample t-tests to determine if there were any significant 
between-condition mean differences.  
Independent samples t-tests showed that there were a number of significant 
between-condition mean differences (see Table 7.3). A number of these would be 
expected, such as mean values for NA and each of the negative differential emotion 
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mean scores (fear, sadness, anger and contempt) being significantly higher in the 
control group than the treatment group at Time 3 (i.e. post-trust repair effort). Trust 
and trustworthiness means were statistically significantly higher in the treatment group 
at Time 3 than in the control group. Again, this was expected and suggests that there 
was a trust repair effect. However, the mean level of trust was also higher at Time 2 
(i.e. post-violation) in the treatment group compared to the control group to a 
statistically significant degree. Furthermore, the fear, anger, sadness and contempt 
baseline mean scores at Time 1 were all significantly higher in the control group than 
the treatment group, as was prevention orientation. This may indicate that the control 
group was more prone to negativity in general than the treatment group. However, at 
Time 2 there were no statistically significant between-condition mean differences 
relating to any of the emotions. 
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Table 7.2 - Full-Sample Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach's Alphas 
Note. N = 253, ^ = Treatment group only (n = 122), NA = Negative Affect, PA = Positive 
Affect, PBC = Private Body Consciousness. 
  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
 M SD α M SD α M SD α 
Trust 4.11 .76 .85 3.38 1.04 .92 3.43 1.10 .94 
Trustworthiness 3.66 .60 .91 3.28 .65 .91 3.38 .70 .94 
Trust Repair Rating^ -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.78 .56 .92 
          
Positive Affect 2.43 .84 .90 1.86 .70 .88 1.89 .72 .90 
Negative Affect 1.22 .40 .87 1.71 .70 .91 1.46 .60 .92 
          
Implicit PA -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.22 .11 -- 
Implicit NA -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.22 .10 -- 
          
Fear 1.10 .32 .75 2.19 1.04 .93 1.62 .78 .91 
Sadness 1.17 .47 .82 3.05 .93 .69 2.11 .90 .83 
Anger 1.09 .32 .66 2.11 .93 .90 1.61 .79 .91 
Joy 2.70 1.06 .90 1.15 .36 .70 1.34 .56 .79 
Calmness 3.37 .95 .86 1.63 .72 .77 2.03 .86 .81 
Contempt 1.26 .51 .60 1.99 .90 .85 1.64 .77 .89 
          
Emotional Intensity 3.23 .91 .83 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Negative Reactivity 3.72 .98 .83 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        -- -- 
Promotion 6.33 1.42 .90 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Prevention 5.50 1.57 .82 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
        -- -- 
PBC 3.55 .69 .69 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
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Table 7.3 - Treatment and Control Group Descriptive Statistics and 
Independent Samples T-tests 
 Treatment 
Group 
 Control Group   
Variable M SD  M SD  t 
1. Trust, T1 4.19 .66  4.04 .83  1.58 
2. Trust, T2 3.51  1.02  3.24 1.05  2.04* 
3. Trust, T3 3.63 1.02  3.25 1.15  2.75** 
4. Trustworthiness, T1 3.64 .52  3.68 .67  -.54 
5. Trustworthiness, T2 3.27 .62  3.28 .68  -.11 
6. Trustworthiness, T3 3.50 .59  3.28 .76  2.59** 
7. PA, T1 2.37 .88  2.49 .81  -1.13 
8. PA, T2 1.86 .71  1.87 .69  -.01 
9. PA, T3 1.82 .71  1.95 .72  -1.35 
10. NA, T1 1.18 .34  1.25 .43  -1.36 
11. NA, T2 1.68 .67  1.75 .74  -.74 
12. NA, T3 1.41 .52  1.50 .67  -1.17 
13. Implicit PA .23 .10  .21 .11  1.63 
14. Implicit NA .23 .10  .21 .10  1.97* 
15. Fear T1 1.05 .20  1.15 .40  -2.57 
16. Fear T2 2.10 1.01  2.27 1.07  -1.29 
17. Fear T3 1.47 .60  1.78 .90  -3.12** 
18. Sadness T1 1.09 .20  1.24 .60  -2.66** 
19. Sadness T2 3.01 .95  3.10 .90  -.67 
17. SadnessT3 2.00 .81  2.22 .96  -2.04* 
18. Anger T1 1.05 .20  1.13 .39  -2.14* 
19. Anger T2 2.13 1.10  2.28 1.09  -1.14 
20. Anger T3 1.47 .69  1.74 .86  -2.77** 
21. Contempt T1 1.19 .41  1.33 .58  -2.26* 
22. Contempt T2 1.90 .92  2.07 .87  -1.53 
23. Contempt T3 1.49 .69  1.77 .83  -2.84** 
24. Joy T1 2.67 1.01  2.72 1.10  -.34 
25. Joy T2 1.13 .36  1.17 .36  -.87 
26. Joy T3 1.31 .51  1.36 .61  -.66 
27. Calmness T1 3.40 .87  3.34 1.01  .49 
28. Calmness T2 1.61 .70  1.65 .73  -.41 
29. Calmness T3 2.09 .86  1.97 .85  1.12 
30. Emotional 
Intensity 
3.17 .87  3.29 .94  -1.05 
31. Negative 
Reactivity 
3.70 1.00  3.76 .97  -.45 
32. Promotion  6.32 1.41  6.36 1.44  -.26 
33. Prevention 5.45 1.33  5.81 1.40  -2.13* 
33. PBC 3.53 .68  3.57 .70  -.44 
Note: N = 253. df ranged from 182 to 251, PA = Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect, 
PBC = Private Body Consciousness.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
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Table 7.4 shows bivariate correlations between the individual difference 
variables of interest and Time 2 and Time 3 independent (affect, differential emotion 
and trust repair perceptions variables) and dependent variables (perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust). Time 1 independent and 
dependent variable measures were not included due to space limitations, and given that 
the hypotheses relate to the change relationships between independent and dependent 
variables from Time 2 to Time 3. Furthermore, variables that did not prove to be 
influential in Study 1, such as those related to PA, trust propensity and promotion-
orientation, were also excluded to save space. 
Analysis of Table 7.4 indicates that prevention-orientation had moderate 
negative relations with trust at both Time 2 (r = -.15, p = .017) and Time 3 (r = -.16, p 
= .011), and with trustworthiness at Time 2 (r = -.17, p = .006). These results were the 
opposite of Study 1, in which the relationships were positive. Of the new measures 
included in the current study, the differential emotions appeared to correlate with trust 
and trustworthiness at Times 2 and 3, with the exception of joy at Time 2, which did 
not significantly correlate with either willingness to trust or perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness. The CEO’s trust repair response measure had 
statistically significant positive relations with willingness to trust and perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness at both Time 2 (willingness to trust r = .40, p <.001, 
perceptions of trustworthiness r = .50, p <.001) and Time 3 (willingness to trust r = 
.46, p <.001, perceptions of trustworthiness r = .68, p <.001). Emotional intensity and 
negative reactivity both had statistically significant negative correlations with trust at 
Time 2 (intensity r = -.20, p <.001, reactivity r = -.14, p = .026) and emotional intensity 
also correlated negatively with trust at Time 3, (r = -.19, p = .002), yet negative 
reactivity did not (r = -.11, p = .081). Neither of these variables correlated significantly 
with trustworthiness at either Time 2 or Time 3, perhaps supporting the proposal that 
willingness to trust involves an emotional component that perceptions of 
trustworthiness lacks.  
PBC did not correlate directly with either trust or trustworthiness at either Time 
2 or Time 3. However, PBC did correlate positively with the “negative” differential 
emotion variables of anger, fear and sadness at both time points, and contempt at Time 
2, and negatively with the calmness variable at Time 2. 
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Table 7.4 - Study 2 Bivariate Intercorrelations 
Note. N = 253, ^ TRR N = 122. TR = Trust, TW = Trustworthiness, TRR = Trust Repair Response, NA = Negative Affect, PA = Positive Affect, INA = Implicit Negative 
Affect, IPA = Implicit Positive Affect, Sad = Sadness, Clm = Calmness, Ang = Anger, Fea = Fear, Cnt = Contempt, NR = Negative Reactivity, EI = Emotional Intensity, 
Prev = Prevention, PBC = Private Body Consciousness.  
r>|12| has p <.05; r>|16| has p <.01; r>|20| has p <.001. ^ TRR, r>|17| has p <.05; r>|22| has p <.01; r>|29| has p <.001 (two-tailed)
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1.TR2 94 69 72 40 -33 -35 -10 -02 -29 -44 34 42 -30 -39 -35 -38 11 24 -37 -43 -14 -20 -15 -05 
2.TR3 -- 66 74 46 -31 -35 -08 -01 -25 -43 32 44 -26 -40 -29 -37 08 25 -36 -43 -11 -19 -16 -04 
3.TW2 
 
-- 88 50 -35 -41 -11 05 -31 -41 .36 37 -35 -47 -31 -34 11 23 -43 -49 -04 -.07 -10 02 
4.TW3 
  
-- 68 -35 -41 -10 04 -31 -43 31 40 -31 -47 -28 -37 07 22 -40 -48 -05 -10 -17 02 
5.TRR^ 
   
-- -39 -51 -13 19 -23 -40 00 29 -20 -53 -22 -34 -06 08 -26 -51 08 -10 -13 -04 
6.NA2 
    
-- 79 06 -05 56 56 -13 -05 55 58 68 63 13 12 53 58 23 20 25 11 
7.NA3 
     
-- 03 -05 45 66 -09 -11 46 69 52 74 11 03 53 67 10 16 22 06 
8.INA 
      
-- 42 12 07 -15 -20 03 02 07 06 -08 -17 04 02 15 13 -01 05 
9.IPA 
       
-- 02 -07 -11 -06 -02 -04 -05 -09 -15 -09 -03 -12 10 02 -02 05 
10.Sad2 
        
-- 62 -33 -11 65 51 61 45 -11 -01 59 47 28 10 12 21 
11.Sad3 
         
-- -20 -29 52 72 52 73 -01 -17 57 69 24 15 19 18 
12.Clm2 
          
-- 58 -24 -21 -26 -14 47 40 -26 -15 -11 -18 -08 -14 
13.Clm3 
           
-- -07 -22 -12 -19 36 72 -18 -18 -03 -20 -13 -06 
14.Ang2 
            
-- 69 60 46 -05 06 74 59 22 07 18 17 
15.Ang3 
             
-- 50 66 04 -03 67 76 13 09 23 14 
16.Fea2 
              
-- 70 00 06 59 51 23 24 27 13 
17.Fea3 
               
-- 08 -01 51 67 15 20 26 12 
18.Joy2 
                
-- 53 -03 06 -12 -15 -08 -09 
19.Joy3 
                 
-- -04 -01 -07 -10 -08 00 
20.Cnt2 
                  
-- 71 18 11 24 13 
21.Cnt3 
                   
-- 08 03 17 06 
22.NR 
                    
-- 53 27 30 
23.EI 
                     
-- 44 30 
24.Prev 
                      
-- 21 
25.PBC                                                -- 
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PBC also had strong positive correlations with emotional intensity (r = .30, p 
<.001), negative reactivity (r = .30, p <.001) and prevention-orientation (r = .21, p 
<.001). 
Manipulation checks and trust repair.  
ANOVA results show that there was a significant trust breach between Time 1 
and Time 2. The main effect of time was statistically significant F(1, 251) = 152.19, p 
< .001, yet, as predicted, at Time 1 there was no statistically significant between-
condition difference, F(1, 251) = .93, p = .34. The treatment group’s mean level of 
trust fell by .68, from M = 4.19 at Time 1 to M = 3.51 at Time 2, as shown in Figure 
4. In the control group, mean trust decreased by .80, from M = 4.04 to M = 3.24. 
There was also a statistically significant between-subject recovery in trust from 
Time 2 to Time 3. Participants in the treatment group recovered trust to a greater extent 
than those in the control group, suggesting a trust repair effect. This was evidenced by 
a significant time-by-condition interaction, F(1, 251) = 5.55, p = .019. As shown in 
Figure 4, mean level of trust in the treatment group increased by 0.12, from M = 3.51 
to M = 3.63. In the control group, Δ trust was miniscule, with the level of trust changing 
from M = 3.24 at Time 2 to M = 3.25 at Time 3, a mean increase of .008. 
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Figure 4. Study 2 Trust Violation and Repair: Estimated Marginal Means 
of Trust from Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 3). 
 
Figure 5. Study 2 Trustworthiness Violation and Repair: Estimated 
Marginal Means of Trustworthiness from Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 
3). 
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Figure 5 shows that there was a significant decline in perceptions of 
trustworthiness in both the treatment and control groups. The main effect of time was 
significant F(1, 251) = 79.39, p < .001, but, as with willingness to trust, there was no 
statistically significant between-condition difference from Time 1 to Time 2, F(1, 251) 
= .14, p = .71. Regarding trust repair effects, there was a significant time-by-condition 
difference in perceptions of trustworthiness from Time 2 to Time 3, F(1, 251) = 34.83, 
p < .001. The Time 2 to Time 3 mean level of trustworthiness in the treatment group 
increased by 0.13, from M = 3.27 to M = 3.50. In the control group, the mean level of 
trustworthiness fell slightly from M = 3.28 at Time 2 to M = 3.27 at Time 3. 
Results show that there was a significant trust breach in the full sample and 
subsequent trust repair effect in which the treatment group improved in both mean trust 
and mean trustworthiness whilst the control group did not. The following section 
concerns the testing of the hypotheses outlined earlier. 
Hypothesis Testing  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 of the current study aimed to replicate results obtained in 
Study 1. Specifically, Study 1 indicated that NA change was significant in predicting 
trust change even when trustworthiness change was included in analysis, so 
Hypothesis 1 related to whether or not this result would be replicated in a larger 
sample. 
As displayed in Table 7.5, the regression of Δ trust on Δ NA yielded the 
following results in the treatment group: F(1, 120) = 7.48, p = .007, R² =.06. As 
expected, the relationship was negative, b = -.25, t = -2.73. The addition of Δ 
trustworthiness resulted in a more significant effect, ΔF(2, 119) = 9.44, Δp = .003, ΔR² 
=.07, however, Δ NA remained significant when Δ trustworthiness was controlled, b = 
-25, t = -2.81, p =.006. The significant effects of Δ NA as a predictor of Δ trust were 
not present in the control group, F(1, 129) = 0.15, p = .70, R² =.01. These results 
replicate those found in Study 1 and give further credence to the importance of affect 
in the trust repair process. They also provide some evidence to suggest that solely 
considering cognition in relation to trust repair does not give a complete picture of the 
processes at work.  
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Table 7.5 - Regressions of Trust Change (Time 3 – Time 2) on Explicit 
Negative Affect Change (Time 3 – Time 2) and Trustworthiness Change (Time 3 
– Time 2) 
Note: Treatment n = 122, Control n = 131, Δ = a difference score created by subtracting T2 
variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables indicate an increase from T2 
to T3, IV = Independent Variable, NA = Negative Affect. TW = Trustworthiness.  
** p <.01. 
 
Hypothesis 2 aimed to replicate the results found in Study 1 relating to 
prevention-orientation. Namely, it was expected that prevention-orientation would 
moderate the relationship between NA variables and Δ trustworthiness. Furthermore, 
it was also expected that prevention orientation would moderate the relationship 
between NA variables and Δ trust. However, the current study was not able to replicate 
the results obtained in Study 1, as prevention-orientation did not moderate the 
relationships between NA Time 2 or NA Time 3 and Δ trustworthiness. Neither did it 
moderate the relationships between NA Time 2 or NA Time 3 and Δ trust. Results are 
displayed in Table 7.6. 
Results pertaining to Hypothesis 2a, concerning Δ trustworthiness, were as 
follows. The prevention x NA 2 interaction was not significant, b = -.04, t = -.96, p = 
.34. Prevention x NA 3 results were also nonsignificant, b = -<.01, t = -.04, p = .97. 
As a whole, the model was not significant, F(5, 116) = 1.01, p = .42, R² =.04. 
Similar results occurred in relation to Hypothesis 2b, which considered Δ trust 
as the dependent variable. The interaction term of prevention x NA T2 produced the 
following results, b = - 07, t = -1.55, p = .12. Prevention x NA T3 was also 
nonsignificant, b = .03, t = .43, p = .67. Total model results were nonsignificant, F(5, 
116) = 2.20, p = .059, R² =.09. Although significance was just under the .05 level in 
this model, the previous model without the interaction terms proved a better fit, F(3, 
118) = 2.67, p = .051, R² =.06. In sum, hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported. 
  
 Treatment  Control 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t  Β t  Β t  Β t 
Δ NA -.25 -2.73**  -.25 -2.81**  -.02 -.39  -.03 -.42 
Δ TW -- --  .30 3.07**  -- --  .40 3.85** 
            
R² .06**   .13**   <-.01    .10** 
ΔR² --   .07**   --    .10** 
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Table 7.6 – Study 2 Regressions of Dependent Variables' Change (Time 3 
- Time 2) on Prevention Orientation and Negative Affect 
Note. Treatment n = 122, Control n = 131. IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable. 
Δ TW = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trustworthiness from T3 Trustworthiness, 
thus positive values of this variable indicate an increase in Trustworthiness from T2 to T3, Δ 
Trust = a difference score created by subtracting T2 Trust from T3 Trust, thus positive values of 
this variable indicate an increase in Trust from T2 to T3. NA = Negative Affect. PrevxNA = the 
interaction term of Prevention Orientation and Negative Affect. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
Furthermore, prevention-orientation did not appear to play a moderating role 
when differential emotions were tested as predictors of either of Δ trust and Δ 
trustworthiness, either. Additionally, unlike in Study 1, prevention-orientation did not 
have a statistically significant direct effect on neither Δ trust nor Δ trustworthiness. 
The outcome of the regression of Δ trust on prevention-orientation was as follows, F(1, 
120) = .02, p = .902, R² =<.01. For Δ trustworthiness, results were also nonsignificant, 
F(1, 120) = 2.85, p = .094, R² = .02. Thus, it appears that prevention focus was not 
influential in predicting either Δ trust or Δ trustworthiness, either directly or as a 
moderator of their relationships with mood or specific emotion variables. 
Support for Hypothesis 3a requires that specific emotions render the effects of 
Δ NA nonsignificant, and 3b requires that the added emotion remains statistically 
  Treatment   Control  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Δ TW              
Prevention -.04 -1.69 -.04 -1.82 -.05 -2.04* -.02 -.93 -.01 -.73 -.03 1.71 
NA 2 -- -- .02 .23 .03 .32 -- -- <-.01 -.08 .02 .37 
NA 3 -- -- .03 .27 .03 .24 -- -- -.02 -.39 .01 .18 
PrevxNA2 -- -- -- -- -.04 -.96 -- -- -- -- <01 .05 
PrevxNA3 -- -- -- -- <-.01 -.04 -- -- -- -- -.10 -2.25* 
             
R²  .02  .03  .04  .01  .03  .12** 
ΔR²  --  <.01  .01  --  .02  .09** 
             
DV: Δ Trust              
Prevention <-.01 -.12 -.02 -.55 .02 .37 -.02 -1.02 -.02 -.68 -.02 .14 
NA 2 -- -- .25 2.72** .27 2.89** -- -- .01 .14 <.01 .14 
NA 3 -- -- -.21 -1.77 -.22 -1.85 -- -- -.08 -1.13 -.08 -1.13 
PrevxNA2 -- -- -- -- -.07 1.55 -- -- -- -- .01 .39 
PrevxNA3 -- -- -- -- -.03 -.43 -- -- -- -- -.02 -.36 
             
R²  .00  .06  .08  .01  .02  .02 
ΔR²  --  .06*  .02  --  <.01  .00 
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significant when Δ trustworthiness is included. Both of these requirements were 
satisfied for Δ fear and Δ joy. However, no other emotions satisfied both requirements. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3a, as a lone predictor of Δ trust, Δ fear proved to be statistically 
significant, F(1, 120) = 11.82, p <.001, R² =.09. It remained so when Δ trustworthiness 
was included in the regression, and as expected had a negative relationship with Δ 
trust, b = -.17, t = -3.44. The results of the entire model were as follows, ΔF(2, 119) = 
8.45, Δp <.001, ΔR² =.09, accounting for over 18% of the variance in trust change from 
Time 2 to Time 3. Moving on to Hypothesis 3b, the statistical significance of Δ NA 
was completely eliminated by the addition of Δ fear to the regression. Δ NA as lone 
predictor was significant, and had b-value of -.25, but when Δ fear was included in the 
regression, the p-value of Δ NA dropped to .86 and its b decreased by .12 to -.13. Δ 
Fear was statistically significant in predicting Δ trust alongside Δ NA, with a p-value 
of .003 and a b of -.13, and remained so when Δ trustworthiness was included as a 
control variable, p = .014, b = -.12.  
Δ Joy was significant in predicting Δ trust as a lone variable, F(1, 120) = 7.84, 
p = .006, R² =.06, and also remained significant when Δ trustworthiness was included 
in the regression. The direction of the relationship between Δ joy and Δ trust in this 
regression was positive, b = .23, t = 2.80, and the total model accounted for around 
12% of the total variance in Δ trust, ΔF(2, 119) = 7.78, Δp = .006, ΔR² =.06. The 
addition of Δ NA to the equation for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 3b altered 
results somewhat; the effect of Δ joy remained significant, but the influence of Δ NA 
did not decrease substantively. When Δ joy was added to the regression of Δ trust on 
Δ NA in the treatment group, the Δ NA regression coefficient remained at a similar 
level, falling from -.25 to -.23, and Δ joy b was .23. Here we see that the two 
independent variables have the same weighting, but with different signs. This makes 
conceptual sense, as prior research indicates that the existence of positive emotion is 
influential in repairing cooperation (Bottom et al., 2002) and trust (Chen et al., 2013). 
The inclusion of Δ trustworthiness did not alter the NA regression coefficient, but it 
did reduce the influence of Δ joy slightly, from .23 to .19 
Results for other emotions were less consistent. Δ Anger also significantly 
predicted Δ trust as a sole independent variable, F(1, 120) = 5.63, p = .019, R² =.05, 
however, when controlling for trustworthiness Δ, its significance fell below the .05 
threshold and its unstandardized beta coefficient fell from -.11 to -.05. The whole 
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model results were as follows, ΔF(2, 119) = 7.09, Δp = .009, ΔR² =.05. The regression 
of Δ trust on Δ NA and Δ anger resulted in the NA variable remaining significant (b = 
-.20) and the anger variable not adding anything substantive to the regression (b = -
.08). Including Δ trustworthiness in the regression saw the regression coefficient of Δ 
NA increase slightly, to -.22, and the Δ anger coefficient fall further, to -.06, thus not 
supporting Hypothesis 3b. The other emotions of interest, Δ sadness, Δ calmness and 
Δ contempt did not have any substantive influence in predicting Δ trust, either without 
Δ NA (Hypothesis 3a) as summarised in Table 7.7 or with Δ NA (Hypothesis 3b), as 
summarised in Table 7.8. 
In summary, results suggest that the fear and joy difference scores were clear 
predictors of Δ trust, even when controlling for Δ trustworthiness, but effects for other 
emotions were generally nonsignificant. Put differently, it is evident that the inclusion 
of Δ trustworthiness did not significantly reduce the predictive power of the 
aforementioned emotions on Δ trust. This indicates some support for Hypothesis 3a. 
In testing Hypothesis 3b, it was evident that Δ NA appeared to be robust as a predictor 
of Δ trust when considered alongside the majority of differential emotions, controlling 
for Δ trustworthiness, providing some support for previous research into the 
hierarchical categorisation of emotions in which general dimensions (i.e. NA and PA) 
were superordinate to specific emotions (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson et al., 
1999). Only Δ fear substantively reduced the effects of Δ NA. Table 7.9 summarises 
these results. 
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Table 7.7 - Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust Change (Time 3 – 
Time 2) from Change in Emotions and Trustworthiness (Time 3 – Time 2) 
Note. Treatment n = 122, Control n = 131. IV = Independent Variable, NA = Negative Affect, 
TW = Trustworthiness, Cont. = Contempt. Δ = a difference score created by subtracting T2 
variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables indicate an increase from T2 
to T3. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 Treatment  Control 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t  Β t  Β t  Β t 
Δ Fear -.17 -3.44**  -.16 -3.35**  -.06 -1.60  -.04 -1.18 
Δ TW -- --  .29 2.91**  -- --  .39 3.68** 
            
R² .09**   .15**   .02   .11**  
ΔR² --   .06**   --   .09**  
            
Δ Joy .23 2.80**  .21 2.57*  .04 .63  .03 .64 
Δ TW -- --  .28 2.79**  -- --  .40 3.85** 
            
R² .06**   .12**   <.01   .10**  
ΔR² --   .06**   --   .10**  
            
Δ Anger -.11 -2.37*  -.05 -1.94  -.05 -1.41  -.05 -1.29 
Δ TW -- --  .27 2.66**  -- --  .39 3.81** 
            
R² .04*   .09**   .02   .12**  
ΔR² --   .05**   --   .10**  
            
Δ Sad. -.05 -.86  -.04 -.68  -.05 -1.58  -.06 -1.77 
Δ TW -- --  .30 2.94**  -- --  .41 3.95** 
            
R² .01   .08**   .02   .13**  
ΔR² --   .07**   --   .10**  
            
Δ Calm .01 2.10*  .08 1.64  <.01 -.01  -.01 -.14 
Δ TW -- --  .28 2.68**  -- --  .40 3.85** 
            
R² .04*   .10**   <.01   .10**  
ΔR² --   .06**   --   .10**  
            
Δ Cont. -.06 -1.11  -.04 -.77  <.01 .26  <.01 .30 
Δ TW -- --  .30 2.88**  -- --  .40 3.85** 
            
R2 .01   .08**   <.01   .10**  
ΔR2 --   .07**   --   .10**  
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Table 7.8 - Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust Change (Time 3 – 
Time 2) from Change in Negative Affect, Emotions and Trustworthiness (Time 3 
– Time 2) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
IV B t R2  B t R2 ΔR2  B t R2 ΔR2 
Treatment              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.12 -1.14 .10** .04*  -.13 -1.27 .16** .06** 
Δ Fear -- -- --  -.13 -2.32* -- --  -.12 -2.18* -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .29 2.96** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.23 -2.61** 11** .05**  -.23 -2.70** .16** .05** 
Δ Joy -- -- --  .22 2.68** -- --  .19 2.45* -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .28 2.86** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.20 -2.14* .08** .02  -.22 -2.33* .14** .06** 
Δ Anger -- -- --  -.08 -1.67 -- --  -.06 1.20 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .28 2.82** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.25 -2.58** .06** <.01  -.26 -2.73** .13** .07** 
Δ Sadness -- -- --  <.01 .08 -- --  -.02 .31 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .31 3.07** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.22 -2.31* .08** .02  -.23 -2.48* .14** .06** 
Δ Calm. -- -- --  .07 1.53 -- --  .05 1.03 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .29 2.83** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.25 -2.73** .06**  -.24 -2.56** .06** <.01  -.24 -2.70** .14** .07** 
Δ Cont. -- -- --  -.04 -.62 -- --  -.01 -.26 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .30 3.00** -- -- 
              
Control              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  .04 .57 .02 .02  .02 .27 .11** .09** 
Δ Fear -- -- --  -.08 -1.65 -- --  -.05 -1.13 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .38 3.63** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  -.02 -.29 .01 <.01  -.02 -.32 .11** .10** 
Δ Joy -- -- --  .03 .57 -- --  .03 .58 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .40 3.84** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  .02 .26 .02 .02  .01 .17 .12** .10** 
Δ Anger -- -- --  -.06 -1.37 -- --  -.05 -1.23 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .39 3.79** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  .01 .09 .02 .02  .01 .12 .12** .11** 
Δ Sadness -- -- --  -.05 -1.52 -- --  -.06 -1.72 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .41 3.93** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  -.01 -.22 .02 .02  -.02 -.30 .11** .09** 
Δ Calm. -- -- --  .07 1.58 -- --  .05 1.09 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .39 3.64** -- -- 
              
Δ NA -.02 -.39 <.01  -.03 -.40 .01 <.01  -.03 -.42 .11** .10** 
Δ Cont. -- -- --  .01 .10 -- --  <.01 .07 -- -- 
Δ TW -- -- --  -- -- -- --  .40 3.84** -- -- 
Note. Treatment n = 122, Control n = 131, IV = Independent Variable, NA = Negative Affect, TW = 
Trustworthiness, Calm. = Calmness, Cont. = Contempt. Δ = a difference score created by subtracting T2 
variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables indicate an increase from T2 to T3. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01
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Table 7.9 - Regression Coefficients for Change in NA in Predicting Change 
in Trust (Time 3 – Time 2), Controlling for Change in Trustworthiness (Time 3 – 
Time 2) in Treatment Group 
Emotion Variable B-coefficients 
ΔNA by itself -25** 
ΔNA including Fear  -.13 
ΔNA including Joy  -.23** 
ΔNA including Anger  -.22* 
ΔNA including Sadness -.26** 
ΔNA including Calmness -.23** 
ΔNA including Contempt  -.24** 
Note. Treatment n = 122. NA = Negative Affect. Δ = a difference score created by 
subtracting T2 variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables indicate 
an increase from T2 to T3 Refer to Table 7.8 for full regressions. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
Given the process view of trust favoured in this thesis, I posited that the 
differential emotions considered in this study would influence Δ trustworthiness rather 
differently than they would Δ trust. Perceiving an entity as trustworthy is a belief, yet 
actually trusting said entity requires action. As emotions influence action, it is 
expected that they would predict willingness to trust due to its action-orientation, yet 
not trustworthiness, as finding something trustworthy does not require action. So, as a 
final note regarding the relationship between NA and differential emotions in the trust 
repair process, evidence from post-hoc analyses suggest change in differential 
emotions influenced Δ trustworthiness in a rather different manner than they did Δ trust 
in the current study. Whilst Δ NA, Δ fear and Δ joy appeared to be particularly 
influential in predicting Δ trust, they did not predict Δ trustworthiness. Indeed, the only 
emotion variable of interest that did predict Δ trustworthiness was Δ calmness. 
Perceptions of trustworthiness, that is, appraisals of someone’s ability, benevolence 
and integrity, are cognitive in nature. I assert that willingness to trust has a substantial 
emotional component that is largely independent of cognition, and thus it should not 
be surprising that the constructs of perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and 
willingness to trust are influenced differently by emotion. See Tables 7.8 and 7.10 for 
a comparison of the effects of Δ emotion variables on Δ trust and Δ trustworthiness, 
respectively. 
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Table 7.10 - Regressions of Trustworthiness Change (Time 3 - Time 2) on 
Emotion Change (Time 3 - Time 2) 
 Treatment Control 
IV Β t R² Β t R² 
Δ NA -.01 -.07 <.01 <.01 .02 <.01 
Δ Fear  -.03 -.71 <.01 -.05 -1.51 .02 
Δ Joy .08 1.15 .01 <.01 .05 <.01 
Δ Anger -.08 -1.90 .03 -.02 -.57 <.01 
Δ Sadness -.04 -.78 .01 .01 .32 <.01 
Δ Calmness .08 2.00* .03* .06 1.70 .02 
Δ Contempt -.07 -1.39 .02 .01 .13 <.01 
Note. Treatment n = 122, Control n = 131, IV = Independent Variable NA = Negative 
Affect, TW = Trustworthiness. Δ = a difference score created by subtracting T2 
variables from T3 variables, thus positive values of variables indicate an increase from 
T2 to T3. 
* p < .05. 
 
With regards to the hypotheses relating to the affect intensity individual 
difference measures and their predicted interaction effects with Δ emotions and Δ trust, 
none were supported. Hypothesis 4a was not supported, as negative reactivity did not 
moderate the relationship between Δ trust from Time 2 to Time 3 and any of the state 
emotion or affect variables of interest. Hypothesis 4b, which suggested that emotional 
intensity would moderate the relationship between Δ trust (Time 2 to Time 3) and the 
emotion and affect variables of interest, was not supported either. Finally, PBC did not 
relate to Δ trust from Time 2 to Time 3, neither did it moderate the relationship between 
this change and any emotion variable, thus Hypothesis 5 was not supported.  
Hypotheses 6a-6c related to perceptions of the CEO’s trust repair effort. 
Specifically, it was expected that how participants in the treatment group perceived 
the National Express CEO’s trust repair effort would directly influence their Δ trust 
from Time 2 to Time 3 (Hypothesis 6a), that the trust repair perceptions would mediate 
the relationship between Δ trust and Δ NA (Hypothesis 6b), and, between Δ trust and 
Δ trustworthiness (Hypothesis 6c). The relationship between perceptions of the CEO’s 
trust repair response and Δ trust from Time 2 to Time 3 was not statistically significant, 
F(1, 120) = 2.55. p = .113, R² =.021. As such, mediation is not possible and none of 
the hypotheses were supported.  
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Exploratory Analyses  
The hypotheses of the current study focused on the difference between trust 
and emotions from Time 2 to Time 3, or post-violation to post-repair. Post-hoc 
analyses of Time 1 to Time 2 differences were also considered to ascertain whether 
the emotionality variables would predict baseline trust to trust post-violation change. 
For these analyses, the whole sample was considered, because from Time 1 to Time 2 
all participants saw the same stimuli. Thus, there was no reason to consider the 
treatment and control groups separately, unlike during the hypothesis testing which 
concerned Time 2 to Time 3 change. 
Negative reactivity and PBC were significant predictors of Time 1 to Time 2 
trust change. The results for negative reactivity were as follows: F(1, 251) = 5.78, p = 
.017, R² =.02. The direction of this relationship was negative, b = -.15, .36, t = -2.41. 
The direction of PBC’s relationship with Time 1 to Time 2 trust change was also 
negative b= -.18, t = -2.06, and significant, F(1, 251) = 4.23, p = .041, R² = .02. None 
of the other individual difference variables tested, namely prevention- and promotion-
orientation, or emotional intensity proved to be significant predictors of Time 1 to 
Time 2 trust change, as demonstrated in Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11 - Regressions of Trust Change (Time 1 - Time 2) on Individual 
Difference Variables 
IV Β T R² 
Prevention -.06 -.1.40 <.01 
Promotion -.03 -.81 <.01 
Negative Reactivity -.15 -2.41* .02* 
Emotional Intensity -.09 -1.44 <.01 
Private Body Consciousness -.18 -2.06* .02* 
Note: N = 253.  
* p < .05. 
Discussion 
Summary of results: Studies 1 and 2. The same experimental stimuli in both 
Study 1 and Study 2 were used in order to determine whether certain key findings in 
Study 1 could be replicated in Study 2.  
Firstly, it is important to note that there was a significant trust breach from the 
baseline Time 1 measure of trust to the Time 2 measure post-violation. Furthermore, 
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there were recoveries in both willingness to trust and perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness in the treatment group that were statistically significant but not 
apparent in the control group, suggesting that there was a trust repair effect and that 
the study was appropriate for testing issues relating to trust violation and recovery. In 
Study 1, a significant repair effect was found for perceptions or organizational 
trustworthiness, but not for willingness to trust (although the mean level of trust did 
increase, as expected). In this respect, Study 2 replicates the trust breach and 
trustworthiness repair effects of Study 1, and also provides confidence in the trust 
repair effects that were not statistically significant in Study 1, given Study 2’s larger 
sample. 
The most significant of the Study 1 findings concerned the apparent role of Δ 
NA change in predicting Δ trust. Further exploratory analyses were undertaken to 
determine whether this would still be the case even when controlling for the effects of 
Δ trustworthiness. It was, and these results were replicated in Study 2, suggesting that 
NA plays an important role in the trust repair process, an idea that has received scant 
empirical support in extant literature.  
Another significant finding of Study 1 related to the influence of prevention 
orientation, both as a direct predictor of Δ trustworthiness and as a moderator of the 
relationship between NA Time 2 and Time 3 and trustworthiness change. However, 
the directionality of the relationship between prevention orientation and 
trustworthiness was unexpected; there was a positive relationship between the two 
variables, when one would expect that it would be negative. In Study 2, the direction 
of the relationship was negative, yet there were no statistically significant results 
relating to the influence of prevention orientation as either a direct predictor of 
trustworthiness change or trust change or as a moderator of dependent variables 
relationships with NA change or any of the negative differential emotion change 
scores. 
The other key findings of the second study, specifically, the influence of Δ fear 
and Δ joy as predictors of Δ trust, were not tested in Study 1 as differential emotion 
measures were not included in the research design. A summary of key findings is 
displayed in Table 7.12 
While Δ NA predicted Δ trust in the current study, it did not affect Δ 
trustworthiness. This result differed from Study 1, where Δ trustworthiness was also 
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predicted by Δ NA. Given that perceptions of the organization’s trustworthiness are 
cognitive, that Δ NA may not necessarily influence such cognitive perceptions should 
not be surprising. On the other hand, the operationalization of trust as willingness to 
rely on the company to get the participant to a destination (a) safely, (b) on time, and 
willingness to use the company (c) as a coach-provider and (d) to take a long-distance 
journey may be more likely to tap into emotions. These aspects of trust invoke 
questions about the trustor’s perceptions of the safety of taking a journey with the 
company and more general questions regarding its competence. Results showed that 
the greater the decrease in participants’ NA from Time 2 to Time 3, the greater the 
increase in their trust from Time 2 to Time 3, so it may be that a decrease in negative 
emotion may prove to be the catalyst that drives the “leap of faith” from finding an 
entity trustworthy to being willing to trust it (Möllering, 2006).  
 
Table 7.12 - Summary of Key Findings 
Finding 
Study 1 
Support? 
(Y/N) 
Study 2 
Support? 
(Y/N) 
Replication 
(Y/N) 
Trust repair effect occurred. Y Y Y 
    
Δ NA predicts Δ trust. Y Y Y 
    
Δ NA predicts Δ trust, controlling 
for Δ trustworthiness. 
Y 
(Exploratory) 
Y Y 
    
Δ PA predicts Δ trust Y N N 
    
Δ PA predicts Δ trust, controlling 
for Δ trustworthiness. 
N N N 
    
Prevention orientation moderates 
the relationship between NA and 
perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness. 
Y N N 
    
Prevention orientation has a direct 
relationship with Δ trust. 
Y N N 
    
Δ fear predicts Δ trust, controlling 
for Δ trustworthiness and Δ NA. 
Not Tested Y N/A 
    
Δ joy predicts Δ trust, controlling 
for Δ trustworthiness and Δ NA 
Not Tested Y N/A 
Note. Y = Yes, N = No, N/A = Not Applicable. 
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A particularly interesting finding of the current study was how changes in 
specific emotion variables and general affect influenced trust and trustworthiness 
change quite differently. Δ Fear and Δ joy, so influential in predicting Δ trust, were not 
significant indicators of Δ trustworthiness. Indeed, the most significant predictor of Δ 
trustworthiness in terms of differential emotions was Δ calmness, which was not 
related to Δ trust. Why then, did a decrease in fear, a state of high arousal, not have the 
same effect on Δ trustworthiness? Equally, why did an increase in calmness not have 
the same effect on trust as it did trustworthiness?  
The answer to these questions may lie in the action-orientation of willingness 
to trust. My conceptualisation of the concept dictates that there is a motivational 
component to trust that is not necessarily apparent in perceptions of trustworthiness. 
This provides a possible explanation as to why Δ fear may be particularly powerful in 
influencing Δ trust, while Δ calmness is not. Namely, fear is an evolutionary cue that 
alerts people to potential threats in the environment, both physical and psychological 
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). According to Frijda (1986) fear can be defined by its 
withdrawal action tendency (emphasis added). Here we can see a clear link between 
the action-orientation of trust and fear; trust requires positive action in the midst of 
vulnerability, fear causes actors to withdraw from situations of physical and 
psychological vulnerability. Also, given the intense nature of fear, it may consume 
cognitive resources as it is regulated, reducing its relation to cognitive measures. On 
the other hand, calmness does not possess the same action-orientation. It is considered 
a low state of arousal (Russell, 1980), so it may be that people who are calmer are able 
to consider the trustworthiness of National Express from a more rational perspective. 
This may be related to the misattribution of arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962), which 
posits that arousal accentuates judgements depending on the positivity or negativity 
associated towards an object. That is, associations of objects may become more 
positive, and negative associations may become more negative when one is aroused 
depending on the prior association one has towards that object (Storback & Clore, 
2008). 
Δ Joy, the only specific emotion that constituted a positive emotional response 
in this study, was the next most influential of the differential emotions in predicting Δ 
trust. Specifically, an increase in joy from Time 2 to Time 3 was positively related to 
an increase in trust. Fredrickson’s perspective (2001) suggests positive emotions help 
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people “broaden and build”, leading to greater thought-action processes and the 
development of more personal resources. Joy, specifically, “broadens by creating the 
urge to play, push the limits, and be creative” (Fredrickson, 2001: 220). She also posits 
that positive emotions may have the ability to “undo” the effects of negative emotions. 
From these perspectives, when we think of trust in terms of willingness to be 
vulnerable and being based on positive expectations, we could infer that positive 
expectations are more likely to be developed in the presence of positive emotions, and 
vulnerability may be negated by them. Δ PA was not a significant predictor of Δ trust 
in this study, yet it was in Study 1. However, the influence of joy in the current study 
and PA in Study 1 may suggest that positive emotion is also important in willingness 
to trust, but not necessarily to perceptions of trustworthiness, in this case due to the 
lack of action-orientation attached to these perceptions.  
Unlike in Study 1, prevention-orientation did not prove to predict Δ trust or Δ 
trustworthiness directly or as part of an interaction effect. The Study 1 results were 
somewhat unexpected, as there was a positive relationship between prevention-
orientation and both Δ trust and Δ trustworthiness, yet one would expect these 
relationships to be negative. Moreover, significant interactions were not found for the 
other individual difference emotion variables, yet affect intensity appeared to play a 
role in predicting Δ trust from baseline to post-violation (Time 1 to Time 2) when 
exploratory analyses were conducted. The negative relationship between negative 
reactivity and Time 1 – Time 2 Δ trust is not surprising; one would expect that the 
higher an individual’s level of reactivity to negative events, the more she would be 
affected by the crash and the greater the loss in trust would be from her base level. 
Limitations 
Although Study 2 had a larger sample size than Study 1, given the use of the 
same stimuli and similar procedures, it still suffers from some of the same limitations 
as Study 1 did. Specifically, participants were not involved in a personally relevant 
situation and they were not affected by the trust failure in any way. As a consequence 
of this, it was not possible to measure the entire trust process. That is, the action stage 
of the process was not measured in either study. 
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Chapter Summary and Implications for Study 3 
Chapter 7 detailed the second study of my thesis. Study 2 aimed to build on the 
work conducted in Study 1 by attempting to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a larger 
sample. To this end, results showed that affect appeared to be important for trust 
violation and repair, strengthening the case for further study into its effects. 
Furthermore, Study 2 also included specific emotions and showed that Δ fear and Δ 
joy appeared to be particularly important in predicting Δ trust, even when controlling 
for Δ NA, which otherwise proved to be a robust predictor of the dependent variable. 
Finally, results showed that there was a difference in the predictive capacity of NA 
and specific emotion variables on trust and trustworthiness, respectively. Whilst 
emotions did not appear to be particularly predictive of Δ trustworthiness, they did 
appear to influence willingness to trust. This has implications for how trust is 
measured. Furthermore, it suggests that considering emotions in trust violation and 
repair is important, and that purely cognitive models are not enough to sufficiently 
understand these processes.  
Given the limitation of the current study, it was necessary to consider a design 
that allowed for measurement of the entire trust process; belief, decision, and action. 
In order to achieve this goal, a different, personally relevant scenario was required. 
This is detailed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Study 3 – The Measurement of Trust as a Process 
Extending Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 was designed to address key limitations 
of Studies 1 and 2.  First, the stimuli in these studies were not likely to be salient to 
participants as they were merely passive observers of a process that did not affect them 
personally. Second, my conceptualisation of trust as a process requires measurement 
of trustworthiness beliefs, the decision to trust, and action(s).  
Studies 1 and 2 were only able to capture the belief (perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness) and decision (willingness to trust) components of this 
process; action was not measured. Hence, the two primary goals of Study 3 were to 
examine whether the findings pertaining to the relationship between affect and 
willingness to trust found in the previous studies also relate to (dis)trusting actions in 
a scenario that subjects would find salient. In order to do this, a field study was 
conducted in which Volkswagen (VW) vehicle owners were contacted and asked 
whether the recent Volkswagen Emissions Scandal (henceforth: the scandal) had 
influenced them in terms of their emotions towards the company, perceptions of 
Volkswagen’s trustworthiness, willingness to trust Volkswagen and, crucially, 
whether or not they had engaged in several specific distrusting actions since the 
scandal occurred. In addition, there was an experimental component to the current 
study in which participants randomly assigned to either a treatment group, which 
witnessed a trust repair manipulation, or a control group, which witnessed no 
manipulation. It was this component of the study that aimed to replicate the trust repair 
effects found in Studies 1 and 2. 
Background: An Overview of the Scandal  
Before outlining Study 3’s hypotheses and research design. I first provide an 
overview of the scandal that provides the context for this study. Table 8.1 contains a 
timeline of the scandal and indicates when data for Study 2 were collected. 
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Table 8.1 - Timeline of Volkswagen Scandal and Study 3 Data Collection 
 
The Emissions Scandal was set into motion in May 2014, when the West 
Virginia University (WVU) Centre for Alternative Fuels, Engines and Emissions 
published the results of a study which found that two Volkswagen diesel cars produced 
higher-than-claimed in-use emissions (Thompson, Carder, Besch, Thiruvengadem & 
Kappana, 2014). WVU alerted the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the 
Date Event 
May 2014 
West Virginia University (WVU) publish study which indicated 
that two Volkswagen diesel vehicles emitted higher-than-claimed 
in-use emissions. WVU inform EPA and CARB of results. 
  
Summer 2014 
EPA contacts VW for an explanation for poor real-world NOx 
emissions. 
  
December 2014 
VW voluntarily recalls TDI vehicles and applies a software fix but 
EPA and CARB not satisfied. 
  
May 2015 
CARB conducts follow-up tests which indicate that VW’s fix has 
not worked and NOx emissions are still significantly higher than 
the acceptable limit. 
  
July 2015  
CARB shares findings with VW and EPA. VW declares that some 
vehicles include a second calibration that is activated in laboratory 
conditions.  
  
3 September 2015 
Volkswagen admits that the secondary calibration is designed to 
bypass emissions testing. 
  
18 September 2015 
EPA makes public announcement, issuing VW with a notice of 
violation that states the automaker must recall affected 2009-2015 
vehicles. 
  
20 September 2015 VW issues public apology. 
  
21 September 2015 First business day after the scandal breaks, VW shares down 20%. 
  
23 September 2015 CEO Martin Winterkorn resigns. 
  
25 September 2015 
Mattias Muller appointed CEO. VW blames a small number of 
technicians for the crisis. 
  
8 October 2015 VW USA CEO Michael Horn testifies before US Congress. 
  
9 March 2016 Michael Horn resigns as VW USA CEO. 
  
21 March – 21 April 2016 Study 3 data collection period. 
  
21 April 2016 VW announces settlement package for affected US vehicles. 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the results, but over the course of the 
summer Volkswagen asserted to the two agencies that the in-use emissions could have 
been caused by a number of technical difficulties and unexpected in-use conditions. 
However, in December 2014 the car manufacturer agreed to recall almost 500,000 
vehicles in order to update the emission control software to make them compliant with 
emissions standards (Whorinsky & Warrick, 2015).  
CARB conducted follow-up tests in May 2015 to determine whether the new 
control had worked. This appeared not to be the case, as nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
emissions were still significantly higher than the prescribed limit. In July 2015, CARB 
shared the results with the EPA and Volkswagen. At this point, Volkswagen disclosed 
that the vehicles have a second calibration that only runs while being emissions tested, 
invoked through the use of a few lines of computer code. On September 3rd 2015, the 
company admitted to CARB and the EPA that this software was designed to “bypass, 
defeat and render inoperative elements of the vehicle emissions control system” 
(Herbert, 2015). The EPA defines any device that reduces the effectiveness of 
emissions control under testing as a defeat device, and the use of such a device is 
subject to penalty (Herbert, 2015). Volkswagen’s admission to the use of a defeat 
device led the EPA to issue a notice of violation to Volkswagen on September 18th 
2015 (Herbert, 2015). This notice stated that Volkswagen must initiate a process to fix 
the emission systems of roughly 482,000 diesel cars sold in the United States since 
2008, and the manufacturer announced a recall on September 20th 2015. On this date, 
Martin Winterkorn the CEO of Volkswagen released a statement in which he 
apologised for breaking the trust of customers and the public, and stated that he “will 
do everything necessary in order to reverse the damage that has been caused” (Audi, 
2015).  
Three days later, on September 23rd 2015, Winterkorn resigned as CEO, 
stating:  
As CEO I accept responsibility for the irregularities that have been found in 
diesel engines and have therefore requested the Supervisory Board to agree on 
terminating my function as CEO of the Volkswagen Group. I am doing this in 
the interests of the company even though I am not aware of any wrong doing 
on my part. (Volkswagen AG, 2015). 
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On September 25th 2015, Volkswagen promoted Mattias Muller from CEO of 
Porsche to head of the entire Volkswagen group. In a press conference to announce 
the appointment, the acting chairman of the company’s work council, Bernd Osterloh, 
said that “unlawful behaviour of engineers and technicians involved in the engine 
development” was responsible for the scandal, before stating that “a small group has 
done damage to our company. We need a climate where mistakes are not hidden” 
(Ruddick & Farrell, 2015). As a response to the crisis, three employees from technical 
departments were suspended, pending an investigation. 
In October, Volkswagen Group of America CEO, Michael Horn, gave 
testimony relating to the scandal to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
of the United States House of Representatives. In this hearing, Rep. Tim Murphy called 
the scandal “a fundamental violation of public trust” (House of Representatives, 2015). 
Horn provided details of some measures Volkswagen would take in response to the 
crisis, including a worldwide investigation, open communication, and compensation 
to dealers. He explained that he did not personally know about the existence of a defeat 
device, and that, to his knowledge, the installation of such software was not a corporate 
decision. On 9th March 2016, Horn resigned. A statement from the company said that 
Horn would be “leaving to pursue other opportunities, effective immediately” 
(Volkswagen, 2016). Hinrich Woebcken, formerly Head of the North American 
Region and Chairman of Volkswagen Group of America, replaced Horn as President 
and CEO of Volkswagen Group of American on an interim basis. It was shortly after 
this event, on March 21st, 2016, that data collection for Study 3 began. 
Financially, the crisis has been catastrophic for VW, with the company losing 
over £18.5bn, or one-third, of the worth of its stock in the week beginning September 
21st 2015, the first business day after the EPA issued a notice of violation and the 
automaker admitted malfeasance. It could face a fine of up to £11.6bn from the EPA, 
and class action lawsuits have been brought about by American and Australian law 
firms on behalf of customers who bought affected vehicles (Pandey, 2015). In the 
United States, Volkswagen has been granted preliminary consent for a $10 billion 
settlement to buy back or provide fixes for around 475,000 affected vehicles, pending 
approval by a U.S judge in October 2016 (Sheperdson & Schectman, 2016). In light 
of this agreement, and Volkswagen’s adamancy that compensation is not an option for 
customers affected in the United Kingdom (Transport Select Committee, 2016), the 
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UK Secretary of State for Transport has pressed Volkswagen regarding the 
discrepancy in their approach in different jurisdictions (Campbell, 2016). As 
Volkswagen came to a preliminary agreement to compensate affected North American 
customers on 22nd April 2016, it was decided that data collection should cease on this 
date. It allowed for a data collection period of one month, and data collected from 
participants with knowledge of this agreement might have led to very different 
responses than those collected before it was announced, potentially biasing results.  
From a societal standpoint, the scandal hit the German economy “at its core”, 
with one economist claiming it could prove to be a greater economic threat than the 
Greek Debt Crisis (Nienaber, 2015). In Wolfsburg, the home of Volkswagen and a city 
that is heavily dependent on the company, feelings of disbelief, worry and anger were 
pervasive amongst employees and wider stakeholders (Milne, 2015). For dealers and 
owners in the United States, similar emotions were reported by numerous news outlets 
(Mouawad & Jensen, 2015; Wallace, 2015).  
On the other hand, a survey of 1,000 Germans conducted in October 2015 by 
Prophet, a market research firm, suggested that Volkswagen’s reputation had not 
suffered unduly in its domestic market. 65% of respondents still thought of 
Volkswagen’s vehicles as being “outstanding”, and 63% thought that the scandal was 
a passing trifle and would soon disappear. 91% believed that Volkswagen is not the 
only car manufacturer cheating on emissions tests (Gibbs, 2015). However, another 
survey conducted at a similar time by UK consumer body ‘Which?’ produced rather 
different findings. Of 2,000 motorists directly affected by the scandal in the UK, nine 
out of 10 wanted compensation, 86% were worried about the environmental impact of 
their car, and more than half said that they were put off buying a Volkswagen vehicle 
in the future (Ruddick, 2015). These results show that the scandal was personally 
relevant and had behavioural implications for affected motorists. 
Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study was to attempt to replicate results found in Studies 1 
and 2, and to extend findings by including the final component of trust-as-process, i.e. 
the action, whilst examining the relationship between attribution, emotion and trust. 
Hypotheses 1 to 5 attempt to replicate prior findings, and Hypotheses 6 to 11 aim to 
extend them. 
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Trust Repair 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that there was a significant trust repair effect in the 
trust repair treatment group compared to the no repair control group for perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness. The time-by-condition (Time 2 to Time 3) interaction 
effects for willingness to trust were less clear, in terms of significance, in the two prior 
studies. However, between-subject effects were significant, with trust being better 
maintained in the treatment group than the control group. The context of the current 
study is very different to that of Studies 1 and 2. Firstly, all participants in the current 
study own Volkswagen vehicles, and some were directly affected by emissions 
noncompliance, therefore it is likely to be more salient to them than the scenario used 
in Studies 1 and 2 was to participants. Secondly, the fallout from the scandal has not 
yet ended. There is much still to be resolved. The stimuli used for the manipulations 
in this study occurred in October 2015, five months before data collection began, and 
until the date that data collection concluded, not a great deal had changed with regards 
to substantive customer reparations or vehicle fixes, and it is likely that owners would 
know this. With this being the case, while participants may have perceived 
Volkswagen as more trustworthy in light of a trust repair effort, it is unlikely that their 
behavioural willingness to trust would change significantly. Hence, the following 
hypotheses were advanced: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant trust repair effect from Time 1 
(baseline) to Time 2 (post-trust repair stimulus) for perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, as demonstrated by an increase in this variable from Time 1 to Time 
2 in the treatment group. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will not be a significant trust repair effect from Time 1 
(baseline) to Time 2 (post-trust repair stimulus) for willingness to trust. 
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Mood and Trust Repair  
Given the role of Δ NA in predicting Δ trust in studies 1 and 2, it is expected 
that a similar effect would occur in the current study. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Δ NA will be a significant indicator of Δ trust in the treatment 
group when Δ perceived organizational trustworthiness is controlled. 
Specific Emotions and Trust Repair  
In Study 2, Δ fear and Δ joy were shown to be predictive of trust when both 
trustworthiness and NA were controlled. An aim of the current study was to examine 
whether these results would replicate. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Change in the differential emotions of (a) fear and (b) joy will 
have an incremental effect over that of NA in predicting Δ trust in the treatment group, 
even when Δ perceptions of trustworthiness are controlled.  
Mood, Emotion, Baseline Trust, and Trustworthiness 
Further to considering Δ trust and Δ trustworthiness (Time 1 to Time 2), it was 
deemed pertinent to examine the relationships between the emotion variables, trust, 
and trustworthiness at Time 1, given the salient history that participants would have 
had with Volkswagen. History was not as salient a factor in Studies 1 or 2; it was the 
trust repair effect that was of primary interest. In the current study, Time 1 data were 
likely to be more salient than the Time 2, post-repair information given the context of 
the scenario, as explained in the paragraph pertaining to Hypotheses 1 and 2. In line 
with the trust repair results of Studies 1 and 2, indicated by difference score effects, it 
was expected that NA would prove to be predictive of both perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust, and that they would remain so 
for willingness to trust when controlling for perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness.  
 
Hypothesis 5: NA will be a significant predictor of (a) organizational 
trustworthiness and (b) willingness to trust at Time 1. 
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Hypothesis 6: NA will be a significant indicator of trust at Time 1 when 
perceived organizational trustworthiness is controlled. 
 
Furthermore, it was also expected that the specific emotions of fear and joy 
would remain significant indicators of willingness to trust, controlling for both 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and NA, given the results pertaining to 
difference scores obtained in Study 2. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The differential emotions of (a) fear and (b) joy will have an 
incremental effect over and above that of NA in predicting trust at Time 1, when 
perceptions of trustworthiness are controlled. 
Trustworthiness, Willingness to Trust, and (Dis)trusting Actions 
Study 3 included a component of the trust process that was not included in 
Studies 1 or 2: the (dis)trusting action. The conceptualisation of trust taken in this 
thesis is that trust is a process that consists of belief, decision and action (Dietz & Den 
Hartog, 2006; Skinner, et al., 2013). Skinner et al. (2013: 218) state that the action 
stage of the trust process is vital; it is, as they state, “real trust” (emphasis in original); 
the manifestation of trust through action. Trusting acts include deliberately reduced 
monitoring, sharing valuable resources, increased collaboration and reliance (Dietz & 
Den Hartog, 2006; Gillespie, 2003; Nienaber et al., 2015), the adoption of a product 
or service (Kim et al., 2009; McKnight et al., 2002) and making a purchase (McKnight 
et al., 2002). There are few extant studies that include the measurement of trusting acts 
or behaviours in organizational settings. Kim and colleagues’ (2009) study of trust, 
perceived risk and trusting behaviour in internet banking is an exception. It found that 
trust in internet banking as a medium had a significant, positive direct effect on the 
trusting act of adopting internet banking, and an indirect effect through the perceived 
risk of internet banking. Furthermore, trust that the bank would not take advantage of 
customers’ information also significantly influenced trusting behaviour through 
perceived risk in internet banking. In McKnight et al.’s (2002) seminal study of trust 
in e-commerce, trust-related behaviour, or adoption of a service, was included in their 
conceptual model. However, the authors note that they did not directly test this 
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outcome in their study, but indicated that doing so would be a fruitful avenue of future 
research.  
In the current study, I am particularly interested in acts or behaviour that could 
be constituted as different from the norm, or a change in a pre-planned action. Also, 
as the participants already have a relationship with Volkswagen, as they own VW 
brand vehicles, the context is very different to those in the studies described earlier in 
this section related to business-to-consumer relationships. In Kim and colleagues’ 
(2009) article, the trusting behaviour measured was adoption of an online banking 
platform. Participants in the current study have already “adopted” by buying a 
Volkswagen vehicle, but a more pertinent question would be whether the scandal has 
caused them to act differently, particularly in a negative manner.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, I do not consider distrust as being the polar opposite 
of trust on a continuum, as simply a lack of trust. Rather, it is a linked but separate 
construct that is activated in a different region of the brain to trust, in a quick, episodic 
and largely automatic manner (Bijilsma-Frankema et al., 2015; Dimoka, 2010). A 
graphical representation of the trust/distrust process is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. A process model of trust. 
For the purpose of Study 3, a series of dichotomous behavioural items relating 
to distrusting acts were developed. Participants were asked whether they had engaged 
in any acts since the scandal related to the vehicle itself (making or changing plans to 
sell it, actively deciding to drive it less), complained to and about the organization, 
discouraged others from buying a product from the company, and altered previous 
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plans relating to going to a Volkswagen-themed or sponsored event. If they answered 
“yes” to any of these items, they were asked to what extent the scandal influenced their 
actions. Each item was summed to create a continuous distrusting acts variable. I 
considered developing a dichotomous dependent variable measure based on number 
of distrusting acts committed, coded as 1 = had engaged in one or more distrusting 
acts, and 0 = had not engaged in any distrusting acts. However, logistic regression 
results can be difficult to interpret, and my sample may not have passed the events-
per-variable rule of thumb, which dictates that logistic models should be used with a 
minimum of 10 outcome events per predictor variable (Peduzzi, Conacto, Kempfer, 
Holford, & Feinstein, 1996). With these issues in mind, I took the decision to sum the 
items into a continuous measure in order to develop a psychometric scale score, and 
to attempt to produce a clearer, more parsimonious interpretation of results in keeping 
with the analyses conducted in Studies 1 and 2. In the context of this study, it was 
expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 8: (a) Perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and (b) 
willingness to trust will have significant, negative relationships with distrusting acts. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Willingness to trust will have a greater substantive effect in 
predicting distrusting acts than perceptions of organizational trustworthiness 
 
Hypothesis 10: NA will have a significant, positive effect in predicting 
distrusting acts, controlling for willingness to trust. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Specific emotions will predict distrusting acts, controlling for 
willingness to trust. Namely, (a) fear, will have a significant, positive effect, and (b) 
joy will have a significant, negative effect. 
 
Attribution and the trust process. Attribution theory was covered in detail in 
Chapter 3. Although many studies consider trust and trust repair from an attributional 
basis (Dirks et al., 2009), there have been few empirical studies that directly test 
attribution in the process of trust repair. Chen et al (2013) built on Tomlinson and 
Mayer’s (2009) conceptual model of attribution and emotion in trust repair and found 
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that none of the attributional components in their study (controllability, locus of 
causality, or stability) were significant in predicting post-encounter trust after a poor 
e-service encounter. However, it was not noted what kind of failures occurred in the 
Chen et al. (2013) paper. Specifically, whether they were ability-, benevolence-, or 
integrity-based failures, or whether different failure types occurred for different 
customers. 
It may be that attribution type weighs more heavily in some failure types than 
others. For instance, Kim et al. (2006) note that an apology coupled with external 
attributions was more successful in repairing trust after an integrity-based failure, 
whereas an apology coupled with internal attribution was deemed to signal greater 
trustworthiness after an ability-based failure. As the failure type of the current study is 
one of integrity, one may expect that attribution would be a moderator in the trust 
process. Specifically, given the prevalence of NA, fear and joy as influential emotion 
variables, it was expected that attribution would moderate the relationships between 
those variables and willingness to trust. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Attribution will moderate the relationships between (a) NA and 
willingness to trust, (b) fear and willingness to trust, and (c) joy and willingness to 
trust. 
Method 
Research design. The purpose of Study 3 was two-fold. Firstly, given the 
conceptualisation of trust used in this thesis, namely that it is a process that consists of 
belief, decision and action, it was important to consider the action component of the 
process as this had not previously been investigated in Studies 1 or 2. Furthermore, 
there was a second component to the study which mirrored the design of Studies 1 and 
2. Namely, an experiment was conducted in which participants were randomly 
assigned to either a treatment or control group, with the treatment group seeing a trust 
repair manipulation and the control group seeing no repair. In this respect, the current 
study aimed to replicate results found in Studies 1 and 2. However, as participants in 
this study were owners of Volkswagen vehicles, it is likely that they would find the 
context more salient than participants in the thesis’ previous studies. 
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Participants and Procedure  
138 Volkswagen vehicle owners completed Study 3. They were solicited via 
(a) personal invitation (n = 21), (b) Volkswagen communities, such as message boards 
and owners’ clubs (n = 20), and (c) Prolific Academic (n = 97). After consulting box 
plots and plotting residuals against leverage plots for regressions of trust on each 
specific emotion variable, three participants were identified as outliers and excluded 
from further analyses, leaving an N of 135. As stated previously, data collection began 
on 21st March 2016 and ended on 21st April 2016.  
Individual differences were measured, followed by measures directly related 
to Volkswagen. Whether a participant’s vehicle was affected by the scandal, the extent 
to which they felt informed about the scandal, and the extent to which they cared about 
the scandal were measured. These items all related to the issue of salience. Participants 
were then asked how important seven of purchase decision factors were in choosing 
to buy the Volkswagen vehicle: reliability, price, running costs, environmental 
considerations, design, engineering, and practicality. Dichotomous yes/no questions 
related to whether participants had performed any of six distrusting acts, accompanied 
with scales for each relating to how influential the scandal had been in these decisions, 
with response options ranging from 1 – not at all influential, to 5 – extremely 
influential, or 6 – not applicable (had they not engaged in that particular distrusting 
act). To end this section, respondents were asked if they were part of a formal or 
informal Volkswagen community, and whether or not Volkswagen could control the 
scandal and had power over it, these items related to a measure of attribution. At this 
point, Study 3 began to mirror Studies 1 and 2. Specific emotions, perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust were measured at two time 
points before the trust repair manipulation (Time 1: baseline) and again after it (Time 
2: post-repair). After the relevant measures were collected for a second time, 
demographic information pertaining to gender, age, education level, country of birth 
and residence was collected before participants were debriefed.  
The stimuli for both groups were taken from the testimony relating to the 
scandal, by Michael Horn, the former CEO of Volkswagen Group of America, to US 
Congress on October 8th 2015. In total, the testimony lasted for three hours and twenty-
five minutes. This was edited down into just over three minutes of video footage per 
condition. The treatment group was presented with two videos that constituted a trust 
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repair manipulation. In the first video seen by the treatment group, which lasted just 
over two minutes, participants saw a section of the testimony in which the CEO 
provided a five-point plan of action that the company will undertake to deal with the 
scandal and to ensure that such an event cannot happen again (Lockey, 2016a). See 
Appendix H for a transcript of this video. In the second video, which lasted just over 
a minute, the CEO described substantive remedies that the company had already 
undertaken to provide assistance for Volkswagen dealers, including a discretionary 
fund that could be used by dealers to assist customers as they see fit (Lockey, 2016b). 
Appendix I contains the second video that the treatment group watched. Here, the 
actions taken by the CEO in the trust repair videos map on to the first two stages of 
Gillespie & Dietz’s (2009) model of organizational trust repair, as shown in Table 8.2 
The control group saw two videos of a similar length to those in the treatment 
condition. Again, the focus of the videos was the CEO, but there was no information 
pertaining to trust repair efforts. Instead, in the first video, which lasted about two 
minutes, the CEO gave a timeline of events relating to the scandal (Lockey, 2016c). In 
the second video, which lasted just under a minute, he provided an explanation as to 
how the defeat device software was able to discern whether a vehicle was under 
laboratory testing conditions or being used on a road. (Lockey, 2016d). 
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Table 8.2 – Evidence of Study 3 Treatment Group Manipulation Quotes, 
Response Types and Trust Repair Stage 
 
Descriptive statistics. Of the sample of 135, 65% were male. The most 
prevalent age range was 20-29 (37%), followed by those aged 30-39 (30%). Just under 
half of the sample, 47%, had attained a Bachelor’s degree level of education, or 
equivalent. 61 participants currently live in the UK or Ireland, 39 in the United States, 
 
Quote 
 
Response Type 
Trust Repair Stage 
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009) 
“I apologise on behalf of everyone 
at Volkswagen. We will fully 
cooperate with the responsible 
authorities. We will find remedies 
for our customers, and we will 
work to ensure that this will never 
happen again”. 
Apology Immediate response 
 
   
“We are conducting investigations 
on a worldwide scale as to how 
these matters could have happened. 
Responsible parties will be 
identified and held accountable”. 
Explanation Immediate response 
   
“Technical teams are working 
tirelessly to develop remedies for 
each of the affected group of 
vehicles. These solutions will be 
tested and validated, and then 
shared with the responsible 
authorities for approval”. 
Self-regulation Immediate response 
   
“Also, on Friday we look very 
intensively to the customer 
remedies, and what we need to do 
for the customers”. 
Potential penance Immediate response 
   
“Coming towards October, now, we 
provided every dealer around the 
US with a discretionary fund. With 
a discretionary fund which was 
explained to them through the 
district managers, sales operations 
managers, and which was wired to 
the dealers on October 1st […] so 
no accountability towards us, 
flexibility to solve the most urgent 
customer cases, or to invest, or to 
put the money where they think it 
would be fit”. 
Self-regulation 
Penance 
Reforming interventions 
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five in Germany, and 30 are categorised as “other”. Independent-samples t-tests 
showed no statistically significant differences between the demographics of the 
treatment and control groups. See Table 8.3 for between-condition demographic 
information. 
Measures  
In Study 2, the dependent variables considered were willingness to trust and 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness. These measures were included again in 
Study 3, but they were altered to fit with the context of the study. For instance, the 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness measure was adapted so that the item 
stems were related to Volkswagen rather than National Express. In this respect, the 
target was changed, and also two item stems were changed to reflect the change in 
industry: 
 
• Volkswagen is a competent and effective car manufacturer (from: 
National Express is a competent and effective coach provider). 
• Volkswagen performs its role as a car manufacturer very well (from: 
National Express performs its role as a coach provider very well). 
 
 The willingness to trust measure was also altered due to the context of the 
study. Rather than considering willingness to rely on using the organization to get 
somewhere on time or safely, as in Studies 1 and 2 considering National Express, I 
measured willingness to rely on Volkswagen to fix issues with affected vehicles (a) in 
a timely manner, (b) at no financial cost, (c) on the company’s word alone, without 
regulatory intervention, and (d) in a manner that would not be detrimental to the car’s 
performance. A reverse-coded item related to willingness to take part in a class action 
lawsuit against the company was also included. These items relate directly to issues 
surrounding the scandal. In addition, more general, trust-related attitudes were 
measured. Participants were also asked the extent to which they would be willing to 
collaborate with Volkswagen with regards to providing positive PR or marketing 
material for the company, how willing they would be to buy a Volkswagen vehicle the 
next time they are in the market for a new vehicle, and how willing they would be to 
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recommend Volkswagen to a family member, friend, colleague or associate in the 
market for a new vehicle.  
Regarding the emotion-related independent variables, the PANAS and DES 
measures used in Study 2, were retained. Two individual difference measures used in 
Studies 1 and 2 were used again, namely regulatory focus and trust propensity. 
Prevention-orientation was significant in predicting trustworthiness in Study 1, as well 
as being a moderator in relationships including trustworthiness in the same study. 
Therefore, although it was not a significant predictor in Study 2, it was included again 
in the current study. Trust propensity was not predictive in either Study 1 or Study 2, 
but it should be included in studies of trust, at least as a control variable. Note that 
preliminary analyses were conducted with these variables, but they did not prove to be 
influential as either predictors or controls, so were excluded from further analyses. In 
order to keep the study at a reasonable length and to create space for new measures, 
the individual difference items relating to emotionality, negative reactivity, emotional 
intensity, and Private Body Consciousness were not included in the current study as 
they did not prove to be influential in any of the hypotheses tested in Study 2. 
Furthermore, the trust repair response measure used in Study 2 was also dropped from 
the current study as it did not prove to be influential. The new Study 3 measures can 
be found in Appendix F. 
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Table 8.3 – Study 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Note. N = 135. 
 
Distrusting acts. Regarding new measures, a new dependent variable, 
distrusting acts, was included. Given the lack of measures relating to either trusting or 
distrusting acts, a new measure had to be developed for this study. Originally, there 
were seven dichotomous items, with yes or no answers. These were as follows: 
 
Since the Emissions Scandal, have you: 
1. Altered your plans related to selling or trading in your vehicle? 
2. Made a complaint to Volkswagen? 
3. Made a complaint about Volkswagen (e.g. via word of mouth, on social 
media, via an internet forum etc.)? 
 Treatment  Control 
 N % 
 N % 
Gender 69 100  67 100 
   Male (1) 45 65.2  43 64.2 
   Female (2) 24 34.8  24 35.8 
Age Category 69 100  67 100 
   Under 20 (1) 4 5.8  3 4.5 
   20-29 (2) 24 34.8  26 38.8 
   30-39 (3) 24 34.8  17 25.4 
   40-49 (4) 8 11.6  10 19.9 
   50-59 (5) 8 11.6  9 13.4 
   60-65 (6) 1 1.4  1 1.5 
   Over 65 (7) 0 0  1 1.5 
Education Level 69 100  67 100 
   GCSEs (1) 13 18.8  10 14.9 
A Level or equiv. (2)  14 20.3  9 13.4 
   Degree or Graduate Qual. (3)  32 46.4  33 49.3 
   Master’s Education (4) 9 13  15 22.4 
   Doctorate (5) 1 1.4  0 0 
Country of Birth 122 100  131 100 
UK (1) 29 42.7  31 46.5 
Ireland (2) 0 0  1 1.5 
USA (3) 22 32.4  16 23.9 
Germany (4) 3 4.4  2 3 
Other (5) 14 20.6  17 25.9 
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4. Recommended Volkswagen to a family member, friend, colleague or 
associate in the market for a new car? 
5. Altered your plans relating to attending a Volkswagen-sponsored or -
themed event (e.g. decided not to attend an event that you originally 
planned to attend)? 
6. Made a conscious decision to use your vehicle less than you usually would? 
7. Actively discouraged a family member, friend, colleague or associate in the 
market for a new car from purchasing a Volkswagen vehicle? 
 
After conducting a principal components analysis on categorical variables 
(CATPCA) on SPSS and supplementing this by estimating tetrachoric correlations 
using TETRA-COM, a program for SPSS developed by Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando 
(2012), distrusting acts item 4 was deleted as it was not shown to have significant 
correlational relationships with any of the other items, and deletion of the item 
increased reliability. This is perhaps not surprising, as it was the only item that could 
be considered as a trusting act, rather than a distrusting one. 
Ecologically Conscious Consumer Behaviour (ECCB). Given that the scandal 
has caused environmental damage (Hall, 2015), and that many owners bought 
Volkswagen diesels due to their “clean” credentials, especially in the Unites States 
(Mouawad & Jensen, 2015), a measure relating to one’s environmental consciousness 
in consumption was deemed to be relevant. A measure relating to environmentally-
friendly consumerism, the Ecologically Conscious Consumer Behavior scale (ECCB; 
Roberts, 1996) was adapted for use in the current study. This scale measured the 
frequency with which participants would purchase goods in a manner deemed to have 
a more positive (or less negative) effect on the environment, buy environmentally 
friendly products, consume in an environmentally friendly manner, or choose not to 
deal with organizations that are known to be environmentally unfriendly. Roberts 
(1996) states that the behavioural orientation of the scale may help mitigate a 
commonly cited issue, particularly in the green consumerism literature, that attitude 
does not necessarily translate to behaviour. The original measure contained 30 items, 
eight of these were used in Study 3. The decision to drop items was taken for 
parsimony, as some items were very similar to each other, and to keep the survey at a 
manageable length. The retained items related to dimensions such as paying more for 
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environmentally products, not doing business with organizations who are known to 
have caused environmental damage, not using household products that pollute, 
switching products for environmental reasons, and making an effort to buy products 
that are either made from recycled materials or contain fewer unrecyclable materials 
than alternatives. A scale was computed as a sum of the items scores, with a higher 
score indicating a greater level of ecologically conscious consumer behaviour. In 
Roberts’ (1996) study, the 30-item ECCB scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .96, and it 
has been used other studies, primarily as a dependent variable (see Roberts & Bacon, 
1997; Straughan & Roberts, 1999). 
Controllability. Controllability was used in this study as a measure of 
attribution. It relates to the extent to which a situation is perceived as being controllable 
or uncontrollable by an organization, and was measured using four items developed 
by Coombs and Holladay (2004), that in turn were inspired by the Causal Dimension 
Scale II (McAuley, Duncan & Russell, 1992). The items are: (a) The cause of the crisis 
was something the organization could control, (b) The cause of the crisis is something 
over which the organization had no power, (c) The cause of the crisis is something that 
was manageable by the organization, and (d) The cause of the crisis is something over 
which the organization had power. Cronbach’s alphas from previous studies range 
from .84 to .89 (Coombs & Holladay, 2004). 
Salience. Finally, two single item measures were included in the current study 
to determine the extent to which participants felt informed about the scandal, and how 
much they cared about it. Participants were asked to fill in a blank for the following 
statement: “I feel ____ (1- Not at all informed, to 5 – Very well-informed, with a 
“Don’t know” option coded as 6) about the scandal”. A similar item was used to 
indicate the extent to which participants cared about the scandal: “I care ____ (1 – Not 
at all, to 4 – A lot) about the scandal”. 
Results 
Data preparation. As in Studies 1 and 2, in order to determine whether there 
were difference effects from Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 (post-repair manipulation), 
difference scores were calculated for the dependent variables of perceived 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust, as well as the independent 
mood and specific emotion variables. Positive values of these newly-created variables 
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would indicate a higher value at Time 2 than Time 1, and negative values would denote 
the opposite.  
The distrusting acts summed dependent variable was significantly and 
positively skewed. A square-root transformation was undertaken to attempt to correct 
this. Although the Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the transformed variable was still 
significantly skewed, visual interpretation of its histogram, Q-Q plot, and box plot 
suggested its data was less skewed than the original variable. Therefore, regressions 
relating to this measure were conducted with the transformed variable. 
Analyses were first conducted controlling for whether or not participants’ 
vehicles were affected by the scandal. However, the control proved not to be 
significant for any of the trust repair effect models. In the regressions testing for the 
effects of trustworthiness and emotion variables on trust at Time 1, it proved to be 
significant as a lone predictor, but when trustworthiness and the emotion variables of 
interest, save for joy, were added to the regression it became nonsignificant. 
Furthermore, it was not significant in predicting distrusting acts, when controlling for 
trust. Analyses were conducted again without the control variable. For those in which 
the affected variable did not alter results substantively, for the sake of parsimony, the 
results without it are presented.  
Testing for common method variance. One problem associated with cross-
sectional research designs is that they are prone to common method variance (Lindell 
& Whitney, 2001; Spector, 1994). I undertook Harmon’s one-factor test to determine 
whether common method variance was present in this sample. If a single factor 
accounting for the majority of the variance emerges when all variables are entered in 
an unrotated principal components factor analysis, then the presence of common 
method variance is likely. Results of such an analysis indicated the existence of six 
factors with an eigenvalue of 1 or greater, with the first component accounting for 36% 
of the variance. The six factors in total accounted for 74% of the total variance. The 
results of these analyses do not preclude the existence of common method variance, 
however, collecting longitudinal data and using change scores may diminish the risk 
of it occurring (Doty & Glick, 1998). 
Descriptive statistics. Full sample Cronbach’s alphas, means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 8.4. All Cronbach’s alpha scores fall within an 
acceptable range, with the lowest being sadness at Time 2 with an alpha score of .80. 
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Split-sample treatment and control descriptive information is shown in Table 8.5, 
along with independent sample t-tests to determine if there were any significant 
between-condition mean differences.  
Independent samples t-tests show that there were a number of significant 
between-condition mean differences, all at Time 2 (see Table 8.5). A number of these 
would be expected, such as trustworthiness being significantly higher post-repair in 
the treatment group, and the negative differential emotion means of sadness, anger, 
and contempt being statistically significantly higher in the control group. Joy and 
calmness at Time 2 were both also statistically significantly higher in the treatment 
group than the control group, as would be expected. 
 
Table 8.4- Full-Sample Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach's Alphas 
 Time 1 Time 2 
 M SD α M SD α 
Trust 3.34 1.04 .92 3.29 1.05 .92 
Trustworthiness 3.12 .60 .95 3.16 1.02 .97 
Distrusting Acts    -- -- -- 
Attribution 7.00 1.71 .88 -- -- -- 
       
Positive Affect 2.58 .91 .91 2.40 .92 .92 
Negative Affect 1.39 .57 .90 1.40 .62 .94 
       
Fear 1.41 .74 .87 1.34 .64 .89 
Sadness 1.90 .99 .82 1.72 .93 .80 
Anger 1.09 .32 .88 2.11 .93 .90 
Joy 2.19 1.14 .91 1.80 1.07 .92 
Calmness 2.44 1.18 .87 2.37 1.14 .89 
Contempt 1.86 1.04 .89 1.78 .90 .90 
       
ECCB 2.91 .88 .93 -- -- -- 
    -- -- -- 
Promotion 6.45 1.42 .90 -- -- -- 
Prevention 5.30 1.49 .81 -- -- -- 
       
Trust Propensity 2.81 .66 .82 -- -- -- 
       
Note. N = 135. 
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Table 8.5 – Split-sample Descriptive Statistics and t-Tests 
Note. Treatment n = 69, Control n = 67. df ranged from 127 to 134, PA = Positive Affect, 
NA = Negative Affect, Tworth. = Trustworthiness. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01 
 
Correlations. Bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 8.6. Some 
variables were excluded from this table in order to save space. The variables that 
proved not to be influential in Studies 1 and 2 were not included. These were trust 
propensity, PA Time 1 and Time 2, and promotion-orientation. In addition, the extent 
to which participants felt informed about the scandal was also excluded because it did 
not correlate significantly with any other variable.  
In terms of being able to test the trust-as-process hypothesis, the most relevant 
correlations in Table 8.6 are those between the three dependent variables of perceived 
organizational trustworthiness T1, willingness to trust T1, and distrusting acts. All had 
significant correlations with each other at p <.001, with perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness and willingness to trust having a positive relationship (T1 r = .89, p 
 Treatment Group  Control Group   
Variable M SD  M SD  T 
1. Trust, T1 3.45 1.04  3.22 1.04  1.29 
2. Trust, T2 3.45 .99  3.13 1.09  1.82 
3. Tworth., T1 3.28 1.02  2.98 .87  1.97 
4. Tworth., T2 3.47 .94  2.84 1.00  3.82** 
5. Distrusting 
Acts 
.36 .48  .37 .49  -.13 
6. Attribution 6.77 1.81  7.24 1.59  -1.59 
7. PA, T1 2.61 .95  2.54 .87  -.02 
8. PA, T2 2.40 .90  2.40 .95  -.01 
9. NA, T1 1.35 .49  1.44 .63  -.89 
10. NA, T2 1.33 .58  1.48 .65  -1.41 
11. Fear T1 1.38 .68  1.45 .81  -.59 
12. Fear T2 1.28 .54  1.40 .72  -1.12 
13. Sadness T1 1.87 .99  1.93 .99  -.30 
14. Sadness T2 1.54 .74  1.90 .83  -2.64** 
15. Anger T1 1.76 .95  1.94 1.14  -1.04 
16. Anger T2 1.50 .70  1.85 .94  -2.44* 
17. Contempt T1 1.81 1.02  1.92 1.07  -.58 
18. Contempt T2 1.61 .77  1.92 .99  -2.00* 
19. Joy T1 2.35 1.27  2.03 .99  1.64 
20. Joy T2 1.99 1.18  1.61 .89  2.14* 
21. Calmness T1 2.53 1.29  2.34 1.07  .83 
22. Calmness T2 2.66 1.23  2.06 .95  3.18** 
23. ECCB 3.01 .94  2.96 .81  .32 
24. Promotion 6.41 1.42  6.49 1.44  -.31 
25.Prevention 5.21 1.64  5.40 1.32  -.76 
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<.001), and both having negative relationships with the distrusting acts variable. 
Willingness to trust had a stronger relationship with distrusting acts (r = -.53, p <.001), 
than did trustworthiness (r = -.39, p <.001). 
All of the specific negative emotion variables had significant positive 
relationships at both time points with distrusting acts, as did NA. For perceptions of 
trustworthiness and willingness to trust, most of the negative emotion variables were 
also significant, but in a negative direction. The exception was the relationship 
between fear T2 and perceptions of organizational trustworthiness T1, which was not 
significant (r = -.09, p = .297). NA T1 and perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness T1 did not have a significant relationship at the .05-level, either (r = -
.16, p = .062). The positive specific emotions of calmness and joy both had strong 
positive relationships with trustworthiness and trust at both time points (p <.001). 
Calmness T1 and T2, and joy T1, had significant negative relationships with 
distrusting acts. 
Other relationships of note included the attribution of controllability, that is, 
the extent to which participants believed that the scandal was within Volkswagen’s 
locus of control, having significant, negative relationships with trustworthiness (r = -
.39, p <.001) and trust (r = -.18, p = .036) at both time points, but not correlating 
significantly with distrusting acts (r = .15, p = .081). The extent to which one cares 
about the scandal also had extremely significant relationships, all at p <.001, with each 
dependent variable. Finally, whether or not one’s vehicle was affected also had 
significant relationships with trustworthiness and trust at both time points, as well as 
with distrusting acts.
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Table 8.6 – Study 3 Bivariate Intercorrelations 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1.TR1 89 81 78 -53 -18 -36 -30 -58 -52 70 54 -63 -62 -40 -25 62 42 -64 -60 -31 -01 -49 35 
2.TR2 -- 80 86 -45 -22 -26 -19 -53 -51 69 63 -53 -57 -29 -20 59 49 -53 -56 -28 -08 -49 31 
3.TW1 
 
-- 88 -39 -39 -16 -08 -51 -47 71 61 -55 -54 -23 -09 65 54 -52 -46 -22 -07 -47 33 
4.TW2 
  
-- -37 -34 -22 -20 -47 -55 64 65 -51 -57 -27 -20 58 55 -50 -52 -23 -08 -44 30 
5.DA 
   
-- 15 52 40 61 43 -41 -20 60 46 60 44 -31 -15 57 43 34 08 45 -34 
6.Att 
    
-- -04 -05 25 22 -31 -32 26 24 -02 -11 -31 -39 20 16 10 18 28 -03 
7.NA1 
     
-- 85 59 47 -26 -07 56 43 72 68 -16 05 60 52 15 16 25 -31 
8. NA2 
      
-- 50 56 -15 -07 45 51 68 77 -07 05 52 58 13 15 15 -20 
9.Sad1 
       
-- 73 -53 -36 69 55 66 54 -46 -28 72 61 38 15 56 -37 
10.Sad2 
        
-- -38 -35 67 75 52 58 -27 -25 68 72 33 14 44 -20 
11.Clm1 
         
-- 78 -50 -43 -26 -16 83 65 -43 -36 -29 -10 -51 32 
12.Clm2 
          
-- -33 -35 -05 -10 67 76 -27 -27 -25 -14 -44 14 
13.Ang1 
           
-- 79 56 41 -42 -20 80 70 37 04 50 -27 
14.Ang2 
            
-- 44 46 -34 -25 72 79 35 15 47 -20 
15.Fea1 
             
-- 76 -16 03 53 49 25 05 33 -30 
16.Fea2 
              
-- -06 03 46 52 21 06 21 -16 
17.Joy1 
               
-- 70 -33 -26 -19 02 -40 33 
18.Joy2 
                
-- -16 -11 -09 -10 -30 14 
19.Cnt1 
                 
-- 81 32 12 48 -31 
20.Cnt2 
                  
-- 28 06 42 -29 
21.Env 
                   
-- -12 55 12 
22.Prev 
                    
-- 14 -05 
23.Care? 
                     
-- -21 
24.Afct?                                             -- 
Note. N = 135. TR = Trust, TW = Trustworthiness, DA = Distrusting Acts, Att = Attribution, NA = Negative Affect, Sad = Sadness, Clm   
= Calmness, Ang = Anger, Fea = Fear, Cnt = Contempt Env = Environmental Consumerism, Prev = Prevention, Care? = The extent to 
which the participant cared about the scandal, Afct? = Whether the participant’s vehicle was directly affected by the scandal. 
r>|17| has p <.05; r>|22| has p <.01; r>|28| has p <.001 (two-tailed) 
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Manipulation checks and trust repair.  
Hypothesis 1 posited that there would be a significant recovery in perceptions 
of organizational trustworthiness from Time 1 to Time 2 in the treatment group. 
ANOVA results show that this was the case, as there was a statistically significant 
between-subject recovery effect, F(1, 134) = 15.59, p <.001. Figure 7 shows this 
interaction, with the treatment group mean trustworthiness increasing from M = 3.28 
at Time 1 to M = 3.48 at Time 2, a difference of .20. In the control group, mean 
trustworthiness fell from M = 2.96 at Time 1 to M = 2.84 at Time 2, a decline of .12. 
Hence, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Hypothesis 2 asserted that there would not be a significant trust repair effect 
for willingness to trust, given that the trust repair effort had occurred five months prior 
to participants seeing it in the study and, for many, not a great deal would have 
substantively changed. For trust, the within-subjects interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 134) = 1.31, p = .22. The between-subjects effect was also not significant, F(1, 
134) = 2.55, p = .11. Although the between-subject interaction effect was not 
significant, Figure 8 shows that, in the treatment group, the mean level of trust held, 
whereas in the control group it fell. The treatment group M = 3.45 at both Time 1 and 
Time 2, showing no change. In the control group, it fell from M = 3.22 at Time 1 to M 
= 3.13 at Time 2, a decrease of .09. As expected, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Mood change and trust change.  
Hypothesis 3 aimed to replicate the results found in Studies 1 and 2 relating to 
the relationship between NA and willingness to trust, controlling for perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness, in a different context and after a different violation type 
(i.e. integrity-based violation rather than ability-based violation). Specifically, support 
for Hypothesis 3 would entail Δ NA being predictive of Δ trust, and remaining so when 
controlling for Δ trustworthiness. See Table 8.7 for results. 
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Figure 7. Study 3 Trustworthiness Repair: Estimated Marginal Means of 
Trustworthiness from Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 2). 
 
Figure 8. Study 3 Trust Repair: Estimated Marginal Means of Trust from 
Baseline (Time 1) to Post-repair (Time 2). 
The regression of Δ trust on Δ NA yielded Model 1: F(1, 67) = 5.40, p = .023, 
R² = .08. Unexpectedly, the relationship was positive, suggesting an increase in NA 
from Time 1 to Time 2 resulted in an increase in trust from Time 1 to Time 2, b = .39. 
The addition of Δ trustworthiness had a substantive influence on Model 2, ΔF(2, 66) = 
4.09, Δp = .047, ΔR² = .05 and increased the significance of Δ NA. Indeed, Δ NA had 
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a stronger influence than Δ trustworthiness in Model 2, with a b-value of .39, t = 2.78, 
compared to the trustworthiness variable, b = .20, t = 2.02.  
In order to examine why this unexpected trend may have occurred, I looked 
closely at the data, considering individual-level data points. Specifically, I consulted 
scatter graphs to visually inspect for the possibility of any there were obvious outliers 
in the relationships between Δ trust and Δ trustworthiness, Δ trust and Δ NA, and Δ 
trustworthiness and Δ NA, as well as examining relationships of their constituent parts 
(i.e. trust T1 and NA T1, trust T2 and NA T2 etc.). I was unable to find any obvious 
outliers, and the relationships appeared to be as expected. That is, there were negative 
relationships between trust and NA at both time points. However, after conducting 
bivariate correlations on the treatment and control groups separately, it was evident 
that willingness to trust at Times 1 and 2 did not correlate significantly with their 
respective NA counterparts in the treatment group. The relationship between the Time 
1 variables was as follows, r = -.21, p = .089, and the Time 2 relationship was weaker 
still, r = -.11, p = .377. In the control group, the Time 1 relationship was significant, r 
= -.48, p <.001, but the Time 2 relationship was not, at least at the .05-level, r = -.23, 
p = .06.  
On the surface, Δ NA was predictive of Δ trust when Δ trustworthiness was 
controlled. However, the direction of the relationship was unexpected, thus support for 
Hypothesis 3 was inconclusive. 
Joy, Fear and Trust Change  
Hypothesis 4 was tested using hierarchical linear regressions of Δ trust on Δ 
fear and Δ joy controlling for Δ trustworthiness, to see if results from Study 2 could be 
replicated.  
Results, displayed in Table 8.7, relating to Hypothesis 4 were unexpected, in 
that for the first time in any of the three studies in this thesis, emotion variables had 
greater influence in the control group than in the treatment group. Ultimately, however, 
Hypothesis 4 was not supported in either condition. 
Regarding Hypothesis 4a, for the treatment group, Δ fear was not a significant 
predictor of Δ trust on its own, F(1, 67) = .22, p = .641, R² = <.01. The inclusion of Δ 
trustworthiness did not result in a statistically significant model, ΔF(2, 66) = 1.69, Δp 
= .198, ΔR² = .03.  
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In the control group, Δ fear did predict Δ trust in isolation, F(1, 66) = .6.20, p 
= .015, R² = .09. The direction of the relationship was negative, as expected, b = -.34, 
t = -2.49 indicating that a decrease in fear from Time 1 to Time 2 correlated with an 
increase in trust from Time 1 to Time 2. However, although the addition of Δ 
trustworthiness to the regression produced a highly significant model, ΔF(2, 65) = 
16.15, Δp <.001, ΔR² = .18, it rendered the effect of Δ fear nonsignificant at the .05 
level, b = -.25, t = 1.99. Hence, Hypothesis 4a was not supported in neither the 
treatment group, nor the control group. 
Results relating to Hypothesis 4b, which posited that Δ joy would predict Δ 
trust, controlling for Δ trustworthiness, mirrored those of Hypothesis 4a. Specifically, 
in the treatment group Δ joy was not predictive of Δ trust, neither as a lone predictor, 
F(1, 67) = 1.46, p = .232, R² = .02, nor controlling for Δ trustworthiness, b = .05, t = 
.87, total model, ΔF(2, 66) = 1.11, Δp = .296, ΔR² = .02.  
Control group results show that Δ joy significantly influenced Δ trust as a sole 
predictor, F(1, 66) = 2.45, p = .017, R² = .09, however the addition of Δ trustworthiness 
in Model 2 caused the effect of Δ joy to fall below statistical significance at the .05-
level, b = .13, t = 1.96. The full model accounted for 27% of the variance in Δ trust, 
ΔF(2, 65) = 16.23, Δp <.001, ΔR² = .19. These results show that Hypothesis 4b was 
not supported. 
As with the analyses concerning Hypothesis 3, given that an unexpected effect 
occurred, I conducted a similar process with regards to checking the difference score 
relationships and their constituent parts for individual-level anomalies, such as 
outliers. I was unable to find any. Furthermore, inspection of full-sample bivariate 
correlations, split-sample bivariate correlations, and partial correlations controlling for 
condition did not indicate any unusual relationships or effects. Thus, it appears 
unlikely that the effects were caused by a statistical artefact. 
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Table 8.7 - Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust Change (Time 2 – 
Time 1) from Change in Emotion Variables and Trustworthiness (Time 2 – Time 
1) 
Note. Treatment n = 69, Control n = 67. IV = Independent variable. NA = 
Negative Affect, TW = Trustworthiness, Δ = a difference score created by 
subtracting T1 scores from T2 scores, thus positive values indicate an increase 
in the variable from Time 1 to Time 2.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
The lack of support for Hypothesis 4 may not be surprising. It is unlikely that 
the difference between Time 1 (baseline) and Time 2 (post-trust repair effort) would 
be as relevant as the difference between Time 2 (post-violation) and Time 3 (post-
repair effort) in Studies 1 and 2. In those previous studies, the scenario presented to 
participants was unlikely to have been personally relevant to them, hence it is likely 
that they would have been naïve participants. Put differently, they would likely have 
been unaware of the stimuli. On the other hand, participants in Study 3 all have some 
form of shared history with Volkswagen as vehicle owners Furthermore, over 65% of 
the sample felt at least a little informed about the scandal, suggesting that the majority 
of respondents had some level of awareness of the scenario that formed the context of 
the study. In this respect, the Time 1 baseline measurements were likely to be more 
relevant and influential than the change scores. 
  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t R2 ΔR2 Β t R2 ΔR2 
Treatment         
Δ NA .33 2.32* .08* -- .39 2.78** .13* .05* 
Δ TW -- --  -- .20 2.02* -- -- 
         
Δ Fear -.04 -.47 <.01 -- -.03 -.33 .03 .03 
Δ TW -- --  -- .13 1.23  -- 
 -- --  -- -- --  -- 
Δ Joy .07 1.21 .02 -- .05 .87 .04 .02 
Δ TW -- --  -- .11 1.05 -- -- 
         
Control         
Δ NA -.08 -.36 <.01 -- .13 .68 .23** .23** 
Δ TW -- -- --  .59 4.37** -- -- 
         
Δ Fear -.34 -2.49** .09* -- -.25 -1.99 .27** .18** 
Δ TW -- -- -- -- .52 4.02** -- -- 
         
Δ Joy .18 2.45* .08* -- .13 1.96 .27** .19** 
Δ TW -- -- -- -- .52 4.03** -- -- 
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Mood, Emotion, and Baseline Trustworthiness and Trust  
Hypothesis 5 related to the Time 1 relationships between NA and (a) 
trustworthiness, and NA and (b) trust. Support for Hypothesis 5 would entail NA 
having significant, predictive relationships with the dependent variables in question at 
Time 1. In addition, Hypothesis 6 posited that NA would remain a significant predictor 
of trust at Time 1, controlling for perceptions of organizational trustworthiness  
Hypotheses 7a and 7b posited that the specific emotions of joy and fear would 
be predictive of willingness to trust when controlling for both perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and NA. 
Results show that Hypotheses 5b and 6 were supported, but 5a was not. Linear 
regressions demonstrated that NA had a significant, negative relationship with 
willingness to trust at Time 1 (Hypothesis 5b), F(1, 134) = 20.51, p = <.001, R² =.13, 
b = -.67, t = -4.53. However, the relationship with perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness (Hypothesis 5a) was not significant, F(1, 134) = 3.61, p = .06, R² =.03. 
Regarding the relations of the specific emotions with willingness to trust at 
Time 1, controlling for perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and NA, neither 
the predictive capacity of fear (Hypothesis 7a) nor that of joy (Hypothesis 7b) was 
significant. The regression model of trust on NA and perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness was significant, F(2, 133) = 162.21, p = <.001, R² =.71. However, 
when fear was added to the regression, the model change statistics were not significant, 
ΔF(3, 132) = 1.89, Δp =.17, ΔR² =. <.01. Results are displayed in Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.8 – Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust (Time 1) from NA 
(Time 1), Fear (Time 1), and Joy (Time 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
NA -.67 -4.53** -.44 -5.06** -- -- 
TW -- -- .84 16.23** -- -- 
       
R²  .13**  .71** -- -- 
ΔR²  --  .58** -- -- 
       
NA -.67 -4.53** -.30 -1.43 -.32 -2.56* 
Fear -- -- -.39 -2.41* -.13 -1.37 
TW -- -- -- -- .82 15.83** 
       
R²  .13**  .17**  .71** 
ΔR²  --  .04*  .54** 
       
NA -.67 -4.53** -.50 -4.15** -.43 -4.95** 
Joy -- -- .52 8.76** .12 2.13* 
TW -- --   .75 11.24** 
       
R²  .13**  .45**  .72** 
ΔR²  --  .32**  .27** 
Note. N = 135. IV = Independent variable. NA = Negative Affect, TW = 
Trustworthiness.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
These results indicate that NA appeared to be an important predictor of trust, 
even when controlling for perceptions of trustworthiness. Also, it was not a significant 
predictor of trustworthiness, a result that was also found in Study 2, indicating that 
emotions influence perceptions of trustworthiness and willingness to trust differently. 
Fear, the most predictive of the specific emotion variables in Study 2, was not 
predictive of trust in the current study. 
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Trustworthiness, Willingness to Trust, and Distrusting Acts 
Perceived organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust were 
analysed separately, to test Hypotheses 8a and 8b, which claimed that (a) perceptions 
of organizational trustworthiness and (b) willingness to trust would each have 
significant negative relationships with distrusting acts. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 
9, which claimed that willingness to trust would be a more significant predictor of 
distrusting acts, than perceptions of trustworthiness, both variables were included in a 
regression model as predictors. Results are displayed in Table 8.9. 
In isolation, trustworthiness accounted for 15% of the variance in predicting 
distrusting acts, F(1, 134) = 22.87, p <.001, R² = .15. As expected, the direction of the 
relationship was negative, b = .31, t = - 4.78. The addition of willingness to trust 
produced a stronger effect, ΔF(2, 133) = 30.83, Δp <.001, ΔR² = .16, and the regression 
weight of willingness to trust was negative and significant, b = -.51, t = - 5.55. The 
directionality of trustworthiness reversed, and became nonsignificant, b = .14, t = - 
1.37, p = .172.  
These results indicate that the effect of trustworthiness on distrusting acts was 
only significant when mediated by willingness to trust. To test this assertion, a 
bootstrapped (5000 iterations) mediation analysis was conducted using Hayes’ (2012) 
Process macro for SPSS. A graphical representation of the mediation model and its 
effects is displayed in Figure 9. 
Firstly, path a, the relationship between trustworthiness and trust, was 
significant, F(1, 134) = 178.23, p <.001, R² =.65, b = .88, t = 13.35. The model of 
trustworthiness and trust predicting distrusting acts was also significant, F(2, 133) = 
30.42, p <.001, R² =.31. The total effect of trustworthiness as a predictor of distrusting 
acts was significant (path c): b = -.31, t = -4.38, yet the direct effect (path c’) was not: 
b = .14, t = 1.34, p = .18. The indirect effect of trustworthiness on distrusting acts via 
trust (path b) was significant, indicating a mediation effect: b = -.55, 95% CI [-.63, -
.29]. Furthermore, a Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of trust on distrusting 
acts was particularly influential, Z = -4.77, p <.001, ƙ2 = .33. These results provide 
support for hypotheses 8a, 8b and 9, suggesting that, although in isolation, both trust 
and trustworthiness were significant predictors of participants committing distrusting 
acts, perceptions of trustworthiness were only predictive when mediated via 
willingness to trust.  
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Table 8.9 – Incremental Variance Explained in Predicting Distrusting 
Acts from Trustworthiness and Willingness to Trust (All at Time 1) 
Note. N = 135.  
** p <.01. 
 
 
Note. *** p <.001 
Figure 9 - Trust process model mediation effects 
Emotions and Distrusting Acts  
Given the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2, it was expected that as NA, fear, 
and joy were particularly predictive of willingness to trust, they would also be 
predictive of the action component of the trust process, in this case, distrusting acts. 
Hypothesis 10 posited that NA would predict distrusting acts, controlling for 
willingness to trust. Hypotheses 11a and 11b related to the influence of fear and joy, 
respectively, on distrusting acts. Results pertaining to these hypotheses can be found 
in Table 8.10. 
Hypothesis 10 was supported. NA had a significant, positive relationship with 
distrusting acts, F(1, 134) = 43.45, p <.001, R² = .25, b = .68, t = 6.60. It remained 
significant when willingness to trust was added to the regression, b = .47, t = 4.73. The 
complete model accounted for 40% of the variance, ΔF(2, 133) = 33.83, Δp <.001, ΔR² 
= .15.  
However, when fear was included in a regression with NA and willingness to 
trust, NA became nonsignificant, b = .20, t = 1.40, p = .139. Model results were as 
  Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t R² ΔR² Β t R² ΔR² 
Trustworthiness -.31 -4.78** .15** -- .14 1.37 .31** .16** 
Trust -- -- -- -- -.51 -5.55** -- -- 
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follows, ΔF(3, 132) = 9.50, Δp = .003, ΔR² = .04. Fear (b = .31, t = 3.08) and 
willingness to trust (b = -.28, t = -5.24), were significant. These results provided 
support for Hypothesis 11a, namely that fear would be a significant predictor of 
distrusting acts, controlling for trust.  
 Hypothesis 11b was not supported, as joy did not add anything to the 
regression of NA and willingness to trust on distrusting acts, ΔF(3, 132) = .24, Δp = 
.628, ΔR² = <.01. 
 
Table 8.10 - Incremental Variance Explained in Predicting Distrusting 
Acts from Willingness to Trust, NA, Fear, and Joy (All at Time 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** -- -- 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -- -- 
       
R² -- .25** -- .40** -- -- 
ΔR² -- -- -- .15** -- -- 
       
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** .20 1.96 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -.28 -5.24** 
Fear -- -- -- -- .31 3.08** 
       
R² -- .25** -- .40** -- .44 
ΔR² -- -- -- .15** -- .04 
       
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** .46 3.54** 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -.33 -4.91** 
Joy -- -- -- -- .03 .49 
       
R² -- .25 -- .40** -- .40** 
ΔR² -- -- -- .15** -- <.01 
Note. N = 135. NA = Negative Affect.  
** p <.01. 
 
Results suggest that NA and fear were both influential in predicting distrusting 
acts, controlling for willingness to trust. These findings build on those obtained in 
Studies 1 and 2, extending the scope from intention to action and providing some 
evidence to support the idea that mood and emotion, particularly negative, are not just 
influential in informing trusting beliefs and decision, but also the action component of 
the process. 
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Moderation Effects 
None of the hypotheses relating to the moderating effects of attribution on the 
relationships between the emotions of (a) NA, (b) fear, and (c) joy with willingness to 
trust were supported. 
Attribution was significant as a lone predictor of trust, having a negative 
relationship, as expected, F(1,134) = 4.61, p = .034, R2 = .03, b = -.11, t = -2.15. It 
remained significant when included in a regression model with NA, ΔF(2,133) = 
22.16, Δp <.001, ΔR2 = .14, attribution b = -.12, t = -2.49, p = .014. A similar result 
was obtained when attribution was included as a predictor of trust with fear, NA, 
ΔF(2,133) = 26.31, Δp <.001, ΔR2 = .18, attribution b = -.12, t = -2.45, p = .015. On 
the other hand, including joy in a regression with attribution subsumed its significance, 
ΔF(2,133) = 75.93, Δp <.001, ΔR2 = .35, attribution b = .01, t =.17, p = .864 As shown 
in Table 8.11, none of the interaction effects between attribution and (a) NA, (b) fear, 
and (c) joy were significant.  
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Table 8.11 - Interaction Effects of Attribution on the Relationships 
between Emotion variables and Trust (all measured at Time 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
Attribution -.11 -2.15* -.12 -2.49* -.12 -2.47* 
NA -- -- -.68 -4.71** -.68 -4.69** 
Att*NA -- -- -- -- .01 .11 
       
R2 -- .03*  .17**  .17** 
ΔR2 -- --  .14**  <.01 
       
Attribution -.11 -2.15* -.12 -2.45* -.12 -2.40* 
Fear -- -- -.56 -5.13** -.56 -5.09** 
Att*Fear -- -- -- -- .01 .17 
       
R2 -- .03*  .19**  .19** 
ΔR2 -- --  .16**  <.01 
       
Attribution -.11 -2.15* .01 .17 -.01 -.13 
Joy -- -- .56 8.60** .56 8.42** 
Att*Joy -- -- -- -- .03 .83 
       
R2 -- .03*  .38**8  .38** 
ΔR2 -- --  .35**  <.01 
Note. N = 135, IV = Independent variable, NA = Negative Affect, Att*NA = the interaction 
between Attribution and Negative Affect, Att*Fear = the interaction between Attribution 
and Fear, Att*Joy = the interaction between Attribution and Joy. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
Exploratory Analyses 
The hypotheses related to emotions in this study aimed to replicate results 
found in Studies 1 and 2, so NA, fear, and joy were the focus. However, given that the 
organizational failure in the current study was one of integrity rather than ability, as in 
Studies 1 and 2, it was likely that the emotions felt by participants would be different. 
Specifically, prior research suggests that anger and contempt may be particularly 
salient in the aftermath of an integrity failure (Chen et al., 2013; Tomlinson & Mayer, 
2009). To test this claim, the specific emotions of anger and contempt were analysed 
in the same manner as fear and joy were in hypothesis testing. Namely, they were 
analysed for trust repair effects, as predictors of baseline trust, controlling for 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and NA, and as predictors of distrusting 
acts. 
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Furthermore, hypotheses related to attribution predicted that it would moderate 
the relationships between the emotion variables of (a) NA, (b) fear, and (c) joy and 
willingness to trust. These assertions were not supported. I undertook further 
exploratory analyses to determine whether attribution perceptions may moderate the 
trust process, or if they influenced specific emotional reactions of fear and anger, as 
proposed by Tomlinson and Mayer (2009), or contempt, as proposed by Chen et al. 
(2011). 
Finally, I undertook further exploratory analyses to determine possible 
moderation effects of (a) personal salience of the scandal with respect to whether 
participants’ vehicles were directly affected by it, (b) the extent to which participants 
cared about the scandal, and (c) how informed participants felt about the scandal on 
the trust process. 
Trust repair effects. With regards to trust repair effects, in the treatment group, 
neither Δ anger nor Δ contempt were predictive of Δ trust, neither in isolation nor 
controlling for Δ trustworthiness. However, in the control group, both independent 
variable change scores were predictive of Δ trust, controlling for Δ trustworthiness. 
These unexpected effects mirror those found in the testing of Hypothesis 4, pertaining 
to the trust repair effects of (a) Δ fear, and (b) Δ joy. Inspection of individual-level data 
suggested that there were no obvious outliers in either group. In addition, visual 
analysis of the scatter plots of the constituent parts of each relationship of interest, and 
their bivariate correlations, showed that the direction of all relationships were as 
expected.  
These results are similar to those pertaining to the unexpected results in 
Hypothesis 3, relating to the positive relationship between Δ NA and Δ trust in the 
treatment group, and Hypothesis 4, relating to the relationships between (a) Δ fear and 
Δ trust, and (b) Δ joy and Δ trust that were stronger in the control group than the 
treatment group. Given this set of results, and the individual-case analyses I conducted 
on them, it seems as though the treatment condition manipulation did not work as 
expected. Possible reasons for this occurrence are discussed further in this chapter’s 
Discussion section. 
Δ Anger was a significant predictor of Δ trust in the control group, F(1, 65) = 
13.92, p <.001, R² = .18, b = -.39, t = -3.73, and remained so with the addition of Δ 
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trustworthiness in Model 2, b = -.30, t = -3.08. The full model accounted for 33% of 
the variance in Δ trust, ΔF(2, 64) = 14.14, Δp <.001, ΔR² = .15.  
Results for contempt were similar as to those of anger. As a lone predictor of 
Δ trust, Δ contempt was statistically significant, F(1, 65) = 13.46, p <.001, R² = .17, b 
= -.45, t = -3.67. With the inclusion of Δ trustworthiness to the regression, Δ contempt 
remained a significant predictor of Δ trust, b = -.29 t = -2.36. The model results were 
as follows, ΔF(2, 64) = 10.43, Δp =.002, ΔR² = .17. These results indicate that Δ anger 
had a stronger influence in predicting Δ trust than Δ contempt did, at least in isolation. 
To further test the relationship between these two variables and their influence on Δ 
trust, they were included together in a regression with Δ trustworthiness. Δ Anger was 
a more significant predictor of Δ trust when controlling for Δ trustworthiness. Indeed, 
while the anger variable remained significant in this regression, b = -.25, t = -2.41, p 
= .019, Δ contempt was not, b = -.19, t = -1.48, p = .145. Results are displayed in Table 
8.12. 
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Table 8.12 - Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust Change (Time 2 – 
Time 1) from Change in Anger and Trustworthiness, and Change in Contempt 
and Trustworthiness (Time 2 – Time 1) 
 Model 1  Model 2 
IV Β t  Β t 
Treatment      
Δ Anger .07 1.06  .08 1.14 
Δ TW -- --  .14 1.41 
      
R2 -- .02  -- .03 
ΔR2 -- --  -- .05 
      
Δ Contempt -.08 -1.21  -.08 -1.21 
Δ TW -- --  .13 1.32 
      
R2 -- .02  -- .05 
ΔR2 -- --  -- .03 
      
Control      
Δ Anger -.39 -3.73**  -.30 -3.08** 
Δ TW -- --  .48 3.76** 
      
R2 -- .18  -- .33 
ΔR2 -- --  -- .15 
      
Δ Contempt -.45 -3.67**  -.29 -2.36* 
Δ TW -- --  .44 3.23** 
      
R2 -- .17  -- .29 
ΔR2 -- --  -- .12 
Note. Treatment n = 69, Control n = 67. IV = Independent variable, TW = Trustworthiness, 
Δ = a difference score created by subtracting T1 scores from T2 scores, thus positive values 
indicate an increase in the variable from Time 1 to Time 2.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
Baseline trust. Both anger and contempt predicted baseline willingness to trust, 
controlling for perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and NA (See Table 8.13). 
Results for contempt were as follows, ΔF(3, 132) = 10.79, Δp =.001, ΔR² =.02, b = -
.22, t = -3.29. Contempt was the only one of the specific emotions to have a stronger 
effect than NA, NA b = -.23, t = -2.13, p = .035. Including anger in the regression 
model with NA and perceptions of organizational trustworthiness produced the 
following, ΔF(3, 132) = 5.52, Δp =.020, ΔR² =.01, b = -.16, t = -2.35. However, when 
both anger and contempt were included in regressions with NA and perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness, contempt appeared to subsume the effect of anger, and 
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NA dropped below significant at the .05 level. The regression coefficient for anger 
was as follows, b = -.05, t = -.61, p = .542. NA was also nonsignificant, b = -.21, t = -
1.93, p = .056, but contempt proved to be significant, b = -.19, t = -2.33, p = .022. The 
total model accounted for 72% of total variance in willingness to trust at Time 1, 
although the increase in variance from Model 3 to Model 4 was only 2%. ΔF(4, 131) 
= 5.56, Δp =.005, ΔR² =.02. 
These results indicate that, of the emotion variables of interest, contempt 
appeared to be particularly influential in predicting willingness to trust. 
 
 Table 8.13- Incremental Variance in Predicting Trust from Negative 
Affect, Anger, Contempt, and Trustworthiness (all measured at Time 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
NA -.67 -4.53** -.44 -5.06** -.30 -2.90** 
Tworth. -- -- .84 16.24** .76 12.40** 
Anger -- -- -- -- -.16 -2.35* 
       
R2  .13**  .71**  .72** 
ΔR2  --  .58**  .01* 
       
NA -.67 -4.53** -.44 -5.06** -.23 -2.13* 
Tworth. -- -- .84 16.24** .73 12.48** 
Contempt -- -- -- -- -.22 -3.29** 
       
R2  .13**  .71**  .73** 
ΔR2  --  .58**  .02* 
       
NA -.67 -4.53** -.44 -5.06** -.21 -1.93 
Tworth. -- -- .84 16.24** .72 11.67** 
Anger -- -- -- -- -.05 -.61 
Contempt -- -- -- -- -.19 -2.33* 
       
R2  .13  .71**  .72** 
ΔR2  --  .58**  .02** 
Note. N = 135. IV = Independent variable. NA = Negative Affect, Tworth. = 
Trustworthiness. 
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
Distrusting acts. Both anger and contempt were significant predictors of 
distrusting acts when controlling for NA and willingness to trust, as shown in Table 
8.14.  
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In Model 3, the addition of anger to the regression of distrusting acts on NA 
and willingness to trust resulted in a statistically significant increase in variance, ΔF(3, 
132) = 10.01, Δp =.002, ΔR² =.04, b = .22, t = 3.16. The total model accounted for 44% 
of the variance in distrusting acts, F(3, 132) = 34.63, p <.001, R² =.44. 
Results for contempt were similar to those for anger, ΔF(3, 132) = 8.35, Δp 
=.005, ΔR² =.04, b = .22, t = 2.89, with the total model accounting for 43% of the 
variance in distrusting acts. F(3, 132) = 33.71, p <.001, R² =.43. 
When both anger and contempt were included in a regression with NA and 
willingness to trust, neither was significant. This may have been caused by shared 
variance between the variables. There was a strong bivariate correlation between anger 
at Time 1 and Contempt at Time 1, r = .80, p <.001. It is also likely that both specific 
emotion variables also shared variance with NA, as both had large correlations with 
the mood variable. For anger, the relationship was as follows, r = .56, p <.001, and for 
contempt, r = .60, p <.001.  
Such effects did not appear to occur in the regression analyses conducted on 
the willingness to trust variable. This may be due to the relationships between NA and 
the dependent variables (willingness to trust r = -.36, p <.001, distrusting acts r = .52, 
p <.001.). Although these relationships were significant, the effect size of the 
relationship between NA and willingness to trust was moderate, whilst the relationship 
between distrusting acts and NA was large. Furthermore, it is evident that the 
correlations of the emotion variables on distrusting acts all fall within a similar range 
(NA r = .52, anger r = .60, contempt r = .57), whereas the same correlations involving 
willingness to trust show a pattern where both anger and contempt have a similar effect 
size, yet NA is comparatively lower (NA r = -.36, anger r = -.63, contempt r = -.64).  
Considering the set of results relating to the influence of anger and contempt 
together, it appears that one was not significantly more influential than the other across 
the entire trust process. With regards to trust repair effects, although neither were 
influential in the treatment group, in the control group Δ anger appeared to be more 
relevant than Δ contempt in predicting Δ trust. For baseline willingness to trust, 
contempt seemed to be particularly influential, apparently subsuming the effect of 
anger. For distrusting acts, although results are not clear, it is likely that both anger 
and contempt were predictive. 
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Table 8.14 - Incremental Variance Explained in Predicting Distrusting 
Acts from Willingness to Trust, NA, Anger, and Contempt (All at Time 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** -- -- 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -- -- 
       
R²  .25**  .40** -- -- 
ΔR²  --  .15** -- -- 
       
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** .31 2.92** 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -.20 -3.27** 
Anger -- -- -- -- .22 3.16** 
       
R²  .25**  .40**  .44** 
ΔR²  --  .15**  .04** 
       
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** .30 2.68** 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -.21 -3.26** 
Contempt -- -- -- -- .22 2.89** 
       
R²  .25**  .40**  .43** 
ΔR²  --  .15**  .04** 
       
NA .68 6.60** .47 4.73** .27 2.34* 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.82** -.18 -2.71** 
Anger -- -- -- -- .16 1.85 
Contempt     .12 1.36 
       
R²  .25**  .40**  .45** 
ΔR²  --  .15**  .05** 
Note. N = 135. NA = Negative Affect.  
** p <.01. 
 
Attributions of controllability (attribution) and the trust process. The influence 
of attribution on each stage of the trust process was interesting in that it was a strong 
predictor of perceptions of organizational trustworthiness, remained a predictor of 
willingness to trust, although to a lesser extent, and was not significant in predicting 
distrusting acts. It did not moderate the relationships between either perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust, or willingness to trust and 
distrusting acts. Results are displayed in Table 8.15.  
Attribution was influential in predicting perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness, F(1, 134) = 24.10, p < .001, R² = .15, b = -.22, t = -4.91.  
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Although attribution predicted willingness to trust, F(1, 134) = 4.61, p = .034, 
R² = .03, b = -.11, t = -2.15, when perceived organizational trustworthiness was 
included in the regression, the relationship between attribution and willingness to trust 
switched sign. The full model statistics were as follows, ΔF(2, 133) = 261.63, Δp < 
001, ΔR² =.64, attribution b = 10, t = 2.92. Model 3 indicates that the interaction term 
of attribution x trustworthiness did not provide a better model fit, ΔF(3, 132) = 3.38, 
Δp = 068, ΔR² =.01.  
The change in the sign of the attribution coefficient from negative in Model 1 
to positive in Model 2 may have been caused by multicollinearity. Perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness had strong correlations with both willingness to trust, r 
= .80, p <.001, and attribution, r = -.39. p <.001. The relationship between willingness 
to trust and attribution, whilst statistically significant, was comparatively weaker than 
the two relationships previously described, r = -.18, p = .034. 
Attribution did not predict distrusting acts directly, F(1, 134) = 2.67, p = .104, 
R² = .01, b = .06, t = 1.64. The inclusion of trust to the model proved significant, ΔF(2, 
133) = 52.84, Δp < 001, ΔR² =.28 When the interaction term of attribution x trust was 
added to a regression of distrusting acts on attribution and trust, it did not have any 
influence on the overall model, ΔF(3, 132) = .03, Δp = 870, ΔR² =.00. 
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Table 8.15 - Interaction Effects of Attribution on the Relationships 
between Trustworthiness and Willingness to Trust, and Willingness to Trust and 
Distrusting Acts (all measured at Time 1). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
DV: Trustworth.       
Attribution -.22 -4.91** -- -- -- -- 
       
R2 -- .15** -- -- -- -- 
ΔR2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
DV: Trust       
Attribution -.11 -2.15* .10 2.92** .08 2.21* 
Trustworthiness -- -- .95 16.18** .92 15.59** 
Att*TW -- -- -- -- .06 1.84 
       
R2 -- .03*  .67**  .68** 
ΔR2 -- --  .64**  .01 
       
DV: DA       
Attribution .06 1.64 .02 .57 .02 .59 
Trust -- -- -.40 -7.27** -.40 -6.98** 
Att*Trust -- -- -- -- -.01 -.16 
       
R2 -- .02  .30**  .30** 
ΔR2 -- --  .28**  .00 
Note. N = 135, IV = Independent Variable, DV = Dependent Variable, DA = Distrusting 
Acts, Att*TW = the interaction between Attribution and Trustworthiness, Att*Trust= the 
interaction between Attribution and Trust.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
Attribution and specific emotions. Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) posited that 
casual attribution would influence the specific emotions of fear and anger, which 
would in turn influence perceptions of trustworthiness, and ultimately, trust. Anger is 
likely to be particularly relevant after an integrity violation, as is contempt (Chen et 
al., 2011). Results of analyses into the influence of attribution perceptions on specific 
emotions, displayed in Table 8.16, indicate that attribution predicted anger and 
contempt, but not fear. 
Of the three specific emotions analysed in these analyses, attribution was the 
strongest predictor of anger, F(1, 134) = 9.97, p = .002, R² = .07, b = .06, t = 3.16. 
Attribution also predicted contempt, but to a lesser extent, F(1, 134) = 5.75, p = .018, 
R² = .04, b = .12, t = 2.40. Finally, attribution was not a significant predictor of fear, 
F(1, 134) = .64, p = .801, R² = .00, b = -.01, t = -.25. 
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Taken as a whole, these results suggest that although attribution perceptions 
may be important early in the trust process, their influence is likely to wane as it 
develops, and may be superseded by one’s emotional response to an event. 
 
Table 8.16 - The Variance Predicted by the Regressions of Anger, 
Contempt, and Fear on Attribution Perceptions 
  
IV Β t R² 
Anger .16 3.16** .07** 
Contempt .12 2.40* .04* 
Fear -.01 -.25 .00 
Note. N = 135. IV = Independent variable 
 
Vehicle affectedness, salience, and knowledge of the scandal as moderators of 
the trust process. It is likely that participants would have different feelings about the 
scandal based on whether it affected their vehicles directly, how much they cared about 
it, and how informed they felt about it. Hence, these factors may influence the trust 
process in terms of being potential moderators. To test this possibility, I undertook 
moderation analyses and included each of the potential moderating variables of (a) 
vehicle affectedness, (b) the extent to which participants cared about the scandal, and 
(c) how informed participants felt about the scandal on the relationships between (a) 
perceived organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust, and (b) willingness 
to trust and distrusting actions. 
Results for the relationship between trustworthiness and trust indicated that 
none of the proposed moderator variables had significant interaction effects. Results 
are presented in Table 8.17. 
Whether participants’ vehicles were affected by the scandal predicted 
willingness to trust, F(1, 105) = 14.21, p <.001, R² = .12, b = -.76, t = -3.79, however, 
the introduction of perceptions of organizational trustworthiness into the regression 
rendered it nonsignificant, b = -.15, t = -1.32. The inclusion of the interaction term of 
vehicle affected x trustworthiness did not increase variance significantly from Model 
2 to Model 3, p = .534, ΔR² =<.01, hence there was not a moderation effect. 
The extent to which participants cared about the scandal predicted willingness 
to trust, F(1, 134) = 41.95, p <.001, R² = .24, b = -.53, t = -6.48. It remained significant 
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when the perceptions of organizational trustworthiness variable was included in Model 
2, b = -.14, t = -2.38. However, the interaction term of care x trustworthiness was not 
a significant predictor of trust, not increasing the variance from Model 2 to Model 3, 
p = .528, ΔR² =<.01. 
The extent to which participants felt informed about the scandal did not predict 
willingness to trust. F(1, 134) = .01, p = .929, R² = .00, b = .01, t = .09. Including 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness resulted in a significant model, but the 
influence of the “informed” variable remained negligible, b = -.01, t = -.20. The 
interaction term of informed x trustworthiness had no influence in increasing variance 
explained, p = .290, ΔR² =<.01. 
Results pertaining to potential moderation relationships between willingness to 
trust and distrusting acts are displayed in Table 8.18, and differed somewhat to those 
for the relationship between perceptions of trustworthiness and willingness to trust.  
Whether the participants’ vehicles were affected by the scandal was predictive 
of distrusting acts, F(1, 105) = 11.33, p =.001, R² = .10, b = .50, t = 3.37, yet became 
nonsignificant with the inclusion of willingness to trust in Model 2, b = .21, t = 1.55. 
The inclusion of the interaction term of affected x trust was significant, ΔF(3, 103) = 
4.55, Δp = 036, ΔR² =.03, b = -.27, t = -2.14. 
The extent to which participants cared about the scandal predicted distrusting 
acts in isolation, F(1, 134) = 36.32, p <.001, R² = .21, b = .37, t = 6.03, and also when 
willingness to trust was included in the regression model, b = .21, t = 3.20. Moreover, 
the interaction term of care x trust was also significant in predicting distrusting acts, b 
= -.18, t = -3.37. 
As was the case for willingness to trust, the extent to which participants felt 
informed about the scandal did not predict distrusting acts, F(1, 134) = 1.50, p = .223, 
R² = <.01, b = .08, t = 1.22. The addition of perceptions of organizational 
trustworthiness resulted in a significant model, but the influence of the “informed” 
variable remained nonsignificant, b = .09, t = 1.52. The interaction term of informed 
x trustworthiness had no influence in increasing variance explained, p = .829, ΔR² = 
.00. 
These analyses indicate that moderation effects appeared to occur in the 
relationship between willingness to trust and distrusting acts, yet not between 
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust. Specifically, 
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whether participants’ vehicles were affected directly by the scandal, and the extent to 
which respondents cared about the scandal appeared to moderate the relationship 
between willingness to trust and distrusting acts. However, somewhat surprisingly, the 
effect of caring about the scandal seemed to be stronger than having an affected 
vehicle, indicating that even those not personally affected by the scandal may engage 
in distrusting acts towards Volkswagen if they care enough about the issue. 
Consultation of Figure 10, which shows the moderation of the condition of the vehicle 
(affected or not) on the relationship between willingness to trust and distrusting acts 
shows that the direction of both relationships is the same. That is, as number of 
distrusting acts increases, willingness to trust decreases. The effect is simply stronger 
for those with affected vehicles and those without. Figure 11, which displays a graph 
of the moderation effects of caring about the scandal a low amount, a moderate 
amount, and a high amount, on the aforementioned relationship. Again, the direction 
of each interaction effect is the same, as distrusting acts increase, trust decreases. The 
effect is strongest for participants who care about the scandal a lot.  
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Table 8.17 - Interaction Effects of Being Personally Affected by the 
Scandal, How Much Participants Care About the Scandal, and How Informed 
Participants Feel About the Scandal on the Relationships Between 
Trustworthiness and Willingness to Trust (all measured at Time 1). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
^Affected? -.76 -3.79** -.15 -1.32 -.37 -1.02 
Trustworthiness -- -- .90 15.71** .88 12.09** 
Aff*TW -- -- -- -- .08 .62 
       
R2 -- .12**  .74**  .74** 
ΔR2 -- --  .62**  <.01 
       
Care -.53 -6.48** -.14 -2.38* -.15 -2.44* 
Trustworthiness -- -- .81 13.10** .80 12.46** 
Care*TW -- -- -- -- .03 .63 
       
R2 -- .24**  .67**  .67** 
ΔR2 -- --  .23**  .00 
       
Informed .01 .09 -.01 -.20 -.02 -.31 
Trustworthiness -- -- .88 15.83** .86 15.11** 
Informed*TW -- -- -- -- .06 1.07 
       
R2 -- .00  .65**  .65** 
ΔR2 -- --  .65**  <.01 
Note. N = 135, ^ Affected n = 106 as participants who responded “Not sure” were 
not included in analyses. IV = Independent Variable, Affected? = Whether the 
participants’ vehicle was directly affected by the Emissions Scandal, coded as 1 = 
Yes, 2 = No. Aff*TW = the interaction between Affected? and Trustworthiness, 
Care*TW= the interaction between Care and Trust, Informed*TW= the interaction 
between Informed and Trustworthiness.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
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Table 8.18 - Interaction Effects of Being Personally Affected by the 
Scandal, How Much Participants Care About the Scandal, and How Informed 
Participants Feel About the Scandal on the Relationships Between Willingness to 
Trust and Distrusting Acts (all measured at Time 1). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV Β t Β t Β t 
^Affected? .50 3.37** .21 1.55 .16 2.53* 
Trust -- -- -.38 -6.14** -.28 -3.48** 
Aff*Trust -- -- -- -- -.27 -2.14* 
       
R2 -- .10**  .34**  .37** 
ΔR2 -- --  .24**  .03* 
       
Care .37 6.03** .21 3.20** .24 3.76** 
Trust -- -- -.31 -5.22** .-.27 -4.50** 
Care*Trust -- -- -- -- -.18 -3.37** 
       
R2 -- .21**  .35**  .40** 
ΔR2 -- --  .13**  .05** 
       
Informed .08 1.22 .09 1.52 .09 1.50 
Trust -- -- -.41 -7.57** -.41 -7.34** 
Informed*Trust -- -- -- -- -.01 -.22 
       
R2 -- .01  .31**  .31** 
ΔR2 -- --  .30**  <.01 
Note. N = 135, ^ Affected n = 106, as participants who responded “Not sure” were 
not included in analyses. IV = Independent Variable, Affected? = Whether the 
participants’ vehicle was directly affected by the Emissions Scandal, coded as 1 = 
Yes, 2 = No. Aff*Trust = the interaction between Affected? and Willingness to 
Trust, Care*Trust= the interaction between Care and Willingness to Trust, 
Informed*Trust= the interaction between Informed and Willingness to Trust.  
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
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Figure 10. Interaction effect of vehicle condition on the relationship 
between willingness to trust and distrusting acts. 
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Figure 11. Interaction effect of vehicle condition on the relationship 
between willingness to trust and distrusting acts. 
Discussion 
The first aim of the Study 3 was to attempt to replicate results obtained in 
Studies 1 and 2. Namely, that Δ NA, Δ fear, and Δ joy would predict Δ trust, indicating 
the influence of these affect variables in explaining a trust repair effect. The only 
treatment group result that replicated was the significance of Δ NA, however the 
direction of the relationship was unexpected and may have been caused by a statistical 
artefact. Neither Δ joy or Δ fear predicted Δ trust when Δ trustworthiness was 
controlled, indicating that none of the effects found in Studies 1 and 2 replicated in 
Study 3. However, significant effects did occur in the control group. These counter-
intuitive trust repair effects suggest that the treatment manipulation did not work as 
planned. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, the control group also saw videos that included the 
target of the treatment group manipulation, Volkswagen USA’s CEO, taken from the 
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same event, a congressional hearing. In Studies 1 and 2, control group participants 
watched video clips completely unrelated to National Express. It may be that the Study 
3 treatment group saw the CEO’s plan of action as “cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002), 
as the hearing took place in October 2015, and, as of the end of the data collection 
period in April 2016, few substantive actions had taken place to implement the plan. 
Furthermore, it was not expected that such trust repair effects would occur, given the 
personal relevance, and non-naivety of the scandal to participants. 
The scenario that participants faced in the current study was very different to 
that used in Studies 1 and 2. Firstly, all participants in Study 3 owned a Volkswagen 
vehicle, even if not all were directly affected by the scandal. In this respect, there was 
a degree of personal involvement and understanding of the situation that may not have 
been present in the prior studies. Secondly, the scandal is still a very current event. It 
was not yet “finished” at the time data were collected, as the reparations and vehicles 
fixes that have been discussed by Volkswagen have not yet been finalised. In this 
respect, the context of the trust repair manipulation would likely be perceived 
differently in Study 3 to that in Studies 1 and 2. In the National Express scenario, the 
Time 2 (post-violation) to Time 3 (post-repair) differences were of primary interest, 
yet in Study 3, I would argue that the Time 1 results were most relevant to the 
understanding the interplay between emotions and trust post-violation. The violation 
was not part of an experimental design, as it was in Studies 1 and 2. Rather, it was a 
natural event that became public knowledge over six months prior to data collection. 
Participants would each have different levels of knowledge about the scandal and may 
have been influenced by factors extraneous to the study, such as the media’s portrayal 
of the scandal. Thus, participants’ personal history and context with the scandal are 
likely to have left strong impressions on attitudes, intentions, and behaviours towards 
the company. Indeed, whether one’s vehicle was affected by the scandal, and the extent 
to which participants cared about it moderated the relationship between willingness to 
trust and distrusting acts. In addition, the experimental stimuli were taken from an 
event that took place five months before the commencement of data collection, and 
participants were given the date of the hearing. Hence, the treatment condition would 
have the benefit of hindsight in potentially knowing whether the plans outlined by the 
former CEO of Volkswagen Group of America had been actioned. Given the weight 
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of history and context available to participants, the post-repair (Time 2) results of the 
current study may not have been as important as those in Studies 1 and 2.  
In addition to attempting to replicate previous results, another aim of the 
current study was to examine the action component of the trust process, something that 
was not measured in Studies 1 or 2. Support was provided for the hypothesised process 
view of trust; both trustworthiness and willingness to trust had significant, negative 
relationships with distrusting acts. Willingness to trust completely mediated the 
relationship between perceived trustworthiness and distrusting acts, as expected, 
perhaps due to the action-orientation of willingness to trust that is not present in 
perceptions of trustworthiness.  
Another aim relating to the trust process was examining the effects of affect 
and specific emotions in it. NA was associated with Time 1 perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, willingness to trust, and distrusting acts. Of the specific emotions, 
fear, anger, and contempt also influenced distrusting acts. Moreover, anger and 
contempt were associated with baseline willingness to trust, controlling for 
trustworthiness and NA. However, when included together in a regression with the 
aforementioned control variables, contempt subsumed the influence of anger. Fear did 
not influence baseline trust when controlling for trustworthiness and NA, but it did 
appear to influence distrusting acts. 
The prevalence of the negative specific emotions of anger and contempt in the 
context of an integrity-based failure is perhaps not surprising, given the moral nature 
of such a failure and the emotions involved. Rozin et al. (1999) developed the CAD 
(contempt, anger, disgust) triad hypothesis, considering “other-critical” moral 
emotions and how they map onto different moral codes. They found that anger related 
to individual rights violations, while contempt was linked to violation of community 
or societal codes. In an article that examined the distinct characteristics and 
interpersonal causes and effects of anger and contempt, Fischer and Roseman (2007) 
conducted a series of experiments that suggested that anger was more a short-term, 
attack-orientated emotion than contempt. Anger could also be a precursor to long-term 
reconciliation, whilst contempt was found to be characterised by both short- and long-
term rejection and social exclusion. Furthermore, the experiments showed that 
contempt may develop out of previously experienced anger, and that lack of perceived 
control over the actions of another person also predicted contempt.  
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In relation to Study 3, given the length of time between the scandal becoming 
public knowledge and data collection (about five months), it is not surprising that a 
subtler (Izard, 1977), longer-term emotion such as contempt would prove to be more 
prevalent than a short-term emotion such as anger with regards to willingness to trust. 
However, that anger appeared to have a stronger influence on predicting distrusting 
acts than did contempt may be comparatively positive for Volkswagen. As stated, 
anger may lead to reconciliation. Indeed, a recent study by Romani, Grappi and 
Bagozzi (2013) hypothesised that anger was a constructive punitive action towards 
corporate wrongdoing, in that it was used in a way designed to try to force 
organizations to change their behaviour, with a view to continuing a relationship. On 
the other hand, contempt was considered a destructive punitive action that aimed to 
harm and discredit the firm, leading to disengagement with it. Romani et al (2013) 
tested these hypotheses empirically in an experiment and a field study and found 
support for both.  
Although Study 3 did not explicitly aim to empirically test the differences 
between anger and contempt in the Volkswagen context, results do seem to provide 
some support for the findings of Romani and colleagues (2013). Post-hoc regressions 
of the effects of anger and contempt in predicting different types of distrusting 
behaviours were conducted by disaggregating the sum measure. Specifically, analyses 
were conducted on two behavioural items that signify the desire to disengage with the 
organization (“Have you altered your plans related to selling or trading in your 
vehicle?”), or the desire to discredit the firm to others (“Have you actively discouraged 
a family member, friend, colleague, or associate in the market for a new car from 
purchasing a Volkswagen vehicle?”). Results showed that contempt had a stronger 
influence than anger in these analyses, although both were significant. To use Romani 
and colleagues’ (2013) term, these behaviours could be considered as destructive 
punitive actions. On the other hand, analyses conducted into the effects of anger and 
contempt on two items that could be inferred as constructive punitive actions (“Have 
you made a complaint to Volkswagen” and “Have you made a complaint about 
Volkswagen”) showed that anger was significant and subsumed the influence of 
contempt.   
Given the nature of the wording of the item relating to changing possible 
vehicle sale plans, one cannot assume that a change in decision to sell or trade in a 
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vehicle would infer that participants would not buy another Volkswagen in future, or 
indeed that such a decision must be considered as a negative behaviour. However, this 
behavioural item had negative relations with both willingness to trust and joy, 
indicating that the less willing participants were to trust Volkswagen and the less 
positive they felt about the company emotionally, the more likely they were to alter 
plans relating to selling or trading their vehicle. Hence, one may argue that engaging 
in such an action could be considered as a negative behaviour, as far as Volkswagen 
is concerned. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, attribution theory underpins a great deal of the trust 
repair literature (Dirks et al., 2009) and has been used as a framework for 
understanding trust breach and repair (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). However, existing 
empirical research failed to find relations between attributional processes and post-
encounter trust (Chen et al, 2013). In Study 3, the significance of attribution appeared 
to wane as the trust process developed; it was a stronger predictor of perceptions of 
trustworthiness than willingness to trust, and was not at all predictive of distrusting 
acts. When included in a regression with trustworthiness and anger as predictors of 
willingness to trust, attribution remained significant, but less so than either anger or 
trustworthiness. Furthermore, its relational direction changed from negative as a lone 
variable, to positive when trustworthiness was included in the regression, suggesting 
the possibility of multicollinearity. Attribution did not moderate the relationship 
between the negative affect variables and trust, but it did predict the specific emotions 
of anger and contempt. These results suggest that, while the cognitive attributions of 
controllability may be important early in the trust process, as the process develops 
from cognitive perceptions through to action its influence will be superseded by more 
motivation-oriented information such as emotional response. However, as with Chen 
and colleagues’ (2013) study, the current study used a cross-sectional design. 
Therefore, causality could not be assumed. 
Finally, exploratory analyses showed that whether a participant’s vehicle was 
affected by the scandal, and whether they cared about the scandal moderated the 
relationship between willingness to trust and distrusting acts, but not perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and willingness to trust. This infers that, the closer one 
gets to having to take action the more relevant these interaction effects become, a 
similar general pattern as to that found for the importance of emotions. Surprisingly, 
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and potentially damagingly for Volkswagen, caring about the scandal appeared to 
matter more than actually owning an affected vehicle.  
Limitations 
As stated in the previous paragraph, the cross-sectional nature of the study 
meant that inferences of causality could not be made relating to Time 1 hypotheses, 
which was a limitation of the research design. Therefore, I cannot discern, for example, 
if participants engaged in distrusting acts because they felt contempt, or feelings of 
contempt were made salient because they were reminded of the fact that they had 
engaged in distrusting acts. A further limitation is the relatively small sample size, 
which made conducting analyses with numerous predictor variables difficult. A 
fruitful avenue of future research would be to develop longitudinal design to better 
analyse the trust-as-process framework by measuring perceptions of trustworthiness, 
willingness to trust and (dis)trusting behaviours over an extended period of time. 
Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
Study 3 built on Studies 1 and 2 by attempting to replicate prior results and 
including the action component of the trust process. Trust repair effects were not 
replicated in the treatment group.  
Support for the proposed process view of trust was found, with both 
trustworthiness and willingness to trust having significant correlations with the 
distrusting actions measure. As expected, willingness to trust proved to be a stronger 
predictor of distrusting acts than perceptions of organizational trustworthiness, to the 
extent that willingness to trust fully mediated the relationship between perceptions of 
organizational trustworthiness and distrusting acts. In addition, NA and the specific 
emotions of fear, anger and contempt were associated with distrusting acts, indicating 
that emotions are appear to be important throughout the trust process, and get stronger 
as it develops. The significance of anger and contempt, which were not influential in 
Studies 1 or 2, suggests that different types of violations (i.e. integrity vs. ability) 
trigger different emotional responses. 
In the next chapter, I present a general discussion of the results of this research 
programme, theoretical and practical implications, and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 9: Summary of Results and General Discussion 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I remind the reader of the research questions 
posed in Chapter 5 and indicate whether they received empirical support in my suite 
of studies. I follow this with a general discussion of some of the key findings, and 
conclude by discussing the implications of my results, their limitations, and directions 
for future research.  
Summary of Research Questions and Results 
Do emotions and mood predict change in trust after a trust failure, controlling for 
evaluations of trustworthiness? (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
 Mood. With regards to mood, Δ NA was shown to be a significant predictor 
of Δ willingness to trust, controlling for Δ trustworthiness, in Studies 1 and 2. In both 
studies, results were as expected, with a decrease in NA from post-violation (Time 2) 
to post-repair (Time 3) resulting in an increase in trust in the treatment groups. For 
state positive affect (PA), in Study 1, PA change was a predictor of trust change as a 
lone variable, but not when trustworthiness change was added to the regression. In 
Study 2, PA was not a relevant predictor of any of the dependent variables of interest. 
Δ NA also predicted Δ trust in Study 3, but the direction of the relationship was 
unexpected. As NA increased, trust also increased, hence the relationship ran counter 
to expectations and did not replicate the results found in Studies 1 and 2.  
Specific emotions. Given the relevance of Δ NA in predicting Δ willingness to 
trust in Study 1, one of the primary aims of Study 2 was to extend the research design 
to include targeted, specific emotions. Specifically, participants were asked to what 
extent they felt the emotions of fear, joy, anger, sadness, calmness and contempt 
towards National Express. Results indicated that the specific emotions of Δ joy and Δ 
fear were particularly influential in predicting Δ trust controlling for both Δ 
trustworthiness and Δ NA in Study 2. In Study 3, neither Δ fear nor Δ joy were 
associated with Δ willingness to trust. Δ Anger and Δ contempt did not predict Δ trust 
in the Study 3 treatment group, but both were significant in the control group, 
controlling for Δ trustworthiness.  
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Does regulatory focus affect trust or interact with emotions? (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
Results pertaining to this research question generally were not supported. 
Although in Study 1 prevention-orientation was found to have interaction effects with 
the relationships between NA at Time 2 (post-violation) and perceived organizational 
trustworthiness, this result was not replicated in Study 2. Study 1 results also indicated 
that prevention-orientation had a direct, negative effect on both willingness to trust 
and perceived organizational trustworthiness. Again, however, these results were not 
replicated in Study 2. Promotion-orientation was not relevant in either Study 1 or Study 
2. Neither prevention- nor promotion-orientation directly influenced any of the 
dependent variables of interest in Study 3, nor did they have interaction effects in the 
relationships between the dependent variables and any of the emotion variables (PA, 
NA, specific emotions).  
Do emotion-related individual differences affect trust or interact with emotions? 
(Studies 1 & 2) 
Results relating to this research question were not supported. Emotional 
sensitivity appeared to moderate the relationship between positive affect (PA) and trust 
change the treatment condition in Study 1, however no further significant relationships 
were found. Given the lack of predictive capacity of PA in either Study 1 or Study 2, 
this result did not appear to be particularly relevant.  
Neither emotional reactivity nor private body consciousness, both measured in 
Study 2, moderated the relationships between any of the emotion variables of interest 
and the willingness to trust Time 2 (post-violation) to Time 3 (post-repair) difference 
score. However, both had direct effects on Time 1 (baseline) to Time 2 trust change. 
Due to the general lack of support for the emotion-related individual differences 
measures in Studies 1 and 2, they were not included in Study 3 in order to devote space 
for other, potentially more relevant measures. 
Do belief, decision, and action processes of trust form a coherent model? (Study 3) 
There appeared to be a relationship between the three components of the trust 
process of belief, decision, and action. These stages were operationalized in Study 3 
as perceived organizational trustworthiness, willingness to trust, and engaging in 
distrusting acts 
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As expected, willingness to trust was significantly related to distrusting acts, 
controlling for perceived organizational trustworthiness. Moreover, analyses showed 
that perceptions of organizational trustworthiness only influenced distrusting acts 
when mediated by willingness to trust. This indicates that willingness to trust, rather 
than perceptions of trustworthiness, is of particular importance in relation to 
behavioural consequences. This finding has ramifications in the consideration of how 
trust is measured, a point discussed in further detail in the General Discussion. 
Are emotions central to an integrated model that predicts distrusting acts? (Study 3) 
Further regression analyses were undertaken to determine whether relations 
existed between the affect variables of interest and distrusting acts. Results suggested 
that NA, fear, contempt, and anger were all influential in this capacity, and remained 
so when willingness to trust was controlled. Fear, contempt and anger were particularly 
important, with the specific emotions having a stronger influence on distrusting acts 
than willingness to trust did. Anger appeared to be the most influential of all emotion 
variables in relation to the act component of the trust process, in the context of Study 
3. Neither PA nor joy, the two positive emotion variables that were measured, were 
predictive of engaging in a distrusting act. 
General Discussion 
A number of research questions were posed over the course of this thesis. At 
its conclusion, three sets of results are particularly striking.  
Mood. Firstly, the importance of NA as a predictor of trust repair effects was 
shown in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2. In Study 3, NA was associated with Time 
1 willingness to trust and distrusting acts, suggesting that it may be influential 
throughout the trust process. This adds to the limited empirical knowledge we have of 
role of negative mood in the trust repair process. Previous empirical studies have 
demonstrated that positive mood may be influential in trust (Chen et al., 2013) and 
relationship repair (Bottom et al., 2002). Chen and colleagues (2013) found that 
negative events had a negative impact on consumer mood, and that positive mood 
helped the rebuilding of consumer trust. However, their cross-sectional research 
design did not allow for causal inferences to be made. My results suggest that 
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decreasing negative mood is particularly salient in increasing willingness to trust. The 
relevance of positive mood was not found in any of my studies. 
Mood results can be interpreted in the context of feelings-as-information 
theory. This theory has a number of core principles, as discussed in Chapter 4, but the 
most relatable to the context faced by participants in Studies 1 and 2 is the informative 
function. This postulates that, in the absence of more substantive information such as 
personal history with or knowledge of a given context, people use their mood (“how 
do I feel about this?”) to assess a situation (Clore, Gaspar & Garvin, 2001; Schwarz, 
2010). Given that, in both Studies 1 and 2, whether or not participants had previously 
been a customer of the coach company did not influence results, it appears that 
personal history with the organization was not an important factor. Furthermore, 
personal salience would likely have been very low due to the participants’ lack of 
active personal involvement in the studies. Thus, the informative function of the mood-
as-information hypothesis may have led participants to evaluate the change in situation 
from post-violation to post-repair from the standpoint of: “I don’t feel as bad about 
this as I did before, so I am willing to trust more”. In other words, decrease in negative 
valence led to increase in willingness to trust.  
The limitations of the feelings-as-information hypothesis may also help to 
explain why NA trust repair effects did not replicate in Study 3. Given that participants 
were likely to have a greater degree of external information and a personal history with 
Volkswagen that would make the Study 3 context salient to them, the informational 
value of one’s mood state would be called into question and would be unlikely to be 
as salient as other sources of information (Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Feelings-as-information theory considers specific emotions differently to general 
mood states. The implications of this in the context of this thesis are discussed in 
further detail in the following paragraphs. 
Specific emotions. Secondly, evidence was found for the influence of certain 
specific emotions, although which emotions were influential varied. It may be that this 
depended on the context of the situation. In Study 2, the experimental stimuli related 
to an ability violation, with an outcome of personal bodily harm. For Study 2, Δ fear 
was a particularly strong predictor of Δ trust. In Study 3, the context was an integrity 
violation, in a situation in which key outcomes included potential loss, both financial 
and in terms of vehicle performance. For Study 3, these results did not replicate. Fear 
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did have a significant relation with distrusting acts, controlling for NA and willingness 
to trust, but it was not associated with willingness to trust as a lone independent 
variable. Anger and contempt were particularly relevant in Study 3, influencing both 
willingness to trust, controlling for of perceptions of organizational trustworthiness, 
and distrusting acts, controlling for both willingness to trust and NA. Moreover, when 
each specific emotion was considered, one-by-one, in regression models with 
willingness to trust and NA, the effects of anger and contempt appeared to be stronger 
than those of fear.  
There are two particular points of interest relating to these results. The first 
relates back to the feelings-as-information theory. The second concerns how the 
context of the different scenarios in Studies 2 and 3 appeared to be influential in 
determining which specific emotions were predictive of and particularly relevant to 
the dependent variables of willingness to trust and, in Study 3, engaging in distrusting 
acts. With regards to the first point, the informational value of specific emotions is 
different from general moods in ways that can be linked to the role of appraisals. 
Specifically, with specific emotions misattribution is less likely because there is a 
target to which the emotion is attached (Schwarz, 2012). In addition, specific emotions 
signal that an expected appraisal criterion has been met, giving us more information 
than a diffuse mood state. For instance, fear acts as an avoidance or withdrawal 
mechanism, whereas anger signals that some form of loss has occurred and is 
attributable to another party. Contempt also has characteristics of avoidance, but 
concerns the isolation of others rather than the withdrawal of oneself from a situation.  
The differing relevance of specific emotions from Study 2 to Study 3 may have 
been influenced by a change in context. Specifically, the shift from the relevance of 
fear in Study 2 to anger and contempt in Study 3 was likely caused by the change in 
violation type from ability to integrity and salience level from low to high. The ability 
failure (a crash) may have caused participants to consider personal safety, evoking a 
fear response that may lead to the desire to psychologically withdraw from the 
situation (Fridja, 1986). Participants may have been scared to be willing to trust the 
company as it had failed in its core role of transporting passengers from one destination 
to another. However, this was an accident, and as people tend to weigh positive 
information related to competence more heavily than negative information (Kim et al., 
2006), the trust repair effect of the CEO assuring the public that the organization would 
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take steps to ensure that such an event would not happen again may have been enough 
to assure participants that it was an anomaly. From this perspective, the specific 
emotions of anger and contempt may not have been relevant due to a lack of blame. 
Moreover, there was no sense of personal loss for participants, given that they were 
not actively involved or invested in the scenario presented to them. This aspect lessens 
the relevance of anger and contempt further.  
On the other hand, an integrity failure may have fostered anger and contempt 
given that both are considered as moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999), and 
the link between integrity and morality. Indeed, anger and contempt are considered 
“other-critical” moral emotions that relate to the moral violations of others. Thus, they 
require an appraisal that a party has deliberately done wrong. In addition, moderation 
analyses showed that the issues of owning an affected vehicle and caring about the 
scandal were influential, suggesting a more salient situation than that faced by 
participants in Studies 1 and 2. Participants faced the possibility of loss, either physical 
(for those directly affected by emissions non-compliance who may suffer financially 
or in terms of vehicle performance) or psychological (owners, directly affected or not, 
who feel let down or betrayed by the actions of the company that made their vehicle). 
Anger may arise from loss that is attributable to an agent, whereas sadness (which did 
not prove to be predictive of trust in any of the studies) is more likely to occur when 
there is nothing to attribute the cause of the loss to (Schwarz, 2010).  
In Study 3, contempt proved to be a more influential predictor of willingness 
to trust at Time 1 than did anger. For distrusting acts, results were not so clear. In 
isolation, both emotions were predictive of distrusting acts, yet when they were 
included in a regression together, with NA, they both became nonsignificant. This may 
have been caused by shared variance between the two variables, and it is likely that 
both had influential relationships with distrusting acts. However, further post-hoc 
exploratory analyses suggested that contempt was particularly influential in predicting 
destructive punitive actions, whereas anger predicted constructive punitive actions 
(Romani et al., 2013), indicating that different emotions relate to differently to 
particular behaviours. Anger is often used in an attempt to change the target’s 
behaviour to develop a more favourable outcome (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007), with a view to continuing the relationship (Romani et al., 
2013). It has been found to relate to an approach-related motivation system (Carver & 
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Harmon-Jones, 2009). Contempt, although a “cooler” emotion than anger (Haidt, 
2003), may have more problematic behavioural consequences from the perspective of 
the target as it often leads to exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007) or, in an 
organizational sense, disengagement with a firm (Romani et al., 2013). From a 
motivational perspective, anger may lead people to approach a situation, whereas 
contempt promotes withdrawal. 
The last point in relation to specific emotions relates to joy. Δ Joy predicted Δ 
willingness to trust in Study 2, but was not associated with it in Study 3. In Study 2, 
when participants felt more positive about the organization after the trust repair 
response, they were more willing to trust it. In Study 3, joy influenced willingness to 
trust, but not distrusting acts. This finding provides some support for results of 
previous work into the influence of positive mood on trust repair (Chen et al., 2013) 
and trust development (Lount, 2010), and the impact of specific emotions on trust 
(Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Although the findings for PA were not significant in any 
of the studies in this thesis, the relationship of the trust repair effect in Study 2 with 
the positive specific emotion of joy suggests that positive valence may lead to 
increased trust (Bottom et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2013; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), and 
is required for at least the willingness to trust to occur (Study 3). These results offer 
further contributions by extending on previous work by replicating results across two 
different contexts, rather than simply using a single, cross-sectional sample (Chen et 
al, 2013) or experiment (Bottom et al., 2002), and by shifting focus from trust (Dunn 
& Schweitzer, 2005) and trust development (Lount, 2010) to trust repair.  
Trust as a process and implications for trust measurement. Finally, the 
trust-as-process conceptualisation received some empirical support, with distrusting 
acts having significant correlations with both trustworthiness and willingness to trust, 
and the effect of trustworthiness being subsumed by that of willingness to trust. A 
number of negative affect variables (i.e., NA, fear, anger, and contempt) were 
associated with distrusting acts, which was the operationalization of the action 
component of the process in the current investigation. Contempt and anger appeared 
to be particularly significant influencers of aggregated distrusting acts, and the 
analyses performed into disaggregated distrusting acts, explained in the previous 
paragraph, may provide further support for the assertion that consumer contempt may 
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lead to the desire to disengage or harm the target company, yet anger may indicate the 
desire to reconcile, or at least create a dialogue with it (Romani et al., 2013).  
One of the more striking results related to the relationships between affect 
variables and different parts of the trust process was how differently emotion variables 
appeared to interact with perceived organizational trustworthiness compared to 
willingness to trust. In Study 2, the calmness change score was the only emotion 
variable to predict Δ trustworthiness, yet it was not at all predictive of Δ trust. In Study 
3, although other emotion variables were influential in predicting Δ trustworthiness, Δ 
calmness had the strongest effect (p <.001). Calmness is characterised by a low state 
of arousal (Russell, 1980), and its relationship with trustworthiness but not willingness 
to trust or engaging in distrusting behaviours may relate to its lack of action-
orientation. As explained earlier, specific emotions such as fear, contempt and anger 
have motivational qualities; fear and contempt provoke withdrawal, whereas evidence 
suggests that anger elicits an approach response. Calmness does not possess such a 
motivational quality, rather, it may encourage people to neither approach nor avoid, 
but rather take stock of a situation and consider it from a more cogent perspective. As 
perceptions of trustworthiness are primarily cognitive, the relationship with calmness 
should be expected.  
Conclusions and Implications for Practice and Theory Development 
The primary research questions that this thesis aimed to explore concerned the 
role of emotion and individual differences in the trust repair process. Three empirical 
studies were undertaken to answer these questions, and results suggest that negative 
emotions and negative mood in general do appear to influence both attitude and 
behaviour in the processes of trust and trust repair. This result is important regarding 
how trust is measured, and has practical implications for organizations in trying to 
repair trust. A number of individual differences were tested, but in general, they were 
not found to be influential. The lack of support in this area suggests that the cognitive-
emotional process is more relevant than a person’s chronic state in trust and its repair, 
but further investigation into these nuances is warranted. 
There are three primary implications for organizational leaders to consider 
from this thesis. Firstly, my results suggest that reducing negative mood and emotion 
may make stakeholders (in this case, potential customers) more willing to trust in 
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organisations after an organizational failure. Therefore, organizational leaders should 
engage in behaviours that focus on decreasing negative affect and promoting positive 
affect (Williams, 2007). Secondly, Study 1 found that participants in the trust repair 
condition had higher levels of negative affect post-repair effort than those in the 
control group, perhaps indicating that the trust repair had an activation effect on 
participants, making the event more salient and increasing negative affect. It is possible 
trust repair efforts will make some people feel worse about their situation, even if they 
appear to “work”. Hence, it may be necessary for organizations to allow and support 
stakeholders to work through negative emotions and identity issues in the aftermath of 
a trust repair attempt. Finally, results in Study 3 show that negative emotions and low 
trust may relate to negative behavioural consequences for organizations, but the type 
of emotion experienced may determine what kind of behaviour is elicited. 
Results also have theoretical implications. They indicate that the influence of 
emotions appears to increase as the trust process develops, and this has implications 
for the manner in which trust is measured. Trust is generally considered to be primarily 
cognitive and rational (Mayer et al, 1995), but then many studies of trust have only 
measured the belief component of the trust process, pertaining to (cognitive) 
perceptions of trustworthiness (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). In this respect, the 
assumption that trust is rational and purely cognitive may be a fair one to make. 
However, only considering trustworthiness does not take into account the willingness 
to be vulnerable component of trust, it only considers positive expectations (Dietz & 
Den Hartog, 2006). This is not sufficient. As per Li (2012), the consideration of trust 
purely as a psychological state is inflexible and does not adequately explain the 
multifaceted nature of the concept. The results of my studies provide compelling 
empirical evidence of the differing interplay between emotions, trustworthiness, 
willingness to trust, and (dis)trusting behaviours. If we only consider the “perceived 
trustworthiness paradigm” (Möllering, 2013a), then the role of emotions may not be 
particularly relevant. However, as the trust process develops from perception to action, 
so to, it seems, does the relevance of emotions. Considering perceptions of 
trustworthiness alone is not enough to understand the nature of trust. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The research programme carried out in this thesis was not without its 
limitations. Difference scores were used in all of my studies, and were especially 
relevant in Studies 1 and 2. However, difference scores have a number of 
methodological problems (Edwards, 1994; 1995; 2001). Edwards indicates that using 
a difference score approach to both independent (Edwards, 1994) and dependent 
variables (Edwards, 1995) is problematic. In considering independent variables, one 
of the prominent methodological issues is that difference scores assume that the two 
components that make up the score contribute equally to the effect and are of opposite 
signs. If this is not the case, then the difference score will primarily represent the 
component with the largest variance (Edwards, 1994). The values of coefficients for 
difference scores confound the effects of their two constituent parts, concealing their 
relative contribution in predicting an outcome variable. Finally, one of the most 
prevalent arguments against the use of difference scores is that they can have low 
reliabilities compared to the reliabilities of each of their component parts measured 
jointly (Edwards, 2001). Each of these methodological problems make results difficult 
to interpret. 
These issues remain when differences scores are used as dependent variables 
(Edwards, 1995). A problem specific to the use of difference scores as dependent 
variables is that they confound the effects of independent variables on the two 
components of the difference. Again, this makes interpreting results difficult, as it is 
not possible to determine whether the independent variables are related to one or both 
components of the difference score. Using X as the independent variable, Y1 as the 
pre-manipulation score and Y2 as the post-manipulation score, X may influence Y1 but 
not Y2, Y2 but not Y1, both Y1 and Y2, or neither Y1 nor Y2. In calculating a difference 
score (Y2 – Y1 = ΔY) and regressing it on X, it is only possible to determine the 
influence of X on ΔY. This issue becomes more problematic still when difference 
scores are computed for both independent variables and dependent variables in a given 
analysis, as was done to test many hypotheses in this thesis. In these cases, results 
pertain to the effects of ΔX on ΔY. Such analyses cannot explain exactly how the 
separate components of X1 and X2 influence Y1 and Y2, or which relationships are most 
relevant, given that an inherently four-dimensional relationship is reduced to two 
dimensions (Edwards, 2002).  
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On the other hand, there are times when difference scores may be appropriate 
or preferable to other methods. For instance, when a construct is specifically conceived 
of as a difference, as is the case with the difference scores I use in this thesis, 
interpretation of results based in the analysis of differences scores may be clearer than 
considering results based on constituent parts. Furthermore, difference scores use 
fewer degrees of freedom than does the consideration of constituent parts separately. 
And, the use of alternative methods to difference scores, such as polynomial and 
multivariate regression, discussed in further detail shortly, may require larger samples 
than were used in this thesis (Edwards, 1994; 1995; 2001). 
The inherent problems of using difference scores may be overcome with the 
use of alternative approaches. Polynomial regression is one such approach that can 
provide answers to questions that difference scores cannot. For example, when 
considering independent variables, how does the level of agreement or discrepancy of 
the two components relate to the dependent variable, and how does the direction of the 
discrepancy factor in? Another advantage of polynomial regression is that it can offer 
greater depth of analysis by demonstrating the impact on the dependent variable (i.e. 
Y) both when X1 > X2 or when X1 < X2. (Edwards; 1994, 2002; Edwards & Parry, 
1993; Shanock, Baran, Gentry, Pattison & Heggestad, 2010). Response surface 
modelling can then be used to graph the results of polynomial regression in a 3-
dimensional chart to aid interpretation of polynomial regression results. Note that this 
approach can only be used when differece scores are used as independent variables. If 
difference scores are used as outcome variables, other approaches have to be taken 
(Edwards, 1995). 
Shanock and colleagues (2010) provide a step-by-step approach for computing 
polynomial regressions and a corresponding response surface model. The first step 
involves establishing a base rate of discrepancy. To do this, Shanock et al. (2010) 
recommend that the predictor variables be standardised, and that any standardised 
score that is .05 +/- the standardised score of the other equals discrepancy. If the two 
independent variable values are never discrepant, then this approach is unlikely to be 
appropriate. The second step involves the polynomial regression. The independent 
variables should be centred on scale midpoint (i.e. centred at 3 on a 5-point scale), and 
three new variables should be computed, leaving values of: X(b1), Y(b2), X
2(b3), XY 
(b4), and Y
2(b5). After running the regression, if the R
2 is significantly different from 
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0, the four surface values of a1, a2, a3, and a4 are tested and results can be graphed an 
interpreted by consulting a response surface graph: 
a1 = (b1+b2) – Slope of line of perfect agreement (X = Y). 
a2 = (b3+b4+b5) – Curvature along line of perfect agreement. 
a3 = (b1-b2) – Slope of the line of incongruence (indicates if X > Y or Y > X). 
a4 = (b3 – b4 + b5) – Curvature along line of incongruence (indicates degree of 
discrepancy between X, Y, and outcome). 
To provide an example, I performed a polynomial regression and plotted the 
results of fear as a predictor of willingness to trust at Time 3 from Study 2 of this 
thesis, using Shanock and colleagues’ (2010) approach. Results are displayed in Table 
9.1, and a three-dimensional response surface graph is shown in Figure 12. 
The significant negative value for a1, the slope of the line of perfect agreement, 
suggests that agreement between fear at Time 2 and fear at Time 3 relates to 
willingness to trust at Time 3, with willingness to trust decreasing as fear at Times 2 
and 3 increase. Furthermore, the significant negative a4 value indicates that the degree 
of discrepancy between fear Time 2 and fear Time 3 is important. It denotes a concave 
surface, with willingness to trust decreasing more sharply as the discrepancy between 
fear Time 2 and fear Time 3 increases. Furthermore, visual interpretation of Figure 12 
suggests that willingness to trust is at its highest point when both Time 2 and Time 3 
fear are at their lowest.  
 
Table 9.1 - Results of Polynomial Regression with Fear Time 2 and Time 
3 Predicting Willingness to Trust Time 3 in Study 2 
Variable b (se) 
b0     Constant 2.36** (.40) 
b1     X = Fear Time 2 (centred) .45 (.49) 
b2     Y = Fear Time 3 (centred) -1.80* (.72) 
b3     X2 = Fear Time 2 squared .03 (.14) 
b4     XY = Fear Time 2 x Fear Time 3 .41 (.37) 
b5     Y2 = Fear Time 3 squared -.70* (.31) 
                                                         R2 .15** 
Surface tests  
a1 = [b1 + b2] -1.35** (.42) 
a2 = [b3 + b4+ b5] -.26 (.17) 
a3 = [b1 – b2] 2.26 (1.16) 
a4 = [b3 – b4 + b5] -1.08** (.03) 
Note. n = 121. b = unstandardized regression coefficient, se = standard error. 
*p < .05, **p  < .01 
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Figure 12. Response surface graph for willingness to trust at Time 3 as 
predicted by fear at Time 2 and Time 3 
These findings appear to support the earlier results pertaining to the regression 
of change in willingness to trust on change in fear, in that both imply the influence of 
fear on willingness to trust and suggest that the difference between the two 
independent variables is important. However, issues remain in that polynomial 
regression cannot be used to analyse difference scores when they are dependent 
variables. Thus, in the above example, only willingness to trust at Time 3 was 
examined. As such, I was unable to analyse the effects of the independent variables on 
change in willingness to trust from post-violation to post-repair. This was a principle 
aim, particularly in Studies 1 and 2, as only by considering change could I make 
inferences about the success of a trust repair attempt.  
Edwards (1995) recommends using multivariate analysis rather than difference 
scores when considering dependent variables. In cases where at least one of the 
dependent variables is exogenous, such as in studies of change, Edwards (1995) 
suggests regressing the post-test dependent variable (in my context, willingness to trust 
at Time 3) on both the independent variable(s) of interest, and the pre-test, exogenous, 
dependent variable (i.e. willingness to trust at Time 2). This controls for the pre-test 
variable by including it as a covariate. Allison (1990) claims that this approach is less 
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optimal than the use of difference scores in certain situations. Specifically, this is the 
case in randomised experimental pre-test post-test designs (see also Maxwell & 
Howard, 1981) where the transient components of the dependent variable are not likely 
to be correlated with the treatment assignment. In my example, willingness to trust at 
Time 2 does not influence treatment assignment, as all participants were randomly 
assigned to either the treatment or control group. 
In sum, based on Allison’s (1990) argument, the use of difference scores as 
dependent variables in the suite of studies conducted in this thesis seems appropriate. 
In considering independent variables, again, the use of difference scores in this thesis 
is justified given the instances of Time 2 and Time 3 NA unstandardized beta weights 
being opposite and equivalent in Study 1. This is demonstrated in the regression of Δ 
willingness to trust on NA Time 2 (b = .42) and NA Time 3 (b = -.41) in the treatment 
group, shown in Table 6.9, p. 125. However, when writing for publication and in 
future studies, I will evaluate Edwards’ (1995) approach of including the Y1 variable 
as a covariate in multivariate regression analysis of Y2 on relevant independent 
variables. Also, in future studies in which there is one dependent variable and 
independent variables could be considered from a difference score perspective, 
polynomial regression and response surface modelling may be more appropriate 
method to use as they are able to provide richer information on the interplay between 
variables. 
Mood and emotion variables were measured using self-report survey 
instruments in each of the studies. Participants were asked to evaluate their general 
mood states and specific emotional feelings towards either National Express or 
Volkswagen. This requires cognitive evaluation and assumes that people are able to 
explicitly identify their emotions, which is not necessarily the case (Johnson et al., 
2010). Word-stem completion measures were used in an attempt to tap into implicit 
affect in Studies 1 and 2, but they did not appear to be influential predictors of the 
dependent variables of interest.  
Another limitation, relating to the analysis of the action component of the trust 
process in Study 3, operationalized as engaging in distrusting acts, was the cross-
sectional nature of the study. This meant that causality could not be inferred. This 
raises the question as to what was the antecedent in the relationship, the distrusting act 
or the emotion. For instance, were participants more likely to engage in distrusting acts 
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because they felt contempt towards Volkswagen, or did they feel contempt towards 
Volkswagen because they were compelled to engage in distrusting acts? In addition, 
distrusting acts were considered in Study 3, rather than trusting acts. Distrusting acts 
were considered due to the context of the study, which was concerned with trust repair. 
I wanted to explore whether the emissions scandal had caused owners to act in a 
manner that would be considered distrustful because this would be more likely to 
constitute a change in behaviour than measures of trusting behaviours. 
Notwithstanding, perhaps a suite of trusting acts should also have been measured. 
Related to this point, further work should be undertaken in an attempt to develop a 
holistic set of trust and distrust behaviours that could be used over a range of contexts. 
The set of distrust behaviours used in Study 3 were limited by context. The same can 
be said for the measurement of willingness to trust and perceptions of trustworthiness; 
the number of disparate measures has resulted in a literature that is fragmented, and 
this has long been lamented within the trust community. It must be said that the 
measurement of willingness to trust and (dis)trusting acts in this thesis does not remedy 
this issue. One may argue that as trust is bound in context, so too must be the measures 
that define it. However, when developing concepts and their measurement, we should 
strive for parsimony. Therefore, further work to this end is needed. 
The manner in which people are able to regulate their emotions after a trust 
transgression may also impact on the trust repair process and how any reconciliatory 
efforts are perceived by the trustor. This was not something that I measured in this 
thesis, but I echo the sentiment of Gillespie and colleagues (2014) in suggesting that 
organizations should take heed of the emotional consequences of organizational trust 
violations, and call for further investigation into this area.  
Another aspect that was not investigated fully related to the measure of 
attribution I used in Study 3. It was comprised entirely of perceptions of controllability. 
While controllability is one of the central components of attribution theory, there are 
others that were not included in Study 3. For instance, just because an event is seen as 
controllable, it does not necessarily infer blame, nor does it take into account stability. 
A pertinent question relating to attribution processes is why Volkswagen cheated on 
emissions testing, and to what extent the company should be blamed for their actions. 
Were they purely attempting to make as much profit as possible at the expense of their 
customers and the environment? Were they squeezed too tightly by overly strict 
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regulations? Was everyone else in the industry doing it? In short, was the locus of 
causality internal or external? How participants respond to these questions is likely to 
be more salient than questions related solely to controllability. More complete 
measures of attribution should be included in future investigations to better understand 
their relevance in the trust repair process. 
This research programme could be extended by using non-survey methods to 
measure emotions, such as physiological instruments. Implicit measures could also be 
explored in further detail. Further research into trust-as-process has been called for (Li, 
2012; Möllering, 2013b), and this thesis has taken the conceptual framework of belief, 
decision, and action and provided some empirical evidence of how the three 
components link and how different emotions relate to each. However, Studies 1 and 2, 
which measured belief and decision, and Study 3, which contained all components, 
were cross-sectional snapshots with no feedback loop. As such, it was not possible to 
investigate the process perspective over time. One way to study this would be to 
undertake a longer-term qualitative longitudinal study. This could help to draw out 
some of the subtleties of the process and help inform inferences about it and its utility 
as a framework. For instance, do trusting or distrusting actions feedback to inform 
perceptions of trustworthiness and willingness to trust, as per expectations in Dietz 
and den Hartog’s (2006) model? Do emotional responses to certain events affect the 
process? If so, are such effects sustained or do they dissipate over time? Another 
method would be to attempt to collect matched survey data over a longer time period. 
For instance, re-contacting participants who took part in Study 3 and providing the 
same survey with an additional question relating to whether their opinions towards 
Volkswagen had changed since taking part in original study could be an alternative 
method to examine some of these questions. What is evident is that the process 
perspective of trust and distrust requires further investigation, and will be central to 
my personal research agenda moving forward. 
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Summary Table of Conceptual Trust Repair Papers 
 
Author 
(Year) 
 
 
Paper Aims 
 
Theoretical 
Underpinning 
Level of 
Analysis / 
Referent 
 
 
Findings 
Bachmann 
et al. 
(2015) 
The authors present a conceptual framework for 
organization- and institution-level trust repair, 
consisting of six key mechanisms: sense-making, 
relational approach, regulation and controls, ethical 
culture, transparency, and trust transference. They 
conclude by presenting five broad research questions 
and a research agenda to further understand this 
nascent area. 
Attribution  
Social Equilibrium 
Structural 
Organization 
or 
Institution / 
Multiple 
stakeholders 
to 
Organization 
or Institution 
Bachmann and colleagues posit that simply considering one of their 
proposed trust repair mechanisms in isolation will not be sufficient 
to repair trust in organizations or institutions, rather a combination 
of approaches will be required.  
Chen et al 
(2011) 
An analysis and extension of Mayer et al.’s (1995) 
integrative trust model and examination of the 
relative amounts of positive affect associated with 
each dimension of trustworthiness (i.e., ability, 
integrity and benevolence). An exploration of how 
breaches of different trustworthiness expectations for 
a particular joint activity influence trust erosion of 
the overall relationship, and the identification of 
specific negative emotions that mediate trust 
breaches and trust erosion. 
Attribution 
Affect 
Individual / 
Individual to 
Individual 
The authors adopt a situational approach that explores trust in 
another in a specific situation rather than trust in another in a total 
relationship that spans various situations and contexts. 
The authors also hypothesised which emotions were likely to be felt 
in trust breaches, depending on which component is breached.  
It is likely that the average negative affective emotions will be 
higher in breaches of benevolence, followed by integrity, followed 
by ability. The first emotion in each list should be lowest among the 
three in terms of intensity, followed by the second, with the third 
being the most intense. 
 
Andiappan 
and 
Trevino 
(2010) 
This paper presents a model of supervisor-
subordinate relationship reconciliation 
Attribution 
Social Equilibrium 
Individual / 
Individual to 
Individual 
The authors propose that the supervisors should initiate the 
relationship repair process. Furthermore, the more serious the 
subordinate perceives the breach, the higher the interdependency 
between the pair, and the more the subordinate attributes blame for 
the perceived breach, the greater the need for relationship repair is 
likely to be. If there is credit in the “trust reservoir” (i.e. the pair 
have had a good relationship in the past in the injustice/breach is 
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perceived as an irregular occurrence by the subordinate) there is 
likely to be less need for relationship repair. Proposed repair 
strategies include: an adequate explanation, sincere apology and 
reparations. The more involved the victim in the repair process, the 
more likely it is to be successful and lead to forgiveness, which in 
turn will be linked to reduced need for revenge, 
retaliation/retribution, and reduction of negative feelings and 
emotions. 
 
Kramer 
and 
Lewicki 
(2010) 
A review of the current organizational trust repair 
literature with an exploration of how trust can be 
enhanced and made more durable when it is repaired 
Review Review 
The authors introduce the notion of presumptive trust, which 
constitutes generalised social expectations perceivers confer on the 
collective as a whole” (p.259). Presumptive trust is formed on three 
psychological bases: 
Identity-based trust - the psychological salience of a shared 
organizational identity. 
Role-based trust: based on the extent that people within an 
organization have confidence in the fact that role occupancy signals 
both the motivation to obligations and the requisite competence 
required for carrying them out, individuals can trust presumptively 
on the basis of their knowledge of role occupancy and the system of 
role relations, even in the absence of personalized knowledge 
regarding the individual in the role. 
Rule-based trust: Organizational rules constitute norms for 
conduct, thus providing a formal set of collective expectations 
about how members of the organization ought to behave. 
 
     
Poppo and 
Schepker 
(2010) 
The development of a framework for organizations 
to follow in order to repair trust with the public after 
a failure. 
Attribution 
 
Organization 
/ General 
Public 
(Individual) 
to 
Organization 
Competence-based failures are likely to be more damaging to an 
organization in the eyes of the public due to them being perceived 
as more controllable than integrity-based transgressions. 
Organizations are more likely to deny an integrity-based failure 
than admit to it. They are also more likely to apologise for actions 
or effects caused by competency failures without accepting 
responsibility for them. 
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Janowicz-
Panjaitan 
and 
Krishnan 
(2009) 
An investigation into how interorganizational trust 
may be repaired through the use of legalistic and 
non-legalistic remedies at the corporate and 
operating levels  
Attribution 
Structural 
Organization 
/ 
Organization 
to 
Organization 
The authors split the organization into the corporate and 
operational levels, and believe that trust repair tactics should be 
different depending at which level competence or integrity 
violations occur, as well as their frequency and severity. 
Operational: Non-legalistic measures with internal attributions are 
likely to be successful in repairing trust after infrequent or insevere 
competence- or integrity-based violations at the operational level. 
However, if the violation is severe or happens frequently, legalistic 
measures voluntarily imposed at the corporate level are likely to be 
necessary after severe or frequent competence- or integrity-based 
transgressions at this level.  
Corporate: When competence-based violations are of low 
frequency, the voluntarily imposition of legalistic measures is likely 
to repair trust. When they are of high frequency, it is likely that the 
partner organization will leave the collaborative partnership. The 
higher the trustor’s dependence on the trustee, the more likely that 
the trustor will opt for a legalistic measure to allow the relationship 
to continue rather than for exit from the relationship in response to 
integrity-based violation. 
     
Ren and 
Gray 
(2009) 
The introduction of a process model, a causal model 
and a number of propositions regarding effective 
relationship repair, taking culture (individualist vs. 
collectivist) into consideration. 
Social Equilibrium 
Attribution 
 
Individual/ 
Individual to 
Individual 
The authors posit that only mechanisms that address the specific 
needs and broken rules will result in effective trust repair: 
For collectivists, it is proposed that external explanations through a 
third party, apology through a third party, and demonstration of 
concern, are likely to be appropriate for identity violations, whilst 
reframing accounts through a third party, altruistic accounts through 
a third party, and private penance are likely to be appropriate for a 
control violation. 
For individualists, direct apology coupled with reframing accounts, 
and penance couples with either reframing accounts or an external 
explanation are likely to be appropriate for identity and control 
violations, respectively.  
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Tomlinson 
and Mayer 
(2009) 
Development of a theoretical framework examining 
the interpersonal trust repair process, how 
controllability, stability and locus of causality 
influences such efforts, and the emotional response 
of the trustee in this process 
Attribution 
Affect 
Individual/ 
Individual to 
Individual 
Relating attribution theory to the perspective of the transgressor, the 
authors post that different trust repair responses are likely to be 
utilised in different scenarios. 
   It is important for a response to a trust transgression to be 
attributed to internal and controllable factors if the locus of 
causality is deemed by the trustor to be internal, stable and 
controllable. A voluntary action is more likely to signal true 
remorse, repentance and desire to reform than a “forced” action 
(e.g. in response to media pressure). However, should the 
transgression be attributed to something external, outside of the 
trustee’s control, or something unstable and not likely to happen 
again, trustworthiness is not likely to be damaged as heavily as it 
otherwise might be if the attributions are internal, controllable 
and/or stable. 
 
Gillespie 
and Dietz 
(2009) 
To introduce a model of organization-level trust 
repair that organizations can use to repair trust 
amongst employees after they have committed a 
transgression. 
Attribution 
Structural 
 
Organization 
/ Employees 
(Individual) 
to 
Organization 
The four stages of the model proposed by the authors are as 
follows: 
1. Immediate Response 
2. Diagnosis 
3. Reforming Interventions 
4. Evaluation 
   Trust repair efforts must be congruent and implemented across 
multiple system components (leadership; culture; structure, policies 
and processes etc.). 
   The trust repair mechanisms that underpin the model are distrust 
regulation (e.g. imposing sanctions, regulations, and controls to stop 
the cause of the failure from happening again) and trustworthiness 
demonstration (e.g. demonstrating actions and behaviours that 
demonstrate benevolence, ability and integrity, such as showing 
transparency, apologising, paying penance and committing 
substantial resources to promoting trustworthy, ethical behaviour). 
   Distrust regulation mechanisms are particularly pertinent after 
ability failures, whilst trustworthiness demonstration mechanisms 
are best utilized after benevolence and integrity failures. 
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Dirks et 
al. (2009) 
A review of the trust repair literature and the 
provision of a more consolidated conceptualization 
for researchers to utilise in order to further advance 
theory 
Review Review See Chapter 3 for a review. 
     
Pfarrer et 
al.  (2008) 
To introduce a four-stage model of reintegration for 
organizations to use in order to restore legitimacy 
amongst various stakeholder groups. 
Attribution 
Structural 
 
Organization 
/ Multiple to 
Organization 
The four stages of the model are as follows:  
Discovering the transgression 
Explaining wrongdoing 
Serving penance by accepting punishment 
Internally and externally rehabilitating or rebuilding the 
organization’s processes and legitimacy. 
   Discourse amongst stakeholders occurs regarding the 
appropriateness of the organization’s response(s) at each stage of 
the model. Concurrence regarding the appropriateness of the 
organization’s actions must be reached amongst stakeholders to 
allow it to move to the next stage of the model. If it is not, 
stakeholders may demand further actions or responses. Not all 
stakeholders have to be agreement; as long as a “dominant opinion” 
or “threshold agreement” is reached, concurrence can take place. It 
is possible for a small, salient group of stakeholders to reach 
concurrence 
   Time and speed are important in each stage of the model. The 
longer time spent in any one stage of the process, the less likely the 
organization is to regain legitimacy with its stakeholders. 
   The greater the consistency between an organization’s internal 
and external rehabilitative actions, the greater the speed and 
likelihood that it will regain legitimacy. 
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Summary Table of Experimental Trust Repair Papers 
 
 
 
Author (Year) 
 
 
 
Paper Aims 
 
 
Theoretical 
Underpinning 
 
 
Level of Analysis / 
Referent 
 
Component(s) of Trust 
Process Measured and 
Methodology 
 
 
 
Findings 
Haesevoets et al. 
(2015) 
To consider the effectiveness 
of money as a means to repair 
trust after competence- versus 
integrity-based violations is 
explored in this study. 
Furthermore, whether 
overcompensation helped in 
this regard was also studied. 
More generally, can (more) 
money buy trust? 
Attribution 
Social Equilibrium 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
 
Study 1: 141 US citizens were 
recruited via a crowdsourcing 
platform (Mechanical Turk) to 
complete a scenario study. A 2 
(violation type: competence 
versus integrity) × 3 
(compensation size: no 
compensation versus equal 
compensation versus 
overcompensation) between-
subjects design was used and 
willingness to trust was 
measured. 
 
Study 2: 137 undergraduate 
students from a Belgian 
university took part in an 
experiment designed to build 
on Study 1 and measure 
trusting behaviours. 
Results indicate that 
money can be used as an 
effective trust repair tool 
for competence- but not 
integrity- based 
violations. These results 
were shown for both 
willingness to trust and 
trusting behaviours. 
Overcompensation was 
not more effective than 
equal compensation in 
repairing trust. 
Elangovan et al. 
(2015) 
This paper examines the 
effects of damage incurred by 
the trustor as a result of a trust 
violation and the impact of 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
 
Belief, Decision. 
 
Results showed that 
trust eroded independent 
of the level of damage 
that may have been 
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different levels of post-
violation trust repair 
behaviours by the trustee on 
the subsequent erosion of trust 
Data were collected from 232 
middle to senior level 
managers using a two-part 
scenario-based experimental 
design to test the impact of 
damage incurred (avoided) and 
post-violation repair 
behaviour. Respondents' levels 
of trust were measured pre- 
and post-violation as well as 
forgiving and a range of 
demographic variables. 
caused. Post-violation 
trust repair behaviour by 
the trustee led to a 
significantly lower 
erosion of trust as 
compared to not 
engaging in such 
behaviours. 
Furthermore, erosion of 
trust was minimized 
when the trustee 
engaged in increasing 
levels of trust repair 
behaviour. 
 
Haesevoets et al. 
(2013) 
Prior empirical research into 
relationship 
repair/preservation has tended 
to focus on either financial or 
relational strategies in 
repairing trust. This study 
examines the effects of both 
strategies simultaneously on 
relationship preservation. 
Social Equilibrium 
 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Decision, Action 
Study 1: In this pilot study, 22 
postgraduate students 
participated in a scenario 
study. 
 
Study 2: 302 undergraduate 
students in a university in the 
Netherlands participated in a 
laboratory-based trust game. 
Results showed that 
undercompensation was 
less effective in 
redressing harm suffered 
by the participant than 
equal or 
overcompensation, but 
overcompensation was 
not more likely to 
redress harm than equal 
compensation. 
Apologies coupled with 
undercompensation 
were more likely to lead 
to participants giving the 
transgressor another 
chance and participate in 
another round of the 
trust game than 
Summary Table of Experimental Trust Repair Papers 
275 
 
undercompensation 
without an apology. 
 
Kim et al. 
(2013) 
This study examines the 
differences that arise when an 
alleged transgressor attempts 
to repair trust with groups as 
opposed to individuals 
Attribution 
 
Team / Team to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision 
673 students participated in a 
video-based scenario. 
Repairing trust is 
generally more difficult 
with groups than 
individuals.   
Both individuals and 
groups trust less after 
denying low 
competence or 
apologizing for low 
integrity.  
The relative difficulty of 
trust repair with teams 
vs. individuals also 
depends on interaction. 
Ensuing group 
assessments affect initial 
individual assessments 
but not the reverse. 
 
Schniter et al. 
(2013) 
A trust game study of how 
promises and messages can be 
used to build trust when none 
existed previously and to 
repair damaged trust. 
Attribution 
 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Decision, Action 
458 students (229 pairs) from a 
university in the United States 
took part in a repeated trust 
game. 
In the first game 16.6% 
of trustees were 
distrusted and 18.8% of 
trusted trustees broke 
promises. Trustees 
distrusted in the first 
game used long 
messages and promises 
closer to equal splits to 
encourage trust in the 
second game. To restore 
damaged trust, promise-
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breakers used apologies 
and upgraded promises. 
On average, investments 
in each game paid off 
for investors and 
trustees, suggesting that 
effective use of cheap 
signals fosters profitable 
trust-based exchange. 
 
Dirks et al. 
(2011) 
Four experiments were 
conducted to investigate the 
implications of ‘substantive’ 
responses for the repair of 
trust following a violation and 
the cognitive processes that 
govern how and when they are 
effective. The two forms of 
substantive responses 
investigated were penance and 
regulation 
Attribution 
Structural 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
Study 1: 106 undergraduate 
students from a university in 
Singapore participated in a 
trust game. 
Study 2: 143 participants from 
a university in the United 
States (85 undergraduate 
students and 58 graduate 
students) participated in a 
video-based scenario. 
Study 3: 102 undergraduate 
students from a university in 
Singapore participated in a 
trust game. 
Study 4: 121 undergraduate 
students from a university in 
Singapore participated in a 
video-based scenario. 
The findings from 
Studies 1–3 suggest that 
both penance and 
regulation can be 
effective to the extent 
that they elicit the 
mediating cognition of 
perceived repentance. 
Data from Study 2 
revealed that trustors 
saw signals of 
repentance as more 
informative when the 
transgression was due to 
a lapse of competence 
than due to a lapse of 
integrity. Study 4 
compared these 
substantive responses to 
apologies (a non-
substantive response) 
and revealed that, 
despite their surface-
level differences, they 
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each repaired trust 
through ‘perceived 
repentance’ more so 
than an apology. 
 
Desmet et al. 
(2011) 
A study into the allocation of 
financial compensation on the 
trust repair process, and 
whether or not the size of the 
compensation is relevant to 
this process. 
Attribution 
Individual/ Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
 
Experiment 1: 132 students 
from a Dutch university were 
recruited to take part in a 
dictator game scenario. 
Experiment 2: 213 students 
from a Dutch university 
participated in a laboratory 
experiment. 
Experiment 3: 106 students 
from a Dutch university 
participated in a laboratory 
experiment. 
Experiment 4: 98 students 
from a Dutch university 
participated in a decision-
making game. 
Experiment 1 revealed 
that trust perceptions 
increased more by a 
slight overcompensation 
of the inflicted harm as 
compared to an exact or 
a partial compensation, 
but not if the 
transgressor’s bad 
intentions became clear 
through the use of 
deception in the 
violation. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, 
findings were replicated 
and further showed that 
it is not the use of 
deception per se, but 
rather the attribution of 
bad intent that 
moderates the effect of 
compensation size. 
Experiment 4, revealed 
that this effect not only 
occurs for small 
overcompensations, but 
also for larger 
overcompensations. 
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Desmet et al. 
(2010) 
A study on the impact of 
financial compensations on 
victims’ trust towards the 
transgressor, whether the size 
of the compensation is 
relevant to this process. 
Attribution 
Structural 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
146 university students 
participated in a repeated trust 
game. 
The experiment showed 
that larger 
compensations only lead 
to more trust when the 
transgressor provided 
the compensation 
voluntarily, whereas 
compensation size had 
no effect when the 
transgressor was forced 
by a third party. 
 
De Cremer 
(2010) 
A study into the 
appropriateness of financial 
compensation vs. an apology 
in the context of a dictator 
game 
Attribution 
 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
86 undergraduate students 
participated in a repeated trust 
game. 
As hypothesised, when 
losses were allocated the 
violated party would be 
motivated to show more 
trusting behaviour 
towards the transgressor 
when a financial 
compensation (resulting 
again in equal final 
outcomes) relative to an 
apology was delivered. 
On the other hand, when 
gains were allocated, 
apologies would be 
more effective in 
promoting trusting 
behaviour than financial 
compensation. 
 
Van Laer and de 
Ruyter (2010) 
A study into how different 
content and format 
combinations may help 
Attribution 
Individual and 
Organization / Individual 
Belief, Decision 
Scenario 
 
The results of Study 1 
show that the 
combination of denial 
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companies restore trust after 
an integrity-based failure. 
to Organization, 
Individual to Individual 
Study 1: 153 students from a 
Dutch university participated 
in the first study. 
Study 2: 145 students from a 
Dutch university participated 
in the second study. 
Study 3: 95 students from a 
Dutch university participated 
in the third study. 
content and analytical 
format, as well as 
apologetic content and 
narrative format, works 
better than combinations 
of opposing response 
content and format. 
Comparing narrative 
apologies and denials in 
two consecutive studies 
demonstrate that the 
concept of 
“transportation”—the 
engrossing effect of a 
narrative—is the 
mechanism underlying 
narrative- based 
integrity restoration. 
Study 2 demonstrates 
how the use of empathy 
accounts for higher 
levels of transportation 
and perceived integrity. 
Study 3, establishes that 
a personal response by 
the involved employee 
is more effective than a 
response issued by a 
company spokesperson. 
De Cremer and 
Schouten (2008) 
A study into the effectiveness 
of apologies in promoting 
fairness perceptions, 
concentrating specifically 
focusing on apology content 
Social Equilibrium 
Individual/ Individual to 
Individual 
Belief 
Study 1: 128 members of a 
multinational corporation 
based in the Netherlands 
completed survey questions to 
Study 1 showed that an 
apology (relative to 
giving no apology) 
revealed higher fairness 
perceptions, but only so 
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(how meaningful and sincere 
the apology is, and the 
perceived respect it holds) 
related perceived respect 
shown towards them by their 
supervisor(s), whether or not 
their supervisor(s) were likely 
to apologise when something 
goes wrong or after they have 
acted in an unfair manner, and 
procedural fairness. 
Study 2: 119 Dutch 
undergraduate students 
participated in an experiment 
in order to provide 
generalisability to the results 
of study 1. 
when the authority was 
respectful rather than 
disrespectful. In study 2, 
the same interaction 
effect on fairness 
perceptions was found. 
Ferrin et al. 
(2007) 
A study into reticence as a 
verbal response to trust 
violations. 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision 
 
Experiment 1: 102 graduate 
students from a university in 
the USA participated in a 
video-based scenario. 
Experiment 2: 241 
undergraduates from a 
university in Singapore 
participated in a video-based 
scenario. 
The results of the 
studies supported the 
authors’ hypothesis that 
reticence is a suboptimal 
response to an integrity 
violation because, like 
apology, it fails to 
address guilt. It is also a 
suboptimal response to a 
competence violation 
because, like denial, it 
fails to signal 
redemption. 
 
Schweitzer et al. 
(2006) 
An investigation into whether 
trust can be restored after a 
trust violation. 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
 
262 participants were recruited 
to take part in a repeated trust 
game that took place over a 
number of rounds. Trust was 
Trust harmed by 
untrustworthy behaviour 
can be effectively 
restored when 
individuals observe a 
consistent series of 
Summary Table of Experimental Trust Repair Papers 
281 
 
measured using survey and 
behavioural measures. 
trustworthy actions. 
Trust harmed by the 
same untrustworthy 
actions and deception 
(emphasis added), 
however, never fully 
recovers—even when 
deceived participants 
receive a promise, an 
apology, and observe a 
consistent series of 
trustworthy actions. A 
promise to change 
behaviour can 
significantly speed up 
the trust recovery 
process, but prior 
deception harms the 
effectiveness of a 
promise in accelerating 
trust recovery. 
 
Kim et al. 
(2006) 
A study that examines the 
trust repair implications of 
apologising with an external 
vs. internal attribution after a 
competence- vs. integrity-
based trust violation. 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision 
 
189 undergraduate students 
participated in a video-based 
scenario. 
The results revealed a 
significant interaction 
whereby trust was 
repaired more 
successfully when 
mistrusted parties 
apologized with an 
internal, rather than 
external, attribution 
when the trust violation 
concerned matters of 
competence, but 
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apologized with an 
external, rather than 
internal, attribution 
when the trust violation 
concerned matters of 
integrity. 
 
Nakayachi and 
Watabe (2005) 
A study into the effects of 
voluntary “hostage posting” 
(the imposition of self-
sanctions in uncertain 
situations) on trust repair. 
Structural 
Individual and 
Organization / Individual 
to Individual, Individual 
to Organization 
Belief, Decision, Action 
 
Experiment 1: 198 
undergraduate students from 
four universities in Japan 
participated in a vignette 
scenario experiment. 
Experiment 2: 313 
undergraduate students from 
two universities in Japan 
participates in a vignette 
scenario experiment. 
Experiment 3: 44 Japanese 
undergraduate students 
participated in a trust game. 
The results of the first 
two experiments 
demonstrate that 
voluntary hostage 
posting raised 
participants’ perceptions 
of the trustworthiness of 
organization that had 
caused incidents, 
whereas imposed or 
involuntary hostage 
posting did not result in 
positive evaluations. 
The third study revealed 
that voluntary posting 
affects not only the 
perception of 
trustworthiness but also 
respondents’ behaviour 
when their interests are 
at stake. 
 
Kim et al. 
(2004) 
A study into the effects of 
different responses (apology 
and denial) after either an 
integrity- or a competence-
based trust violation 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision 
 
Video-based Scenario 
experiment. 
Results show that trust 
was repaired more 
successfully when 
parties (a) apologised 
for violations that 
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Study 1: 63 undergraduate 
students and 137 graduate 
students participated. 
Pilot Study: 71 separate 
undergraduate students 
participated. 
Study 2: 320 undergraduate 
students and 124 graduate 
students participated. 
concerned matters of 
competence but denied 
culpability for matters of 
integrity, and (b) had 
apologised for violations 
when there was 
subsequent evidence of 
guilt but had denied 
culpability when there 
was subsequent 
evidence of innocence. 
Bottom et al. 
(2002) 
To test whether or not 
explanations and various types 
of substantive amends are able 
to restore cooperation after it 
is lost. 
Social Equilibrium 
Affect 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief, Decision, Action 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
experiment. 
225 students from the 
University of Washington, 
USA. 
Once breached, it may 
be possible to restore 
cooperation with the use 
of apology, explanation, 
and substantive actions. 
Early breaches of trust 
appeared to result in 
cognitive reactions, 
while later breaches had 
provoked cognitive and 
emotional reactions. 
Penance had a 
significant positive 
relationship with 
positive emotions. 
 
Shapiro (1991) 
A study into the effect of three 
types of mitigating 
explanations on the negative 
reactions of subjects who had 
been told they had been 
deceived. 
Social Equilibrium 
Individual / Individual to 
Individual 
Belief 
 
192 students from a university 
in the US participated in a 
scenario-based experiment. 
In this study, 
explanations did not 
prove to be effective in 
remedying negative 
reactions to deception. 
The stated goodness of 
an explanation had little 
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effect on the capacity of 
explanations to reduce 
bad news, except when 
punitiveness was 
involved. However, 
punitiveness was only 
mitigated when subjects 
suffered penalties as part 
of the deceit.  
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Appendix C 
Summary Table of Field Trust Repair Studies 
 
 
 
Author (Year) 
 
 
 
Paper Aims 
 
 
Theoretical 
Underpinning 
 
 
Level of Analysis / 
Referent 
Component(s) of 
Trust Process 
Measured and 
Methodology 
 
 
 
Findings 
Stevens et al. (2015) 
A study into the 
effectiveness of 
reorientation and 
recalibration in 
restoring trust and 
attempting to reach 
optimal 
interorganizational 
trust. 
Structural 
Attribution 
Social Equilibrium 
Organization / 
Organization to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
Dyadic, comparative 
case-based study of car 
manufacturers Nissan 
and Renault 
The authors suggest 
that recalibration 
strategies (small, 
proactive balancing 
forces) can maintain 
trust close to an 
optimal level, and 
reorientation strategies 
(substantial efforts that 
attempt to change 
attributions of prior 
behaviour, re-establish 
social equilibrium, and 
bring about structural 
changes) when trust 
deviates strongly from 
an optimal level (i.e. 
either too much or too 
little trust).  
 
Eberl et al. (2015) 
A case study of an 
organization-level 
integrity failure and 
repair effort (Siemens), 
and the effect of 
Structural 
 
Organization 
/Multiple to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
Content analysis case 
study using a grounded 
theory approach. 
The authors indicate 
that tightening 
organizational rules 
may be a good way to 
signal trustworthiness 
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organizational rule 
changes on employees. 
and repair the trust of 
external stakeholders, 
but can cause internal 
dissatisfaction. They 
suggest that both 
formal and informal 
rules need to be 
balanced to repair trust 
for both internal and 
external stakeholders. 
Mueller et al. (2015) 
This paper analyses the 
interplay between 
micro and macro levels 
in re-legitimation of the 
auditing industry in the 
UK (focusing on the 
“Big Four” accounting 
firms: Ernst & Young, 
PwC, KPMG and 
Deloitte). 
Structural  
Attribution 
Institution / Multiple 
to Institution 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
A case study analysis 
of the Lords Select 
Committee on 
Economics Affairs 
inquiry into “Auditors: 
Market Concentration 
and their Role”, 23 
November 2010 
(transcript). 
 
Results suggest the 
necessity of trust 
transfer from non-
partisan political and 
legal agents in re-
legitimizing the Big 
Four’s privileged 
market position.  
Spicer and 
Okhmatovskiy (2015) 
A cross-sectional 
survey analysis of 
whether the state 
produces institutional-
based trust in the 
Russian banking 
system after the 
financial crisis through 
its role as both an 
owner and a regulator 
of the system.  
Structural 
Institution / Individual 
to Institution 
Belief, Decision, 
Action 
 
The authors measured 
trust in top politicians, 
government, state 
ownership and state 
regulation as 
antecedents to 
behaviours related to 
saving (saving in a 
state-owned bank, 
Results suggest that 
people differentiate 
between the state as an 
owner and as a 
regulator when 
deciding whether to 
decide to participate in 
the deposit market, and 
if so, how. For 
instance, higher trust in 
the state as an owner 
had a positive effect on 
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savings in cash, and 
savings in private 
bank). 2,407 people in 
Russia responded to the 
survey. 
the decision to keep 
saving in a state bank, 
and a negative effect on 
the decision to keep 
cash, thus withdrawing 
from the market. On 
the other hand, trust in 
the state as a regulator 
had a positive effect on 
the decision to keep 
savings in a private 
bank. 
 
Petriglieri (2015)  
A case study of the BP 
oil spill in 2010. The 
author explores 
whether it is possible to 
restore employee-
organization 
relationships and 
organizational 
identification  
Attribution 
Social Equilibrium 
Affect 
Organization / 
Individual to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
36 senior leaders from 
BP participated in 
semi-structured 
interviews from which 
concepts, themes and 
dimensions were 
formed. 
Results indicate that the 
resolution of 
ambivalence, 
constantly feeling both 
positive and negative 
feelings is important to 
employees feeling re-
identified with their 
organization. To fully 
repair the relationship, 
co-creation activities 
involving both 
employee and 
organization are 
required. In the BP, if 
co-creation activities 
were absent, social 
information which 
either undermined or 
supported executives’ 
identification with BP. 
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Grover et al. (2014) 
The authors explore 
how trust is violated 
and repaired in leader-
follower relationships 
using a grounded 
theory approach. 
Social equilibrium 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual 
to Individual. 
41 interviews were 
conducted with 
subordinates. Each had 
at least a one-year 
working relationship 
with their manager. 
The authors suggest 
that both apologies and 
substantive action are 
required to repair trust 
in long-term 
relationships. It was 
noted that, in the 
interviews in which 
participants suggested 
that their trust was 
violated to such an 
extent that it could not 
be recovered, all 
instances were integrity 
violations. However, 
all violations types 
were recoverable if 
they were not too 
severe and some sort of 
recovery process was 
initiated. Repair 
processes need to come 
from the leader, but 
followers raise the 
issue as a call to action.  
 
Gillespie et al. (2014) 
A case study analysis 
of a water company’s 
efforts to repair trust 
and restore legitimacy 
amongst stakeholders 
after an integrity-based 
transgression.  
Structural 
Attribution 
 
Organization / 
Multiple to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
The authors conducted 
a case study analysis 
that included 
interviews with 6 
senior members of 
From the analysis of 
the case study, the 
authors posit that: 
   A defensive 
approach, characterized 
by denials and 
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staff, 14 internal 
documents and 231 
external reports from 
media outlets and press 
releases, as well as 
trade and regulatory 
reports. 
obfuscation inhibits 
reintegration efforts. 
   An open, cooperative 
approach to the 
discovery and 
explanation of 
wrongdoing facilitates 
reintegration. 
   Serving penance and 
accepting punishment 
commensurate with the 
wrongdoing facilitates 
reintegration. 
   Stakeholder salience 
is dynamic during the 
reintegration process 
and dismissing a “low 
status” stakeholder at 
one stage of the process 
may have negative 
effects later on. 
   (Re-)establishing a 
positive organizational 
identity facilitates 
reintegration. 
  After an integrity-
based violation, 
reforms to the 
organizational culture 
are required to facilitate 
reintegration. Structural 
reforms alone are not 
enough. 
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Chen et al. (2013) 
This paper investigates 
the impact of causal 
attribution (locus, 
stability and 
controllability 
attributes) and the 
coping strategies 
(affective, functional 
and informational 
initiatives) involved in 
trust repair on building 
positive moods in the 
context of e-commerce 
customers. 
Attribution 
Affect 
Organization/ 
Individual to 
Organization 
Belief, Decision 
 
513 users of a 
Taiwanese e-shopping 
platform completed a 
questionnaire. 
The authors find that 
salient trust repair 
strategies are effective 
in building positive 
moods amongst 
consumers, whereas 
causes of negative 
events have a negative 
impact on mood. 
Positive moods 
significantly influence 
the rebuilding of 
consumer trust. 
Webber et al. (2012) 
The authors aim to 
bridge the gap between 
dyadic laboratory tests 
and organization-wide 
trust repair literature by 
examining trust repair 
efforts of top 
management within an 
organization to a 
competency- and 
integrity-based 
transgression, 
specifically focusing on 
perceived 
organizational support 
and issue-selling 
Attribution 
Organization / 
Individual to 
Organization (TMT) 
Belief 
 
32 managers took part 
in interviews and 
completed a 
questionnaire. 
Perceived 
organizational support 
(the extent to which an 
individual believes that 
his or her organization 
values employees’ 
contributions and cares 
about their wellbeing) 
is positively related to 
trust in top 
management. 
Conversely, issue-
selling (the process by 
which individuals 
affect others’ attention 
to and understanding of 
the events, 
development, and 
trends that have 
implications for 
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organizational 
performance) success 
rate is negatively 
related to trust in top 
management above and 
beyond the impact of 
perceived 
organizational support. 
 
Lamin and Zaheer 
(2012) 
To examine how firm 
responses to defend 
legitimacy play out 
amongst two distinct 
sets of stakeholders: 
“Wall Street” 
(investors) and “Main 
Street” (the general 
public). 
Attribution 
Organization / 
Individual to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
Case study - The 
authors examined 21 
American companies 
through media releases 
and tracked their stock 
market performance. 
The authors found that 
Wall Street and Main 
Street occupied two 
different “thought 
worlds”; investors 
value profit, whilst the 
general public places 
importance on fairness 
to stakeholders. The 
two stakeholder groups 
do not evaluate firm 
responses to defend 
legitimacy similarly. 
Reactions that that 
produce a negative 
reaction with the public 
have no effect on 
investors, whereas 
responses that are well-
received by investors 
have no effect on the 
public. It is also 
suggested that once a 
firm’s legitimacy is 
challenged, its response 
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can make the situation 
worse in the eyes of the 
public, but there is not 
much it can do to turn 
negative perceptions 
around. 
 
Six and Skinner (2010) 
Using evidence from 
two Dutch 
organizations, this 
study examines what 
happened at the critical 
moments when trouble 
occurred in a work 
relationship and 
explore what 
determined the impact 
of that event on the 
level of trust in the 
relationship. 
Attribution 
Individual / Individual 
to Individual 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
Three case studies of 
“trust and trouble” 
between three dyadic 
pairs in two Dutch 
organizations were 
collated via in-depth 
interviews. 
The findings of this 
study suggest that when 
trouble occurs in a 
dyadic relationship in 
the workplace, it is 
important that the 
expectations of both 
parties are explicit and 
clear. The use of 
constructive voice 
(where intention is 
clear and a rich, open 
form of communication 
between the 
participants takes 
place) and engagement 
in positive interaction 
is important. 
 
Elsbach (1994) 
A study into the 
effectiveness of verbal 
accounts to 
controversies in the 
California cattle 
industry.  
Attribution 
Organization / 
Individual to 
Organization 
Belief 
 
Study 1: The author 
chose eight 
controversial events 
after reviewing five 
major local 
newspapers. 15 
The results of these 
studies suggest that 
accounts are 
constructed by linking 
two broad forms of 
accounts 
(acknowledgments or 
denials) with two broad 
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informants from the 
California cattle 
industry were 
interviewed for the 
study. 
Study 2: 15 informants 
from stakeholder 
groups that were likely 
to be the targets of the 
verbal accounts were 
interviewed for the 
second study. 
Study 3: 63 executives 
from the electronics 
industry taking part in 
an executive training 
program participated in 
a vignette study based 
on the cattle industry 
data gathered in study 
1. 
types of account 
contents (references to 
institutionalized or 
technical organizational 
characteristics) and that 
accounts that combine 
acknowledging forms 
of accounts with 
references to widely 
institutionalized 
characteristics are the 
most effective in 
protecting 
organizational 
legitimacy. The 
construction of 
accounts is explained 
by spokespersons’ 
attempts to provide 
logical, believable, and 
adequate explanations. 
The effectiveness of 
accounts is explained 
by audiences’ 
perceptions of the type 
and severity of 
controversial actions, 
their knowledge of the 
area of controversy, 
and their expectations 
of organizational 
responses. Non-expert 
audiences expect 
organizations to 
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acknowledge the events 
and provide evidence 
that actions related to 
the controversy were 
performed in 
accordance with 
endorsed and 
normative practices. 
 
Sitkin and Roth (1993) 
An investigation into 
the use of legalistic 
remedies as an 
organizational response 
to HIV/aids in terms of 
avoiding legal 
sanctions and litigation, 
protecting 
organizational 
legitimacy, and 
protecting employees’ 
organizational rights. 
Structural 
Organization / 
Individual to 
Organization 
N/A (Case Study) 
 
Interviews with 
HIV/aids sufferers in a 
variety of workplace 
settings. 
Legalistic remedies 
may serve to help 
organizations avoid 
legal sanctions, but 
they are not efficient in 
protecting legitimacy 
or protecting 
employees’ rights 
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Appendix D 
Study 1 Measures 
Implicit Affect Measure (Johnson et al., 2010) 
 
Source: Johnson et al (2010) 
 
PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment 
(for trait measure: “indicate to what extent you feel this way in general”). 
 
1 – Very slightly or not at all to 5 – Extremely 
 
1. Interested  2. Distressed  3. Excited  4. Upset 
5. Strong  6. Guilty  7. Scared  8. Hostile 
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9. Enthusiastic  10. Proud  11. Irritable  12. Alert 
13. Ashamed  14. Inspired  15. Nervous  16. 
Determined 
17. Attentive  18. Jittery   19. Active  20. 
Afraid. 
 
Emotional and Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure (Bloise & Johnson, 2007) 
1 – Not at all like me to 5 – Exactly like me. 
 
1. At parties, I can immediately tell if someone is interested in me. 
2. I’m generally concerned about the impression I’m making to others. 
3. I can always feel when there is tension in the room. 
4. I can easily tell what a person’s character is by watching his or her 
interactions with other people in the room. 
5. I sometimes cry at sad films. 
6. I always seem to know what people’s true feelings are no matter how they 
try to conceal them. 
7. I can always tell when someone is upset. 
8. There are certain situations in which I find myself worrying about whether I 
am saying or doing the right things. 
9. If someone is angry with me it makes me very uncomfortable. 
10. I always want to know why someone is upset or in a bad mood. 
11. I am generally influenced by the moods of those around me. 
12. I can be strongly affected by someone smiling or frowning at me. 
General Regulatory Focus Measure (Lockwood et al., 2002) 
1 – Not at all true of me  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 – Very true of me. 
 
1. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. 
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. 
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
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5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to become in the future. 
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. 
7. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my goals. 
8. I often think about how I will achieve success. 
9. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
10. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
11. I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. 
12. I see myself as someone who is primarily responsible striving to reach my 
“ideal self” – to fulfil my hopes, wishes and aspirations. 
13. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” 
to be – to fulfil my duties, responsibilities and obligations. 
14. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. 
15. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. 
16. Overall, I am more orientated towards achieving success than preventing 
failure. 
Short Form of Interpersonal Trust Scale – Trust Propensity (Chun & Campbell, 1974) 
1- Strongly Disagree to 5 Strongly Agree. 
 
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. (r) 
2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have 
provided. evidence that they can be trustworthy. (r) 
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics. 
(R)  
4. Parents can usually be relied upon to keep their promises. 
5. The judiciary is a place we can all get unbiased treatment. 
6. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say, most people are primarily 
interested in their own welfare. (R) 
7. Even though we have reports on the internet, radio, television and in the 
newspapers, it is hard to get objective accounts of public events (adapted from 
original item: “Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio and 
television, it is hard to get objective accounts of public events”.). (r) 
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8. In these competitive times you have to be alert or someone will take advantage 
of you. (r) 
9. Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another. (r) 
10.  Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
11. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their 
speciality. 
12. If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would 
have more reason to be frightened than they now seem to be. (r) 
Organisational Trustworthiness Beliefs (Adapted from McKnight et al., 2002) 
1 – Strongly Disagree to 5 Strongly Agree. 
 
1. I believe that National Express would act in my best interest. 
2. National Express is interested in my well-being, not just its own. 
3. National Express is truthful in its dealings with stakeholders (adapted from 
original “truthful in its dealings with me). 
4. National Express would keep its commitments. 
5. I would characterise National Express as honest. 
6. National Express is sincere and genuine. 
7. National Express is a competent and effective coach provider. 
8. National Express performs its role as a coach provider very well. 
Willingness to Trust 
1 – Not at all Willing to 5 – Extremely Willing. 
 
How willing are you… 
1. To rely on National Express to get you to your destination on time.  
2. To rely on National Express to get you to your destination safely.  
3. To use National Express as a coach provider.  
4. To use National Express to take a long-distance journey.  
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Appendix E 
Study 2 Measures 
Trust Repair Response Score (Adapted from Coombs & Holladay, 2002) 
1 – Strongly Disagree to 5 – Strongly Agree. 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following? 
1. The CEO represented his organisation well. 
2. The CEO is basically dishonest. (r) 
3. The CEO’s response was sincere. 
4. The CEO is a good leader. 
5. The CEO's response was appropriate. 
6. The CEO communicated well. 
7. The CEO's response was reassuring. 
8. I like the CEO. 
9. The CEO's response made me feel worse about the crash. (r) 
10. The CEO only cares about making profits for shareholders. (r) 
11. The CEO is concerned about avoiding similar accidents in the future. 
Differential Emotion Scale (Izard, 1971) 
1 – Not at all to 5 – Extremely. 
 
1. Downhearted  2. Discouraged 3 Sad  (Sadness) 
4. Relaxed  5. Optimistic  6. At Ease (Calmness) 
7. Enraged  8. Angry  9. Mad  (Anger) 
10. Scared   11. Fearful  12. Afraid (Fear) 
13. Delighted  14. Happy  15. Joyful (Joy) 
16. Disdainful  17. Contemptuous 18. Scornful (Contempt) 
 
 
 
Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen & Diener, 1987) 
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1 – Never to 6 – Always. 
 
1. I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie. 
2. My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people. 
3. Sad movies deeply touch me. 
4. When I talk in front of a group for the first time my voice gets shaky and my 
heart races. 
5. My friends might say I’m emotional. 
6. The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me strongly. 
7. “Calm and cool” could easily describe me. (r)  
8. Seeing a picture of some violent car accident in a newspaper makes me feel 
sick to my stomach. 
9. When I do something wrong I have strong feelings of guilt and shame. 
10. I can remain calm even on the most trying days. (r)  
11. When I get angry it’s easy for me to still be rational and not overreact. (r)  
12. When I do feel anxiety it is normally very strong. 
13. My negative moods are mild in intensity. (r)  
14. My friends would probably say I’m an intense or ‘high-strung’ person. 
15. When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong. 
16. When I am nervous I get shaky all over. 
Private Body Consciousness (Miller et al., 1981) 
1 – Extremely Uncharacteristic to 6 – Extremely Characteristic. 
 
1. I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions. 
2. I know immediately when my mouth or throat goes dry. 
3. I can often feel my heart beating. 
4. I am quick to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach. 
5. I’m very aware of changes in my body temperature. 
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Appendix F 
Study 3 Measures 
Ecologically Conscious Consumer Behavior (Roberts, 1996) 
1 – Never True to 5 – Always True. 
 
1. When there is a choice, I always choose the product that contributes to the 
least amount of environmental damage. 
2. I have switched products for environmental reasons 
3. If I understand the potential damage to the environment that some products 
can cause, I do not purchase those products. 
4. I do not buy household products that harm the environment. 
5. Whenever possible, I buy products packaged in reusable or recyclable 
containers. 
6. I make every effort to buy paper products (toilet paper, tissues, etc.) made 
from recycled paper. 
7. I will not buy a product if I know that the company that sells it is 
environmentally irresponsible. 
8. I have paid more for environmentally friendly products when there is a 
cheaper alternative. 
Purchase Decision Factors 
1 – Not at all Important to 5 – Extremely Important. 
 
1. Running Costs (Fuel economy, tax, insurance etc.). 
2. Design (e.g. Shape, colour, model etc.). 
3. Price. 
4. Performance (e.g. Engine size, power, top speed etc.). 
5. Practicality (e.g. Number of seats, number of doors, trunk space etc.). 
6. Environmental Considerations (e.g. CO2 emissions). 
7. Reliability. 
8. Engineering. 
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Personal Control (Coombs & Holladay, 2004) 
1 – Strongly Disagree to 9 – Strongly Agree. 
 
1. The cause of the scandal was something that Volkswagen could control. 
2. The cause of the scandal is something over which Volkswagen had no power 
(r). 
3. The cause of the scandal is something that was manageable by Volkswagen. 
4. The cause of the scandal is something over which Volkswagen had power. 
Organizational Trustworthiness Beliefs 
1 – Strongly Disagree to 5 – Strongly Agree. 
 
1. I believe that Volkswagen would act in my best interest. 
2. Volkswagen is interested in my well-being, not just its own. 
3. Volkswagen is truthful in its dealings with stakeholders. 
4. Volkswagen would keep its commitments. 
5. I would characterise Volkswagen as honest. 
6. Volkswagen is sincere and genuine. 
7. Volkswagen is a competent and effective car manufacturer. 
8. Volkswagen performs its role as a car manufacturer very well. 
Willingness to Trust 
1 – Not at all Willing to 5 – Extremely Willing. 
 
1. To rely on Volkswagen to fix any issues with a vehicle in a manner that 
would not cost you financially? 
2. To buy a Volkswagen model next time you are in the market for a new car? 
3. To recommend a Volkswagen vehicle to a family member, friend, colleague 
or associate? 
4. To collaborate with Volkswagen to provide favourable testimony for the 
company in relation to PR, advertising or marketing activities? 
5. To rely on Volkswagen to fix any issues with a vehicle in a manner that 
would not be detrimental to its performance? 
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6. To rely on Volkswagen to fix any issues with a vehicle in a timely manner? 
7. To rely solely on Volkswagen's assertion that any fix applied to a vehicle 
affected by the Emissions Scandal is appropriate without the need for confirmation 
from an external party (such as a regulator or government agency)? 
8. To participate in a class action lawsuit against Volkswagen? (r) 
Distrusting Acts 
1 – No to 2 Yes. 
 
1. Altered your plans related to selling or trading in your vehicle? 
2. Made a complaint to Volkswagen? 
3. Made a complaint about Volkswagen (e.g. via word of mouth, on social 
media, via an internet forum etc.)? 
4. Altered your plans relating to attending a Volkswagen-sponsored or -
themed event (e.g. decided not to attend an event that you originally 
planned to attend)? 
5. Made a conscious decision to use your vehicle less than you usually would? 
6. Actively discouraged a family member, friend, colleague or associate in the 
market for a new car from purchasing a Volkswagen vehicle? 
  
Transcript of Trust Repair Manipulation Video Used in Studies 1 and 2 
304 
 
Appendix G 
Transcript of Trust Repair Manipulation Video Used in Studies 1 and 2 
JS: “Richard Bowker, what does the company think happened?” 
RB: “Well the first thing I think we must say is that our condolences do go to the 
families that have lost loved ones today, and to those who are still very poorly 
in hospital. That’s been our top priority today, as it has been the emergency 
service, that’s the focus. As to what happened, we are cooperating with the 
police, we’re working with everybody to find out what did happen, ‘cos it’s 
important we find out.” 
JS: “Just to go through a couple of priorities, I mean, contract drivers… how much do 
you really know about them?” 
RB: “We know a great deal. The way National Express operates, quite a lot of our 
coaches are provided to us by firms. They’re all very reputable firms; their 
drivers have to have the very same high, exacting standards and licences that 
our own do. They’re tested, they’re checked, so we require of our contractors 
the same standards we require of ourselves.” 
JS: “How many hours are they allowed to drive and would there have been pressure 
on him to deliver the vehicle to wherever his changeover occurred by a certain 
time?” 
RB: “There are restrictions on the number of hours they can drive. It depends, but there 
are quite tight limits. They’re prescribed, and every vehicle is fitted with what 
is called a tachograph which is an electronic system which checks the number 
of hours they drive… 
JS: “Are you pushing him to keep to time?” 
RB: “No…” 
JS: “… I mean, if he had a baggage delay at Heathrow would he have felt a tremendous 
pressure to get moving?” 
RB: “No driver should drive in a manner that is inconsistent with safe driving, and that 
is part of our ethos and is no different for this coach and for any other.” 
JS: “Now we do know that he did ask everybody to wear their seatbelts, but people 
presumably don’t have to wear them?” 
Transcript of Trust Repair Manipulation Video Used in Studies 1 and 2 
305 
 
RB: “Well they’re required by law to. What we do, as you said right at the beginning 
of the programme, we either have to tell them, or display a sign prominently, 
or put a safety card in place. We do all three, and we believe that’s what was 
happening here. There was an announcement, but it is down to then the 
passenger to wear their seatbelt.” 
JS: “Can you tell whether everyone did have seatbelts on, and indeed, what about kids? 
Should they not be compelled to have seatbelts on?” 
RB: “Well we can’t tell at this stage who did and who didn’t, and that is again 
something that perhaps could be looked at in the investigation. Children under 
14 do not have to wear seatbelts under the current legislation, and we’re going 
to look at that, and again we’ve already started that process.” 
JS: “It’s a surprise, I think, to some people, that a high-sided bus like this makes that 
huge journey to Scotland. That’s standard, is it?” 
RB: “These vehicles are designed to be stable. They are stable vehicles, they’ve been 
round for a long time. There’s a lot of engineering gone in to do that, and they 
do do these long journeys, and they’re designed to be able to do that. What we 
have done today, though, and I say this as a precautionary, not a presumption 
of anything, we have taken all of the vehicles today, the twelve double-deckers 
that we have, out of service. With the manufacturer’s team of engineers, we are 
checking them, that is because safety is top priority for us and we’re just going 
to make absolutely sure. But that’s a precaution, not a presumption of 
anything.” 
JS: “One last question. We wouldn’t lead on a story like this were it not so 
extraordinarily unusual?” 
RB: “It is extraordinarily unusual, we have had no incident like this in National 
Express, ever, and as you said, coach travel is the safest form of travel on the 
roads. It’s amongst the safest forms of travel at all, but what we will do with 
this; we’ve got to find out what happened so we can take appropriate action.” 
JS: “Richard Bowker, thank you very much indeed for coming in.” 
 
JS = Jon Snow, Channel 4 News anchor. 
RB = Richard Bowker, National Express CEO 
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Appendix H 
Transcript of Study 3 Trust Repair Manipulation Video 1 
“I’d like to talk about how we get from where we are now, to that goal. First, 
we are conducting investigations on a worldwide scale as to how these matters could 
have happened. Responsible parties will be identified and held accountable. Thorough 
investigations have already begun, but any information development at this stage is 
preliminary. We ask for your understanding as we complete this work. 
Second, it’s important for the public to know, that, as the EPA has said, these 
vehicles do not present a safety hazard and remain safe and legal to drive.  
Third, technical teams are working tirelessly to develop remedies for each of 
the affected group of vehicles. These solutions will be tested and validated, and then 
shared with the responsible authorities for approval. The three groups of vehicles 
involved, each containing one of the three generations of the two litre diesel engines. 
Each will require a different remedy, but these remedies can only be our first step to 
our customers.  
Fourth, we will examine our compliance processes and standards at 
Volkswagen, and conduct measures to make sure something like this cannot happen 
again. 
Fifth, we commit to regular and open communication with our customers, 
dealers, employees, and the public as we move forward. And as first steps we have set 
up a designated service line, website, microsite, to be a channel for this 
communication, and I have sent a personal letter to every affected customer. 
I can offer today this outline of a path forward towards the goal of making 
things right. Nevertheless, Volkswagen knows that we will be judged not be our words, 
but clearly by our actions over the coming weeks and months. These events are 
fundamentally contrary to Volkswagen’s core principles of proving value to our 
customers, innovation and responsibility to our communities, and to our environment. 
They do not reflect the company that I know, and to which I have dedicated 25 years 
of my life. It’s inconsistent that this company involved in this emissions issue is also 
a company that had invested in environmental efforts to reduce the carbon footprint in 
our factories around the world, where out plant in Tennessee is the best factory in this 
respect.  
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In closing, again, I apologise on behalf of everyone at Volkswagen. We will 
fully cooperate with the responsible authorities. We will find remedies for our 
customers, and we will work to ensure that this will never happen again. Thank you 
again for allowing me to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. Thank 
you.” 
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Appendix I 
Transcript of Study 3 Trust Repair Manipulation Video 2 
“Coming towards October, now, we provided every dealer around the US with 
a discretionary fund. With a discretionary fund which was explained to them through 
the district managers, sales operations managers, and which was wired to the dealers 
on October 1st. I don’t want to call out the number, but, erm, it’s a significant amount 
of money in order for them to have flexibility. So no accountability towards us, 
flexibility to solve the most urgent customer cases, or to invest, or to put the money 
where they think it would be fit. And now, you know, when I come out of this 
congressional hearing, on Friday we look at the next programmes in order how can we 
help the dealers with the cash flow of their cars, of their cash position, because one 
thing is very, very clear, and I’m damn sincere about this, the dealer profitability in 
this county is my first objective. I said this on January 1st and I continue to say this. So 
this is one part. Also on Friday we look very intensively to the customer remedies, and 
what we need to do for the customers. And there will be the first scenarios on the 
table.” 
 
